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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the effects of institutional investors and board of director (BOD) 
characteristics on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) of Public Listed Companies (PLCs) 
in Nigeria. This study is motivated by the lack of empirical studies in Nigeria concerning the 
role of different institutional investors and BOD on CSR. 
More specifically, this study uses multi-method approaches: firstly, the case study method 
involving in-depth interviews, documentary data followed by postal survey. Secondly, the 
Pooled Ordinary Least Square, random effect and fixed effect estimators were used to 
estimate the balanced panel of 174 PLCs from 2003 to 2009. The study finds no significant 
relationship between different types of institutional investors and CSR. Also, while the Non-
Executive Directors (NEDs) and board size show a positive relationship with CSR, the 
executive directors and board diversity show a negative and significant relationship with 
CSR. 
This thesis not only contributes to the understanding of how BOD characteristics and how the 
UROH RI LQVWLWXWLRQDO LQYHVWRUV¶ DIIHFW &65 EXW LW DOVR ILOOV WKH JDS LQ WKH PHWKRGRORJLHV
employed in the corporate governance and CSR studies in Nigeria. This is useful for an 
emerging market economy like Nigeria in areas of policy making and for companies to 
improve on their CSR practices in host communities. 
In addition, the study reveals the absence of the role of institutional investors and BOD 
characteristics in strengthening the corporate governance mechanism in developing countries 
and the significance of filling the gap by supporting the formation of the ethical code of 
conduct and business standard for best practices. Secondly, the study reveals that CSR in 
developing countries are strategic in nature and linked to the corporate philosophies of 
companies.  The implications of this study are that the interest of the managers should be 
aligned to the stakeholder interest; this is to ensure the long term survival of the company and 
to create a win-win situation between the company and community. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This study focuses on Nigeria and the role of different institutional investors1 (such as 
indigenous, foreign and government) and the board of director (BOD) characteristics (for 
instance, board composition, board size and board diversity) on Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) of Public Listed Companies (PLCs) from 2003 to 2009. 
The role of business in society2 has placed more pressure on companies to become more 
accountable to stakeholders3 (Aras and Crowther, 2008a; Aras and Crowther, 2008b; Aras and 
Crowther 2009; Benson et al, 2009; Sandberg, 2011; Jia and Zhang, 2011; Wang et al, 2011; 
Cox and Wicks, 2011; Peloza and Shang, 2011; Hung, 2011; Bingham et al, 2011). This 
development has made the BOD make strategic decisions and policies. These policies help to 
JXDUDQWHH FRPSDQLHV¶ VXUYLYDO LQ D FRPSHWLWLYH JOREDO PDUNHW WKDW GHPDQGV EHWWHU ILQDQFLDO
performance (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Waddock and Graves, 1997), and satisfaction of 
stakeholders (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002; Mahoney and Thorn, 2006, Wahba, 2010). 
In this chapter, a brief description of the research problem, research objectives, research 
questions, methodology and justification of study are presented. The chapter also provides the 
contribution and originality of the study followed by the structure of the thesis. 
                                                 
1
 The institutional investors refer to the large investors that own shares of more than 5% shareholding (Cox et al, 
2004), whereas the diffuse investors (small investors) own share of 5% less.  Examples of institutional investors 
include Banks, Insurance, Pension Funds, and Mutual Fund companies. In Nigeria, Banks and Insurance companies 
are the common institutional investors (Ojo, 2009), while the Pension Funds and Mutual Funds companies are more 
common in the US and UK (Aguilera et al, 2006; Petersen and Vredenburg, 2009a; Wahba, 2010). In Nigeria, the 
LQVWLWXWLRQDO LQYHVWRUV¶ IXQGV DUH YDOXHG DW  ELOOLRQ 1DLUD DSSUR[LPDWHO\  PLOOLRQ ZLWK  ELOOLRQ
Naira (approximately £599.2 million) invested in the Nigerian Stock Market (SEC, Fourth Quarter Magazine, 
2008). 
2For the purposes of convenience this research study uses society or human society to mean community representing 
a group of people related to each other through culture, language and same geographical territory (Carroll and 
Buchholtz, 2009; www.wikipedia.org/society accessed on 31/10/2010). 
3
 The stakeholders¶ group includes shareholders, employee, suppliers, government, consumers, communities and 
environment (Freeman, 1984; Rugman and Verbeke, 1998 and Heslin and Ochoa, 2008). 
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1.1 Research Problem 
The global market recently witnessed the emergence of other stakeholder groups namely, the 
institutional investors and the BODs. Whilst the institutional investors are involved in 
monitoring of the board activities (Waddock and Graves, 1997), the BOD formulate rules and 
policies that govern the company (Baysinger and Butler, 1985). The institutional investors 
include the pension funds, investment banks, insurance companies, private firms and mutual 
funds (Graves and Waddock, 1994; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Cox et al, 2004). Also, the 
BODs formulate rules and strategies including CSR policies (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; 
Coffey and Wang, 1998; Brunninge et al, 2007).  
The institutional investors and BODs have come under increased pressure from both the global 
market and multitude of stakeholders (particularly government, investors, Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs), media and public), to make companies more accountable and sustainable 
(Aguilera et al, 2006). These developments have placed the institutional investors and BODs in a 
very difficult position, such as making risk-return trade-offs among the different stakeholders. 
That is selecting investment in environmental or social issues for the good of public and image 
of the company as against profit maximisation for shareholders. By doing this, their goal is to 
PDNHFRPSDQLHVQRWRQO\ WRSURVSHUSURILWDEO\ EXW WREH UHVSRQVLYH WR VWDNHKROGHUV¶GHPDQG
and their satisfaction. One of the ways of doing this is through monitoring and ensuring that 
BOD makes strategic corporate decisions. For example, when directors and management use 
CSR as a tool for improving corporate reputation and competitive advantage for the company, 
while at the same time, the investors perceive CSR as beneficial. By incorporating CSR in 
selecting social responsibility investment companies, as one of their investment portfolio options 
(Mallin, 2004). Brammer and Pavelin (2006) in their study of CSR and reputation, note that 
reputation effect of companies is associated with CSR. 
Chapter 1  Introduction 
3 
This makes the institutional investors not only interested in the corporate decision as mentioned 
above, such as strategies and financial performance of the company (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; 
1993; Cox et al, 2004), but in corporate control of the company, especially when results fall 
below expectations (Waddock and Graves, 1990). The reason for this is because, according to 
Mallin (2004) the investments of institutional investors are so large that exit strategies become 
difficult compared to dispersed (small) investors.  
Unlike the institutional investors that find exiting from the company difficult, because of their 
large investments, the small investors sell their shares once they perceive the companies are not 
performing. As a result, the institutional investors are beginning to widen their interests, by 
focusing on the long term performance of the company (Li and Zhang, 2010). By doing this, 
they concentrate on satisfying their stakeholders. According to Turban and Greening (1997) the 
institutional investors derive the long term benefit of product quality, low risk and employee 
satisfaction by supporting good environmental practices and community developments. 
Recently, the role of BOD in CSR has raised concerns due to CSR breaches4 by PLCs (Mitchell, 
2007; Tuodolo, 2008). This CSR breaches is as a result of the design of CSR policies and 
structures (Mackenzie, 2007), and CSR implementations (Webb, 2004; Idemudia, 2009). For 
example, one of the CSR policies is the Code of directorships, while CSR structures include the 
Code of Ethics and Business Standards5 formulated by BOD. These CSR issues have led many 
authors to point out the need to examine the role of BODs and investors in CSR (Dulewicz and 
Herbert; 1999; Ibrahim et al, 2003; Webb, 2004; Aguilera et al, 2006; Hung, 2011). 
                                                 
4The breach in CSR practices includes oil spillage, gas flaring and environmental degradation in Nigeria (Oyefusi, 
2007a; Ehikioya, 2009; Idemudia, 2009). 
5The Code of Ethics and Business Standards consists of ethics policy ± that is complying with all government laws, 
rules, regulations and the local customs and tradition of the people; corporate assets policy ± maintain and protect 
FRUSRUDWH UHVRXUFHV DQG XVH LW HIILFLHQWO\ WR DGYDQFH FRPSDQLHV¶ LQWHUHVW FRQIlict of interest policy ± conflict 
EHWZHHQSHUVRQDO LQWHUHVWDQGFRUSRUDWLRQ¶V LQWHUHVWDQGGLUHFWRUVKLSVSROLF\7KHVHSROLFLHVDUH IRU WKHGLUHFWRUV
executive officers, and other employees. 
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In essence, this study seeks to examine CSR practices from the context of the role of institutional 
investors and board characteristics. In other words, this research will explore the role of BOD 
and investors in the design and implementation of CSR, thereby providing an insight into how 
companies govern themselves in the global market environment. Also, this will increase 
understanding and knowledge on how corporate bodies interact with their stakeholders. This is 
because of their important role in strengthening the corporate governance mechanism in PLC, 
such as, monitoring managerial opportunism6 (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Rediker and Seth, 1995). Consequently, CSR structures and implementations are 
improved which ultimately enable companies to reduce CSR breaches (Webb, 2004). Therefore, 
this study attempts to fill the gap in management literature by identifying as well as analysing 
the role of investors and BODs in CSR. 
Moreover, the lack of corporate governance and CSR in developing countries has been widely 
mentioned (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Amaeshi et al, 2006). Shleifer and Vishny (1993), and 
Monks and Minow (2004) argue that there is a considerable lack of corporate governance and 
CSR literatures in developing countries, most especially in the areas of the role of institutional 
investors and board characteristics. This lack of research in areas of corporate governance and 
CSR in developing countries further reinforces the need to investigate the role of institutional 
investors and BOD in CSR (Andayani et al, 2008). 
To begin with, most of the previous studies on the effects of different institutional investors and 
BOD characteristics on CSR concentrate on developed countries (Guyatt, 2005, Hendry et al, 
2006, Petersen and Vredenburg, 2009a and Marshall et al, 2009). To our best literature review, 
however, institutional investors influence on CSR practices in developing countries, including 
Nigeria remains unknown (Eskeland and Harrision, 2003; Sanda et al, 2005; Cole et al, 2008). 
                                                 
6Managerial opportunism refers to when corporate managers become self serving, individualistic and opportunistic 
rather than serving the interest of shareholders (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993; Williamson, 1993). 
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At present, there is no study on the effects of different institutional investors and BOD 
characteristics on CSR in Nigeria. 
Initially, most studies assume different institutional investors are homogenous or aggregated in 
nature (Goergen and Ronneboog, 2002) and thus have similar preferences for CSR. Contrary to 
this assumption, empirical studies have shown that institutional investors are not only 
heterogeneous in nature but have differing preferences for CSR (Johnson and Greening, 1999; 
Rasic, 2010). For instance, some institutional investors are long term or short term in nature, 
while others are large or small investors. These different investors do show differing preferences 
for CSR, Johnson and Greening (1999) find that long term institutional investors support CSR, 
while short term institutional investors do not support CSR. This applies to the directors too, 
such as the non-executive directors (NEDs) support CSR while the executive directors and 
female directors do not (Pfeffer, 1973; Werbel and Carter, 2002; Dunn and Sainty, 2009). 
Several studies find a positive relationship between institutional investors and CSR (Graves and 
Waddock, 1994; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Neubaum and Zahra, 2006). While other results 
are inconclusive or neutral (Abbott and Monsen, 1979; Arlow and Gannon, 1982; Ullman, 1985; 
McWilliams and Siegel, 2000), some findings show a negative relationship between institutional 
investors and CSR (Vance, 1975). Therefore, these inconsistencies surrounding different 
institutional investors have been intriguing. Hence, the effect of different institutional investors 
and BOD characteristics on CSR becomes an open question? As a result, this study will argue 
that different institutional investors and BOD characteristics have an impact on CSR. In the long 
run, this impact will enhance the relationships between the organisations and the communities 
(Webb, 2006). To be able to determine this important role and relationship, a set of research 
questions, hypotheses and questions emerged from the research aims and objectives, which 
inform the multi-method approach adopted in this study.  
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Past studies on the role of BOD composition7 on CSR are also mixed and sometimes 
inconclusive (such as, Wang and Coffey, 1992; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Werbel and Carter, 
2002; Dunn and Sainty, 2009; Kruger, 2010).Ibrahim et al (2003) and Rodriguez-Dominguez et 
al (2009) find no significant relationship between NED and CSR. In contrast, Coffey and Wang 
(1998) and Johnson and Greening (1999) find the inclusions of NED in BOD to be positively 
related to CSR. Thus, Johnson and Greening (1999) suggest that the NED bring their skills, 
connections and contacts to the board. By doing this, they encourage the long-term survival of 
the corporation by enhancing product quality and good environmental practices with the aim of 
satisfying a wider group of stakeholders. As a result, the NED can help develop policies and 
strategies for the corporations to solve the environmental issues and challenges (Pfeffer, 1972). 
Therefore, the effect of BOD characteristics on CSR becomes an open question in developing 
countries like Nigeria. For example, how the BOD involvement in CSR policies enhances 
company performance? Hence, one of the aims of this study is to provide a more integrated 
BOD stakeholder view (Bingham et al, 2011) and to offer additional evidence to help reconcile 
these diverse findings concerning the role of BOD in CSR. 
Several methods have been employed in the study of the effects of different institutional 
investors and BOD characteristics on CSR. While some authors use the econometric method 
(Johnson and Greening, 1999; Neubaum and Zahra, 2006; Rasic, 2010), others employ the case 
study method (Hendry et al, 2006; Petersen and Vredenburg, 2009a; 2009b). Petersen and 
Vredenburg (2009a) argue that despite the use of positivist approach by previous researchers in 
determining the link between institutional investors and CSR, the mixed and inconclusive results 
still persist. In fact, the authors emphasised the use of other methods, for instance, the interview 
method.   
                                                 
7The board composition refers to the total number of executive directors and non-executive directors present in the 
board (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). 
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Nonetheless, the econometric and positivist approach do provide correlation between the 
investors and CSR, though it lacks in-depth understanding (Petersen and Vredenburg, 2009a). 
To resolve it, this research would in addition to adopting the positivist approach, employ the 
case study method, to examine the relationships between the types of institutional investors and 
CSR in Nigeria. The case study method provides depth and robust explanations, concerning the 
behaviours and perceptions of investors and directors and how they influence CSR. Moreover, 
WKLV ZLOO LQFUHDVH WKH XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI µKRZ¶ DQG µZK\¶ CSR and institutional investors are 
UHODWHG 3HWHUVHQ DQG 9UHGHQEXUJ D DUJXH WKDW WKH DQVZHU WR WKH µZK\¶ TXHVWLRQ might 
come from investigating the perceptions of institutional investors on CSR. They explain that by 
exploring the investment decisions of institutional investors, the reasons behind the role of 
institutional investors in CSR might be achieved.  
More importantly, there are several methodological or empirical inconsistencies that are of real 
concern to researchers in examining the relationship between institutional investors, BOD 
characteristics and CSR - See the multi-dimensional structure of CSR, section 2.5 (Aupperle et 
al, 1985, Waddock and Graves, 1990; Johnson and Greening, 1999, Neubaum and Zahra, 2006; 
Chai, 2010). However, the role of institutional investors in CSR has been questioned by several 
authors because of the mixed and inconclusive findings (Graves and Waddock, 1994; Johnson 
and Greening, 1999; Bartkus et al, 2002 and Neubaum and Zahra, 2006; Chai, 2010). According 
to Chai (2010) previous research concerning types of institutional investors and CSR suffer from 
sampling and methodological error as a result of accounting disclosures in CSR practices. 
Consequently, results from rigorous and robust empirical analysis based on reliable longitudinal 
and cross sectional data are limited. 
These mixed findings could be as a result of how CSR is defined (Carroll 1999), see section 2.2 
for details. For example, Carroll (1979) defined CSR based on social issues using four principles 
such as economic, ethical, legal and philanthropy responsibilities, while others (such as, Agle et 
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al,  GHILQHG &65 EDVHG RQ VWDNHKROGHUV¶management. In fact, some authors adopted a 
more strategic approach in defining CSR (Wood, 1991; Wartick and Cochran, 1985 and 
Yongqiang, 2008; 2009) - see section 2.2 for concept of CSR. These inconsistencies in CSR 
GHILQLWLRQDUHGXHWRWKHZRUG³VRFLDO´UHVXOWLQJ in various CSR measures (Carroll, 1999). While 
some authors use social issues to measure CSR (such as environment, employee relations and 
SKLODQWKURS\RU&DUUROO¶VHFRQRPLFHWKLFDOOHJDODQGSKLODQWKURS\UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV,EUDKLPet 
al, 2003). Others use stakeholders such as shareholders, employee relations, environment, and 
consumer satisfaction as a proxy for CSR measurement (Agle et al, 1999). Subsequently, these 
different CSR measures result in errors and lack of adequate control variables (See section 2.5 
and 4.6), sampling method, research design and estimation methods (Waddock and Graves, 
1997). Therefore, this is one of the aims and objectives of this study. The thesis will attempt to 
reduce the specification biases and inconsistencies, by investigating the effect of institutional 
investors and BOD characteristics on CSR using multi-methods approaches and carrying out 
diagnostic tests. These tests are aimed at producing consistent results that are reliable and valid, 
especially in economically vibrant and developing society. 
Whilst most of the past studies adopted the positivist approach (quantitative), others employ the 
realism approach (case study) in providing understanding about the impact of institutional 
investors and BOD characteristics on CSR, hence, this study argues for a pragmatic approach, by 
combining the positivist and realism approaches, with the aim of providing a more robust, valid, 
reliable and replicable findings.  
1.2 Focus on Nigeria 
This thesis focuses on the corporate sector in Nigeria because the first Code of Corporate 
Governance was established in 2003 and later revised in 2009. This undoubtedly increased the 
transparency and accountability of PLCs to their stakeholders. The Code of Corporate 
*RYHUQDQFHH[SHFWV3/&VWREHVWDNHKROGHUV¶RULHQWHGLQDSSURDFKUDWKHUWKDQIRFXVLQJ
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RQ VKDUHKROGHUV¶ LQWHUHVW DORQH 7KH &RGH RI &RUSRUDWH *RYHUQDQFH  emphasises 
VXVWDLQDELOLW\ UHSRUWLQJ IURP3/&VE\VWDWLQJ WKDW«« every company should report at least 
annually on the nature and extent of its social, ethical, safety, health and environmental 
management policies and practices (Code of Corporate Governance, 2009:80). By establishing 
this, the CSR activities of PLCs were expected to increase. Despite, the awareness of the Code 
of Corporate Governance in Nigeria (2009) and the sustainability reporting criteria mentioned 
above, the CSR practices among PLCs in Nigeria are still philanthropic in nature characterised 
by cash donations and charities (Amaeshi et al, 2006; Helg, 2007). According to Amaeshi et al 
(2006) the CSR activities in Nigeria are influenced by the culture of the people which is mostly 
social cohesiveness, togetherness, sharing and communal in nature. However, the downside of 
these CSR activities is the high incidence of CSR breaches among companies operating in the 
country that have led to environmental degradation (Oyefusi, 2007b). 
Recently, the activities of the corporations have been called into question by pressure groups 
such as, the media and NGO because of the breaches in CSR practices. These CSR breaches 
include oil spillage, gas flaring, dumping of toxic wastes in rivers and environmental 
degradation in Nigeria (Oyefusi, 2007a; Ehikioya, 2009 and Idemudia, 2009). These problems 
have affected the sources of livelihood of the communities mainly farming and fishing (Bisina, 
2005). Consequently, several groups such as the international organisations and media 
corporations have pressured the government and corporations to resolve these CSR issues. As a 
result, companies need to reshape and increase their CSR practices in Nigeria. For instance, 
companies can redefine CSR to be in line with their corporate philosophies. Again, this increase 
the need to investigate the role of BOD in CSR practices in the country (Eweje, 2006 and 
Oyefusi, 2007a). Therefore, the central theme of this thesis relates to the role and perceptions of 
institutional investors and directors in CSR activities and what factors influence them to engage 
in CSR, thus reducing the CSR breaches and ultimately creating a win-win situation between the 
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business and community. This means that while, the business organisations improve their 
financial performance because of low cost associated with CSR practices (low tax or clean 
environment), the community benefits from the CSR practices through the provision of school 
blocks, hospital equipment, drugs and waste management tools. 
In classifying the industries, the LPSDFWRIWKHRLOLQGXVWULHV¶RSHUDWLRQVDQGWKHLUSHUIRUPDQFHRQ
the environment are taken into consideration. Recently, most oil companies have come under 
intense scrutiny by NGOs and the media, such as the ExxonMobil, Total and Chevron. Also, 
taken into consideration is the contribution of the oil sector to the economy. The role of 
Multinational Corporation (MNC) in developing country differs from company to company 
(Poynter, 1982). These MNCs are regarded as the economic life wire of the stock exchange and 
economy. The importance of MNCs to the Nigerian economy was articulated by Poynter (1982) 
and Ogwumike and Ogunleye (2008).  The authors both agreed that the presence of MNCs in 
Nigeria contributed to economy in the form of higher employment, technology transfer, and 
increased social responsibility awareness, payment of taxes, dividend and higher wages when 
compared to the local companies. 
2LODVDQDWXUDOUHVRXUFHFRQWULEXWHVSHUFHQWRIWKH1LJHULD¶V*URVV'RPHVWLF3URGuct (GDP). 
The MNCs through their operations can cause harm to the environment. For example, the oil 
spillage, gas flaring, and dumping of toxic wastes in rivers are serious environmental and social 
issues common with the oil MNCs.  In order to capture these impacts, the NSE classification of 
listed industries (See appendix E) are adopted in this study. In addition, industry effects are 
captured by classifying the various industries into three groups (Section 4.6.3.6). These 
companies are classified based oQ WKH *'3¶V FRQWULEXWLRQ WR WKH 1LJHULDQ HFRQRP\ WKDW LV
extractive oil companies, which contributes more to the GDP is coded as (1), while the 
remaining 174 PLCs is grouped as other sectors and coded as (0) (Perrini et al,2007).  
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In addition, the justifLFDWLRQRIWKHVWXG\LVEDVHGRQWKHLQFUHDVHGDZDUHQHVVRIFRPSDQLHV¶&65
activities in Africa, with particular emphasis on Nigeria. There has been increased expectation 
that companies should be socially responsible in their business operations (Webb, 2004). In this 
regard, companies are required to adhere to high ethical standards for society to confer 
legitimacy on them, avoid damaging the environment and produce high quality and 
environmentally friendly products (Ameashi et al, 2006; Helg, 2007; Amao and Amaeshi, 2008). 
One of the important ways a company can achieve this high ethical standards is to ensure that 
CSR is strategic. This study also tends to explore if institutional investors and directors support 
strategic CSR on PLCs as a way of not only enhancing CSR practices but the corporate 
governance structure of the firm. 
1.3 Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this study is to determine the impact of different institutional investors (indigenous, 
foreign and government) and the BOD characteristics (non-executive director, executive 
director, board size and board diversity) on CSR in Nigeria. Furthermore, the objectives of this 
study are as follows:  
x To investigate and identify the effect of the indigenous institutional investors, foreign 
institutional investors and government institutional investors on CSR.  
x To investigate and identify the effect of the non-executive directors, executive directors, 
board size, board composition and board diversity on CSR.  
x To reduce the specification biases and inconsistencies in variables revealed in previous 
studies.  
x To determine the factors that influences the institutional investors and BOD decisions to 
invest in CSR in Nigeria.  
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7KLVVWXG\¶VDLPVDQGREMHFWLYHVFRQFHUQLQJWKHFRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFHDQG&65DERYHGULYHWhe 
research methodology. 
1.4 Methodology 
This research is designed to use the multi-methods approach, that is, the case study and 
econometric statistical method. The statistical analysis examines the impact of the different 
institutional investors and BOD characteristics on CSR of PLCs in Nigeria. This statistical 
analysis involves the use of balanced panel of 174 PLCs from 2003 to 2009. It involves the use 
of Pooled Cross Sectional, Fixed Effect and Random Effect Estimators to test the specific effects 
of different institutional investors, and BOD characteristics on CSR. The institutional investors 
and BOD data are obtained from the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) fact book and 
complemented with postal survey. Based on the above research aims and objectives of this 
study, the following hypotheses are formulated for the statistical analyses. 
1.4.1 Hypothesis Formation 
The stakeholder theory suggests that satisfying all stakeholders can lead to good corporate 
image, high employee morale, reduction in implicit cost leading to competitive advantage and 
high financial performance (Freeman, 1984; Turban and Griffin, 1997; Johnson and Greening, 
1999). The Stakeholder Theory identifies support for a positive relationship between institutional 
investors and CSR (Waddock and Graves, 1997; McGuire et al, 1988). Research carried out by 
Waddock and Graves (1997), Johnson and Greening (1999), and Neubaum and Zahra (2006) 
findings support the positive relationship between the institutional investors and CSR. The 
authors, in their study find a positive and significant relationship between long term institutional 
investors and CSR.  
Specifically, several authors investigating the heterogeneous nature of institutional investors, 
find a positive relationship between foreign institutional investors and CSR (Dasgupta et al, 
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2000 and Chai 2010), while, Nazli and Ghazali (2007) find a positive relationship between 
governments institutional investors and CSR practices. Others such as Earnhart and Lizal (1999) 
find a positive relationship between indigenous institutional investors and CSR. Based on the 
Stakeholder Theory and empirical findings, the following hypothesis is proposed.  
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between foreign, indigenous and government 
institutional investors and CSR practice by the PLCs in Nigeria. 
The stakeholder, stewardship and resource dependence theories support larger board size by 
suggesting that an increase in board size helps the firm to connect to its environment and hence 
CSR (Pfeffer, 1972; Goodstein et al, 1994). Pfeffer (1973) finds a positive relationship between 
board size and CSR. Similarly, Slater and Dixon-Fowler (2009) find a positive and statistically 
VLJQLILFDQWUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ&(2¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDODVVLJQPHQWH[SHULHQFH8 and CSR. 
Other previous empirical studies support the presence of NED on the board (Coffey and Wang, 
1998; Johnson and Greening, 1999). Johnson and Greening (1999) find the inclusion of NED on 
board to be positively related to CSR. Furthermore, the inclusion of women, ethnic minorities 
and directors of different racial background into the BOD are positively related to CSR practices 
(Coffey and Wang, 1998; Johnson and Greening, 1999). The stakeholder theory supports board 
diversity and suggests that the BOD is able to reach quick decisions concerning environmental 
issues when the BODs are diversified (Johnson and Greening, 1999). Also, ethnic minorities 
have more knowledge of their communities where the companies operate and may likely 
encourage the company to invest in CSR as a way of improving their relationship with the 
communities (Huse et al, 2009). Therefore, based on the stakeholder, resource dependence, 
stewardship theories and empirical findings, hypothesis 2 is proposed.  
                                                 
8The CEO international assignment experience is the experience of working and living in a foreign country (Slater 
and Dixon-Fowler, 2009). 
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Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between NEDs, executive directors, board size, 
board diversity and CSR practice by the PLCs in Nigeria. 
Given the lack of depth in the statistical analyses (Petersen and Vredenburg, 2009a); the case 
study approach is also adopted to complement the econometric/statistical method. In this study, 
the case study method provides depth and understanding of the perceptions and behavioural 
perspectives concerning what influences the institutional investors and BOD to engage in CSR 
in Nigeria. The case study approach involves four (4) PLCs namely Zenith Bank, Wema Bank, 
ExxonMobil, and Industrial and General Insurance (IGI) Company. The case study involves the 
use of the primary data (such as, in-depth interviews and survey questionnaires) and secondary 
daWD VXFK DV GRFXPHQWV IURP DQQXDO UHSRUWV ZHEVLWHV DQG FRUSRUDWH FLWL]HQV¶ UHSRUWV RI WKH
companies). Based on the above research aims and objectives of the study, the following 
research questions are formulated for the case study approach. 
1.4.2 Research Questions 
x What are the roles of the indigenous, foreign and government institutional investors on CSR?  
x What are the roles of the non-executive directors, executive directors, board size and board 
diversity on CSR? 
x What factors influence the indigenous, foreign and government institutional investors to 
engage in CSR in Nigeria? 
x What factors influence the board composition, board size and board diversity to engage in 
CSR in Nigeria? 
Moreover, the case study method uses eighteen (18) interviews and documentary analyses from 
ZHEVLWHV DQQXDO UHSRUWV DQG FRUSRUDWH FLWL]HQV¶ UHSRUWV RI FRPSDQLHV 7KLV PXOWL-method 
approach is employed in order to compensate for the lack of rigour and depth in using 
econometric analyses. Finally, this finding from the econometric methods is subjected to further 
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test by the use of case study method to provide depth to the study.  
1.5 Contribution of Study 
This study contributes to knowledge concerning the role of companies in society by 
investigating and providing understanding of how the role of institutional investors and BOD 
characteristics affects CSR. For example, this study finds different institutional investors 
(indigenous, foreign and government) do have little or no influence on CSR. For the BOD 
characteristics, the NED and board size do have a positive and significant relationship, while the 
executive and female directors reveal a negative and significant relationship. To our best 
knowledge, there is no study in the literature that investigates the effect of different institutional 
investors and BOD characteristics on CSR in PLCs in Nigeria.   
In addition, this research provides the opportunity for some theories such as the stakeholder, 
stewardship and resource dependence (see chapter 2) to be tested in Nigeria. The testing of the 
theories in the Nigerian context contributes to the body of knowledge for developing countries. 
The theories were able to provide a deeper understanding concerning the link between the role of 
institutional investors and BOD characteristics. Especially, how it affects CSR from the 
GHYHORSLQJ FRXQWULHV¶ SHUVSHFWLYHV FRQVLGHULQJ WKH IDFW WKDW PRVW :HVW $IULFDQ FRXQWULHV
(Ghana, Sierra Leone, Benin, Gambia just to name a few) share similar economic, social and 
political characteristics. For example, similar foreign institutional investors are common in all 
West African countries. These generalisations help to provide insight into CSR activities in some 
developing countries and hence contribute to the literature. 
This research uses multi-method approaches in Nigeria in determining the influence of different 
institutional investors and BOD characteristics on CSR in the country. Previous studies reveal 
WKHXVHRIPRVWO\TXDOLWDWLYHWHFKQLTXHLQ1LJHULD¶V&65VWXGLHVIRUH[DPSOHWKHXVHRIIRFXV
group and interview methods (Idemudia, 2007b; Rwabizambuga, 2007). The interview method 
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already experimented with Amaeshi et al (2006) and other corporate governance studies reveal 
the use of regression techniques such as, Ordinary Least Square (OLS) or multiple regressions 
(Sanda et al, 2010). This study broadens its research tool by combining quantitative and 
qualitative methods in Nigeria. While the interviews provide a better and deeper understanding 
of CSR through the richness, totality and fullness of the responses, the quantitative (secondary 
and survey questionnaires) enhance the generalisation, validity and reliability of findings. These 
multi-method approaches are illustrated in details in chapter four (4) and six (6). 
Moreover, in order to increase the reliability and validity of this study, the control variables are 
broadened to include several independent variables (such as company age, return on asset, 
earnings per share, company size, industry effects, debt and risk) that affect CSR. This provides 
a more robust approach of examining the role of institutional investors and directors in CSR 
activities. 
Thus, this thesis adds to the growing body of empirical studies in CSR investments, policies and 
implementations, thereby enhancing the comparability of the findings obtained in this research 
with other previous studies obtained from developed economies such as US, UK and Japan. 
These countries have more developed capital market, stable political systems and strong 
regulatory frameworks. 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis structure is divided into seven chapters. This is chapter 1, the introductory chapter. 
Chapter 2 looks at the literature review which focuses on the theories namely agency, 
stakeholder, resource dependence, stewardship, legitimacy and institutional. These theories are 
GLVFXVVHGXVLQJDJHQF\DQGVWDNHKROGHUV¶WKHRU\WRXQGHUVWDQGWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQGLIIHUHQW
institutional investors and BOD characteristics on CSR in Nigeria, which conflict with each 
other. Also, the critiquing of the theories using resource dependence, stewardship, legitimacy 
Chapter 1  Introduction 
17 
DQG LQVWLWXWLRQDO WKHRULHV DUH DGRSWHG DV DJHQF\ DQG VWDNHKROGHUV¶ WKHRULHV VRPHWLPHV WDNH
opposing viewpoints. 
Chapter 3 outlines and evaluates CSR in Nigeria. It shows that CSR in Nigeria is socially 
embedded and philanthropic in nature mainly characterise by donations and charitable activities 
(Amaeshi et al, 2006). In addition, the implementation of the corporate governance framework 
in Nigeria is discussed. It reveals the compliance to the Code of Corporate Governance (2003; 
2009). 
Chapter 4 explains the research methodology. The pragmatist research philosophy was adopted 
for this study. This involves use of the case study method and econometric methods, Pooled 
ordinary least square (OLS), Fixed and Random effect models, to estimate the impact of 
different institutional investors and BOD characteristics on CSR in Nigeria. Also, the multi-
sector case study and the sampling techniques are discussed. The mixed methods are selected to 
ensure robustness, validity and reliability of the study (Creswell, 2003).  
Chapter 5 presents the empirical findings for the statistical method. The Pooled OLS, random 
and fixed effect estimators are employed. The hypotheses are tested using the Pooled OLS, 
random and fixed effect estimators and these estimators are used to test Model 1 and 2.  
Chapter 6 focuses on the use of multi-sector case study approach to investigate the role of 
institutional investors and BOD characteristics on CSR of four PLCs. It also discusses the CSR 
indicators such as CSR and governance structure and how it determines the level of strategic 
CSR among the four (4) PLCs. This is done by exploring how companies align CSR practices to 
the vision, mission and values statements of the business philosophies of the PLCs.  
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Chapter 7 considers the contribution of this research as it runs to its conclusion. Furthermore, it 
highlights the recommendations for companies and proposes areas of future studies. In addition, 
the implications of research findings for managers and policy makers are also discussed.  
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CHAPTER 2 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the theories and previous empirical studies on the role of 
different institutional investors and board of director (BOD) characteristics on 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) of Public Listed Companies (PLCs). The body 
of evidence presented here underpinned the study in terms of the research objectives, 
hypotheses and motivation stated to investigate it. It is organised as follows: It 
discusses the various theories9 used to explain the relationship between different 
institutional investors, BOD characteristics and CSR. Also, discussed are the 
determinants of CSR and its multidimensional constructs. 
Several studies (such as, Petersen and Vredenburg, 2009a, 2009b; Wahba, 2010)  
tend to treat institutional investors as aggregated institutional investors, while others  
(see, Waddock and Graves, 1997, Johnson and Greening, 1999) suggest that the 
institutional investors are dual in nature comprising the long term and the short term 
investors. Others see it as homogenous entity, while some authors use large or 
disperse investors (for instance, Cox et al, 2008). However, few studies (Said et al, 
                                                 
9The agency theory produces conflicting arguments with the stakeholder theory predictions concerning 
the link between the role of institutional investors, BOD characteristics and CSR. To balance this 
conflicting viewpoint, four other theories (stewardship, resource dependence, legitimacy and 
institutional) are used in this study. 
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2009) distinguished the indigenous, foreign and government institutional investors as 
types of institutional investors. In terms of CSR, most studies are centred on either 
CSR disclosures (Said et al, 2009) or environmental performance (Wahba, 2010) and 
none are yet to examine the effect of indigenous, foreign and government institutional 
investors and BOD characteristics on CSR in Nigeria. As a consequence, this study 
tends to fill that gap. 
According to Aguilera et al (2006) institutional investors in developed countries 
(such as in US and UK) have shown more engagement in CSR because of the 
following factors. 1) Higher awareness of risk. 2) Risk management and 3) Ethical 
issues. Aguilera et al (2006) reiterated that not only do different institutional investors 
differ in their preferences for CSR practices within countries, but also differ between 
countries. As a result, the effects of differentinstitutional investors and BOD 
characteristics on CSR are country, firm or period specific (Consolandi et al, 2008; 
Prado-Lorenzo et al, 2010; Ghahroudi et al, 2010). Few studies focus on emerging 
economies (Li and Zhang, 2010). However, none of the previous studies examined 
the effect of types of institutional investors and BOD characteristics on CSR in 
Nigeria. Hence, the next section discusses the concept of CSR followed by its link to 
corporate governance. 
2.2 The Concept of Corporate Social Responsibility 
Carroll (1979: 500) defined CSR as: «HQFRPSDVVLQJWKHHFRQRPLFOHJDOHWKLFDODQG
discretionary expectations that society has of organisations at a given point in time. 
This study draws extensively from CarUROOµVZRUNRQ&65. At the heart 
of the CSR concept is the question of who is to be satisfied or who should the 
business organisation focus on when making decisions? Is it to satisfy shareholGHUV¶
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interest alone or multiple interests of stakeholders? In examining these issues, the 
various CSR definitions are examined, with the aim of providing an understanding of 
what is at stake in the CSR debate. 
The basic idea of CSR is that business and society are interwoven rather than separate 
entities. Evidence of corporate giving, variously referred to as charitable giving 
(Brammer and Pavelin, 2006), philanthropic contributions (Seifert et al, 2004), can be 
traced back to centuries ago. However, formal writing on CSR is largely a 20th 
century work (Carroll, 1999), but it was in the 1960 that CSR construct became 
ubiquitous. For example, CSR have been viewed in different dimensions as corporate 
citizenships (Pinkston and Carroll, 1994), corporate social performance (Johnson and 
Greening, 1999), corporate social responsiveness (Wood, 1991). These constructs 
suggest CSR is a dynamic phenomenon, sometimes with imprecise definitions, and 
used by authors interchangeably (Galbreath, 2010).  
According to Davis (1960: 70), social responsibility is a, µEXVLQHVVPHQ¶V GHFLVLRQV
WDNHQ IRU UHDVRQV DW OHDVW SDUWLDOO\ EH\RQG WKH ILUPV¶ GLUHFW HFRQRPLF RU WHFKQLFDO
LQWHUHVW¶. By this, Davis is suggesting that social responsibility is a vague idea, which 
would be meaningful only if viewed in a managerial context. Similarly, Frederick 
(1960: 60), views social responsibility as: «D SXEOLF SRVWXUH WRZDUGV VRFLHW\¶V
economic and human resources and a willingness to see that those resources are used 
for broad social ends and not simply for the narrowly circumscribed interests of 
private persons and firms. 7KH FHQWUDO DUJXPHQWV RI )UHGHULFNµV GHILQLWLRQ LV WKDW
business derived its means of production from the society; hence, the socio-economic 
interest of the society must be taken into consideration when distributing business 
ZHDOWK+RZHYHUZKLOH)UHGHULFNµVGHILQLWLRQVXJJHVWVWKDWWKHUHVSRQVLELOLW\RIWKH
firm goes beyond that of making economic gain, it fails to specify what those social 
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HQGVDUH&OHDUO\)UHGHULFN¶VGHILnition lacks specificity on the normative or moral 
obligations of the role of business in society. 
In extending the suggestion that the responsibility of the firm goes beyond that of 
making economic gain, to improving the society, McGuire (1963: 144), opined that: 
The idea of social responsibility supposes that the corporation has not only economic 
and legal obligations but also certain responsibilities to the society, which extend 
beyond these obligations. McGuire in supporting the arguments of Davis and 
FUHGHULFNµVDERYHLPSO\WKDWDVLQJOHGHILQLWLRQRI&65PD\EHGLIILFXOWVRORQJDV
the society continues to change and that the socio-economic interest of the society 
must be taken into consideration. 
 Other definitions highlighted those areas that CSR is usually considered to cover. 
Extending the self-interested principles was Fitch (1976) by adding other principles to 
it. Fitch (1976) widens CSR principles to include pursuance of self-interest 
principle10, social-society interest principle and mutual interest. The self-interest 
approach by corporation was referred to as the utilitarian principle or short term view 
(Fitch, 1976; Wood, 1991). Fitch argued that this short term view may force 
managers to adopt minimal responsibility as its guiding philosophy of CSR. Fitch 
view CSR as a problem solver. By this, the author tries to argue that CSR can be used 
WR VROYH VRFLHW\¶V VRFLDO LVVXHV VXFK DV HQYLURQPHQWDO ZDVWH PDQDJHPHQW WKHUHE\
ensuring that the society remains clean. The author defined CSR as the serious 
                                                 
10
 Self-interest is the satisfaction of shareholders interest by making profit. Society interest includes 
product quality, job creation and satisfying customers. Mutual interest principle is satisfying 
stakeholder (Fitch, 1976).   
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attempt to solve social problems caused wholly or in part by the corporation (Fitch, 
1976: 38). Fitch (1976) proposes that a corporation can be socially responsible by 
stating the absence of any social problems in society as its desired situation, 
prioritising which of the social problems are most relevant to it (as a corporation) and 
then using the normal corporate problem solving mechanisms to reduce or eliminate 
the gap between the desired state of affairs and the existing one. He further suggested 
that corporations can achieve enlightened self-interest by applying their expertise to 
WKHVROXWLRQRIVRFLDOSUREOHPVWKHUHE\LQFUHDVLQJSURILW)LWFKµVSUREOHPFRQFHSWRI
CSR appears limited and failed to capture what CSR covers in light of the previous 
definitions. His proposition that the problem concept of CSR be used as a profit 
maximisation tool may also be faulted by authors who have criticised profit motives 
as being the sole interest of business (Davis, 1960; Carroll, 1975). 
From the background of previous definitions, Carroll (1975; 1999) identified three 
issues necessary for the acceptability and implementation of CSR by managers or 
firms: (1) basic definition of CSR, (2) enumeration of the social areas or the 
stakeholders to whom the firm had a responsibility, and (3) specification of 
philosophy of responsiveness to the issues. He therefore proposed a conceptual model 
RI 6RFLDO 3HUIRUPDQFH FRPSULVLQJ RI WKH IRXU DVSHFWV UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV RI LWV¶
definition. These are regarded as the responsibilities of CSR. 
In the context of this research, (Carroll, 1979, 1995), operational definition of CSR is 
used. For instance, they envisage CSR as having four (4) compartments; first, 
companies are expected to meet their judiciary responsibility of making profits and 
guaranteeing a return on investments. This is their economic responsibility. Second, 
FRPSDQLHV DUH H[SHFWHG WR REH\ WKH FRXQWULHV¶ UXOHV ODZV DQG UHJXODWLRQV 7KH
society expects the business to fulfil its economic responsibility within the legal 
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framework. This forms the legal responsibility of business organisations. Third, 
companies are expected to do the right thing that are morally correct and avoid 
anything that will cause harm to the society. Fourth, by discretionary responsibility, it 
means companies are supposed to invest in areas not required by law or mandatory on 
them, such as investing in society, employee training, quality product and 
philanthropy. This responsibility is anchored on the belief that business and society 
are interwoven rather than separate entities (Pinkston and Carroll, 1994). However, 
the shortcomings of Carroll CSR conceptualization is that it covers CSR orientation 
(Galbreath, 2010) and views discretionary responsibility of CSR as not only separate 
but represent the lDVW UHVSRQVLELOLW\ EDVHG RQ &DUUROO¶V S\UDPLG RI FRPSDQLHV¶
UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV¶ FRPSDQLHV VKRXOG SHUIRUPHG :KDW WKLV PHDQV LV WKDW WKH
discretionary responsibility is not only broad but could conflict with economic and 
legal responsibility.  
Taking a different approach, several authors (Jones, 1980; Frederick, 1986; Woods, 
1991) decide to focus more on the processes, outcomes and responsibility of CSR. 
This was common in the 1980s and 1990s (Jones, 1980; Woods, 1991). Jones agrees 
with Frederick (1986) by summing up that CSR is a fundamental idea that 
FRPSDQLHV¶ KDYH D UHVSRQVLELOLW\ WR ZRUN IRU WKH JRRG RI WKH VRFLHW\ -RQHV 
59), raising the question of adoption and implementation of CSR, defines the concept 
as, «WKH QRWLRQ WKDW FRUSRUDWLRQV KDYH Dn obligation to constituent groups in the 
society other than stockholders and beyond that prescribed by law or union FRQWUDFW¶ 
Jones argues that CSR should be seen as a process rather than a set of outcomes, 
arguing that it is virtually impossible to define social responsibility in terms of 
specific decisions. He proposes further that by incorporating into the decision-making 
process, ways by which broader social concerns are given consideration, CSR then, 
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will be seen as a means rather than as a set of ends. Jones (1980) CSR definition is 
not significantly different from previous ones. His work has however been very 
insightful and addresses the question of implementation of CSR. 
Other authors adopted a more strategic approach in defining CSR (such as Wood, 
1991; Wartick and Cochran, 1985 and Yongqiang, 2008). Wood (1991) defines CSR 
using the term Corporate Social Performance (CSP), viewing CSP as CSR in action. 
The author tried to link the societal outcomes with principles and processes. CSP is 
defined as D EXVLQHVV RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V FRQILJXUDWLRQ RI SULQFLSOHV RI VRFLDO
responsibility, processes of social responsiveness, and policies, programs, and 
REVHUYDEOHRXWFRPHVDVWKH\UHODWHWRWKHILUP¶VVRFLHWDOUHODWLRQVKLSV(Wood, 1991: 
693). Wood definition tries to answer the shortcomings of Wartick and Cochran 
(1985) idea of CSP which regarded CSP as performances, implementation and 
strategies of CSR rather than on varying interactions and linkages between the 
business and society. The CSP model as develop by Wood (1991) comprises of 3 
principles of CSR: This involves the institutional principle (legitimacy); 
organisational principles (public responsibility) and individual principle (managerial 
discretion). Wood argued that the society confers legitimacy to corporations. The 
GLIIHUHQFHV EHWZHHQ VRFLHWDO H[SHFWDWLRQV E\ FRUSRUDWLRQV DQG FRUSRUDWLRQ¶V
perceptions and performances on social issues create a legitimacy gap (Davies, 1973; 
Wood, 1991). The ability of corporations to fulfil the legitimacy gap will guarantee 
their long-term survival as good companies in the society (Davies, 1973). 
Despite all attempts by scholars to create acceptable definitions of CSR, there were 
notable criticisms. Freidman (1970) and Elaine (1994) were more critical in their 
analysis of CSR agenda. Both authors view CSR practices as a misguided philosophy. 
Friedman and Elaine viewed CSR practices as misappropriation of company 
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resources. Friedman (1970) went further to define corporate responsibilities by 
affirming that corporate bodies should be responsible only to shareholders interest. 
7KHDXWKRUIXUWKHUQRWHGWKDWWKHPD[LPLVDWLRQRIVKDUHKROGHU¶VZHDOWKVKRXOGEHWKH
main corporate objectives of corporations. However, Goodijk (2000) in advocating 
for the stakeholder model as against the shareholder wealth maximisation model gave 
the following reasons as the advantages of stakeholder model: that stakeholder 
approach increases shared responsibility, good management practices and societal 
legitimacy. 
Several authors, in criticising CSR, for instance, Fitch (1976) adopts the cost 
perspectives approach. Fitch emphasised CSR cost should be borne by the society 
because corporation engage in CSR activities for image building. The author 
concludes that the cost of production be transferred to societies resulting in higher 
prices, higher taxes and low dividend for shareholders. However, corporations tend to 
avoid this cost and internalised them so as to be seen as socially responsible. Fitch 
mixed signals on CSR was evident as he initially view CSR as strategic and now view 
it as a transferable cost, which can be transferred from businesses to society 
(customers). 
Further critiquing CSR agenda, Hendenson (2001) adopts a cost-benefit approach. 
Here, Hendenson argues that CSR should be accepted by companies if the benefit 
derived from CSR outweighs the cost incurred. Interestingly, Barnea and Rubin 
(2006) argue that CSR may create conflicts among the insiders and outsider 
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shareholding11. According to the author the insider shareholders (top managers as 
shareholders) are more likely to support CSR unlike the outside shareholders 
(institutional shareholders). This is because the insider shareholders, who are 
managers, benefit from ownership of shares and therefore will support CSR practices, 
if they belieYH WKDW &65 ZLOO LQFUHDVH FRUSRUDWLRQ¶V YDOXH XQOLNH WKH RXWVLGH
shareholders (Barnea and Rubin, 2006).  
The conflicting CSR definitions according to Carroll (1979; 1991) are caused by the 
ZRUG µVRFLDO¶ LQ FRUSRUDWH VRFLDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\ EHFDXVH &65 FRQQRWes ambiguity. 
This inconsistency in the word social was supported by (Cochran and wood 1984; 
Wartick and Cochran, 1985; Clarkson, 1995). It could be said that these criticisms of 
CSR have led many scholars to adopt CSP, which means CSR in action as mentioned 
earlier, suggesting the processes and relationships between firms and society (Carroll, 
1979; Carroll, 1991; Carroll, 1999; Clarkson, 1995; Cochran and wood, 1984; 
Wartick and Cochran, 1985 and Husted, 2000).  
Considering the above discussions on CSR, this study will sum up the whole 
definitions and concept of CSR as voluntary provision or contribution of business 
organisation resources beyond their fiduciary responsibility, aimed at satisfying the 
various internal and external stakeholders. These provisions and contributions by 
firms include the provision of amenities to the communities, providing quality 
products, clean environments and high employee morale. 
                                                 
11
 Insider shareholdings are shareholders with high stake of their reputation, identity closely related 
DQG WLHG WR FRUSRUDWLRQ¶V LQWHUHVW 2XWVLGHU VKDUHKROGHUV DUH LQVWLWXWLRQDO DQG YHU\ VPDOO LQYHVWRUV
(Barnea and Rubin, 2003). 
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In sum, CSR comprises the economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary responsibility 
and these responsibilities must be carried out by a company simultaneously. 
Therefore, according to Carroll (1979: 501) the four-part frame work can thus be 
used to help identify the reasons for business actions as well as to call attention to the 
ethical and discretionary considerations that are sometimes forgotten by managers. 
In essence, the philosophy behind the other side of CSR (business, legal, ethical and 
discretionary) or social responsiveness is the managerial responses (mode, strategy) 
to social issues. According to Carroll (1975) the model integrates economic 
objectives into the social performance framework, by placing discretionary and 
ethical expectations into a rational and legal framework. What this does is that? It 
helps the managers to systematically think through social issues when making 
strategic decisions that affect the company.  
The central arguments in this study is in line with (Carroll, 1975, 1991, 1999), that 
managers, investors and directors should understand that the social responsibility of 
business is equally as important as the economic performance, if they are to survive 
LQ WKH ORQJ WHUP +HQFH RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V SHUIRUPDQFH LV HQKDQFHG ZKHQ HFRQRPLF
performance and the social responsibility of business are linked and strategic (Hess et 
al, 2002). By this business organisation must ensure CSR is strategic, especially if the 
ERDUG DQG LQYHVWRUV¶ SHUFHLYH &65 DV EHQHILFLDO WR WKH FRPSDQ\ 7KH QH[W VHFWLRQ
discusses reasons and the need for strategic CSR. 
2.3 Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility 
The words strategic CSR connotes different meaning to different authors, while Hood 
(1996) view strategic CSR as an attempts by companies to expect a return on their 
investment on social issues, for example expecting a lower risk (such as avoidance of 
fine or fee from government) in exchange for investment in good environmental 
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management and practices. Together, Gills and Spring (2001), and Hess et al (2002) 
view strategic CSR, as when companies aligns their CSR activities with its business 
objectives, such as enhancing their core competencies by investing in CSR. Besides, 
this will provide competitive advantage for the company and thus, improve their 
performance.  
This study argues that strategic CSR is achieved by companies if they align their CSR 
investments to their corporate objectives. From a different perspective, CSR is said to 
be strategic when a company incorporates community involvement activities into its 
strategic planning process and operations. In other words, companies are required to 
incorporate external environmental concerns into its strategic policies, at the same 
time, while not perceiving CSR as a waste of company resources or anti-profit 
(Amaeshi, 2010). 
The above argument is supported by Carroll (1975; 1991; 1999) that suggests that not 
RQO\ VKRXOG FRPSDQLHV¶ LQWHJUDWH WKHLU HFRQRPLF REMHFWLYHV LQWR WKH VRFLDO
performance framework, but also ensure that these social issues such as external 
environmental concerns; product quality and high employee morale must be strategic 
to the overall corporate belief and philosophy of the company. This according to 
Carroll (1999) will ensure that firms survive in the long term. While Brammer and 
Millington (2005), and Brammer and Pavelin (2006) note that the linking of CSR to 
the corporate philosophy of companies enhance their reputation and brand image, it 
also gives them competitive advantage over their competitors. 
The importance of strategic CSR by companies is anchored on the premise of 
achieving long term engagement and sustainability while striving to enhance greater 
accountability (Pinkston and Carroll, 1994; Huse, 2005). It is widely believed that 
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different companies have different levels of CSR engagement (Werther and Chandler, 
2006). For instance, the authors suggest that the more a company adopts strategic 
CSR, the more it is perceived to be socially responsible. 
Furthermore, the importance of aligning corporate objectives and its strategies to 
CSR was supported by Bell (1974). Thus, Carroll (1999) assessments that the 
company is an integral part of the society are factual. According to Bell (1974) 
strategic CSR involve incorporating environmental and social issues as an integral 
SDUW RI WKH FRPSDQ\¶V VRFLDO RULHQWDWLRQ IRU LQVWDQFH &65 DFWLYLWLHV RI FRPSDQ\
should be an integral part of its business mission, vision, values, strategy and 
operations. According to Carroll this integration will ensure that businesses continue 
to understand that they have an obligation to ensure a better society. 
The central argument about strategic management concerns itself on how the 
company positions itself in relation to its environment to ensure effectiveness and 
good corporate performance (Carroll and Bulcholz, 2006). Strategic CSR therefore, 
ensures that management addresses social issues from the environment by effectively 
using company resources to achieve organisational goals. Consequently, this outcome 
will make the company socially responsible. 
Waddock and Boyle (1995) gave examples of strategic CSR to include the following: 
1) it requires top management involvement, that is, decisions not relegated to some 
middle managers in Marketing or Human Resources departments. This involves the 
CEO, directors and top managers in the evolution and implementation of CSR 
strategies. This underscores the significance of strategic CSR in enhancing corporate 
performance. 2) Requires huge company resources such as human, physical and 
financial assets deployed by the company over an extended period of time. 3) 
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Requires strategic decisions committed to long term prosperity of the company. 
Strategic CSR projects are becoming long term in nature and committing the firm to a 
longer time period, for instance community development projects, schools, hospitals 
etc.  
Furthermore, Hess et al (2002) acknowledge strategic CSR to include social audits 
that ensures accountability and transparency on how large company resources are 
utilised by management. Social audit reports provide firm with information about 
how they are viewed and how they are progressing in maeting the interests and 
expectations of investors, employees, suppliers, customers, community needs on a 
variety of CSR issues ranging from good environmental management to product 
quality. 
Increasingly, making strategic CSR decisions can be deemed to be excellent 
manaeerial criteria necessary for company performance, for example, top 
managements and BODs are responsable for making strategic decisions that will 
guarantee the satisfaction of stakeholder and long term survival of company (Hess et 
al, 2002). The driving force for strategic CSR, according to Pearce and Robinson 
(1997) include first, the process of globalisation. According to Waddock and Boyle 
(1995: 135) greater globalisation of many companies¶ RSHUDWLRQV LPSOLHV that the 
communities to which these companies are responsible to can no longer be narrowly 
defined as those communities immediately surrounding their corporate headqearters. 
But companies are being redefined as those areas that the companies has significant 
activaties. Therefore, community has grown and evolved to become communities. 
Second, the building of alliances and networks by firms aimed at expanding the scope 
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companies are building alliances to ensure that good corporate citizenship efforts 
result in a long term improvement in the competitive environment.  
Other reasons driving strategic CSR include changing government regulations or 
voluntary codes, for instance, the Global Compact, ISO 14001 and Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI). These regulations are forcing companies to adopt strategic CSR. 
Finally, societal changes are forcing increased NGO activism demanding companies 
to make positive impact on the society they operate in, to gain legitimacy and avoid 
fallout with the public due to loss of legitimacy. Recently, there has been increased 
media focus on CSR activities by companies arising from corporate malpractices and 
collapse of companies tarnishing their corporate reputation and image. 
According to Werther and Chandler (2006) strategic CSR can be used as guide for 
CSR indicators mentioned below. In this study, the case study method was based on 
the Werther and Chandler (2006) model of strategic CSR. This study uses the CSR 
indicators as the framework/model for discussion. According to Carroll (1999) the 
managers are systematically incorporating social issues when making strategic 
GHFLVLRQV WKDW DIIHFW WKHLU FRPSDQ\¶V SHUIRUPDQFH Werther and Chandler (2006) 
developed a theoretical framework of strategic CSR comprising three (3) phases, 
namely, the CSR planning phase (vision and mission), CSR strategy phase and CSR 
implementation phase12 (See section 4.8 for details ). 
                                                 
12Werther and Chandler (2006) model of strategic CSR comprises: first phase, which is the CSR 
planning phase that indicates the alignment of the CSR policies with the corporate philosophy (vision, 
mission and values statements) of the organisation. The second phase is the CSR strategy which 
indicates the tactics and signifies the level of compliance of companies to national and international 
Code of Conduct of Best Practices. This includes formation of corporate governance structure such as 
Code of Ethics and Business Conduct. The third phase is the CSR implementation and performance 
evaluation phase. This phase involve the lunching of formal CSR practices and strategy documents,  
CEO/management briefings and meetings on CSR, community development projects, donations and 
charitable activities, the process of getting feedback and evaluating performances. 
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In summary, the strategic CSR indicators as mentioned above are in line with Carroll 
(1991; 1999) arguments that business and society are interwoven. According to 
Carroll (1999) this integration ensures that business organisations continue to 
understand that they have an obligation to ensure a better society. This is achieved by 
incorporating ethical, environmental and social issues as an integral part of their 
business mission, strategy and operations. By doing this, companies ensure that not 
only should the economic objectives and social issues be integrated, but also confirm 
that this integration satisfies the expectations of the various stakeholders and 
guarantee the long term survival of company. The next subsection discusses the link 
between corporate governance and CSR. 
2.4 The Link between Corporate Governance and Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
The link between corporate governance and CSR is in the area of ethics and moral 
behaviour aspects of the company (Barnea and Rubin, 2005, Andayani et al, 2008). 
Corporate governance and ethics do share common traits, such as, the understanding 
of business ethics. Business ethics examines both the ethical principles and moral or 
ethical problems that arise in a business environment. It applies to all aspects of 
business conduct and relevant to the conduct of individuals and entire organizations. 
In Carroll (1991; 1999) definitions of CSR, that is the 2nd and 3rd responsibility of 
&65 VXJJHVWV WKDW FRPSDQLHV DUH H[SHFWHG WR REH\ WKH FRXQWULHV¶ UXOHV ODZV DQG
regulations. This is the legal responsibility of business organisation. The society 
expects the business to fulfil its economic responsibility within the legal framework, 
by complying with the rules and laws of the country where they operate. The 3 rd 
component is the ethical responsibility that expects companies to do the right thing 
that are mobally correct and avoid anything that will cause harm to the society. 
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The main argument concerning 4th link between corporate governance and CSR is 
that both of these responsibilities (legal and athical responsibilities of Carroll 
definitions of CSR) are emphasised in not only in the copplrate governance 
mechanisms, for instance in the various Codes of Corporate Governance, but also in 
the CSR concept (Ethics policy). This means that the ethical ald legal responsibalities 
of companies are enshrined in the Codes of Corporate Governance and CSR concept 
(the Ethical Code of Business Standard). Clearly, Carroll arguments as stated above 
highlight the link between Corporate Governance and CSR. 
Several authors have noted that the corporate governance structure and governance 
system affects CSR (Johnson and Greening, 1999; Benson et al, 2009). For instance, 
the BODs are responsible for making policies, rules and procedures concerning CSR 
(Webb, 2004) with the aim of improving firm performance. In this case, the BODs 
are the internal corporate governance mechanism. One of the ways that the link 
between corporate governance and CSR (ethics) has been expressed is through 
integration of one another (Fisher, 2004).  
Corporate governance and ethics do share common traits, such as, the understanding 
of business ethics do enhance the understanding of CSR. In fact, there are definitions 
in CSR literature that claim that the substance of CSR developed from ethics or 
ethical governance. For instance, Davis (1967: 46) argues that the substance of social 
UHVSRQVLELOLW\ DULVHV IURP FRQFHUQ IRU WKH HWKLFDO FRQVHTXHQFHV RI RQH¶V DFWLRQ DV
they may affect the interest of others. Similarly, Epstein (1987: 104) asserted that the 
normative correctness of the products of corporate action has been the main focus of 
corporate social responsibility. This confirms that the link between corporate 
governance and CSR shared some overlapping concepts and meaning. As capped by 
Samson and Daft (2003: 147), ethics deals with internal values that are part of 
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corporate culture and shapes decisions concerning social responsibility with respect 
to the external environment. Hence, this shows that the internal values and cultures of 
companies can influence the CSR policies, particularly as it affects the ethical 
standards in companies. For instance, the formation of Code of Ethics and Business 
Standards are influenced by the corporate governance structure of the firm. 
Nonetheless, De Graaf and Stoelhorst (2010) observed that the corporate governance 
has not fully occupied a central focal place in CSR analysis and research. This is 
EHFDXVH HDUOLHU VWXGLHV LJQRUHG WKH VDWLVIDFWLRQ RI RWKHU VWDNHKROGHU¶V LQWHUHVW DSDUW
from shareholders. For example, Freidman (1972) argues that investment on the 
environment is a dollar stolen from shareholders. However, Carroll (1999; Carroll 
and Buchholtz, 2009) noted that the satisfaction of stakeholder enhances the long 
term survival of companies. In this case, De Graaf and Stoelhorst argues that the 
stakeholders influence the governance structure or systems of corporate bodies 
thereby making the governance structure and system as the useful focal point for 
understanding CSR responsiveness through empirical enquiry. What this means is 
that the satisfaction of stakeholder is very important in any RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V
performance, growth and their survival. Also, the satisfaction of stakeholder is being 
influenced by the corporate governance structure operated by the organisations. This 
reinforces Carroll (1991) and a Beltrattie (2005) assertion of the values of CSR that 
emphasises that good corporate governance mechanisms and CSR policies 
HQFRXUDJHV VWDNHKROGHUV¶ VDWLVIDFWLRQ &RQVHTXHQWO\ WKLV GHPRQVWUDWHV DQRWKHU OLQN
between corporate governance and CSR. For instance, both are aim at satisfying 
various stakeholders such as the investors, employees, suppliers, consumers and 
communities thereby making a firm to be more respected and valuable. Also, this 
makes the corporate governance and CSR good pair and complements to each other.  
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In addition, the link between corporate governance and CSR can help resolve the 
dilemma problem surrounding the meaning of CSR (Benson et al, 2009). De Graaf 
and Stoelhorst (2010) argue that the governance system can help business to resolve 
the problem associated with the normative and descriptive CSR (Mitnick, 1995). 
)XUWKHU WKH PRUDO SDUDGR[ SUREOHP RI µZKDW EXVLQHVV GRHV¶ DQG µZKDW EXVLQHVV
VKRXOGGR¶KDVEHHQWKHPRVWUHFXUUHQW&65SUREOHP-RQHV+XVWHG13. 
At the centre of this dilemma are the BOD responsibility to formulate policies and 
strategies concerning CSR (Johnson and Greening, 1999; Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002; 
Williams, 2003; Webb, 2004; Mackenzie, 2007). Therefore, the BOD becomes a 
useful group that captures the trade-RIIV LQVWDNHKROGHU¶VPDQDJHPHQW. Also, part of 
the reasons for studying the role of BOD and institutional investors on CSR revolves 
around the problem associated with the normative and descriptive CSR. This means 
that a focus on the cause and effect on BOD actions and social outcomes may provide 
a useful answer to the normative and social dilemma of CSR in a developing country. 
In summary, the link between corporate governance structure and CSR can be viewed 
IURP WZR GLPHQVLRQV 1RWDEO\ WKHVH GLPHQVLRQV DUH WKH HWKLFDO DQG VWDNHKROGHUV¶ 
satisfactions. This shows that the internal values and cultures of companies, which is 
part of the corporate governance system influences CSR policies and most often 
determines the extent of its implementation. This implies that corporate governance 
and CSR complements each other and are sometimes referred to as CSR governance 
(Graaf and Stoelhorst, 2010). Clearly, the link between corporate governance and 
CSR reinforces Carroll arguments that business organisation has got a role to play in 
the society, particularly, if it will improve their performance and survival in the long 
                                                 
13
 7KH µ:KDW LV¶ PHDQV ZKDW FRUSRUDWH ERGLHV RU EXVLQHVV GR ZKLOH µZKDW RXJKW WR¶ PHDQV ZKDW
corporate or business should do (Jones, 1991, Husted, 2000).  
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term. As a result, the BOD and top managers should engage actively in formulation 
and implementation of CSR policies to ensure satisfaction of their stakeholders. 
Following the review of CSR and corporate governance mechanism, the various 
theories underpinning this study focus particularly on the stakeholder theory which is 
used to explain CSR practices by companies. Several additional theories (agency, 
stewardship, resource dependence, legitimacy and institutional) are examined in order 
to understand further, the link between the roles of institutional investors and BOD 
characteristics on CSR. Hence, the next section discusses these theories followed by 
the empirical findings of previous studies. 
2.5 Theories of Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility 
Letza et al (2004) divided the theories of governance and CSR into two; namely, the 
shareholders and stakeholders models; while Hawley and Williams (1996) named 
four(4) governance and CSR theories: i) the finance model, ii) stewardship model, iii) 
stakeholder model, and iv) the political model.  
Moreover, the finance model is built around the principal agent relationship (Berle 
and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983) with the main 
DLP RI FRPSDQLHV WR VDWLVI\ VKDUHKROGHUV¶ ZHDOWK )ULHGPDQ  ,Q WKH ILQDQFH
model view, the agency problem (Jensen, 1993) is resolved through the use of 
incentives to align the interest of shareholders to that of managers (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). On the other hand, the stewardship model 
DUJXHV WKDW PDQDJHUV DUH JRRG VHUYDQW ZRUNLQJ UHOLDEO\ WR HQKDQFH VKDUHKROGHUV¶
ZHDOWK7KHVWDNHKROGHUV¶PRGHODUJXHVWKDWFRPSDQLHVVKRXOGVDWLVI\DZLGer group 
of stakeholders such as shareholders, employees, suppliers, community and 
environment (Freeman, 1984 and Carroll, 1999). The political model locates the 
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governance-performance issues from the political context such as the use of non-
market mechanism for monitoring managers and BODs (Hawley and Williams, 1996; 
Letza et al, 2004). 
2.5.1 Agency Theory 
The agency theory assumes that corporate managers are self-serving, individualistic 
and opportunistic in nature (see, Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993; Williamson, 1993; Rediker and Seth, 1995; 
Kirkbride and Letza, 2004). According to Kirkbride and Letza (2004) the principal-
agent (finance model) underpinned by the agency theory assumes that the singular 
DLP RI FRPSDQLHV LV WKH PD[LPLVDWLRQ RI VKDUHKROGHUV¶ ZHDOWK %DVHG RQ WKH
opportunistic and self-interest assumption of human behaviour, agency theory argues 
that managers (as agents) will pursue their own interest at the expense of 
VKDUHKROGHUV¶ LQWHUHst (as principal) causing agency problems. Therefore, these 
agency problems such as moral hazards and conflict of interests lead to higher agency 
costs14 which affect performance (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993).  
Moreover, the agency theory usually views CSR activities by companies as anti-
profit. Friedman (1970) argues that profit maximisation is the sole responsibility of 
business organisations and the author further dislikes corporate attempts to invest in 
RWKHU VWDNHKROGHUV¶ ZHOIDUH VXFK DV HQYLURQPHQWDO FRQFHUQ FRQVXPHUV¶ SURWHFWLRQ
and employee welfare. Also supporting the above arguments are Hughes (2001) and 
Bakan (2004) that pointed out that the legal responsibility of companies is to make a 
profit for investors by providing goods and services demanded by the society. 
                                                 
14The agency cost is the risk that agents will use organizational resource for their own benefit (Hawley 
and Willaims, 1996; Letza et al, 2004). 
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According to Carroll (1991; 1999) the society expects companies, apart from 
VDWLVI\LQJFXVWRPHUVDQGLQYHVWRUVWRVDWLVI\ZLGHUVWDNHKROGHUV¶JURXSVVXFKDVWKH
employees, environment and the public. In contrast to Friedman (1970) and Bakan 
 DUJXPHQW WKDW &65 LV D PLVDOORFDWLRQ RI FRPSDQLHV¶ UHVRXUFHV $PDHVKL
(2008) argues that CSR is not anti-profit but rather contributes to the corporate 
performance and the value of the firm (Mallin, 2004; Heslin and Ochoa, 2008). 
Furthermore, due to conflicting interests inherent in such CSR practices, Jensen 
(2001) argues that management will pursue their own interests at the expense of 
shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Managers will achieve their interest using 
CSR as a cover for managerial opportunism, thereby affecting the value of the firm 
(Chen, 2001). Therefore, in resolving the problem of opportunism, self-interest and 
multiple trade-off objectives, Jensen (2001) proposes the enlightened stakeholder 
theory15 by suggesting that the firms and corporate officers should pursue the value 
maximisation function if companies are to survive in the long term.  By maximising 
value, managers avoid the temptation of placing some stakeholder interest over 
others. The author argues that CSR provides multiple functions rather than single 
value function causing the trade-offs problem arising from companies trying to satisfy 
multiple stakeholders.  
The corporate governance mechanism for resolving conflicting interests, such as, 
managerial opportunisms and agency problems (owners-managers and employees- 
                                                 
15The enlightened stakeholders¶ group includes apart from the traditionally considered stakeholders 
such as shareholders, employees and consumers (Freeman, 1984) but also a wider group, the suppliers, 
government, communities and environment (Rugman and Verbeke, 1998 and Heslin and Ochoa, 
2008). 
Chapter 2  Literature Review 
40 
shareholders) are the BOD and institutional investors. Several authors (for example, 
Rediker and Seth, 1995; Hawley and Williams, 1996; Kirkbride and Letza, 2004) 
recommend the BOD and institutional investors as good corporate governance 
mechanisms in companies. As for the BOD, Jensen (1993) and Sanda et al (2010) 
suggest a small BOD size as a way of enhancing BOD effectiveness and 
independence. In the same line, Yermack (1996) argues that smaller board size is 
better because larger BOD decision making process is slow and directors hardly 
criticise the policies made by managers. Yermack further argues that smaller BOD 
favour higher financial performance.  
Using CSR, Webb (2004) opposes the ideas of Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996). 
Webb (2004) argues that the introduction of Non-Executive Directors (NEDs) and 
women (Sanda et al, 2005) into the board, increases the board size, and this will not 
slow down the decision making process of BOD but rather enhances CSR practices. 
Therefore, according to Balabanis et al (1998), managers invest in CSR practices if 
WKH\EHOLHYH&65SUDFWLFHZLOOHQKDQFHFRPSDQ\¶VYDOXH 
Rediker and Seth (1995) in examining alternative corporate governance mechanisms 
suggest the use of institutional investors as an additional corporate governance 
mechanism for monitoring opportunistic managers. This is because of the ability of 
institutional investors to use their voting power to fire or hire managers. According to 
Rediker and Seth (1995) LQVWLWXWLRQDO LQYHVWRUV¶YRWLQJSRZHUFDQDFWDVDFKHFN WR
managerial opportunism and help to strengthen good corporate governance practices. 
In testing agency theory, Atkinson and Galaskiewicz (1988) use managerial and 
disperse ownership shareholding of companies. According to them institutional 
investor-controlled companies differ from the manager-controlled companies in their 
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response to CSR. This means a higher percentage of managers as shareholders will 
not support CSR. They find a negative relationship between managerial institutional 
owners and CSR. The reason for this is that, managers are primarily more concerned 
with the management and satisfaction of stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995).  
In fact, the reason for the negative relationship, according to Atkinson and 
Galaskiewicz (1988), is that if managers are not shareholders the firms engage in 
CSR. The authors concluded that managerial shareholders are capitalists and hence, 
will not invest in CSR. What this means is that, managers who eventually become 
owners, pursue profit and return on their investment. However, the opposite will be 
the case if they are managers (that is, not owners), as they would allocate resources to 
CSR activities. That is, according to the authors mean as managers they tend to 
protect their jobs and long-term interests by enhancing profit maximisation.  
2.5.2 Stakeholder Theory 
Freeman (1984: 46) defines stakeholder theory as a person or group that can affect or 
LVDIIHFWHGE\WKHDFKLHYHPHQWRIWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VREMHFWives. In fact, Freeman and 
McVea (2001) argue that the stakeholder theory expects managers to have a balanced 
view of all groups that have a stake in the company. The stakeholder group includes 
the shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers, environment, communities, 
government and the media (Freeman, 1984; Carroll, 1991; 1999; Jensen, 2001). Also, 
Jensen (2001) states that companies should pursue the maximisation of the value 
function in the long term, thereby satisfying the welfare of the stakeholder. Several 
authors (See, Agle et al, 1999; Jawahar and McLaughlin, 2001; Heslin and Ochoa, 
2008; Benson et al, 2009; Chai, 2010) support stakeholder theory by implying that 
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corporations should implement policies that satisfy the interests of the different 
groups that have stakes in the corporations if they are to survive in the long-term.  
According to Hung (2011) the stakeholder theory can be used to describe how BOD 
views the interest of corporate units by focusing on what each stakeholder deserves or 
requires from the BOD. In order words, the stakeholder theory can be used to analyse 
and determine the interaction between a company and its environment (Pfeffer, 1972; 
Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002). In addition, the stakeholder theory has become a focal 
point for describing, evaluating and managing CSR (Clarkson, 1985; Bingham et al, 
2011). Peloza and Shang (2011) argue that CSR activities by impacting on the 
attitudes and behaviours of investors and directors using products and services create 
stakeholder value. 
The stakeholder theory16 is made up of three different components namely, a) the 
descriptive or empirical, b) normative and c) instrumental (Jones 1995; Donaldson 
and Preston, 1995; Hawley and Williams, 2004). According to Donaldson and 
Preston (1995) the descriptive, normative and instrumental stakeholder17 are different 
but mutually accommodating of each other as the stakeholder theory (Jones, 1999; 
                                                 
16According to Jones (1995) by exploring how managers and firm behave, when there is a social issue, 
the descriptive stakeholders address the questions: what happens to firm? While, the instrumental 
stakeholders address the questions: what happens to firm, if managers behave in a certain way? The 
normative stakeholders are the moral behaviour of firms or managers and address the questions: what 
should happen (Jones, 1995)? Put differently, the descriptive stakeholders enables the firm to describe 
the interests of the stakeholders, while instrumental enables the firm to address the interest of the 
stakeholders and the way to address it and finally the normative explains the moral view of firms of 
doing the right thing for all stakeholders.  
17
 The descriptive stakeholder presents the corporation as a collection of several interest groups having 
a stake or inherent value. The instrumental stakeholders focuses on how the stakeholder enhances 
corporate performance such as profitability, growth, competitive  advantage, risk mitigation while the 
normative is anchored on the social issue aspect of the corporation (Donaldson and Preston, 1995).  
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Husted, 2000), attempts to guide and explain the operation and structure of the firm. 
The stakeholder theory considers the organisation as an entity through which several 
and diverse groups achieve their objectives (Jones and Wicks, 1999; Moir, 2001). 
,Q DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK WKH ORQJ WHUP JRDO RI WKH FRPSDQ\ WKH VWDNHKROGHUV¶ WKHRU\
provides a useful framework to evaluate CSR through examining the impact of 
different institutional investors, BOD characteristics on CSR. Prado-Lorenzo et al 
(2009) tested the stakeholder theory in examining the relationship between types of 
institutional investors and CSR in Spanish companies and finds government 
institutional investors and financial institutions influence CSR. Using survey and 
interview approaches for banks in the UK, Thomson and Cowton (2004) argue that 
banks, apart from interest on recovering their loan debt, should pursue CSR practices. 
Similarly, Huse and Rindova (2001) test the stakeholder theory from BOD roles and 
responsibilities using survey questionnaires and interviews. Huse and Rindova (2001) 
conclude that different stakeholder group expect different roles and responsibilities 
from the BOD. The authors find that the customers have a higher influence on the 
BOD roles compared to owners, management employees, and community. These 
findings indicate that the BOD favour long term relationships of the companies. In 
the light of the aforementioned studies, this thesis uses the stakeholder theory to 
examine the impact of institutional investors and BOD characteristics on CSR 
SUDFWLFHV LQ 1LJHULD 7KH DXWKRUV DUJXH WKDW LW LV WKH VWDNHKROGHUV¶ WKHRU\ WKDW EHVW
explains the CSR practices of companies and by extension, the role of firms in 
society. 
Moreover, Freeman and McVea (2001) point out the importance of stakeholder 
theory in assisting corporate managers in CSR decisions.  In order to maintain a 
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balance between the governance in public and corporate setting, a corporation must 
engage in dialogue with the various stakeholders (Carroll, 1991; 1999; Webb, 2004). 
For supporters of the stakeholder theory (such as, Agle et al, 1999; Jawahar and 
McLaughlin, 2001; Freeman and McVea, 2001), shareholders are seen as one of a 
number of important stakeholders. However, according to Jensen (2001) conflicts 
arise when managers are faced with satisfying multiple stakeholders. An example of 
that conflict is the traditional conflict of interest between profit maximisation and 
stakeholder management model18 such as when a company is faced with 
environmental and profit maximisation goals (Benson, 2009). Therefore, companies 
might face problems on how to allocate firm resources on clean environment with the 
aim of avoiding fines from government or allocating resources in operations that 
maximise profits for shareholders (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002).  
According to Benson et al (2009) the traditional conflict, that is, profit maximisation, 
can be resolved if companies engage in a trade-off between social, environmental and 
profits maximisation goals. Another way to resolve the conflict according to Benson 
et al (2009) is to apply a cost-benefit analysis. This according to the authors means 
that the corporation should consider the marginal costs and benefits when making 
decisions concerning production, efficiency and environmental goals. In other words, 
when the marginal cost is lower than the marginal benefit derived from CSR activity, 
companies should invest in CSR. However, if the costs are greater than the benefits, 
                                                 
18
 The stakeholder management model is based on the assumptions that prudent management of 
FRPSDQLHV¶VWDNHKROGHUVVKRXOGEH LQVWUXPHQWDODQGVWUDWHJLF WRDFKLHYLQJ WKHFRPSDQLHV¶REMHFWLYes 
such as revenues, profits and returns to shareholders (Jones and Wick, 1999).Therefore, the authors 
argue that companies should satisfy stakeholders in such a way as not to obstruct the objectives of the 
company of profit maximisation. 
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then the government policies or interventions from the market will correct any 
abnormality arising from the costs imbalance especially when the social costs are 
greater than corporations internal cost of production (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002).  
 Besides, Laplume et al (2008) mentioned the criticisms of stakeholder theory as not 
ZHOOJURXQGHGDQGDOVRGRHVQ¶WSURYLGHFRUSRUDWHPDQDJHUVZLWKDVWURQJDQGYLYLG
instrument in tackling environmental problems. Also, the stakeholder theory does not 
assist managers in decision-making when faced with trade-off problems concerning 
multiple stakeholders (Hillman et al, 2001; Benson et al, 2009). According to Heath 
and Norman (2004) the stakeholder theory is based on a wrong assumption that 
shareholders are part of the stakeholders, in violation of the corporate law. In line 
with corporate law, Heath and Norman (2004) argue that the shareholders are well 
elevated and protected as the owners of the corporation, and are therefore given rights 
WR HQVXUH WKDW PDQDJHUV FRQVLGHU WKH PD[LPLVDWLRQ RI VKDUHKROGHUV¶ YDOXH WR EH RI
primary concern.  
Another criticism against the stakeholder theory is the governance structures as laid 
out in corporate law in many countries (Elanie, 1994). In some cases, there is the 
possibility that managers investing in CSR can be removed by the institutional 
investors that are short term oriented (Heath and Norman, 2004). For example, 
managers can lose their jobs, if majority of investors view them as sacrificing a 
certain amount of profit to advance other stakeholder interests (Heath and Norman, 
2004). This line of argument is supported by Friedman (1971, 1972). According to 
Friedman (1972) investing in CSR and trying to satisfy the stakeholders should be 
FRQVLGHUHGDVWKHPLVDSSURSULDWLRQRIVKDUHKROGHUV¶ZHDOWK%\GRLQJWKLVPDQDJHUV
are acting against the interest of the owners, which is to maximise profit and satisfy 
their interests.  
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On the other hand, one of the arguments for stakeholder theory, according to Ingley et 
al (2011) is for companies to practice more stakeholder engagement or corporate 
democracy. This will ensure more diversity on the board and long term survival of 
company. Also, there will be more strategic decisions in companies and stakeholder 
relations. The next part of this section discusses the stewardship theory and how it 
supports CSR practices. 
2.5.3 Stewardship Theory 
While the agency and stakeholder theories may seem irreconcilable with each other, 
the stewardship theory takes a middle ground approach. Letza et al (2004) argue that 
the agency theory and instrumental component of the stakeholder theory assume the 
human nature as self-interested, suggesting that managers cannot be trusted as 
efficient agHQWV WR VHUYH WKH SULQFLSDO¶V LQWHUHVW +RZHYHU WKH VWHZDUGVKLS WKHRU\
rejects the notion of self-seeking managers as assumed by agency theory. Instead, the 
stewardship theory argues that managers are not self-centred and opportunistic but 
have a wide range of motives and values comprising self-recognition, achievement, 
success, respect, and good corporate performance (Letza et al, 2004). 
According to Davis et al (1997) the stewardship theory is embedded in the 
psychological and sociological perspectives of corporate governance that view 
managers as collectivist and decent. The psychological and sociological perspectives 
of corporate governance assume that all managers are not the same; hence some 
PDQDJHUVDUHWUXHVXERUGLQDWHVVDWLVI\LQJVKDUHKROGHUV¶LQWerests rather than pursuing 
individual motives (Lane et al, 1998). Consequently, Letza et al (2004) suggest that 
managers are good stewards that work for the maximisation of profit and enhance 
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RZQHU¶V ZHDOWK 'RQDOGVRQ DQG 3UHVWRQ  'DYLV et al, 1997; Balabanis et al, 
1998; Robin, 2008). 
Furthermore, the stewardship theory highlights the fact that managers will satisfy 
their own objectives better by satisfying that of the corporation (Davis et al, 1997). 
According to Davis et al (1997) stewardship theory helps to resolve the agency 
problems, identified namely, the motivational variability by asserting that managers 
are more servant-like, pro-corporations, and trustworthy in nature. On the contrary, 
agency theory portrays managers as self-centred, opportunistic and wasteful (Jensen, 
1993). However, the stewardship theory disputes managerial opportunism by 
portraying managers as honest, dependable and having good intention, such as 
improving organisational performance (Davis et al, 1997). 
Lane et al (1998) suggest that there are many situations in which managers serve their 
RZQ LQWHUHVWV ZKLOH VHUYLQJ VKDUHKROGHUV¶ LQWHUHVW $V D UHVXOW PDQDJHUV SXW WKH
LQWHUHVWRIWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQILUVW$OVRVRPHRIWKHVHGLUHFWRUV¶GHFLVLRQVDUHOLNHO\WR
be influenced by financial performance (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Baysinger 
et al, 1991) and because of the need to protect their reputations; they are likely to 
behave in a way that maximises shareholder returns (Daily et al, 2003). Therefore, 
stewardship theory LVDVVXPHGWREHLQOLQHZLWKVDWLVI\LQJWKHVKDUHKROGHUV¶LQWHUHVW
only.  
Nonetheless, Kay and Silberston (1995) disagree and view stewardship theory from 
another assumption of human nature, referring to managers as trustees. Kay and 
Silberston (1995) suggest that managers are trustees to the companies rather than 
EHLQJ DJHQWV WR WKH VKDUHKROGHUV :KDW LV HVVHQWLDO LQ WKH DXWKRUV¶ DUJXPHQW LV WKH
trust existing between managers and shareholders? Therefore, stewardship theory 
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argues that managers, by acting as trustees to the company, satisfy a wider group of 
stakeholders. 
6XEVHTXHQWO\WKHPDQDJHUVVDWLVI\PXOWLSOHVWDNHKROGHUV¶JURXSVEHFDXVHWKH\ZDQW
the organisation to succeed in its endeavours. Hence, stewardship theory supports 
CSR practises by predicWLQJ WKDW &65 DFWLYLWLHV ZLOO HQKDQFH D ILUP¶V YDOXH
(Donaldson and Preston, 1995). As a result, the present study uses the stewardship 
theory to examine the impact of institutional investors and BOD characteristics on 
CSR practice in Nigeria. 
However, Davis et al (1997) identify a number of limitations associated with the 
stewardship theory. Firstly, it is assumed that all stakeholder groups have interests 
that will be well served by increasing organisational wealth. This assumption may be 
unrealistic and too simple. Even among stakeholders, there can be conflicting 
interests. For example, Johnson and Greening (1999) argue that some categories of 
institutional investors, such as, investment fund managers are more concerned with 
short-term earnings, while others such as pension fund managers are concerned with 
the long-term performance of the corporation. Secondly, Davis et al (1997) argue that 
the stewardship model may only be suitable under certain situations, for example, if 
there is a collectivist culture, that is, managers view themselves as members of one 
group (work units). Finally, the adoption of the corporate governance mechanisms is 
consistent with minimizing agency cost and reduction of steward-like behaviour in 
most large corporations (Davis et al, 1997). The next part of this section discusses 
resource dependence theory and how it sometimes supports stakeholder theory and 
CSR. 
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2.5.4 Resource Dependence Theory 
The resource dependence theory takes a middle ground approach similar to that of the 
stewardship theory (Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Russo and Fouts, 1997). Conner and 
Prahalad (1996) argue that the resource dependence perspective is a knowledge-based 
theory, built around the internal competencies of companies, for example, the assets 
which are valuable to the companies. Conner and Prahalad (1996: 477) state that the 
resource dependence theory ...based on irreducible knowledge differences between 
individuals rather than the threat of purposeful cheating or withholding of 
information. We assume limited cognitive abilities on the part of individuals 
(bounded rationality), and assume that opportunistic behaviour will not occur. 
Therefore, individuals are different with varying skills, experience, insights or 
knowledge which they bring to the organisation as asset and resources.  
Pfeiffer (1972), and Silky and Parker (2005) argue that the resource dependence 
WKHRU\ LV DQFKRUHG RQ WKH H[SHULHQFH DQG FRQQHFWLRQV RI WKH 1('V¶ DELOLW\ WR SXOO
resources from the environment to the company. The theory views the BOD as the 
go-between the corporations and communities. Furthermore, the theory suggests that 
the inclusion of NED on board brings diversity to the BOD. This helps to reduce 
transactions costs, pull resources to company and serves as a source of important 
LQIRUPDWLRQ EHFDXVH RI 1('¶V FRQWDFWV DQG FRQQHFWLRQV &RQQHU DQG 3UDKDODG
1996). On a similar note, Russo and Fouts (1997) use resource based perspective to 
show that there is a positive relationship between CSR and economic performance of 
companies.  
In addition, the resource dependence theory is seen as overlapping with the 
stakeholder theory in the sense that both theories, unlike the agency theory, 
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accommodate the fact that the firm has an obligation towards its environment (Silky 
and Parker, 2005) and by extension the multiple stakeholders (Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995; Carroll, 1999). Lynall et al (2003) state the resource dependence 
theorists view a firm as an open system, dependent on external organisations and 
environmental contingencies. By extension, the firm depend on the environment for 
its resources to be able to survive and the board is seen as playing a central role when 
PDQDJLQJ WKHFRUSRUDWLRQ¶V UHODWLRQVKLSZLWK LWVHQYLURQPHQW 3IHIIHUDQG6DODQFLN
1978). For example, using social linkages, connections and skills of NED and 
executive directors, companies are able to improve organisation performance. 
According to Prado-Lorenzo (2009) the powers that control the resources dependence 
theory belong to the controller of organisational resources, thus establishing different 
OHYHOV RI SRZHUV EHWZHHQ VWDNHKROGHUV¶ JURXSV 7KHUHIRUH WKLV FRQWULEXWHV WR
institutional investors having different goals towards organisational achievement 
(Atkinson and Galakiewicz, 1988). The different institutionDOLQYHVWRUV¶SULPDU\UROH
as resource providers tend towards satisfying different groups of stakeholders 
depending on whether their interest is long term or short term (Johnson and Greening, 
1999). In this study the resource dependence theory is used to examine the impact of 
institutional investors and BOD characteristics on CSR of PLCs in Nigeria. 
On the other hand, the primary role of the BOD, from the resource dependence 
perspectives is to serve as resource providers (Lynall et al, 2003). The board 
members may contribute to the operations of the firm by managing external 
stakeholders (Pfeffer, 1972). Also, resource dependence theory offers areas of 
guidance to the BOD. For example, while the agency theory focuses on incentives to 
monitor executive managers, the opposite is true for resource dependence theory 
which excludes the consideration of incentives that might serve to encourage board 
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members to provide resources to the corporation (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). The 
potential contribution of resource dependence theory in understanding the 
relationship between corporate governance and CSR is, however, largely restricted to 
the BOD. The next part of this section discusses the institutional theory and how it 
supports CSR practices. 
2.5.5 Institutional Theory 
The institutional theory is rooted in the economics, sociology and political science 
field19. The institutional theory refers to the flexibility of the social structure. 
According to Scott (2004: 2) institutional theory considers the processes by which 
structures, including schemes, rules, norms, and routines became established as 
authoritative guidelines for social behaviour. It inquiries into how these elements are 
created, diffused, adopted, and adapted over space and time; and how they fall into 
decline and disuse. In other words, institutionalisation refers to the repeated processes 
that have similar meanings over a number of times (Bondy, 2008). For instance, the 
Code of Ethics and Standard Practice in organisation is governed by institutional 
theory.  
Selznick (1957) argues that the organisation is an adaptive mechanism that is shaped 
DFFRUGLQJ WR SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ FKDUDFWHULVWLFV LQIOXHQFHV FRQVWUDLQWV DQG FRPPLWPHQWV
from the external environment (Monks and Minows, 2004; 2008). As a result, 
                                                 
19
 The economic field focuses on individual as rational utility maximisers if institutions provide 
benefits greater than cost to the individual. The political perspectives refer to the way political 
institutions influences decisions, structures, processes, forms and outcomes while the sociology 
perspectives focuses on the new institutional theory, hence the most suitable for gaining insight into 
how corporations interact with the environment (Scott, 2004; Bondy, 2008). 
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institutionalisation is firm specific and time specific, as well as a process of creating 
values and reality (Selznick, 1957). 
In addition, Scott (2004) argues that it is the external environment that shapes the 
processes and forms within an organisation. For example, the role of Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs), government, media and unions shape 
organisational processes in governance and CSR, such as the employees. Scott (2004) 
concludes that the organisational arrangements and forms are not designed by 
economic laws but by the social, culture and political factors and processes.  
Besides, the institutional theory approach is embedded in sociology and adopted by 
social science and management scholars in studying organisations (Scott, 1987; 
2004), and is known as new institutional theory. The new institutional theory offers 
insightful perspectives about CSR acceptability in the business field. Consequently, 
the new institutional theory, offers a useful tool for analysing how firms are affected 
by their wider environment especially on the planning and execution of CSR 
practices within PLCs. 
Similarly, Campbell (2006) in exploring the role of institutional theory in shaping 
CSR argues that the institutions (governance rules, norms and standards) influence 
companies to engage in CSR. This is done through restraining corporate behaviours 
using rules and punitive sanctions, for example, imposing sanctions against 
irresponsible companies through fines and fees. Hence, institutions can enable actions 
by creating favourable incentives to influence participants and actors to behave in 
certain ways. Campbell (2006) concludes that companies engage in CSR if they 
encounter more pressures from compliances to government regulations, rules and 
laws. Also, pressures from NGO and tKHLQGXVWULDOVHFWRU¶VVHOI-regulation rules make 
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companies to engage in CSR activities. The author suggests that the extent of CSR in 
companies will depend on the ability of the company to engage in institutionalised 
dialogue with various stakeholders.  
2.5.6 Legitimacy Theory 
Suchman (1995:574) defined legitimacy as a generalised perception or assumption 
that the actions on an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions. This means that 
corporate policies and actions of organisations should conform to societal values, if 
they are to be accepted by the society as legitimate. According to Davis (1973) a 
corporation operating in any given society must exercise its power judiciously and in 
a responsible way. The author further states that if the corporation fails to operate in a 
responsible manner, the society will be forced to protest and withdraw its support and 
legitimacy to the corporation. This is also called Social Licence to Operate (SLTO)20. 
According to Idemudia (2009) Multinational Companies (MNCs) in Nigeria engage 
in CSR because they want to legitimise their operational activities in the community. 
In other words, companies want the community to perceive them as good corporate 
citizens because of their involvement in CSR (Eweje, 2006; Tuolodo, 2008). 
According to Seth (1979) businesses are social institutions that must use their powers 
responsibly, if they are to survive in the long term and be accepted by the society. 
Also, Carroll (1999) argues that corporations derive their benefits from society which 
confers legitimacy on them and ensure their continued survival as wealth creators. 
Therefore, corporations should be responsible to the society and community, such 
                                                 
20The SLTO is the community approval or consent that corporate bodies must obtain from the host 
communities in areas where they are operating (www.policyinnovations.org accessed on 20/10/2010). 
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that the BODs and investors use CSR as a tool to enhance company legitimacy 
(Idemudia, 2007a). In the same vein, Hannifin and Cooke (2005) state that 
organisational legitimacy is essential for ensuring social worthiness, while corporate 
survival (Eweje, 2006), ensures that their operations are perceived as good to the 
consumers (Joyner and Payne, 2002). This will ensure repeated patronage and long 
term survival of the firm (Carroll, 1991). 
On a similar note, Dowling and Pfeiffer (1975) propose that a corporation becomes 
legitimate through its operations in the community when it is considered noble, 
worthy and just by the society. However, when corporations fail in their 
responsibility of protecting the environment by avoiding oil spillage, the government 
may decide to punish them through payment of fines and taxes, which will increase 
WKHFRVWRIRSHUDWLRQ&DVVLQL¶VDQG9DOHV 
Also, Davis (1973) argues that the inability of the BOD to focus on CSR practices 
WRZDUGV VDWLVI\LQJ WKH VWDNHKROGHUV¶ JURXS FDQ Pake the society and community 
withdraw its legitimacy. Consequently, Reinhardt et al (2008) stated that this lack of 
legitimacy can cause FRPSDQLHV¶WR loss talented employees, competent personnel and 
the ability to operate peacefully in the community. Therefore, these punitive measures 
can force the management of an irresponsible corporation to behave socially 
responsible within the community (Nasi et al, 1997).  
Furthermore, Nasi et al (1997) argue that the image and impression acquired by the 
corporation helps to confer legitimacy on it, but this image and impression change 
from time to time and this can affect its legitimacy in the long run. This is why 
corporations must ensure that their image, perception and expectations from the 
society must be monitored and maintained at all times (Lindblom, 1994). By 
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PRQLWRULQJ WKHLU &65 DFWLYLW\ DQG LWV LPSDFW RQ DOO VWDNHKROGHUV WKH FRPSDQLHV¶
survival in the long term is guaranteed (Nasi et al, 1997; Prado-Lorenzo et al, 2009b). 
Otherwise there exists a gap known as the legitimacy gap (Eweje, 2006), referred to 
ZKHQWKHFRUSRUDWLRQ¶VSHUIRUPDQFHDQGH[SHFWDWLRQVIURPWKHVRFLHW\EHJLQWRZLGHQ
6HWK  7KLV OHJLWLPDF\ JDS FDQ FDXVH WKH FRPSDQ\¶V ORQJ WHUP IXWXUH DQG
existence to be in jeopardy (Reinhardt et al, 2008).  
In the case of Nigeria, Eweje (2006) argues that there is a legitimacy gap between oil 
companies and host communities in the Niger Delta region of the country. This 
legitimacy gap is traced to the policies and procedures employed by some MNCs in 
their operations (Eweje, 2006). For instance, the Shell Petroleum Development 
Corporation (SPDC) uses their public relations department to improve their 
relationships with the communities by providing social amenities, such as pipe water, 
school blocks and hospital equipment (Rwabizambuga, 2007). However, Eweje 
(2006) argues that despite the claim by SPDC on CSR practices in the Niger Delta 
region, the local communities still perceive the responses and efforts of SPDC as 
double standards; public relation stunts and inadequate policies especially among the 
Ogoni people of the region.  
Collaborating Eweje (2006) is Rwabizambuga (2007) and Idemudia (2007b) who 
reiterate the presence of legitimacy gap between oil MNCs and local community 
expectations in Nigeria. In bridging this gap, Idemudia (2007b) suggests that efforts 
should be made by companies to widen the range of communications between the 
MNCs and its stakeholders. Thus, the PLCs are becoming conscious of the 
consequences of their operations within the society which has influenced them to 
change from creating wealth not only for shareholders, but also to satisfy other 
groups of stakeholders (Carroll, 1999; Shahin and Zari, 2007). 
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Following the discussions above, the development of agency, stakeholders, 
stewardship, resource dependence, institutional and legitimacy theories exposes the 
need to understand the strategic CSR practices of companies. According to Mahmud 
and Ritz (2008) corporate governance mechanisms such as, the different institutional 
investors and BOD characteristics help to understand the role of companies in CSR. 
Particularly, how the role of governance structure and mechanism influences CSR.  
This study takes a posture and assumes that business organisation should not only 
pursue their economic interest but should, also pursue the ethical and social 
responsibility in other to be sustainable in the long term (Carroll, 1991; 1999; Aras 
and Crowther, 2008). This embedded CSR responsibility by corporate organisation is 
supported by the stakeholder theory. Given these concerns, this thesis will examine 
the roles of different institutional investors and BOD characteristics on CSR.  The 
next section considers the empirical studies on the different institutional investors and 
BOD characteristics on CSR. This further provides insight into the heterogeneous 
nature of institutional investors and BOD characteristics and how they affect CSR 
activities in companies. 
2.6 Empirical Analysis of the Role of Institutional Investors and Board of 
Director Characteristics on Corporate Social Responsibility 
The literature review on the empirical studies on the role of different institutional 
investors and BOD characteristics on CSR show various dimensions and varied 
results. Different institutional investors pursue different organisational goals and have 
different preferences for CSR practices. For example, some institutional investors 
pursue long term goals, while others are interested in the short term goals (Waddock 
and Graves, 1997; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Bartkus et al, 2002; Neubaum and 
Zahra, 2006). 
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2.6.1 The Role of Institutional Investors on Corporate Social Responsibility 
The relationships between institutional investors and CSR are mixed (Coffey and 
Fryxell, 1991; Graves and Waddock, 1994; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Goergen 
and Ronneboog, 2002; Bartkus et al, 2002; Neubaum and Zahra, 2006; Wahba, 2010; 
5DVLF  :KDW LVQ¶W FOHDU LV WKH H[WHQW RI KRZ LQVWLWXWLRQDO LQYHVWRUV DIIHFW 
stakeholders? This is because some institutional investors may have short term 
orientation in their investment approach (Graves and Waddock, 1994), ensuring 
return on investment for shareholders. However, other institutional LQYHVWRUV¶
companies are long term oriented (Coffey and Fryxell, 1991; Johnson and Greening, 
1999). Examples of long term institutional investors include pension fund and 
insurance companies while short term institutional investors are investment banks and 
mutual fund companies. 
Graves and Waddock (1994), Waddock and Graves (1997), Johnson and Greening 
(1999); and Cox et al (2004; 2008) find a positive relationship between long term 
institutional investors and CSR, suggesting that increased CSR practices attract a 
higher number of institutional investors. Graves and Waddock (1994) findings show 
CSR is a risk reducing measure, hence, offering investors some predictions of an 
efficient market theory. Thus, prompting them to invest in pro-CSR companies with 
lower risk. In fact, Johnson and Greening (1999) state that the positive relationship 
between the long term institutional investors and CSR imply that effective CSR 
practices enhance product quality, responsiveness to the community, and promote 
good environmental management. In a related study, Cox et al (2004) suggest that 
pressure from regulatory authorities forces long term institutional investors to engage 
in CSR. Also, Atkinson and Galaskiewicz (1988) suggest that companies that engage 
in CSR and social oriented seminars (on social issues) are more likely to assume CSR 
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as enlightened self-interest principle. 
On the other hand, Waddock and Graves (1997); Johnson and Greening (1999) and 
Neubaum and Zahra (2006) examine the link between short term institutional 
investors and CSR. They find insignificant relationship between short term 
institutional investors and CSR. Accordingly, Johnson and Greening (1999) short 
term institutional investors, for example, the investment bankers, pursue short term 
gain, based on quarterly outcomes and therefore do not support CSR.  
Conversely, several studies (Coffey and Fryxell, 1991; Cox et al, 2008; Andayani et 
al, 2008; Wahba, 2010) find no relationship between institutional investors and CSR. 
Though, Wahba (2010) argue that under certain conditions of resource availability 
and limited investment options, institutional investors engage in CSR. On the whole, 
the author concluded that the findings are inconclusive. 
In other related studies, Coffey and Fryxell (1991) use numbers of women as proxy 
for CSR measures. According to Coffey and Fryxell (1991) the use of women as 
proxy for CSR measure creates uncertainty in the directionality of influence of 
institutional investors on CSR. These findings indicate that institutional investors do 
not influence the BOD and management enough through corporate decisions to 
engage in CSR because of the need to make quick returns on their large investments. 
Similarly, Cox et al (2008) and Andayani et al (2008) finding indicate that the 
institutional investors are not interested in CSR because they pursue short term 
interest of maximising profit. In contrast, Consolandi et al (2008) find a negative 
relationship between institutional investors and CSR. The negative findings imply 
that institutional investors are interested in holding a temporary stake in the 
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companies. This short term interest by investors prevents management from 
allocating resources to CSR. 
Previous studies reviewed so far reveal that institutional investors such as long term 
and short term investors have different preferences for CSR. While long term 
institutional investors support CSR, the short term institutional investors do not 
support CSR. This suggests mixed and inconclusive findings. Therefore, further 
studies are needed to examine the relationship between different institutional 
investors and CSR.  
Moreover, many authors argue that the institutional investors have different 
preferences for CSR (Waddock and Graves, 1997; Johnson and Greening, 1999; 
Neubaum and Zahra, 2006). Based on these different preferences, several authors 
have distinguished institutional investors into different groups (Cumming and Johan, 
2004; Lydenberg, 2007; Rashid and Lodh, 2008). Lydenberg (2007) divided 
institutional investors into universal, social and rational investors. The author argues 
that both the universal and social investors seek to benefit from return on the 
economy and society, while the rational investors benefit from return on market 
because of the portfolio market theory. 
In addition, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) divide institutional investors into large and 
diffused (small) investors. In another study, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) find that 
diffused shareholders are disadvantaged due to information asymmetry. Diffuse 
shareholders have less motivation to monitor the BOD unlike the institutional 
investors who have huge investment, for instance, the institutional investors do not 
only put pressure on managers to perform, but also demand accountability and 
transparency from them (Johnson and Greening, 1999). Bingham et al (2011) find 
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family investors support CSR rather than non-family investors. The author states that 
family investors are more interested in relationship building and stakeholder 
satisfaction compared to non-family investors that are individualistic and averse to 
social issues. 
In the same line, Rashid and Lodh (2008) introduce managerial ownership (inside 
RZQHUVKLSDQGIDPLO\RZQHUVKLSDVDQRWKHUW\SHRILQVWLWXWLRQDOLQYHVWRUV¶variables. 
Rashid and Lodh (2008) find family investors to be positively associated with CSR. 
The findings indicate that the family investors engage in CSR because they want to 
comply with regulation that mandates companies to ensure the presence of NED in 
BOD, thus, promoting board independence. In fact, Rashid and Lodh (2008) findings 
contradict the finding of Consolandi et al (2008) that show a negative relationship 
between institutional investors and CSR. These mixed findings suggest the use of 
YDU\LQJ W\SHV RI LQVWLWXWLRQDO LQYHVWRUV¶ YDULDEOHV DV SUR[LHV 7KHVH LQFRQFOXVLYH
findings raise additional calls for more research to investigate and examine the roles 
of institutional investors in CSR. 
Furthermore, past studies investigate the influence of the role of indigenous, foreign 
and government institutional investors on CSR (Cumming and Johan, 2004; Rasic, 
2010). For indigenous institutional investors (see, Earnhart and Lizal, 1999; 2002; 
Choe et al, 2005); foreign institutional investors (Dasgupta et al, 2000; Eskeland and 
Harrision, 2003; Prasanna, 2008; Song et al, 2009; Chai, 2010); government 
institutional investors (Nazli and Ghazali, 2007; Said et al, 2009; Zhang et al, 2009; 
Li and Zhang, 2010). In this present study, the impact of indigenous, foreign and 
government institutional investors and how they affect CSR of PLCs in Nigeria are 
investigated.  
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Using a different methodological approach, Petersen and Vredenburg (2009a) use the 
case study method to examine the link between institutional investors and CSR 
practices in Canada. Petersen and Vredenburg (2009a; 2009b) find institutional 
investors favour companies that engage in CSR. This is because investors perceive 
CSR as a risk mitigating strategy that offers a competitive advantage to the company 
(Hockets and Moir, 2004) and enhances its financial performance (Cummings and 
Burritt, 2007). 
Similarly, Marshall et al (2009) use the case study method to explore the link 
between institutional investors and CSR in Australia. The study reveals institutional 
investors favour CSR, for instance, long term HPSOR\HHV¶ZHOIDUH management. This 
suggests that institutional investors promote long term value in companies. Marshall 
et al (2009) finding contradicts both the findings of Guyatt (2005) and Hendry et al 
(2006) that suggest institutional investors have short term horizons by satisfying the 
shareholders interest of maximising profit. 
Conversely, Guyatt (2005) and Hendry et al (2006) explore the influence of 
behaviour and perception of institutional investors on CSR in the UK. The authors 
find institutional investors do not support CSR. The findings reveal a number of 
behavioural challenges such as short term approach, reluctance in adopting CSR 
practices, defensibility of decisions and policies by investors aimed at short term 
objectives. This finding suggests that rules, conventions and the market influence the 
institutional investors to favour the short term approach of maximising profit. 
Consequently, the long term projects are viewed as riskier since the market is 
structured on short term horizon. Surprisingly, Guyatt (2005) findings disagree with 
Petersen and Vredenburg (2009a; 2009b); Clark and Hebb (2005). While, Clark and 
Hebb (2005) find that the global market influence institutional investors, Proffitt and 
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Spicer (2006); Ullah and Jamali (2010) find that culture and religion both influence 
institutional investors to favour CSR. 
On the whole, these studies use aggregated institutional investors in their qualitative 
approach (using case study and interview methods) to investigate the relationship 
between investors and CSR. The assumption is that institutional investors are one-
dimensional and possesses the same characteristics. In contrast, this study uses the 
case study method to explore the heterogeneous nature of institutional investors and 
how they affect CSR. The different institutional investors such as the indigenous, 
foreign and government institutional investors, and their role in CSR are therefore 
explored. 
Following the portrayed facts above, the debate concerning the relationship between 
types of institutional investors and CSR is still varied and indecisive. These mixed 
findings could as a result of the heterogeneous nature of institutional investors. 
Hence, the reason different institutional investors pursue different organisational 
goals. This could be attributed to their aim to satisfy multiple stakeholders (Johnson 
and Greening, 1999). Therefore, this study will further explore this relationship 
between investors and CSR. The next part of this chapter discusses the relationships 
between the indigenous, foreign and government institutional investors and CSR, 
starting with the indigenous institutional investors.  
2.6.2 Indigenous Institutional Investors and Corporate Social Responsibility 
Past studies on the role of indigenous institutional investors and CSR is contradictory 
(Earnhart and Lizal, 1999; 2002; Choe et al, 2005; Said et al, 2009). Earnhart and 
Lizal (1999) examined the effect of types of institutional investors on CSR using an 
unbalanced panel of 884 companies in 1998. Five different institutional investors 
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were employed namely, government21, financial entities (banks, investment 
companies, insurance companies, pension fund managers), indigenous investors, 
investments fund managers and other companies. The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
regression estimator is used to test the effects of types of institutional investors on 
CSR. Earnhart and Lizal (1999) find a positive relationship between indigenous 
institutional investors and CSR. However, in the same study, they find government 
institutional investors show no relationship with CSR. The authors argue that the 
indigenous institutional investors perceive CSR practices as helping companies to 
lower fines and mitigate negative risk. This is because the indigenous institutional 
investors are more knowledgeable about the concern of the community. Accordingly, 
Earnhart and Lizal (1999) finding illustrates that different institutional investors show 
different preferences for CSR activities. Our study differs from that of Earnhart and 
Lizal (1999) in terms of methodology. In this study, a mixed method approach is 
adopted. While Earnhart and Lizal used cross sectional data and OLS, this study used 
panel data, random and fixed effect estimators. The Pooled OLS, fixed and random 
effect estimators are used in addition to the case study method. These approaches are 
more robust because they provide depth and deeper understanding.  
In another study, Earnhart and Lizal (2002) present the effect of different institutional 
investors on CSR. Six different institutional investors, namely, government investors, 
indigenous investors, investment funds, portfolio companies, bank and strategic 
investors22 are employed. Also, the authors studied the effects of privatisation policy 
from 1996 to 1998 using an unbalanced panel data. Pooled OLS, fixed effect and 
                                                 
21The government institutional investors refer to government shareholding where it retains shares in 
private companies and can pressure companies to engage in CSR disclosure (Said et al, 2009). 
22The strategic investors are the concentrated ownership while banks are the investment bankers or 
fund managers referred to as institutional investors (Earnhart and Lizal, 2002). 
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random effect estimators are used to establish that strategic investors are positively 
related to CSR.  
In both studies of Earnhart and Lizal (1999) and (2002), the foreign institutional 
investors were not used. Consequently, the effect of foreign institutional investors on 
CSR was not fully captured. The authors argue that the study considered the 
privatisation exercise from 1996-1998 and centred on how much foreign investors 
participate since they have the resources to acquire new company compared to 
indigenous investors. However, this study incorporates foreign investors as one of its 
explanatory variables. It is argued that developing countries rely on foreign 
investments as part of the engine for economic development that can produce great 
changes to the socio-economic challenges (Zadek, 2001; Earnhart and Lizal, 2002). In 
contrast, a further attempt is made in this study, to investigate and understand the 
effect of foreign institutional investors on CSR. This is one of the objectives of this 
study. 
Choe et al (2005) in their study on trading experiences in Korea, argue that 
indigenous institutional investors are better traders than foreign investors. They 
conclude that the indigenous institutional investors have an edge over foreign 
investors as prices move up against foreign institutional investors in trading domestic 
stocks and shares. Also, indigenous institutional investors pay less during trading of 
small, medium and large stocks compared to foreign investors because of their 
understanding of the local market environment and trading experiences. 
Past studies on indigenous institutional investors and CSR are still varied and 
inconsistent (See, Earnhart and Lizal, 1999; 2002; Choe et al, 2005; Said et al, 2009), 
implying that institutional investors have different goals and hence show different 
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preferences for CSR activities (See, Coffey and Fryxell, 1991; Graves and Waddock, 
1994; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Neubaum and Zahra, 2006; Wahba, 2010; Rasic, 
2010). As a result, this forms part of the objectives addressed in this study. The next 
part of this section discusses the relationship between foreign institutional investors 
and CSR.  
2.6.3 Foreign Institutional Investors and Corporate Social Responsibility 
Studies on foreign institutional investors and CSR are also mixed and inconclusive 
(see, Dasgupta et al, 2000; Eskeland and Harrision, 2003; Prasanna, 2008; Song et al, 
2009; Chai, 2010). Prasanna (2008) argues that the foreign institutional investors 
provide the avenues for nations to have access to foreign capital which increases the 
level of economic activities and development (Song et al, 2009). Generally, Rasic 
(2010) argues that foreign institutional investors normally emanate from developed 
economies. These foreign investors include MNCs such as Chevron, ExxonMobil, 
Lever Brothers and Cadbury PLCs to mention a few. By extension, they move to 
developing countries because of increased globalisation and low barriers (Bondy et 
al, 2004; Clark and Hebb, 2005; Bondy, 2008; Carroll and Buchholz, 2009). Also, 
foreign investors are driven by the need for lower cost of production, cheaper labour, 
competition and profit maximisation (Goergen and Ronneboog, 2002; Mallin, 2004).  
Several researchers find a small effect of foreign institutional investors on CSR 
(Dasgupta et al, 2000). Dasgupta et al (2000) in examining the effect of management 
policies on CSR using survey of 236 firms in Mexico concluded that foreign 
institutional investors have little effect on CSR. This finding indicates that foreign 
institutional investors lack experience and knowledge about the environment, hence; 
find it difficult to engage in CSR. 
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On a similar note, Cole et al (2008) examine the relationship between foreign 
institutional investors and CSR in Ghana. The finding shows that foreign institutional 
investors do not influence CSR practices in Ghana. The author concluded that 
training and experience of CEO are essential to CSR.  
Conversely, Chai (2010) examines the relationship between foreign institutional 
investors and CSR using panel data of 1,017 listed Korean firms. The author finds a 
positive relationship between foreign institutional investors and CSR. Chai (2010) 
argues that big companies with high advertising budget and export orientation tend to 
favour CSR. The author concludes that CSR is strategic and discretionary, voluntary 
and embedded in the corporate philosophies of companies. This is similar to the 
views of Werther and Chandler (2006) that argue that companies should align their 
CSR practices to their corporate philosophy.  
Chai (2010) used the random effect regression estimator to test the effect of foreign 
institutional investors on CSR. The author explains that the positive relationship 
between foreign institutional investors and CSR suggest they are inclined to long 
term value, strategic goodwill or financial performance benefits. Chai (2010) finds a 
positive relationship between foreign institutional investors and CSR. This finding 
implies that CSR improves firm reputation. Ultimately, they are able to do this by 
giving companies competitive advantage over their competitors (Johnson and 
Greening, 1999; Goergen and Ronneboog, 2002; Bartkus et al, 2002; Neubaum and 
Zahra, 2006). 
Similarly, Eskeland and Harrision (2003) use panel data from four (4) host countries, 
namely, Ivory Coast, Mexico, Morocco and Venezuela to investigate the effect of 
foreign investors on CSR. The random effect and fixed effect estimators are used to 
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test the hypotheses. The empirical evidence shows positive relationship between 
foreign institutional investors and CSR. Eskeland and Harrision (2003) argue that the 
foreign institutional investors are more involved in environmental management than 
indigenous investors. Foreign institutional investors use better technological 
equipment that produce cleaner energy and pollute less.  
Conversely, Rasic (2010) finds no relationship between foreign institutional investors 
and CSR. The author finds the value of the chi-square to be 6.266, while the p-value 
is 0.652. The author investigates the effect of different institutional investors (that is, 
private, indigenous and foreign) on CSR in Croatia. The finding implies that foreign 
investors do not pressure companies to engage in good environmental practices. Rasic 
(2010) identified weak institution, lack of effective government regulation, high cost 
of new technologies as factors militating companies from engaging in CSR.  
On the same line, Ananchotikul (2008) argues that foreign institutional investors 
favour countries with weak corporate governance system because it enables them to 
exploit and take advantage of minority and disperse shareholders. Also, the author 
found that foreign institutional investors behave like insider and do not improve CSR 
and governance practices if their original country has weak corporate governance and 
regulatory system. This means that foreign institutional investors favour CSR and 
corporate governance practices if they believe that first, it will improve the firm 
performance and their investment and secondly, when they are under pressure to 
comply with existing regulatory laws, and finally, if they have strong corporate 
governance experience from their country. 
Continuing on the reason why foreign institutional investors favour CSR and 
corporate governance practices, Ananchotikul (2008) argues that the extent and level 
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of relationship between foreign institutional investors and CSR governance depends 
on the amount of shareholding. For instance, if the level of shareholding is small, 
foreign institutional investors will invest more in CSR and governance practices. 
However, the author stated that, if the shareholding is large, foreign institutional 
investors become entrenched and show little or no interest in CSR and corporate 
governance practices.  
Following the discussion above, it was revealed that some authors investigate only 
the effect of foreign institutional investors on CSR (for instance, Eskeland and 
Harrision, 2003; Cole et al, 2008), while others investigate a combination of private, 
indigenous and foreign (Rasic, 2010). In contrast, this study examine foreign, 
indigenous and government institutional investors, thereby exploring the effect of 
government institutional investors on CSR. This is one of the goals of this study, to 
understand the role of government institutional investors on CSR. The next part of 
this section discusses the relationship between government institutional investors and 
CSR.  
2.6.4 Government Institutional Investors and Corporate Social Responsibility 
Several studies on government institutional investors and CSR appear varied and 
inconclusive (Earnhart and Lizal, 2002; Nazli and Ghazali, 2007; Said et al, 2009; 
Zhang et al, 2009; Li and Zhang, 2010). Earnhart and Lizal (2002) examine the 
effects of institutional investors on CSR. This relationship according to Earnhart and 
Lizal (2002) depends on firm specific effects.  However, after controlling for firm 
specific effects which captures industry specific effect, the fixed effect estimator 
show that government institutional investors improve CSR. Also, the random effect 
estimator used to estimate the panel data show that government institutional investors 
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have no impact on CSR. In the case of the indigenous institutional investors, after 
controlling for industry specific effect, production levels and financial performance, 
produce an insignificant relationship with CSR. The authors concluded that the 
results imply that ownership structure does not directly affect CSR but indirectly 
affects financial performance, which in turn determines CSR activities. 
Likewise, Nazli and Ghazali (2007) explore the relationship between management, 
foreign and government institutional investors and CSR practices in Malaysia. The 
authors generated the data from the company annual reports (CSR data). The results 
show a positive and statistically significant relationship between government 
institutional investors and CSR. The authors concluded that government institutional 
investors are an important aspect of what influences CSR practices. Nevertheless, 
Nazli and Ghazali (2007) find that management investors engage in less CSR 
practiseV EHFDXVH RI WKHLU LQWHQWLRQ WR PD[LPLVH SURILW DQG VDWLVI\ VKDUHKROGHUV¶
interest.  
Similarly, Said et al (2009) find government institutional investors to be positively 
and significantly associated with CSR. Said et al (2009) findings indicate that the 
higher the government shareholding in Malaysian PLCs, the higher the level of CSR. 
Said et al (2009) argue government investors can influence companies to allocate 
their resources towards CSR practices. Also, the authors explain that among the types 
of institutional investors, the government institutional investors are the most 
important corporate governance mechanism. The government institutional investors 
ensure PLCs comply with the legal requirements and accounting standards. 
Therefore, the positive association of government investors and CSR is aimed at 
reducing agency cost and alleviating the agency problem between managers and 
shareholders, public and stakeholders. The government institutional investors can 
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reduce negative outcomes on companies by mandating companies to provide more 
disclosures and transparency thereby enhancing company legitimacy. However, Said 
et al (2009) finding of a positive relationship between government institutional 
investors and CSR contradict the negative relationship between government 
institutional investors and CSR (see, Zhang et al, 2009).  
Moreover, Li and Zhang (2010) investigate the link between types of institutional 
investors; political interference and CSR in China using 692 manufacturing PLCs. Li 
and Zhang (2010) use multivariate analysis to test their hypothesis. The authors find 
government institutional investors to be positively related to CSR. This positive 
finding is supported by Dasgupta et al (1997) that argue government institutional 
investors tend to engage in CSR in order to favour government policies. Also, Li and 
Zhang (2010) report political interference has a positive and significant relationship 
with CSR. The findings suggest government institutional investors influence CEOs to 
pursue social issues relating to the policies of government, for example, 
infrastructural developments  (Rwabizambuga, 2007 and Oyefusi, 2007b), offering 
employment (Turban and Greening, 1997) and environmental management (Wahba, 
2010). According to Li and Zhang (2010) these are politically motivated objectives 
that pressurise CEOs to pursue CSR.  
Nevertheless, Li and Zhang (2010) find non-state owned companies (i.e. private 
firms) to be negative and significant with CSR. This indicate that institutional 
investors in non-state owned companies (institutional investors) expropriate disperse 
investors. This is similar to findings of Atkinson and Galaskiewicz (1988) that 
disperse investors are being marginalised by large investors, hence do not invest in 
CSR. Also, institutional investors influence management to achieve their own 
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interests by ignoring other stakeholders, by not involving in CSR (Hendry et al, 2006; 
Guyatt, 2005; Consolandi et al, 2008). 
The limitation of Li and Zhang (2010) is the use of non-state owned companies as a 
proxy for institutional investors. This does not reveal if the types of institutional 
LQYHVWRUVDUHLQGLJHQRXVRUIRUHLJQ,WKDVEHHQDUJXHGWKDW&KLQD¶VHFRQRPLFJURZWK
has been influenced by both foreign and indigenous institutional investors (Chen, 
2001). Therefore, this study incorporates foreign ownership as a variable and 
examines the specific effect of these types of institutional investors (indigenous, 
foreign and government) on CSR using institutional investors as independent 
variables (Johnson and Greening, 1999). 
On the contrary, Zhang et al (2009) examine the role of institutional investors on 
CSR using 686 firms in China. Zhang et al (2009) find government institutional 
investors to be negatively related to CSR. The authors noted that government 
institutional investors do not favour CSR. The finding indicates that the government 
owned companies are poor in managing company assets, thereby making losses 
because they interfere with the company operations. Zhang et al (2009) finding 
contradicts Li and Zhang (2010) that finds government institutional investors to be 
positively related to CSR. The reason for these contradictions could be the use of 
different CSR measures. For instance, the use of cash donations as CSR measures by 
Zhang et al (2009). The author uses cash donations to earthquake victims as a proxy 
for CSR while Li and Zhang (2010) used the CSR rating from Shanghai National 
Accounting Institute index as proxy for CSR measure. In essence, the Shanghai 
National Accounting Institute index is formulated to follow the standard of the SA 
8000 issued by Social Accountability Index.  
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Nonetheless, Rasic (2010) finds an insignificant relationship between government 
institutional investors and CSR. Rasic (2010) uses environmental performance as a 
proxy for CSR measures. The author argues that government institutional investors 
are inefficient in allocation of firm resources. 
The review of both the theoretical and empirical literature suggests that the role of 
different institutional investors in determining CSR has received considerable interest 
from researchers and scholars. In particular, the impact of the different institutional 
investors in determining CSR practices in developed countries has been common. For 
example, Aguilera et al (2006) argue that the institutional investors in developed 
countries paid more attention to social and environmental concerns. However, these 
kinds of studies are lacking in developing countries (Cole et al, 2008). This study 
undertakes one of such investigations in the direction of CSR by PLCs in developing 
countries, such as Nigeria. 
In view of the discussions above, previous studies on the effect of different 
institutional investors on CSR revealed not only varied and inconclusive findings, but 
show that the effects are firm and country specific (Consolandi et al, 2008). 
Therefore, because of this gap, there is the need to examine the impact of different 
institutional investors on CSR in Nigeria. This study intends to achieve that aim and 
resolve this problem in the body of literature. So, it is the prediction of this study that 
the indigenous, foreign and government institutional investors influence PLCs to 
engage in CSR. The next section reviews the role of the BOD characteristics on CSR. 
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2.6.5 The Role of Board of Director Characteristics and Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
The role of the BOD includes strategy, control and service. For instance, formulating 
goals, rules and strategies for the organisation, 2) monitoring and rewarding 
performance and 3) providing and securing resources for the company and the 
HQYLURQPHQW+XQJ7KHVHUROHVRI%2'LQFOXGHVRPHRIWKHFRPSDQLHV¶&65
policies which shape the CSR structure and implementation. 
Extensive literature has been documented in past studies on the role of BOD 
characteristics on CSR, and the findings are also diverse (Wang and Coffey, 1992; 
Johnson and Greening, 1999; Werbel and Carter, 2002; Dunn and Sainty, 2009; 
Kruger, 2010). The role of BOD characteristics on CSR focuses on board 
composition, that is, the Non-Executive Director (NED) and executive director 
(Pfeffer, 1972), board size (Conyon and Peck, 1998), and board diversity (Campbell 
and Minguez-Vera, 2008; Post et al, 2011). 
2.6.6 Board of 'LUHFWRUV¶&RPSRVLWLRQ and Corporate Social Responsibility 
Several studies on the role of board composition23 on CSR are equally mixed (Wang 
and Coffey, 1992; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Werbel and Carter, 2002; Dunn and 
Sainty, 2009; Kruger, 2010). In terms of the relationship between NED and CSR, 
several authors find the inclusions of NED in board to be positively related to CSR 
(Coffey and Wang, 1998; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Post et al, 2011). According 
to Johnson and Greening (1999) the NEDs would bring their skills, connection and 
                                                 
23The board composition refers to the total number of executive directors and non-executive directors 
present in the board (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). 
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contact to the board; thereby encouraging the long-term survival of the corporation. 
7KH DXWKRUV QRWH WKDW WKH 1('V¶ LQYROYHPHQW LQ &65 KHOSV WR HQKDQFH SURGXFW
quality and good environmental practices with the aim of satisfying a wider group of 
stakeholders (Pfeffer, 1972).  
In addition, Wang and Coffey (1992) analyse the relationship between NED and CSR 
using multiple regression analysis to test hypotheses. The authors find a positive 
relationship between NED and CSR. However, the shortcoming in Wang and Coffey 
(1992) are the use of agency theory in formulating their hypotheses. In fact, other 
theories were ignored, such as the stewardship (Davis et al, 1997), resource 
dependence (Silky and Parker, 2005) and stakeholders (Heslin and Ochoa, 2008; 
Benson et al, 2009; Chai, 2010). In that regard, this study attempts to resolve this 
shortcoming by using these theories (stewardship, resource dependence and 
stakeholders) to explore the relationships between BOD composition and CSR. 
In contrast to the positive relationship between NED and CSR, Ibrahim and 
Angelides (1995); Ibrahim et al (2003) and Rodriguez-Dominguez et al (2009) find 
no significant relationship between NED and CSR. Ibrahim and Angelides (1995) 
examine the relationship between board composition and CSR using secondary data 
and postal questionnaires. Ibrahim and Angelides (1995) use correlation analysis and 
MONOVA regression technique to test the hypotheses. The authors find no 
significant relationship between NED and CSR. Similarly, Rodriguez-Dominguez et 
al (2009) explain that the insignificant relationship between the NED and CSR 
implies that NED is concern with implementing policies that protect shareholders 
interest of maximising profit. By doing this, the NED do not support CSR 
(Rodriguez-Dominguez et al, 2009). 
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As for the effect of executive directors on CSR, Wang and Coffey (1992) find 
executive directors to be positively related to CSR. Also, Werbel and Carter (2002) 
report that executive directors are significantly correlated with CSR, as suggested by 
stewardship theory thDW H[HFXWLYH GLUHFWRU¶V HQJDJHPHQW LQ &65 This is in the 
interest of shareholders because the stewardship theory assumes executive directors 
to be pro-organisational. According to Wang and Coffey (1992) executive directors 
favour CSR because CSR contributes to the community development through 
improvement in the public infrastructures. On the whole, this contributes to the long 
term relationship between the company and society.  
Also opposed to NED is (Vance 1964) who argues that executive directors rather than 
1(' KHOS WR LPSURYH D FRUSRUDWLRQ¶V SHUIRUPDQFH ZKHQ WKH\ DUH PDMRULW\ LQ WKH
board. In addition, the criticisms of NED, according to Schaffer (2002) range from 
lack of adequate information concerning the state of the corporation and its operation, 
that is, information asymmetry, a lack of total commitment to the corporation and a 
lack of time as some Needs are multi-tasked in nature, having more than one job. 
Furthermore, Kruger (2010) finds executive directors to be positively related to CSR. 
According to the author, the higher numbers of experienced executive directors in the 
BOD, influence their decision making process. The author noted that the executive 
directors prevent the BOD from pursuing short term interest, while focusing on CSR 
and stakehoOGHUV¶VDWLVIDFWLRQ7KLVDUJXPHQWRIH[HFXWLYHGLUHFWRUVIDYRXULQJ&65LV
supported by the stewardship theory. Therefore, the executive directors help to reduce 
the amount of law suits that could harm the company. Along the same lines, Kruger 
(2010) argues that executive directors reduce the occurrences of negative events such 
as litigations against the company. 
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7KH VXSSRUWHUV RI H[HFXWLYH GLUHFWRUV¶ GRPLQDWHG ERDUGV DUJXH WKDW H[HFXWLYH
directors have access to information about the day to day affairs of the corporation 
DQGLQIRUPDWLRQRQVHQLRUPDQDJHU¶VSHUIRUPDQFH%D\VLQJHUDQG+RVNLVVRQ
According to Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) executive directors favour smaller 
growth firms, high research and development intensity and firms with low 
diversification strategy.  
Given the review of past studies on the relationship between board composition and 
CSR, the findings still remain mixed, as most studies are based on developed 
countries. However, this study will focus on developing countries, such as, Nigeria 
where empirical evidence is lacking. The next part of this section discusses the 
relationship between the board size and CSR.  
2.6.7 Board Size and Corporate Social Responsibility 
Many authors differ on how the board size24 affects the quality of BO'¶V GHFLVLRQ
making process (Johnson et al, 1993; Dalton et al, 1998; Filatotchev and Bishop, 
2002; Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002).While, Sanda et al (2010); Conyon and Peck 
(1998) argue that board size affects financial performance, Kruger (2010) notes that 
board size affects CSR. 
Jensen (1993) argues for smaller board size and suggests that larger boards are more 
likely to incur higher agency costs than smaller BOD. In other words, larger BODs 
are less active and participatory compared to smaller BOD (Sanda et al, 2010). This 
PD\ LQGXFH PDQDJHUV WR EHFRPH RSSRUWXQLVWLF DQG XQDEOH WR FDUU\ RXW %2'V¶
monitoring activities on CSR (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002). Consequently, larger 
                                                 
24
 The board size refers to the total number of directors on the board of companies including the 
executive directors and NEDs (Ogbechie et al, 2009). 
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%2'VEHFRPHOHVVHIIHFWLYHWKDQWKHLUVPDOOHUERDUGV¶FRXQWHUSDUWV*RRGVWHLQet al, 
1994; Yermack, 1996; Conyon and Peck, 1998; Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002; Amaeshi 
et al, 2006). In terms of the appropriate board size, Sanda et al (2010) propose a BOD 
size of ten as the effective board size, while Jensen (1993) proposes a BOD size of 
seven members for each company. This could be one of the ways of dealing with the 
increase in agency cost associated with larger BODs (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
Consistent with Jensen (1993) argument, Yermack (1996) finds a negative 
relationship between BOD size and financial performance. Given the low availability 
of financial resources, the argument is that larger BODs find it difficult to engage in 
CSR (Consolandi et al, 2008). Similarly, Yermack (1996) supports smaller BODs by 
stating that smaller BODs favour higher market valuation. Along the same lines, 
Jamila et al (2010) argue that smaller BODs are more effective mechanisms to 
enhance corporate performance (McGuire et al, 1988). Besides, Conyon and Peck 
(1998) find BOD size to be negatively associated with financial performance and 
according to Earnhart and Lizal (2002) given low firm performance, companies will 
not invest in CSR. The negative findings support small BOD size and this means low 
BOD efficiency through less CSR disclosures.  
Furthermore, Goodstein et al (1994) examine the effects of BOD size on CSR in the 
US and find a negative relationship between BOD size and CSR. This finding implies 
that a large BOD may find it difficult to coordinate decisions concerning CSR. 
Goodstein et al (1994) use a panel data of 334 hospitals in the health care industry 
from 1980 to 1985. The model is estimated using weighted generalised least square. 
The finding suggests larger BOD may be unwilling to bring about a strategic change 
within a company, for example, to engage in CSR. 
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On the other hand, Ogbechie (2009) argues that larger BODs are more prone to 
conflict and difficult to coordinate. Ogbechie (2009) finds no relationship between 
BOD size and BOD involvement in the strategic decision making process of the 
company. Some of these strategic decisions include formulating CSR policies. In 
addition, Said et al (2009) find no relationship between BOD size and CSR. Said et al 
(2009) investigated the relationship between BOD characteristics and CSR. The 
authors use content analysis of Malaysians PLCs in 2006. They find that board size is 
not associated with CSR. This suggests that the board size hardly influences CSR. 
In line with Goodstein et al (1994), Kassinis and Vafeas (2002) find BOD size to be 
negatively related to CSR. Kassinis and Vafeas (2002) examine the effect of board 
size on CSR among 209 firms. The authors use logistic regression models to test the 
hypotheses. The negative results imply higher BOD size attracts higher lawsuits filed 
against the company. Kassinis and Vafeas argue that larger BODs are problematic 
because they are less cohesive in nature than smaller BOD and encounter process 
losses. Also, according to Kassinis and Vafeas (2002) larger BODs are incapable of 
having corporate strategies that prevent lawsuits against the company because of poor 
CSR practices.  
Conversely, several authors argue that the BOD provides a pool of potentially 
valuable resources for the firm (Pfeffer, 1972; Hillman et al, 2000). Pfeffer (1972) 
emphasises that larger board size assists the corporation to connect with its external 
stakeholders and gather resources (Cyert and March, 1963), reputation and good 
corporate brand (Joyner and Payne, 2002). This assertion is supported by the reqource 
dependence viaw (Russo ald Fouts, 1997). Pfeffer (1972) further argues that 
increased resources could enhancHWKHFKDQFHVRIFRUSRUDWLRQV¶ERDUGV adopting CSR. 
Also, the author argues that large BODs provide expertise and skills used to monitor 
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an entrenched executive eanagement. This indicates that larger BODs are well 
positioned to make strategic decisions. Empirically, Pfeffer (1972; 1973) finds BOD 
size to be positively related to CSR, concluding that larger BODs act as linkage to the 
community and environment. This is because the BODs are interested in the long 
term interest of the firm.  
Coleman (2007) uses panel data from 1997-2001 in four (4) African countries namely 
South Africa, Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria. The author finds that BOD size is positively 
related to maximisation of shareKROGHUV¶ YDOXH and corporate performance. The 
argument is that, given higher financial performance, managers will engage in CSR 
practices (Waddock and Graves, 1997).  
Following the discussion on BOD size and CSR, the findings remain varied. Some 
authors find a positive relationship between BOD size and CSR (Pfeffer, 1972; 1973; 
Coleman, 2007). Others such as Kassinis and Vafeas (2002) recorded a negative 
relationship between BOD size and CSR, while no relationship is sustained by Said et 
al (2009). Therefore, one of the objectives of this study is to investigate the 
relationship between BOD size and CSR aimed at contributing to the body of 
literature.  
2.6.8 Board Diversity and Corporate Social Responsibility 
Male and female directors have different values as regards CSR (Post et al, 2011). In 
GHILQLQJ ERDUG GLYHUVLW\ «as variation among its members: Coffey and Wang 
(1998:1596) argue that «WKLV YDULDWLRQ PD\ GHULYH IURP PXOWLSOH VRXUFHV VXFK DV
expertise and management background, personalities, learning styles, education, age 
and values. A board may be viewed as diverse when it is comprised of owners, non-
owning managers and outside members. Similarly, Campbell and Minguez-Vera 
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(2008: 437) defined board diversity DV WKH YDULHW\ LQKHUHQW LQ WKH ERDUG¶V
composition. This variety can be measured by a number of dimensions: gender, age, 
ethnicity, nationality, educational background, industrial experiences and 
organisational membership, among others. 
Coffey and Wang (1998) argue that diversity of BOD is positively related to CSR. 
This is because charities and donations are in line with the long-term goal of the 
company, and altruistic in nature. Coffey and Wang (1998) argue that board diversity 
reduces managerial control25, improves BOD effectiveness, and check management 
excessiveness. In a similar vein, Bear et al (2010) reiterate that board diversity 
enhances robust decision making, board effectiveness and independence. According 
to Williams (2003) board diversity encourages the BODs to be responsive to a wider 
group by satisfying the various stakeholders of the corporation. However, in the 
absence of board diversity, managerial opportunism thrives. As a result, this 
encourages inefficiency, reduced profit, hence affecting the availability of funds for 
philanthropic and charitable projects (Coffey and Wang, 1998).  
Taking a middle approach, Post et al (2011) argue that female directors favour CSR, 
only if they are more in numbers in the BODs. For example, three female directors 
and above are expected to have an impact on the board to engage in CSR. However, 
if the number falls below a minimum of three female directors in the BODs, there is 
little or no impact on CSR. 
However, Khan (2010) finds no relationship between female directors and CSR in 
%DQJODGHVK¶V EDQNV ,Q examining the role of female directors in CSR, the author 
                                                 
25Managerial control means the ability of management to influence BOD decisions and outcome 
(Coffey and Wang, 1998). 
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XVHV ERWK WKH FRQWHQW DQDO\VLV DQG PXOWLYDULDWH DQDO\VLV .KDQ¶V  ILQGLQJ
implies that female directors are new in executive roles and responsibilities. 
7KHUHIRUHDIHPDOHGLUHFWRU¶VUROHPLJht be restricted, having little or no impact on 
CSR, as a result of their small numbers in the board (Post et al, 2011). 
On the other hand, Williams (2003) finds no relationship to demonstrate that women 
as board members increase the adoption of policies in public and educational matters. 
Charitable investments or donations by corporations influence managers to adopt 
CSR, especially those with bad corporate image. This is a way to amend their image 
and increase societal acceptability (Williams, 2003). Also, Tsalikis and Ortiz-
Buonafina (1990) find no significant relationship between board diversity and CSR. 
In the same way, Rose (2007) finds no significant relationship between female 
directors and firm performance. Given low profitability, the argument is that 
companies will not invest in CSR.  
Nonetheless, Prado-Lorenzo et al (2009b) find a negative relationship between 
inclusion of women in the BODs and CSR. This finding implies that the majority of 
the male dominated BODs influence the female directors, through unconscious 
socialisation to adopt the view of the majority of board members, which is to invest 
less in CSR. 
Similarly, Rodriguez-Dominguez et al (2009) find negative and no significant 
relationship between women in BODs and CSR (the coefficient = -3.255 at Wald-
value of 2.365). The finding indicates lack of impact of women in CSR, especially on 
ethical issues. Also, the non-significant results imply few women in the board puts 
women directors in the minority group in male dominated BODs. As a result, the 
decision and view of the minority group will not be considered in the decision 
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making process of the BODs. Likewise, Rodriguez-Dominguez et al (2010) find 
mixed and inconclusive results between female directors and corporate performance. 
The authors stated that, in the telecommunication and technology sectors, female 
directors are related to corporate performance, while in the service sectors, female 
directors show a negative relationship with financial performance. Given low 
profitability, companies ZLOO QRW LQYHVW LQ &65 7KH ILQGLQJV LPSO\ WKDW ZRPHQ¶V
backgrounds are not related to the complexity of the production processes in the 
service sector. 
On the other hand, Bear et al (2010) examine the impact of board diversity and 
gender composition on CSR and firm reputation using OLS estimator to test the 
hypotheses. Bear et al (2010) find a positive and significant relationship between 
women in the BODs and firm reputation. Also, the authors find a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between CSR practices and board diversification. 
While, Ayuso et al (2007), using 946 companies from Dow Jones Global Index 
Annual Review in 2004 from 31 countries, find that the board diversity favours 
stakeholder engagements. In addition, the authors find women inclusion in board and 
stakeholder engagement to be positively related to financial performance.  
Given the review of literature concerning the role of BOD characteristics in CSR, 
studies reveal that directors differ in their preferences for CSR (Ayuso et al, 2007; 
Rodriguez-Dominguez et al, 2009). In the role of board diversity and CSR, the 
findings are varied. Some authors, as already mentioned, find a positive relationship 
between board diversity and CSR (Bear et al, 2010), negative relationship 
(Rodriguez-Dominguez et al, 2009; Prado-Lorenzo et al, 2009b), no relationship 
(Tsalikis and Ortiz-Buonafina, 1990; Rose, 2007). This makes the findings not only 
varied and inconclusive but sector and gender specific (William, 2003; Rodriguez-
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Dominguez et al, 2010). These empirical studies are carried out in developed 
economies while they are non-existent in developing economy like Nigeria. Most 
importantly, there are no studies on the role of BOD characteristics in CSR in 
Nigeria. One of the efforts in this study will be to examine the relationships between 
BOD characteristics and CSR in Nigeria. Our study is exploratory. 
The differences between this study and previous studies so far reviewed is that; 1) it 
focuses on the impact of indigenous, foreign and government institutional investors 
on CSR in Nigeria, 2) it focuses on the impact of board composition, board size and 
board diversity on CSR of PLCs in Nigeria, 3) it examines the perceptions and 
behavioural factors of indigenous investors, foreign investors, government investors, 
NEDs, executive directors, BOD size and BOD diversity and how they all influence 
CSR in Nigeria, 4) it uses both the statistical analysis and case study methods to 
examine the impact of indigenous investors, foreign investors, government investors, 
board composition, board size and board diversity on CSR in Nigeria. The next 
section reviews other factors that affect and determine CSR practices. 
2.7 Determinants of Corporate Social Responsibility 
Several authors have identified the determinants of CSR to include financial 
performance (Solomon and Hansen, 1985; Pava and Krausz, 1996; Preston and 
2¶%DQQRQ:DGGRFNDQG*UDYHV-RKQVRQDQG*UHHQLQJ+LOOPDQ
and Keim, 2001; Orlitzky et al, 2003; Amaeshi, 2010), firm size and industry type 
(McGuire et al, 1988; Mckendal et al, 1999; Waddock and Graves, 1997; 
McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). 
,QIDFWWKHUHODWLRQVKLSVEHWZHHQ&65DQGFRUSRUDWLRQV¶SHUIRUPDQFHIURPSUHYLRXV
authors show positive, negative and sometimes inconclusive findings (McWilliams 
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and Siegel, 2000). The different findings and disagreements between CSR and 
financial performance arise from both the theoretical context (Balabanis et al, 1998), 
the methodological or the empirical inconsistencies adopted by different researchers 
(Aupperle et al, 1985). Whilst some authors find positive relationships between CSR 
and financial performance (See, Solomon and Hansen, 1985; Pava and Krausz, 1996 
DQG 3UHVWRQ DQG 2¶%DQQRQ  :DGGRFN DQG *UDYHV  -RKQVRQ DQG
Greening, 1999; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Orlitzky et al, 2003; Cox et al, 2004); 
Other authors find negative or neutral relationships (Abbott and Monsen, 1979; 
Arlow and Gannon, 1982; Ullman, 1985; McWilliams and Siegel, 2000).  
In actual fact, this inconsistency between CSR and financial performance is explained 
by Amaeshi (2010), when the author writes that....CSR and financial performance 
will continue to run on competing logics until their different markets are distinctively 
articulated and/or aligned (Amaeshi, 2010: 41). Therefore, trying to compare CSR 
which is difficult to measure, unlike financial performance, that is easily measured 
using profitability is the underlying reasons for the mixed and inconclusive results 
reported in the relationships between CSR and financial performance (McWilliams 
and Siegel, 2000). 
Furthermore, the reason for the positive correlation between CSR and financial 
performance is based on stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984; Jawahar and 
McLaughlin, 2001; Freeman and McVea, 2001). The stakeholder theory anchors on 
the fact that the value of corporation (performance) is determined by costs namely 
implicit cost26 and explicit cost27. Kesner et al (1986) argue that when a corporation 
                                                 
26
 The implicit cost is the cost incurred in developing quality products (low emission of carbon dioxide, 
greener products that reduces climate change and better environment such as avoiding dumping of 
toxic waste in river and land (Waddock and Graves, 1997). 
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avoids investment in CSR, for example, the dumping of toxic waste in the water, the 
implicit cost decreases and the corporation become socially irresponsible. This could 
lead to environmental damage and higher explicit cost, because the cost has been 
transferred to the society through destroying or harming the environment. This could 
place the corporation in a competitively disadvantaged position with their 
competitors.  
Waddock and Graves (1997) used the slack resources theory 28 to explain the positive 
relationship between CSR and financial performance. The slack resources according 
to Cyert and March (1963), are the excess resources above what the corporation needs 
to operate at a certain period of time. Apart from relieving scarcity in corporation, 
reducing monitoring on profitability and diverting resources to subunits and 
experimentation, slack resources have been linked to the possible reasons for 
corporations investing in CSR projects (Cyert and March, 1963). This is because 
corporations with sound financial resources invest in CSR projects so as to reach a 
higher standard of corporate performance (Waddock and Graves, 1997; McGuire et 
al, 1988).  
In contrast, the reasons for negative correlation between CSR and financial 
performance are based on the neoclassical economic concepts (Aupperle et al, 1985). 
These neoclassical economic concepts are on prices, output and income distribution 
of corporations as dictated by the forces of supply and demand. The use of factors of 
production in business imposes limitations or constraint on both the cost and income. 
Therefore, proponents of negative correlation argue that managers should be focused 
                                                                                                                                           
27
 The explicit cost is the cost incurred in payments to shareholders and wage contracts (Waddock and 
Graves, 1997; McGuire et al, 1988). 
28
 The availability of unspent or excess resources is diverted to other purposes for instance investing in 
CSR (Waddock and Graves, 1997). 
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on their fiduciary (legal) responsibility of companies which is maximizing wealth and 
satisfying the shareholders (Friedman, 1970). In this case, CSR is seen as an 
additional cost RQ WKH FRPSDQ\ ZKLFK ZLOO UHGXFH WKH SURILWV DQG VKDUHKROGHUV¶
wealth. This is supported by the agency theory (See section 2.1.1) that is anchored on 
maximising the shareholders wealth. 
However, Ullman (1985) offered the reason for the neutral relationship to be as a 
result of several variables or components of CSR and financial performance not 
included in the model. Therefore, these variables causes what is known as the omitted 
variable bias? These are the variables that result in both CSR definitional 
inconsistencies and measurement inconsistencies. These variables can render CSR-
financial performance correlation invisible (Abbott and Monsen, 1979; Arlow and 
Gannon, 1982).  
The other concept that determines CSR is the good management theory (See 
Waddock and Graves, 1997). Corporations involved in good stakeholder practices, 
such as increase in board diversity (more women and ethnic minorities), good 
community relation practices, and good customer perception have been linked to 
improved financial performance (McGuire et al, 1988). Satisfying all stakeholders 
can lead to good corporate image, high employee morale, reduction in implicit cost 
leading to competitive advantage and high financial performance (Johnson and 
Greening, 1999). 
Another determinant of CSR is the firm size and industry. Several studies have 
confirmed that firm size and industry type influence CSR (McGuire et al, 1988). 
Following several studies (See Mckendal et al, 1999; Waddock and Graves, 1997; 
McWilliams and Siegel, 2001) firm size is related to financial performance and CSR. 
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It is assumed that firms with large assets have slack resources that are used for CSR 
practices. 
Moreover, another determinant of CSR is using CSR as a strategic tool. If CSR is 
aligned to the corporate philosophy of companies, then CSR can be used to gain 
competitive advantage. For example, the CSR expenditures are based on managerial 
discretion aimed at improving the long term interest of the company. Consequently, 
this alignment of CSR to the mission, vision and values statements of corporations 
can be said to be strategic. This is part of what the study explored using the case 
study approach (See chapters 4 and 6 for details).  
Joyner and Payne (2002) suggested various factors that motivate organisations to 
engage in CSR practices. They are known as CSR drivers 29 (Loimi, 2002; Lohman 
and Ateinholtz. 2004), and these include employee retention, consumer satisfaction 
DQG OR\DOW\ FRPSDQ\ UHSXWDWLRQ OHJLWLPDF\ DQG LQFUHDVH LQ FRPSDQLHV¶ EUDQG
(Carroll, 1999; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Amaeshi, 2008).  
Debt is another determinant of CSR (Goss and Roberts, 2009). Debt is the amount 
owned by the company (Mallin, 2004). Neubaum and Zahra (2006) argue that debt 
affects the level of investment in CSR. While, Goss and Roberts (2009) state that as 
the level of debt rises, the company comes under pressure to repay its loan and as 
such may affect the resources needed for CSR practices. Goss and Roberts (2009) 
find the impact of cost of debt financing to be high and low levels on CSR (Goss and 
Roberts, 2009). This means that at low level of debt, companies invest in CSR. 
However, as the debt increases companies are forced to repay their loans and this 
                                                 
29
 CSR drivers are factors that influence companies to adopt CSR practices (Joyner and Payne, 2002). 
Other CSR drivers include avoidance of tax and litigation suits, pressure groups (NGOs) and 
adherence to government regulations (Navarro, 1988). 
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makes it difficult for companies to invest in CSR. Goss and Roberts (2009) state most 
companies invest in CSR when faced with more environmental, social and ethical 
issues. The authors find a significant spread between two and sixteen basis points in 
the relationship between debt and CSR. Therefore, companies use strategic CSR to 
lower their costs of debt. Accordingly, Goss and Roberts (2009) concluded that CSR 
is used as insurance against environmental and social concerns. The multidimensional 
construct of CSR is discussed next with the view of understanding the inconsistencies 
surrounding CSR. 
2.8 The Multi-Dimensional Construct of Corporate Social Responsibility 
More importantly, CSR is a multidimensional construct that is the diversity of CSR 
(Coffey and Fryxell, 1991; Carroll, 1979; Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Carroll, 1999). 
The diversity of CSR is partially studied empirically (Johnson and Greening, 1999). 
Cox et al (2004) use the disaggregated CSR dimensions such as environment, 
community and employee relations as a measure of CSR in their study. Johnson and 
Greening (1999) use two CSR dimensions as a measure of CSR, namely, the people 
dimensions (women and minorities, employee relations and community) and product 
dimensions (product quality and environment).  
Furthermore, there are several methodological or empirical inconsistencies that are of 
real concern to researchers in examining the relationship between institutional 
investors, BOD characteristics and CSR (Aupperle et al, 1985; Waddock and Graves, 
1990; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Neubaum and Zahra, 2006; Chai, 2010). The role 
of institutional investors in CSR has been questioned by several authors because of 
the mixed and inconclusive findings (Graves and Waddock, 1994; Johnson and 
Greening, 1999; Bartkus et al, 2002; Neubaum and Zahra, 2006; Chai, 2010). 
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According to Chai (2010) previous research concerning types of institutional 
investors and CSR suffer from sampling and methodological error as a result of 
accounting disclosures in CSR. Consequently, the results from rigorous and robust 
empirical analysis based on reliable longitudinal and cross sectional data are limited. 
These mixed findings could be as a result of how CSR is defined (Carroll 1999). 
Carroll (1979) defined CSR based on social issues using four principles such as 
economic, ethical, and legal and philanthropy responsibility. The author illustrates 
this in a pyramid form by stating that the economic responsibility is more important 
to the company followed by ethical, legal and philanthropic responsibility. Others 
defined CSR based on stakeholder management (Freeman, 1984; Agle et al, 1999). 
The European Commission (2006) views CSR as a concept and voluntary practises 
by firms to widen their responsibility to include social and environmental concern 
with the goal of satisfying a wider stakeholder group, such as shareholders, 
employees, customers, society, community, environment and suppliers (See section 
2.2).  
Some authors adopted a more strategic approach in defining CSR (Wood, 1991; 
Wartick and Cochran, 1985 and Yongqiang, 2008; 2009). This inconsistency in CSR 
dHILQLWLRQVLVDVDUHVXOWRIWKHZRUGµVRFLDO¶ZKLFKDUHWKHPRUDOFRPSRQHQWVRI&65
(Carroll, 1999). This has resulted in varying CSR measures. Some authors use social 
issues to measure CSR (such as environment, product quality and philanthropy). For 
example, as mention earlier, Johnson and Greening (1999) used product quality and 
environment as product dimension and women and minorities, employee relations 
and community as people dimension. The product and people dimensions were used 
by the authors as a measure for CSR. Ibrahim et al (2003) use stakeholders such as 
shareholders, employee relations, environment, and consumer satisfaction as a proxy 
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for CSR (Agle et al, 1999). In some studies, some authors use BOD characteristics 
such as inclusion of women as a proxy for CSR measures (See, Coffey and Fryxell, 
1991). 
Besides, the use of secondary data from organisations that use several CSR 
dimensions as measures of CSR is another source of the methodological 
inconsistencies. For instance, Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini and company (KLD) 
and FSTE4GOOD index use several CSR components as a measure of CSR, such as 
women and minorities, product quality, employee relations, ethics, and environment. 
Consequently, there is lack of empirical uniformity in the findings reported (Turban 
and Greening, 1997; Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Chai, 2010). According to Slater and 
Dixon-Fowler (2009) KLD is an independent rating agency that specialises in rating 
organisations using environment, social and governance performance variables. Some 
of the KLD CSR dimensions have been employed by several authors (Graves and 
Waddock, 1994, Waddock and Graves, 1997; Johnson and Greening, 1999; 
McWillams and Siegel, 2000; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Slater and Dixon-Fowler, 
2009). Waddock and Graves (1997) use five CSR dimensions of KLD (women and 
minorities, product quality, environment, community and employee relations) as 
dependent variables. McGuire et al (2003) use four CSR dimensions of KLD, 
namely, product quality, environment, and community and employee relations. 
Moreover, several studies measure CSR using different methods such as content 
analysis of annual reports (Said et al, 2009), surveys (Aupperle et al, 1991), Standard 
DQG 3RRU¶V  *UDYHV DQG :DGGRFN  ./' :DGGRFN DQG *UDYHV 1997; 
McGuire et al, 2003), behavioural methodological and perception measures 
(Wodutch and Mckinney, 1991), case study approach (Clarkson, 1985; Petersen and 
Vredenburg, 2009a), and use of interviews (Hendry et al, 2006). 
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Subsequently, these different CSR measures result in measurement and 
methodological errors and these errors are concern to management and finance 
researchers (Waddock and Graves, 1997). In this study, therefore, an attempt will be 
made to reduce the errors by investigating the effects of institutional investors and 
BOD characteristics on CSR, using the multi-methods approach. Moreover, in order 
to understand how CSR and corporate governance structures operate and are linked, it 
is important to discuss the necessary framework for the Code of Corporate 
Governance. 
2.9 Conclusion 
The review of literature provides five key concepts for this research. First, the 
literature on the role of institutional investors on CSR is not only mixed and 
inconclusive (Johnson and Greening, 1999; Cox et al, 2004; Petersen and 
Vredenburg, 2009; Chai, 2010; Wahba, 2010), but country, industry and firm specific 
(Consolandi, 2008). While, some studies find a positive relationship between 
institutional investors and CSR (Cox et al, 2004), other studies show no relationship 
between institutional investors and CSR (Consolandi et al, 2008). In addition, 
previous studies on the effects of foreign, indigenous and government institutional 
investors on CSR reveal diverse and uncertain findings (See, Earnhart and Lizal, 
1999; Nazli and Ghazali, 2007; Rasic, 2010). Furthermore, past studies on the role of 
institutional investors on CSR concentrate on developed countries whereas there are 
none on Nigeria. This gap concerning the role of institutional investors on CSR is 
what the objectives of this study intends to examine and fill, thereby contributing to 
the body of knowledge.  
Second, the literature on the role of BOD characteristics on CSR is also varied 
(Coffey and Wang, 1998; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Werbel and Carter, 2002; 
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Dunn and Sainty, 2009). Previous studies on the characteristics of the BODs and CSR 
are concentrated on developed countries and the results are mixed. Furthermore, there 
is no study on the effects of the BOD characteristics on CSR in Nigeria. Hence, there 
is a gap on the impact of NEDs, executive directors, board size and board diversity on 
CSR of PLCs in Nigeria. It is one of the goals of this study to also fill this gap in the 
body of literature. 
7KLUGWKHVWDNHKROGHUV¶WKHRU\DWWHPSWVWRDGGUHVVZKo and what really matters to the 
company. This refers to the arguments that companies have a moral obligation to 
HQJDJH LQ&65DQGVDWLVI\GLIIHUHQWVWDNHKROGHUV¶JURXS ,WHTXDOO\ VWUHVVHV WKH IDFW
that management must satisfy them for the purpose of creating long term value for the 
company. The debate outlines the fact that management is still confused on how to 
allocate company resources to the competing groups that have stake in the company 
without encountering conflicts of interest. These tradeoff conflicts have weakened the 
stakeholder theory as there is little empirical evidence of resolving the tradeoff and 
helping managers to obtain one value maximising function rather than multiple value 
maximising functions (Jensen, 2001). 
Fourth, the weakness in stakeholder theory does not assist managers in making trade-
off decision when faced with multiple stakeholders (Benson et al, 2009). This 
sometimes contributes to our understanding and contested definitions of CSR. The 
stakeholder theory is still relatively under applied in developing countries like 
1LJHULD ,W LV VWLOO HYROYLQJ WR UHVROYH µZKR DQG ZKDW DFFRXQWV WR FRPSDQLHV &65
especially in the area of resolving the legitimacy gap between companies CSR and 
community expectations (Idemudia, 2009a).  
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Fifth, as a whole the literature review reveal gaps between the lack of empirical 
research on the impact of institutional investors and BOD characteristics on CSR. 
They also reveal the conflicts among governance and CSR theories and the need for a 
theory that incorporate a broader context of CSR practices. In this way, it becomes 
possible to predict the fundamental difference about strategic CSR practices and 
corporate governance mechanisms. For instance, is that, it is better explained by the 
stakeholder theory and value maximisation theory rather than the traditional business 
theory of profit maximisation? 
Finally, previous studies have adopted either the positivist approach (quantitative) or 
the realism approach (case study) in providing understanding about the impact of 
institutional investors and BOD characteristics on CSR. This study provides a more 
robust approach by arguing for a pragmatic approach, which allows for combining the 
positivist and realism approaches. Thus, providing a better understanding of the 
construct, and also, as a means of achieving valid and reliable findings.  
The next chapter discusses the general overview of CSR and corporate governance 
framework in Nigeria. It also provides some evidence suggesting that CSR in Nigeria 
is philanthropic in nature, while the Code of Corporate governance in Nigeria is 
modeled along the Anglo-Saxon model of both the UK and US. 
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CHAPTER 3 
3.0 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CORPRATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
IN NIGERIA 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the theories and past empirical studies on the role of different 
institutional investors and board of director (BOD) characteristics on Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR), thereby, providing the scope for the research objectives for this study (see 
section 1.3). In synthesis, this chapter is aimed at illustrating and understanding the CSR and the 
regulatory framework of corporate practices of PLCs in Nigeria. The significance of this chapter 
is to provide further justification to the study of the roles of institutional investors and BOD 
characteristics on CSR activities in PLCs, thereby serving as an additional motivation and basis 
for the research aims and objectives. 
This chapter is organised to examine the following themes: the regulatory framework in Nigeria, 
ownership structure of companies in Nigeria and shareholders activism in Nigeria. Also, the 
CSR practices, the role of BODs and its structure of PLCs in Nigeria are further discussed.  
3.1.1 Corporate Governance Regulatory Framework in Nigeria 
Historically, the government played an important role during the post-colonial era restricting 
foreign ownership of companies in the Nigeria economic sectors (Okike, 2004; 2007; Ehikioya, 
2009; Ojo, 2009). According to Ahunwan (2002), the interventionists approach by government 
in developing countries is aimed at exercising control over the developmental process. This is 
because of the absence of a democratic political culture, weak market structure and lack of good 
corporate governance practices. Earlier, during the British colonial era, the company registration 
law known as the Company Ordinance Act was introduced in 1922.  
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Earlier on, in 1886, the National African Company was the first British company chartered in 
England to operate in Nigeria (Okike, 2007). The success of the National African Company in 
Nigeria attracted other companies to Nigeria leading to the rise of foreign ownership in Nigeria. 
Orojo (1992) asserted that the colonial era witnessed the concentration of foreign owned 
companies operating in Nigeria. Oftentimes, the foreign investors and their Multinational 
Companies (MNCs) dominated the economic interest and business environment of Nigeria. In 
fact, the corporate governance in the British colonial era is the British corporate system which 
also regulated the activities of companies operating in Nigeria as at that time (Orojo, 1992, 
Ahunwan, 2002). Consequently, Ahunwan (2002) stated that the British colonial era law forms 
the core of the Nigeria legal system because of the British colonisation. 
Currently, Okike (2007) argues that the legislation in Nigeria is rooted in the colonial British 
institutions. After Nigerian independence in 1960, the British colonial government transferred 
most of the rules and regulations to the self-rule, independent Nigerian state. According to 
Ahunwan (2002) the pre-independence era in Nigeria witnessed the replacement of the Company 
Ordinance Act of 1922 with the Companies Act of 1948. The Companies Act of 1948 was later 
replaced by the Company Act of 1968. However, the Company Act of 1968 failed to address the 
problem of company law, such as the political and socio-economic problems. As a result, Okike 
(2007) reiterated that the rising economic, commercial and investment activities in Nigeria were 
dominated by foreign owned companies. This dominance of foreign owned companies formed 
the bedrock for the growth of foreign institutional investors in Nigeria (NSE fact book, 2008), 
and this accounted for 40% of the total shareholding of company ownership structure in Nigeria 
(NSE fact book, 2009). 
Furthermore, the post-independence era is perceived to mean economic self-independence, after 
Nigeria gained independence from the British colonial authority in 1960. This economic self-
independence raised agitation for indigenous ownership of companies and control of the means 
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of production in the socio-economic developments of Nigeria. This also created the advent of 
indigenous ownership of companies leading to the growth of indigenous institutional investors in 
Nigeria. 
Accordingly, two laws changed the ownership structure of companies in Nigeria. These laws 
are; the Foreign Exchange Act of 1962 and the Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Degree of 1972 
(Indigenisation Degree). Subsequently, Yakasai (2001) argues that the Indigenisation Degree of 
LQIOXHQFHGWKHDFTXLVLWLRQRIIRUHLJQLQYHVWRUV¶VKDUHVE\LQGLJHQRXVLQYHVWRUV+RZHYHU
most indigenous investors could not acquire the whole shareholdings held by foreign 
institutional investors, because of lack of funds (Okike, 2007). As a result, the government 
intervened by acquiring outstanding shares which indigenous institutional investors could not 
purchase as at that time. This led to the growth of government ownership of companies which 
attracted the presence of government institutional investors in Nigeria. 
Consequently, the government formed state owned companies, as most state and federal 
governments acquired the shares of foreign investors. In this way, the government gained control 
of most public utilities, for example, energy, telecom, banks and oil companies (Yakasai, 2001; 
Ahunwan, 2002).  
The growth of companies and their practices led to the significance of a sound regulatory 
framework in Nigeria. The regulatory framework in the country is similar to that of the British 
law. Hence, Okike (2007) refers to the Nigeria corporate governance system as mainly the 
Anglo-Saxon model because of the dominance of the post-colonial era by British companies and 
their legislations. 
The first elaborate regulatory framework in Nigeria is the Company and Allied Matters Act 
(CAMA) of 1990 which provided the legal framework for corporate governance in Nigeria. 
CAMA 1990 replaced the Company Act of 1968 as a result of changes in the social, political and 
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economic environment in Nigeria (Okike, 2004). However, Okike (2007) observes that the 
corporate governance legislation in Nigeria is weak and this assessment is supported by ROSC 
(2004)30.  
Moreover, the various institutions in Nigeria charged with monitoring corporate governance 
practices are mainly the government and its institutions. The government plays a vital role by 
providing the legal framework incorporated in the 1979 constitution, and later reviewed in 1999. 
The various financial institutions charged with corporate governance are the Corporate Affairs 
Commission (CAC), Nigeria Stock Exchange (NSE) and Security and Exchange Commission 
(SEC). The CAC regulates, supervises, monitors and enforces the registration of companies 
(Yakasai, 2001; Okike, 2004). Also, the CAC is involved with the formation, incorporation, 
management and winding up of corporate bodies in Nigeria31 (Okike, 2007).  
The collapse of companies has raised the significance and need for the formation of the Nigerian 
Code of Corporate Governance in 2003. The aim of the Corporate Governance Code is to 
establish a standard framework for best practices for PLCs and ensure good governance 
practices concerning the board leadership and board effectiveness through high accountability 
and disclosures practices to stakeholders (Ogbuozobe, 2009).  
Ehikioya (2009) explains that the importance of corporate governance mechanisms in Nigeria is 
anchored on transparency, accountability, fairness, trust and responsibility by PLCs. 
&ROODERUDWLQJ2NLNH¶VDVVHVVPHQWV LV(KLNLR\D) who extended the advantages of 
corporate governance in Nigeria to include the ability of the company to attract foreign 
investment, local investors and partners. Other advantages according to Ahunwan (2002) include 
                                                 
30The ROSC is a report on the observance on the standards and codes prepared by World Bank in 2004. It reported 
that institutional failures regarding auditing, regulation, compliance, implementation and enforcement of rules and 
standards in Nigeria corporate organizations are common among PLCs (ROSC, 2004). 
31The NSE is self-regulating and it also supports SEC.  NSE is the life wire of the capital market and was 
established by the NSE Act in 1961. It regulates the second tier security market (Okike, 2007). 
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the ability to raise funds from the capLWDOPDUNHW LQFUHDVHLQYHVWRUV¶FRQILGHQFHDQGVWLPXODWH
performance and growth. Furthermore, Ojo (2009) points out that the practice of good corporate 
governance in Nigeria (that is, good reporting, transparency, accountability, fairness, trust and 
responsibility) has led to lower bankruptcy risk, high firm performance and market valuation. 
Consistent with the above argument, Ehikioya (2009) argues that companies with high 
ownership concentration in Nigeria have better financial performance. However, the author 
concludes that companies with low financial performance have CEO duality and an unqualified 
family relative as a member of the BOD. This is a breach of the Nigerian Code of Corporate 
Governance (2003, 2009).  
Moreover, the Code of Corporate Governance in Nigeria (2003, 2009) has raised the confidence 
of investors translating into the rise of listed PLCs in the Nigerian Stock Market (NSE) (Okike, 
2007). Table 3-1 illustrates the rapid growth of the corporate sector as evidenced during the 
period of 1971 to 2009. The pre-1970s in Nigeria witnessed the rise in the numbers of listed 
companies in the NSE by four companies, translating to a rise of 4.8%. But, post-1970s to 2009 
witnessed the rise of listing of PLCs in the capital market by 101 listed companies, which is an 
increase of 60%. The reason for the boom in registration of companies as PLCs from the 1970s 
till 2000s is associated with the federal government privatisation policy which is considered as a 
proxy for the success of the abrogation of the Exchange Control Act of 1962 and the Nigerian 
Enterprise Promotion Decree of 1989 (NSE Fact book, 2010). The Nigerian Enterprise 
Promotion Decree of 1989 led to the partial relaxation of the restrictions, for instance, the 
foreign investors could hold a share of up to 40% in few sectors, banks, insurance, oil production 
and mining (the Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Decree of 1972 and 1977) on foreign 
investments. In 1995 all restrictions concerning foreign investment in all sectors were lifted by 
the Federal Government. 
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Table 3.1: Number of Established and Listed Companies 
Age analysis Established Quoted 
1901 -1950 14 0 
1951-1970 68 4 
1971-2009 84 185 
Source: Data compiled using Nigeria Stock Exchange Fact book 2002-2010 
Other regulatory frameworks for governance of companies in Nigeria are Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) and Nigeria Shareholders Solidarity 
Association (NSSA), Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), National Insurance Commission 
(NAICOM) and National Pension Commission (PENCOM).  
Following the above discussion, on the corporate governance regulatory framework in Nigeria 
that was shaped according to the British colonial legislation emphasises the need to have a good 
corporate governance structure in companies. This corporate governance structure will enhance 
checks and balances among PLCs. Therefore, Nigeria Corporate Governance can be referred to 
as the Anglo-Saxon model.  The next section discusses the corporate governance mechanism in 
general.  
3.2 The Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Several studies have emerged to examine the Code of Corporate Governance as one of the 
mechanisms of reducing agency problems (See, Rediker and Seth, 1995; Kirkbride and Letza, 
2004). In essence, the Code of Corporate Governance recognises the role of institutional 
investors and BOD characteristics, most especially, the inclusion of NED in BOD as a way of 
increasing BOD independence, while BOD diversification reduces managerial entrenchment and 
opportunism (Mallin, 2004; Monks and Minow, 2004; 2008).  
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Furthermore, the roles and responsibilities of institutional investors in both UK and Nigeria are 
similar (Code of Corporate Governance, 2009). For instance, the fulfilment of these 
responsibilities in both countries improves the quality of corporate governance practices in the 
UK and Nigeria. In UK, the Code of responsibilities of institutional investors was drawn up as 
µWKH 8. VWHZDUGVKLS &RGH LQ -XO\  FKDUJHG ZLWK HQKDQFLQJ WKH TXDOLW\ RI HQJDJHPHQW
between institutional investors and companies. The Code of responsibilities of institutional 
investors help to improve the long-term returns to shareholders, assist in the efficient 
implementation of governance responsibilities by setting out good practices on engagement with 
companies helping to reduce the risk of outcomes(FRC, 2010). However, in Nigeria, the roles 
and responsibilities of institutional investors in the country are embedded in the Code for 
Shareholders Association (2007) and Code of Corporate Governance (2009). These Codes 
recommend that the: 
Institutional investors and other shareholders with large holdings should seek to 
positively influence the standard of corporate governance in the companies in which they 
invest (Code of Corporate Governance, 2009: 23).  
In other words, the institutional investors in Nigeria ensure that PLCs comply with the 
provisions of the Code of Corporate Governance (2009) or explain the circumstances of non-
compliance. Essentially, the formations of these Codes are aimed at strengthening the corporate 
governance mechanism. 
Cuervo (2002) affirms that one of the important corporate governance mechanisms is the Code 
of Corporate Governance. Zattoni and Cuomo (2008: 01) identify two main questions behind the 
relevance of the Codes of Corporate Governance, 1) the determination to improve the efficiency 
RIWKHQDWLRQDOJRYHUQDQFHV\VWHPRUWKHZLOOWRµOHJLWLPL]H¶GRPHVWLFFRPSDQLHVLQWKHJOREDO
financial market without radically improving the governance practices. For them the issuance of 
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the Code of Corporate Governance for civil law countries (France, Germany, Japan, Greece and 
Mexico) are influenced by the will to legitimise companies without enhancing the corporate 
governance practices. Hence, this is one of the criticisms against the corporate governance 
practices by PLCs (Mallin, 2004). 
Cuervo (2002) argues for more control mechanism and less Code of Corporate Governance for 
the maximisation of company financial performance (Kirbride and Letza, 2004; Mackenzie, 
2007). The essence of the corporate governance system is in ensuring the effective decision-
making process by BOD, such as maximisation of firm value (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002). 
According to Cuervo (2002) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) the corporate governance 
mechanism adopted and practiced by a country is determined by the kind of corporate 
governance system available in the country. For example, is LWLQVWLWXWLRQDOLQYHVWRUV¶RULHQWHGRU
market oriented type of corporate governance? The difference between the two types, according 
to Mallin (2004) is that, while the market for corporate control and board incentives are used by 
PDUNHWRULHQWHGV\VWHPVWRUHVROYHDJHQF\SUREOHPVWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOLQYHVWRUV¶RULHQWHGV\VWHP
uses the institutional investors to align the interests of principal to agents. 
Furthermore, Turnbull (1997) identifies the internal corporate governance mechanisms as a way 
of solving the agency problem and optimising firm value, for example, BOD and board 
incentives. The external corporate governance mechanism includes the market for managers, 
market for goods and services and market for corporate control (Jensen, 1986). 
However, Cuervo (2002) points out the shortcomings of both the institutional investors oriented 
or market oriented systePRIFRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFH7KHGUDZEDFNIRUWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOLQYHVWRUV¶
oriented system is the limitation of control power by institutional investors which they use to 
pursue their interest at the expense of diffuse investors which eventually turn to be dispersed 
small investors (Atkinson and Galaskiewicz, 1988). Whereas, the market oriented system relies 
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on the market for corporate control which is expensive, and the anti-takeover deficiencies. 
According to Cuervo (2002) it does not matters, since managers become manipulative using 
anti-takeover measures to protect their jobs and top management. 
Similarly, according to Letza et al (2004), the main problem of corporate governance32 is the 
encouragement of institutions to focus on short term profits and performance measures. This is 
the common practice of the Anglo-American model of corporate governance. The market exerts 
pressures on firms to be short term in approach. For example, these areas include management 
performances, quarterly returns, and expenditures, market prices of stock and evaluation of 
stock. 
Following the collapse of companies and corporate scandals, for example, the Enron scandal in 
the US (Rediker and Seth, 1995), government and regulatory authorities developed rules and 
regulations to encourage PLCs to comply with the best practices of corporate governance. One 
of such rule is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) in US. In the UK, the set of standards and best 
practices formed the framework for the Code of Corporate Governance. Specifically, the Code 
of Corporate Governance contains sets of standards of good practices for PLCs to comply or 
explain. These sets of recommendations include board remuneration, leadership and 
effectiveness, accountability and the BOD relationship with shareholders (Combined Code of 
Corporate Governance, 2006; FSA, 2010).  
                                                 
32Mallin (2004) defined corporate governance as the rules, policies and structure put in place to govern an 
organisations and it also deals with the ways in which supplies of finance to corporations assure themselves of 
getting their return on investment, while, Katsoulakos and Katsoulacos (2007) defined corporate governance as the 
ways corporations deal with the legal requirement and responsibility placed upon them by law. This, according to 
the authors, can lead to corporations adopting CSR practices as part of business responsibility. 
. 
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Consequently, the collapse of companies has further exposed the weaknesses of the self-
regulation or Code of Corporate Governance and the need to improve the internal governance 
mechanism, such as, the BOD (Cuervo, 2002). Given these weaknesses, this study will attempt 
to investigate the effect of institutional investors and BOD characteristics on CSR, as a way of 
understanding their roles in order to strengthen the corporate governance mechanisms in 
developing countries, in this case, Nigeria. 
Generally, the various Codes of Corporate Governance (mainly the 2003 and 2009 codes) have 
shown gradual improvement aimed at self-regulation towards best practices among PLCs in 
Nigeria. There are lapses for example, CSR breaches, such as, poor ethical conducts and bad 
environmental performances (See, Rediker and Seth, 1995; Turnbull, 1997; Cuervo, 2002). 
Therefore, the effect of the role of investors and BODs on CSR is examined with a view to 
understanding how the Code of Corporate Governance strengthens the relationships between 
business and the society. 
The next section discusses the ownership structure of companies in Nigeria and how the 
historical perspectives, the pre and post-independence legislations and business activities helped 
to determine the foreign, indigenous and government institutional investors activities in Nigeria.  
3.3 The Ownership Structure of Companies in Nigeria 
After the Nigerian independence in 1960, the pressure for indigenous control of companies grew 
and these pressures influenced the Nigerian government to promulgate the Foreign Exchange 
Act of 1962 and Indigenisation Decree of 1972. The laws were aimed at reducing the 100% 
shareholdings of foreign investors to 40% (Ahunwan, 2002). According to Ahunwan (2002), the 
aim of the Foreign Exchange Act and Indigenisation Decree was to change the ownership 
structure of companies, dominated by foreigners (Aburime, 2008). However, Yerokun (1992) 
disagrees with Ahunwan (2002) that the Foreign Exchange Act and Indigenisation Decree were 
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responsible for the change in the ownership structure of Nigerian companies. The author argues 
that the government investors bought most of the shareholding instead of the indigenous 
investors. Yerokun (1992) reiterates that the lack of availability of funds for indigenous investors 
made the government acquire shareholdings because of the huge resources at their disposal. 
Subsequently, the government became part of the productive process by providing goods and 
services to booster the Nigerian economy (Okike, 2007). According to Ahunwan (2002) the 
resultant ownership structure of the Nigerian companies after the effects of the Foreign 
Exchange Act and Indigenisation Decree comprises, 1) 100% government owned companies as 
banks, insurance, oil industry, hotels etc., 2) Joint Venture Company, a partnership between the 
government and foreign investors in oil industry, 3) the Public Listed Companies (PLCs) 
comprising of foreign investors and indigenous investors operating in the market, 4) Privately 
Owned Company dominated by family owned businesses operating outside the capital market 
because the companies are not listed on the stock exchange. The companies are mostly small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs), while, some are large companies attracting large investors. 
According to Ahunwan (2002) the ownership structure of PLCs in Nigeria is mainly diffused 
shareholders. These diffused shareholders are responsible for the corporate governance problem 
(insider trading, favouritism, employing family members as directors). The diffuse shareholders 
because of their small investment hardly show interest in the Annual General Meeting (AGM) or 
do not have voting rights. These problems allow a few large institutional shareholders to 
influence the board to pursue their own short term interest. As a result, the institutional 
VKDUHKROGHUV VDWLVI\ VRPHJURXSVRI VWDNHKROGHUV IRU VHOILVK LQWHUHVW VXFKDV WKHVKDUHKROGHUV¶
satisfaction. In support of Ahunwan (2002) the Code of Corporate Governance in Nigeria (2009) 
notes that the majority of investors in Nigeria have small equity holding (diffuse investors) of 
less than 5% (NSE fact book, 2009). Consequently, the Code of Corporate Governance (2009: 
34) states that the majority of shareholders control a relatively small part of the issued share. 
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Although, public companies generally meet the mandatory 25% public ownership requirement, 
on the average, about 90% of the shareholders control only 15% of the shares of companies. 
Thus, the larger percentage of the ownership structure is concentrated in the hands of a few 
investors. These few investors are the institutional investors, which according to Okike (2007) 
have caused the imbalance in the ownership structure thereby side-lining and disenfranchising 
minority shareholders. 
Furthermore, the presence of foreign institutional investors in Nigeria did not happen by chance 
(NSE Fact book, 2008). It is the abolition in 1995 of the Exchange Control Act of 1962 and the 
Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Degree of 1989 and 1995 that finally attracted foreign 
institutional investors to invest in Nigeria. Also, the capital market pressure on companies to be 
transparent and accountable motivated the foreign investors to invest in Nigeria as Joint venture, 
subsidiaries and takeovers of companies (Yakasai, 2001). This created confidence and stability 
in the market, thereby encouraging foreigners to invest again in Nigeria. As a result of this, the 
foreign institutional investors own 40% of the total shareholding in the NigeULD¶VFDSLWDOPDUNHW
(NSE Fact book, 2009). 
Table 3.2: Shareholdings of Financial Institutions in Nigeria 
Ownership Structure % of Shareholding 
Government Institutional Investor 6% 
Foreign Institutional Investor 10% 
Acquired by CBN 1% 
Private Nigerians 83% 
Total 100% 
Source: Adopted and modified version of Yakasai (2001) 
Table 3.2 shows the percentage shareholding of the various institutional investors in Nigerian 
financial institutions, most especially the banks and insurance companies. Consistent with the 
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Code of Corporate Governance (2009), the ownership structure of banks in Nigeria is 
characterised by dispersed owners (Yakasai, 2001). However, one of the limitations of Yakasai 
(2001) is the grouping of indigenous investors and dispersed investors as private Nigerians. This 
is illustrated in Table 3.2.  
So, the role of institutional investors is noticeable in the AGM where their power over 
management is exercised. According to CAMA of 1990, the shareholders have the power to hire 
and fire auditors, to approve or reject the financial reports. Thus, these powers of the 
shareholders to hire or replace the directors and amend the articles of association are aimed at 
UHGXFLQJPDQDJHULDORSSRUWXQLVPWKHUHE\FXUELQJWKHGLUHFWRUV¶H[FHVVLYHSRZHU-HQVHQ993; 
Williamson, 1993; Rediker and Seth, 1995; Kirkbride and Letza, 2004), and influence the 
corporate behaviours (Amao and Amaeshi, 2009).  
The ownership concentration of PLCs in Nigeria is illustrated in Table 3.3 showing the 
percentage of shareholders for all investors. It also illustrates the dispersed ownership structure 
of shares and the institutional investors as shareholders. In 2009 the percentage of shareholders 
for the minority shareholders (1 to 10,000) is highest by 95.68%, 2008 is 89.14% and 2007 is 
74.97%. Few individuals (4.32%) in 2009 hold more shares in the range of 10,000 and above, 
compared to (10.86%) in 2008 and (25.03%) in 2007. This indicates that a higher number of the 
minority shareholders (96%) hold few shareholdings. 
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Table 3.3: Average Shareholders and Their Percentage Holdings * 
Number of Shareholders %. of 
Shareholders 
2009 
%. of 
Shareholders 
2008 
%. of 
Shareholders 
2007 
1-1000 33.9 23.37 12 
1001-5000 26.97 33.13 16 
5001-10000 34.81 32.64 46.97 
10,001-50,000 3.43 10.38 22.52 
50,001-100,000 0.37 0.29 1.94 
100,001-500,000 0.34 0.07 0.28 
500,001-1,000,000 0.07 0.09 0.18 
1,000,001-5,000,000,000 0.11 0.03 0.11 
Total 100 100 100 
* (196 companies, 2007 - 2009) 
Source: Data compiled using Nigeria Stock Exchange Fact book from 2007-2010 
 
In this research, the indigenous institutional investors refer to investors with shareholdings of 5% 
and above (e.g. Zenith Bank) while the foreign institutional investors own shareholdings of 5% 
and above (e.g. ExxonMobil); (Earnhart and Lizal, 1999, 2002; Rasic, 2010). The government 
institutional investors own 5% and above in shareholding of companies (Li and Zhang, 2010; 
Said et al, 2009). However, Ahunwan (2002) argues that the agency problem between 
management and government ownership arises from the problems between institutional investors 
and diffuse investors because unlike institutional investors, diffuse investors lack the capacity to 
monitor management.  
3.4 6KDUHKROGHUV¶$FWLYLVPLQ1LJHULD 
7KHVKDUHKROGHUV¶DFWLYLVPLQ1LJHULa is largely made up of individual small investors (Yakasai, 
2001; Ahunwan, 2002). It is relatively new compared to developed countries and it is on the rise 
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in Nigeria (Amao and Amaeshi, 2008). The authors argue WKDWVKDUHKROGHUV¶DFWLYLVPLQ1LJHULD
is a process where shareholders as represented by institutional investors influence management 
behaviours using their powers. For example, the Cadbury PLC accounting scandal in Nigeria 
exposed the failures of corporate governance mechanism as a control tool for limiting false 
disclosures. Consequently, the Cadbury PLC scandal intensified the shareholders activism in 
Nigeria. According to Amao and Amaeshi (2008: 120) the aim of shareholders activism in 
Nigeria states...that in order to increase participation in the financial market, in an economy 
VXFKDV1LJHULDLWZRXOGEHQHFHVVDU\WRJDLQVKDUHKROGHUV¶FRQILGHQFHE\GHPRQVWUDWLQJWKDW
their companies are being run and managed efficiently, and that they have a real role to play in 
the company. As a result, the significance of the role of shareholders in monitoring the behaviour 
of managers is very important to guarantee the interests of all stakeholders are satisfied. 
(VVHQWLDOO\ WKHUHKDYHEHHQVHYHUDOVLJQLILFDQWUROHVRIVKDUHKROGHUV¶DFWLYLVPLQ1LJHULD  For 
LQVWDQFH VKDUHKROGHUV¶ DFWLYLVP KDV EHHQ XVHG WR SUHVVXUH FRPSDQLHV LQWR DGRSWLQJ JRRG
corporate governance practices (Amao and Amaeshi, 2008). These practices according to the 
authors include guaranteeing product safety, reducing employment discriminations, curbing 
environmental pollution, antitakeover and social involvement (Oyefusi, 2007a, 2007b; Amaeshi, 
2008). Despite all these efforts of the regulatory institutions to enhance good corporate 
governance and CSR practices in Nigeria, there is still poor compliance by PLCs. This is 
evidenced by the recent bailout of five (5) banks in 2009 by the Federal Government of Nigeria 
through the Central Bank of Nigeria - CBN (Cenbank, 2009). 
According to Okike (2007) the shareholders rise in Nigeria can be traced also to the 
indigenisation policies of the Federal Government (1972) which gave rise to foreigners in 
corporate bodies to sell their shareholdings to Nigerians in PLCs. However, the NSE fact book 
VXJJHVWVWKDWWKHVKDUHKROGHUV¶DFWLYLVPEHFDPHcommon as a result of the transparency 
and reporting standards being recommended by both the SEC and NSE.  
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On the whole, it is the Nigerian Shareholders Solidarity Association (NSSA)33 that regulates and 
ensures that business organisations comply with the Code of Corporate Governance in Nigeria 
which recommends that the shareholders interest should be protected (Okike, 2007).  
3.5 The Structure of the Board of Director (BOD) 
In order to enhance the BOD effectiveness, the Nigeria Code of Corporate Governance (2009) 
recommends the board size of PLCs to be between five (5) and fifteen (15) directors. The BOD 
should be headed by the chairman who should be a NED. In addition, the Code of Corporate 
Governance (2009) recommends that the shareholders should be responsible for appointing the 
members of the BOD. Part of this recommendation, according to Okike (2007), is the diversity 
of the board involving the mix of executive directors and NEDs. Other recommendations include 
the separation of position of chair from that of the CEO, to be occupied by separate persons 
(Sanda et al, 2005; Okike, 2007; Code of Corporate Governance, 2009). In other words, the post 
of the CEO should be occupied by the executive director while that of chair should be occupied 
by a NED. This is similar to the recommendation in the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010). 
8QGRXEWHGO\ WKHUHKDVEHHQDQ LQFUHDVH LQ WKHQXPEHURIGLUHFWRUVKLSV LQ1LJHULD¶VFRUSRUDWH
sector. This increase in BOD size is attributed to the compliance of the Code of Corporate 
Governance (2003). The increase in directorships is illustrated in Table 3-4. Table 3-4 illustrates 
the directorships holdings of PLCs from 2007 to 2009 in Nigeria. The total number of directors 
increased from 2007 to 2008 by 7.7%, while the number of directors increased by 16.1% from 
2008 to 2009. The other reasons for the rise in the number of directors are traced to the 
following reasons. First, the effects of bank consolidation implemented by the CBN in 2006 
strengthened the financial institutions aQG LQYHVWRUV¶ FRQILGHQFH 2NLNH  7KH VHFRQG
                                                 
33NSSA was established in 1987 as a result of the lack of trust and confidence by shareholders on auditors. The 
NSSA is the group of shareholders in Nigeria. NSSA was formed to promote interest of shareholders in Plc, ensure 
good management of Plc, and enlightenment of shareholders through seminars and workshops (Okike, 2007). 
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reason could be the compliance to the recommendations of the Code of Corporate Governance 
(2003) led to the number of NED in the BOD to rise, while stipulating a minimum of two 
independent directors in the BOD (Code of Corporate Governance, 2009). Nevertheless, Okike 
(2007) points out that it was the lack of compliance and weaknesses in the Code of Corporate 
Governance (2003) that motivated the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to develop the Code of 
Corporate Governance (2006) for the banking sector in 2006. 
Table 3.4 Directorships of PLC from 2007 to 2009 
 2009 2008 2007 
Number of quoted company 176 136 120 
Total Number of directorship 765 659 612 
Average number of directorship per 
company 
4.34 4.55 5.1 
% of directors holding only 1 directorship 91.5 88 73 
Number of directors holding 2 or more 
directorships 
30 32 122 
% of directorships holding 2 or more 
directorships 
3.9 4.9 20 
Source: Data compiled using Nigeria Stock Exchange Fact book (2007-2009). 
FurWKHUPRUH WKH&RGHRI&RUSRUDWH*RYHUQDQFHSUDFWLFHV IRUEDQNV¶SRVWFRQVROLGDWLRQVZHUH
enacted by CBN in 2006 as a result of the inherent weaknesses in the Nigerian Code of 
Corporate Governance (2003). These weaknesses include boardroom squabbles arising from 
different business culture and ownership structures which were initially in sole proprietorship or 
family owned structures, poor internal control weaknesses, poor risk management, inside related 
lending just to mention a few. These weaknesses confirmed the concern of SEC that 
acknowledged that only 40% of PLCs plus banks has recognized the Code of Corporate 
Governance (2003) (NSE Fact book, 2009). The aim of the Code of Corporate Governance Post 
Consolidation (2006) for banks is the consolidation of the banking sectors, reducing 
malpractices such as inside lending and enhancing performance and confidence among investors.  
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However, the Code of Corporate Governance (2003) is a voluntary practice while the 
compliance to the CBN Post Consolidation Code (2006) for banks remains mandatory (Code of 
Corporate Governance, 2009). Some of the major improvements of the CBN Code for banks 
2006 over the Code of Corporate Governance (2003) in guiding the financial industry in Nigeria 
(Code of Corporate Governance, 2009: 38) are its mandatory provisions and compliance 
PHFKDQLVPV DQG WKH UHTXLUHPHQWV WKDW LQGHSHQGHQW FRQVXOWDQWV DQQXDOO\ UHYLHZ EDQNV¶
governance processes, issue a report to the CBN and present a copy of the report at WKHEDQN¶V
Annual General Meeting (AGM). 
The shortcomings of the CBN Post Consolidation Code (2006) for banks include the 
concentrated ownership problem as highlighted above, continuing occupation of the post of 
chairman and CEO by a single person, lack of accountability and lack of proper disclosures34 
(Okike, 2007; Code of Corporate Governance, 2009). Also, the ownership of most PLCs in 
Nigeria is concentrated on a few individuals and family members leading to appointments of 
unqualified managers as CEO of banks (Okike, 2004; Ehikioya, 2009). According to Okike it is 
FRPPRQSUDFWLFHWKDWFRPSDQLHV¶&(2RUFKDLUPDQHPSOR\VWKHLUIDPLO\PHPEHUVDVPHPEHUV
of the BOD in Nigeria.  
Moreover, Ogbuozobe (2009) identifies the shortcomings of the corporate governance in Nigeria 
as lack of language, content, quality, and inadequate for transparency and accountability among 
PLCs. The author suggests the need for enforceability and the use of legislation to regulate 
corporate behaviour rather than the use of the voluntary Code of the Corporate Governance in 
Nigeria. Therefore, according to the author, the need to incorporate the Code of Corporate 
Governance into Nigerian corporate law is long overdue. 
                                                 
34
 Despite the fact that CBN Code emphasised on annual appraisal of BODs of banks, some banks do not comply 
(Okike, 2007; Code of corporate governance in Nigeria, 2009). 
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Consequently, the central role of CBN Code of Post Consolidation (2006) could not regulate 
bank practices because of the problems mentioned above such as insider trading and 
appointment of family members as CEOs. This led to the Code of Corporate Governance (2009) 
being developed to replace the Code of Corporate Governance (2003). The Code of Corporate 
Governance (2009) recommended that investors and BODs enhance their CSR reporting. The 
shaping of the Corporate Governance systems in Nigeria is aimed at encouraging PLCs to 
increase their responsiveness to social issues and sWDNHKROGHUV¶ PDQDJHPHQW 7KH LQFUHDVH LQ
CSR practices by most PLCs is illustrated in Table 3-5 and Table 3-6. This increase in CSR 
practices can be traced to the role of BOD in ensuring that companies meet CSR standards, most 
especially, in CSR reporting. In practice, the Code of Corporate Governance in Nigeria (2009) 
stipulates that companies should report their social, economic, ethical and environmental 
sustainability performances (Code of Corporate Governance, 2009). 
Given the discussion above, the Code of Corporate Governance in Nigeria alone cannot 
strengthen the activities of PLCs because of the continuous Corporate Governance and CSR 
breaches. For instance, the Cadbury PLC accounting scandal in Nigeria and the recent bailout of 
five (5) banks in 2009 by the Central Bank of Nigeria further highlights the weaknesses of the 
current corporate governance mechanism. Therefore, other regulatory government agencies 
involved in the control of companies, such as, the SEC and CAC are significant to the strong 
Corporate Governance practices in Nigeria. In total, this enhances the understanding of the 
FRUSRUDWHVHFWRU¶VOHJDOIUDPHZRUNLQ1LJHULD 
3.6 The Role of Institutional Investors in CSR 
In the case of the role of institutional investors on CSR, Sorensen and Pfeifer (2011) argue that 
WKHUHKDVEHHQDQLQFUHDVHGLQLQVWLWXWLRQDOLQYHVWRUV¶HQJDJHPHQWLQ&65LQGHYHORSHGFRXQWULHV
(UK and US), such as in their investment practices. For instance, the authors state that the issue 
of climate change must be resolved through an assessment of long term risk and strategies put in 
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place to address it. Sorensen and Pfeifer observe that many institutional investors have adopted 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) policies in building their investment portfolios and 
practices which the BOD have equally accepted at senior management and board level of 
companies.  
According to Sorensen and Pfeifer (2011: 58) many investors have signed up to the United 
Nations Principles of Responsible Investment (UN PRI) which were launched in 2006 and 
provide a voluntary framework by means of which investors can incorporate ESG issues in 
decision-making and ownership practices. On the whole, institutional investors are ensuring that 
mobilised institutional capitals are not only used to support their fiduciary responsibility but also 
to support policies limiting ESG issues. The reasons for this increased role of investors in ESG 
issues are wide such as political, financial, regulatory and social factors. The increased public 
debate that ESG adoption is associated with increased corporate performance cannot be over 
emphasised. This is also evident with increased Non-Governmental organisations, governmental 
regulations and media attention on ESG issues (Sorensen and Pfeifer, 2011). 
On a similar note, Mallin (2004) noted that institutional investors have adopted socially 
responsible investment (SRI) policy statement as an integral part of their corporate governance 
policies. The author mentioned that other areas that institutional investors are becoming aware of 
importance of CSR are in client demand and corporate citizenship. Mallin also argues that 
institutional investors expect companies to forego child or prison labour. What this means is that, 
there has an upward trend in the involvement of institutional investors in CSR, most especially 
in advanced economies (US and UK). However, these are all happening in developed countries, 
while there is relatively no literature on the role of institutional investors on CSR in Nigeria. 
Therefore, this is one of the objectives of this research. The next section discusses CSR practices 
in Nigeria. 
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3.7 Corporate Social Responsibility of Public /LVWHG&RPSDQLHV¶LQ1LJHULD 
Several authors examine CSR practices in Nigeria (Eweje, 2006; Amaeshi et al, 2006; Helg, 
2007; Amaeshi, 2008; Amaeshi and Amao, 2009), and conclude that CSR practices in Nigeria 
are discretionary and philanthropic in nature. According to Helg (2007) MNCs perform greater 
CSR activities than most indigenous companies that are mostly small and medium sized firms. 
This is because of both their huge resources and firm size, thereby providing slack resources for 
the MNCs to engage in CSR.  
Similarly, Amaeshi and Amao (2009) study the CSR of MNCs in Nigeria and argue that the 
operational methods of MNCs are a reflection of their home country form of corporate 
governance practices based on capitalism. These MNCs ignore their host country Code of 
Corporate Governance practices. Examples are companies not listed on the NSE such as Shell 
Petroleum Development Company (SPDC). Most MNCs, according to the authors, tend to 
engage in CSR without noting the socio-cultural and political dynamics of host country. 
Therefore, CSR practices of the MNCs are a reflection of their capitalism (Amaeshi and Amao, 
2009).  According to the authors, CSR in Nigeria are common among MNCs in oil and gas 
industries and their strategies include community development, voluntary social reporting and 
compliance to Corporate Code of Conducts.  
According to Ite (2004) CSR practices by PLCs has emerged as a strategic business practice in 
Nigeria. Ite (2004) argues that in the absence of governmental socio-economic developments of 
communities, companies rather than government lead the path of community development 
projects in the Nigeria. Ite (2004) posited that government from all levels, such as the council, 
state and federal have failed to offer solutions (such as building infrastructures, roads, medical 
equipment and schools). This has led to high incidence of poverty in Nigeria because of the 
following: corruption, weak institutional framework, lack of transparency and accountability 
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among public officials and bad governance. The failure by government to fulfil its mandatory 
obligation of providing social amenities for communities has made MNCs to become quasi-
government with community depending and targeting MNCs to solve their economic problems. 
As a result, Ite (2004) concludes that the absence of macroeconomic planning and good 
governance, strengthened by the availability of resources, and backed by good environmental 
management determines the nature of CSR practices in Nigeria.  
Currently, there is a CSR bill before the Nigerian parliament seeking to mandate companies to 
engage in CSR. According to Yusuf (2010) of the InternatLRQDO%DU$VVRFLDWLRQµ7KH&65ELOO
LV DLPHGDWEHFRPLQJDQ$FW WKDWZLOO FUHDWH µ&RUSRUDWH6RFLDO5HVSRQVLELOLW\&RPPLVVLRQ¶35, 
charged with providing standards, integration of social responsibility, and international trade 
issues. The bill seeks to establish a supervisory organ that will mandate corporations and 
companies to spend 3.5% of their profit before tax on CSR activities (Yusuf, 2010). However, 
the author points out that one of the shortcomings of the CSR bill is to increase corporate tax, 
which eventually might lead to the exodus of MNCs to neighbouring countries. In contrast, 
Ehikioya (2009) stated that CSR activities should be voluntary while government should 
perform its responsibility of providing basic infrastructures for the community. According to 
Ehikioya, companies should complement the efforts of government on a voluntary basis. 
The above discussions reveal the absence of institutional investors on CSR activities in Nigeria. 
In contrast, the role of institutional investors on CSR by companies in developed countries has 
been evident (Johnson and Greening, 1999; Mallin, 2004). This is not the case in developing 
countries, especially Nigeria, where literature are lacking on the role of institutional investors 
                                                 
35The role of the CSR commission include: Publishing the annual report of social and environmental impact of 
ILUP¶VDFWLYLWLHVDQGHQVXULQJ WKDW ILUPVHQJDJHLQFRPPXQLW\GHYHORSPHQWDQGHQVXULQJILUPVDUHDFFRXQWDEOHWR
stakeholders (Okike, 2007; Code of corporate governance in Nigeria, 2009; Yusuf, 2010). 
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and BOD characteristics on CSR practices. Thus, there is the need to examine this role of 
institutional investors and BOD characteristics on CSR practices within the Nigeria context. 
Furthermore, on the nature of CSR practices in Nigeria, Amaeshi et al (2006) use unstructured 
questionnaires to explore the practices and establish that CSR is localised and practised by 
indigenous companies as corporate philanthropy. Amaeshi et al (2006) argue that their findings 
affirm CSR to be socially embedded and culturally rooted in the operations of indigenous 
companies. 
On a similar note, Wheeler et al (2002) explore the challenging issues faced by companies in 
their stakeholder responses in the oil industries using SPDC and Ogoni community as case 
studies. Wheeler et al (2002) conclude that increasing stakeholder responses at the strategic and 
corporate level of the companies is important in promoting a peaceful Ogoni community. 
In addition, Ana et al (2009) investigate CSR breaches in different communities in Nigeria. They 
find environmental degradation to be higher in oil producing areas with a high incidence of 
pollution compared with non-oil producing area. Also, health related diseases such as skin 
disorders, respiratory problems and deformity are prevalent in oil producing areas compared  
with non-oil producing areas. Another reminder of CSR breaches (See, Wheeler et al, 2002) is 
the degradation of the Ogoni land by SPDC. Some environmentalists, such as Ken Saro-Wiwa 
protested the activities of SPDC in their land. This led to the hanging of the Ogoni writer, human 
rights activist and environmentalist, Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight (8) of his colleagues in 1995. 
According to Wheeler et al (2002) the Ogoni land and SPDC complicity are indications of the 
poor stakeholder welfare management by MNCs in Nigeria.  
+LVWRULFDOO\&65SUDFWLFHV LQ1LJHULDRULJLQDWHGIURPWKHZHVWHUQQDWLRQV WKURXJK WKH01&V¶ 
operations in the extraction sectors of the Nigerian economy, especially in the oil sector (Amao 
DQG $PDHVKL  7KH 01&V¶ investments brought revenue for the government and 
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employment for the people (Oyefusi, 2007b). However, the operations of the MNCs in these 
communities resulted in CSR breaches especially in areas of environmental degradation (oil 
spillage, gas flaring and toxic waste materials dumped in the rivers). According to Bisina (2005) 
the sources of income for the communities which are mainly farming and fishing are destroyed 
by the companies. This, according to Bisina, causes widespread poverty and agitation from the 
communities, thereby, raising further concern about the role of business in society. 
Consequently, these CSR breaches have further intensified the need to investigate the role of 
investors and BOD on CSR. 
Moreover, CSR in Nigeria tends to be culturally oriented (Helg, 2007). Altogether, the practice 
blends into other activities which reflect the religious, educational, linguistic, ethnicity and 
traditions of the people (Amaeshi et al, 2006; Amao and Amaeshi, 2008). According to Helg 
(2007) CSR in Nigeria reflects the communal lifestyle of the people which involves sharing, 
togetherness and consensus in CSR practices. It follows that these cultural influences help to 
shape CSR practices in Nigeria. They turn out to look like philanthropic donations embedded 
into the socio-cultural lives of the people (Amaeshi et al, 2006). 
Furthermore, Helg (2007) points out that CSR in Nigeria are characterised by the informal CSR 
as practised by majority of SMEs. For example, donations and charitable works fall under 
informal CSR activities, while most MNCs practice the formal CSR such as community 
development, product quality and environmental management (Perrini et al (2007). Besides, 
+HOJ  DGRSWHG &DUUROO¶V  &65 PRGHO RI HFRQRPLF OHJDO HWKLFV DQG SKLODQWKURS\
responsibility in her study and concluded that philanthropic responsibility is ranked second after 
WKHHFRQRPLFUHVSRQVLELOLW\ LQ WKH1LJHULD¶V&65SUDFWLFHV $PDHVKLet al, 2006). This differs 
IURP WKH &DUUROO¶V S\UDPLGmodel for developed countries that ranked legal responsibility as 
second and philanthropy responsibility as fourth on the pyramid. This underlines the importance 
of donations as a common form of CSR practice in Nigeria. Equally, both Table 3-5 and Table 
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3-6 illustrate the significance of the CSR practices in Nigeria as mainly philanthropic in nature 
confirming the argument of Amaeshi et al (2006) and Helg (2007) that CSR activities in Nigeria 
is mainly discretionary.  
Table 3-5 explains the mission statements of 168 PLCs in Nigeria from 2006 to 2008 while 
Table 3-6 illustrates the average CSR investments from 2006 to 2008. Table 3-6 shows that 
PLCs spent an average of 16.8% of their CSR fund sponsoring the entertainment and music 
industries. The mission statements further reveal that the entertainment industry is not mentioned 
in their mission statements as shown in Table 3-6.  
Most companies prefer to sponsor sports and in some cases enter into partnership with the 
communities through various donations and project implementations. Most of these projects are 
on religious grounds, such as contribution to churches and mosques. According to Obono 
(2003), religion has a major influence on organisational culture in Nigeria. This fact is evident in 
Table 3-5 where 12 companies in 2006, 2007 and 2008 had religion in their mission statements. 
Also, donations made to religious activities accounted for an average of 21.25m Naira, 21m 
Naira and 13.7m Naira for 2006, 2007 and 2008 respectively as illustrated in Table 3-6. 
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Table 3.5 $QDO\VLVRIFRPSDQLHV¶PLVVLRQVWDWHPHQWVLQNigeria 
Mission statements of firms No of firms 
2008 
No of firms 
2007 
No of firms 
2006 
Partnership with society 21 12 12 
Youth Empowerment 15 23 18 
Education 8 14 14 
Health and Safety 8 7 12 
Religious organisations 12 9 6 
Sports 31 30 26 
Environment 12 12 12 
Economic Empowerment 12 26 26 
Support for SMEs (financial institutions) 12 12 12 
Disaster relief 26 11 27 
Security 11 12 3 
Total number of firms 168 168 168 
Source: Data compiled from the annual reports and websites of companies from 2006 to 2008 
Figure 1, below, illustrates the different categories of philanthropic activities mentioned in 
FRPSDQLHV¶PLVVLRQVWDWHPHQWVXVLQJWKHEDUFKDUW7KHEDUFKDUWVKRZVWKDWIHZHUQXPEHUVRI
companies actually had education, health and safety on their mission statement in 2008. It also 
points to a decline in the number of companies investing in education, health and safety and this 
differs for youth and sports empowerment which top the list for most companies. The reasons for 
this could be that Nigerians are more passionate about sports than education. Furthermore, it 
supports the argument that some managers are involved in CSR for image building (Joyner and 
3D\QH  +RZHYHU WKLV FRQWUDGLFWV -HQVHQ¶V  HQOLJKWHQHG VWDNHKROGHU WKHRU\ WKDW
argueVWKDWPDQDJHUVVKRXOGVDWLVI\VWDNHKROGHUV¶JURXSVRQWKHORQJWHUPZKLOH&ODUNVRQ
acknowledges the support and satisfaction of primary stakeholders groups36 by companies. 
Consequently, applying the argument of Benson et al (2009) to the Nigerian CSR context means 
                                                 
36
 These are non-core groups of stakeholders and their influence does not affect the survival of company (Clarkson, 
1985). 
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the marginal cost of social investment is higher than the marginal benefit. This leads to a 
downturn in the firm value of the companies. For example, the investments of companies in 
religious activities concerning churches and mosques are shown in Table 3.6. Admittedly, the 
misallocation of CSR investment in PLCs in Nigeria tends to increase the need to investigate the 
link between corporate governance and CSR in PLCs. 
Figure 3.1: Analysis of Companies¶ Mission Statements in Nigeria (2006 - 2008) 
 
Table 3-6 illustrates the average CSR investments in Nigeria from 2006 to 2008. Table 3-6 
findings are consistent with the view of Amaeshi et al (2006) and Helg (2007) as earlier 
mentioned that CSR in Nigeria are heavily philanthropic in nature. Table 3-6 reveals that the 
entertainment industry in Nigeria got the highest amount of CSR investments in 2006, 2007 and 
2008. The entertainment industry had an average of 75 million naira, 99 million naira and 116 
million Naira respectively (i.e. an equivalent of £300,000, £396,000 and £466,400 respectively). 
Also discovered, is the fact that most PLCs are donating money to churches, mosques and state 
government agencies as mentioned above. The state government agencies received an average of 
47.5m Naira (£197,917) in 2008, while the churches receive an average of 13.7m (£57,450) in 
the same year.  
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Table 3.6: Average CSR Investments of 168 Companies (2006 ± 2008) 
Donations 2008 2007 2006 
Government agencies 19.35 11.23 4.9 
Schools 27.5 35.82 12.67 
Hospitals 6.5 32 0.3 
Health Foundations 9.5 0.5 1.95 
Sports 74 42.5 32 
Education/talent 23 12 1.745 
Private agencies 3 2.2 1.2 
Natural disaster victims 30 10 0.6 
Roads construction 34 32 34 
Waste management 14 5.6 1.7 
Beautification 43 34 23 
Churches/Mosques 13.7 21 21.25 
Summit/seminars 16 12 11 
Media 5.5 5.6 6.8 
Institutes 55 30.1 31.5 
Music /entertainments 116.6 99 75 
Health institutes 14 12 0.6 
Charitable Gifts 32 13 4 
State government agencies 47.5 0.5 5 
World summit 8.8 7.3 6.4 
Business foundations 30 23 12.6 
International NGOs 50 11 23 
Local NGOs 12 37.5 0.5 
Companies 0.6 4.4 4 
Orphanages 6.4 0.5 1.3 
Total 691.95 494.75 317 
Source:  Data compiled from the annual reports and websites of companies from 2006 to 2008 
In the above discussion, it is clear that CSR practices in Nigeria are still largely characterised by 
donations, charities and community developments. Therefore, some authors argue that CSR 
practices are unsustainable in Nigeria (Outran, 1994; Ergonomic and Olatumile, 2010). As a 
result, it is difficult to say that the PLCs are practicing strategic CSR as evidenced by developed 
countries. To be able to understand the reasons why CSR practices are still philanthropic in 
Nigeria, this study attempts to uncover not only the effect of the roles of investors and directors 
on CSR but also understand the factors that influence them to engage in CSR. This forms one of 
the objectives of this research. 
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3.8 The Gap in the Literature 
Empirical studies did not only reveal the institutional investors as heterogeneous in nature but 
also their support for CSR. These effects of different institutional investors on CSR were found 
to be mixed and inconclusive. Some authors found a positive relationship (Graves and Waddock, 
1994; Waddock and Graves, 1997; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Cox et al, 2004; 2008), while 
others found negative relationship (Consolandi et al, 2008) or sometimes inconclusive results 
(Coffey and Fryxell, 1991; Cox et al, 2008; Andayani et al, 2008; Wahba, 2010). Similarly, 
these mixed results are the same for the relationship between BOD characteristics and CSR, 
resulting in a positive relationship (Coffey and Wang, 1998; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Post 
et al, 2011), negative relationship (Rodriguez-Dominguez et al, 2009) or neutral effects 
(Consolandi et al, 2008; Said et al, 2009). These confusing results open up further questions and 
also raise the demand for more empirical studies to be conducted to provide understanding in the 
corporate governance and CSR literature. 
Furthermore, studies that examine the role of institutional investors and BOD characteristics 
were done using single methodological approach. For example, some studies employ interpretive 
paradigm (interview method), such as, Hendry et al (2006), while others employ the positivist 
paradigm (OLS) in understanding these relationships (Earnhart and Lizal, 1999). This study aims 
to provide a more robust methodology by arguing for a pragmatic approach. This is achieved by 
combining the qualitative method (case study) and quantitative method (panel data of 174PLCs). 
This approach not only provides for better understanding, but also provides a means of 
validating the findings. Finally, the pragmatic approach enables the researcher to extrapolate the 
findings beyond the samples, industry, and finally the country of study (Nigeria). 
Besides, most past studies are focused on developed countries (Johnson and Greening, 1999; 
Aguilera et al, 2006), with few or scanty literature in developing countries (Cole et al, 2008). 
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Based on previous studies, and the underpinning theories, this thesis aims to explore the 
relationship between corporate governance and CSR. Eventually, this can lend support to the 
few findings on developing countries, particularly the West Africa countries and further confirm 
previous findings on developed countries. 
Most PLCs are plagued with CSR breaches such as unethical practices, oil spillages, gas flaring, 
dumping of toxic wastes in rivers and environmental degradation in Nigeria. Once again, these 
problems highlight the unresolved dilemma of poor corporate governance practices in 
developing countries. These CSR issues have led many authors to point out the need to examine 
the role of BODs and investors on CSR (Johnson and Greening, 1999; Webb, 2004; Aguilera et 
al, 2006). In essence, this study seeks to examine the role of BODs and investors on CSR. 
In fact, while previous studies have concentrated on the relationship between CSR and corporate 
performance, others focus on the effect of different institutional investors and BOD 
characteristics on CSR. Most studies as mentioned earlier are centred on developed countries 
(Dulewicz and Herbert; 1999; Webb, 2004; Aguilera et al, 2006; Hung, 2011). Therefore, this 
study intends to fill that gap in the literature by examining the relationship between corporate 
governance and CSR in Nigeria. 
3.9 Conclusion 
In providing a detailed discussion of both CSR and corporate governance regulatory framework 
in Nigeria, this chapter highlights five points. First, there is the acknowledgement of the 
existence of PLCs in Nigeria because of the presence of a developing capital market, represented 
by the presence of SEC and NSE. Also, the corporate culture illustrates the low level of 
acceptance of Non-regulatory Codes of Corporate Governance (40%). The Code of Corporate 
Governance in Nigeria (2009) is a major improvement from the revised Code of Corporate 
Governance (2003), even though we are yet to see the high level of compliance to the new 
Chapter 3 Corporate Governance Mechanism and CSR Practices In Nigeria 
124 
changes in the Code of Corporate Governance (2009) by PLCs, such as in the areas of CSR 
disclosures. 
Second, the Code of Corporate Governance in Nigeria (2009) is encouraging companies to 
engage in CSR because of the addition of the triple bottom line reporting (economic, social and 
environmental). Consequently, companies are expected to report apart from their economic 
activities their social, environmental and ethical issues and how they complied or to explain if 
they did not. This is a major departure from the Code of Corporate Governance (2003) because 
the revised Code of Corporate Governance (2009) ensures that companies are held accountable 
to other stakeholders. 
7KLUGWKHVKDUHKROGHUV¶DFWLYLVPLQ1LJHULDKDVVKDSHGWKHUROHRILQVWLWXWLRQal investors on CSR 
SUDFWLFHV &RQVHTXHQWO\ WKHUH KDV EHHQ D FRQVWDQW ULVH RI VKDUHKROGHUV¶ DFWLYLVP LQ 1LJHULD
because of government policies that remove barriers, such as abolishing the Exchange Control 
Act of 1962 and the Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Degree of 1989. This encouraged the 
institutional investors to invest in PLCs in Nigeria. Another encouraging factor is the 
development and role of the capital market in enhancing best reporting practices and 
transparency among companies, thereby enhancing LQYHVWRUV¶FRQILGHQFH 
Fourth, the role of BOD is not only aimed towards compliance to the Code of Corporate 
Governance (2009), but towards making the board effective and independent. These Practices 
have ensured that the BOD becomes more responsible and accountable. Moreover, companies 
have been required to strengthen the BOD by being more effective and independent in their 
monitoring function and accountability to stakeholders. This is done by employing a minimum 
of two independent directors and raising the number of NED to equal the number of executive 
directors. Also, companies are encouraged through the Code of Corporate Governance (2009) 
recommendations to separate the post of chairman and CEO to be occupied by separate 
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individuals. 
Fifth, CSR practices in Nigeria are still evolving. They are largely philanthropic and culturally 
embedded (Amaeshi et al, 2006; Helg, 2007). Philanthropic investments accounted for 90% of 
the total CSR investments by companies. Also, a larger part of the philanthropic investment are 
PDGHWRFKXUFKHVPRVTXHV\RXWK¶VHPSRZHUPHQWDQGHQWHUWDLQPHQWDVVKRZQLQ7DEOH-5 and 
Table 3-6.  
Therefore, the review of literature on CSR and corporate governance regulatory framework in 
Nigeria provides the opportunity to investigate the research objectives. These provide a holistic 
view and understanding on CSR, role of institutional investors and role of the board in Plus in 
1LJHULD$OVRKRZFRPSDQ\¶V&65SUDFWLFHVLQ1LJHULDDUHEHLQJLQIOXHQFHGE\WKHUHJXODWRU\
framework illustrates the link between corporate governance and CSR and the need for this 
research study.  
The next chapter discusses the research methodologies used in examining the link between 
corporate governance and CSR. 
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CHAPTER 4 
4.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
The review of literature in chapters 2 and 3 suggest that Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
is influenced mainly by different institutional investors (indigenous, foreign and government) 
and Board of Director (BOD) characteristics (board composition, board size and board diversity) 
(See, Waddock and Graves, 1997; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Huse and Rindova, 2001, 
Kruger, 2010). This assertion forms the main argument of this study. This chapter presents the 
methodology used to achieve the aims and objectives of this research.  
This chapter discusses the following: research philosophy, formation of hypotheses, model 
specification, model estimation technique, data collection and the case study method. The next 
section discusses the research philosophy underpinning this study. 
4.2 Research Philosophy 
This section focuses on the philosophical approach, the beliefs and assumptions underpinning 
this research work. The research paradigm37 for this study is the pragmatist philosophy that 
combined both the positivism and realism research philosophy. The positivist paradigm is rooted 
in the natural science with emphasis on experimental scientific observations to explain and test 
                                                 
37
 Kuhn (1970) and Guba and Lincoln (1994) defined a paradigm as a set of beliefs, new philosophical assumptions 
or worldviews that guides the researcher. There are four (4) paradigms namely the positivism, realism, critical 
theory and constructivism (Sobh and Perry, 2006). Paradigms are made up of the ontology, epistemology and 
methodology (Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Sobh and Perry, 2006). The ontology is the reality, epistemology is that 
relationship between the investigator and reality, and methodology is the technique that the investigator employ to 
discover that reality (Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Sobh and Perry, 2006). 
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the cause±effect relationships of an event (Creswell 2003; Babbie, 2001). The positivists38 
believe that human life is governed by generic laws (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005); therefore the 
society and the people can be studied in a natural scientific manner. Subsequently, this research 
is based on the positivist approach (Healy and Perry, 2000). The positivist paradigm tests the 
cause and effect relationship between dependent and independent variables. This study uses CSR 
as the dependent variable, while the different institutional investors and BOD characteristics are 
used as the independent variables.  
However, the criticism against the positivist paradigm is that it excludes the discovery of new 
dimensions of empirical inquiry and undermines the determination of a new theory (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2005; Sobh and Perry, 2006; Gaffikin, 2008). However, there are increasing concerns 
about the assumption of easily apprehensible reality (Sobh and Perry, 2006: 1197) which do not 
always yield the same results as the previous research. Also, Petersen and Vredenburg (2009a) 
argue that the positivist approach lacks depth and robustness in understanding the link between 
different institutional investors and BOD characteristics on CSR.  
On a similar note, Aguilera et al (2006) argue for multi-method approaches for studies on 
corporate governance and CSR. Aguilera et al (2006: 156) state that: as for future research, it 
would be very important to have more data, both quantitative and qualitative, on institutional 
investors. They further argue that the multi-method approaches will provide more insights into 
the different institutional investors and offer a deeper understanding of engagement practices and 
investment goals of different institutional investors. As a result, in this study, in addition to the 
econometric method, the case study method will be used to give an in-depth understanding of the 
effect of different institutional investors and BOD characteristics on CSR of PLCs in Nigeria. In 
essence, the multi-method approaches yield better results, with the advantages and strengths of 
                                                 
38
 Positivism is based on assumptions (Blaike, 1994; Guba and Lincoln, 1994; 2005) and these assumptions assume 
that universal laws govern social events, and uncovering these laws enables researchers to describe, predict, and 
control phenomena (Patton, 1990; Drisko, 1997). 
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one method, replacing the disadvantages of the other method (Creswell, 2003). For instance, the 
quantitative method provides generalisation and breadth, while the qualitative method provides 
depth and deeper understanding of the phenomenon, which the quantitative method lacks (Stock 
and Watson, 2007). 
In line with the aims and objectives of this study, the case study method and Pooled ordinary 
least square (Pooled OLS), fixed and random effect models are used to estimate the impact of 
different institutional investors and BOD characteristics on CSR in Nigeria. The following aims 
and objectives of this study are presented. 
4.3 Aims and Objectives of the Study 
The research tools (methods) for this study will use both the balanced panel data of 174 PLCs 
from Nigeria between 2003 and 2009. In addition, the case study method involves the use of 
eighteen interviews and documentary data to determine the impact of different institutional 
investors and BOD characteristics on CSR of PLCs in Nigeria. The empirical data will be used 
to address the following objectives:  
x To investigate and identify the effects of indigenous, foreign and government 
institutional investors on CSR.  
x To investigate and identify the effects of the non-executive directors, executive directors, 
board size and board diversity on CSR.  
x To reduce the specification biases and inconsistencies in variables revealed in the study.  
x To determine why the different institutional investors and BOD characteristics influence 
CSR in Nigeria.  
Given the research objectives concerning the different institutional investors and the BOD 
characteristics on CSR of PLCs in Nigeria, the following hypotheses are formulated for the 
statistical/ econometric analyses. 
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4.4 Formation of Hypotheses 
The formation of the research hypotheses have been aided by the review of prior works from the 
literature, some of which are grounded in theoretical relationships, the following hypotheses 
would allow the examination of these relationships in light of the data collected for this study. It 
would also enable the researcher to explore the relationship between the construct of interest, 
and some of the identified explanatory variables. Apparently, this allow for comparison of the 
results obtained in this study and those found in previous research. 
This section focuses on the formation of hypotheses which analyse the relationship between the 
impact of different institutional investors and BOD characteristics on CSR in Nigeria. A 
hypothesis is a proposed explanation of a phenomenon. Also, the hypothesis formation 
demonstrates the cause and effect relationship between two variables, that is the dependent and 
independent variables. In this study, the relationship between the different institutional investors 
(indigenous, foreign and government) and the BOD characteristics (non-executive directors, 
executive directors, board size and board diversity) on CSR in Nigeria are been explored. 
4.4.1 Different Institutional Investors and CSR 
The stakeholder theory states that investors and corporations should implement policies that 
satisfy the interests of a wider group of stakeholders who have stakes in the corporation 
(Johnson and Greening, 1999; and Freeman and McVea, 2001). The stakeholder theory 
according to Freeman (1984) is a person or group that can affect or is affected by the 
DFKLHYHPHQWRI WKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VREMHFWLYHV. Though, Freeman identifies only 4 stakeholders, 
other researchers have expanded the stakeholders (Agle et al, 1999). The stakeholders include 
the shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers, environment, communities, government and 
the media (Freeman, 1984; Carroll, 1999; Jensen, 2001). In fact, Freeman and McVea (2001) 
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argue that the stakeholder theory expects managers to have a balanced view of all groups that 
have a stake in the company.  
Essentially, the stakeholder theory suggests that for long term survival interest of the firm, 
investors must engage in CSR (Johnson and Greening, 1999; Chai, 2010). By satisfying all 
stakeholders the corporation benefits from enhanced corporate image, high employee morale, 
reduced implicit cost, high competitive advantage and increased financial performance (Agle et 
al, 1999; Jawahar and McLaughlin, 2001). 
More recently, Prado-Lorenzo et al (2009) test the stakeholder theory in examining the 
relationship between types of institutional investors (financial institutions and government) and 
CSR in Spanish companies. The authors find government institutional investors and financial 
institutions (indigenous and foreign) to be positively related to CSR. In addition, Thomson and 
Cowton (2004) argue that indigenous and foreign investors, apart from interest on recovering 
their loan debt, should encourage CSR by pressuring their debtors to engage in sustainable CSR 
activities.  
Earnhart and Lizal (1999) find a positive relationship between indigenous institutional investors 
and CSR. Also, Nazli and Ghazali (2007) established a positive relationship between 
government institutional investors and CSR. Similarly, Chai (2010) finds a positive relationship 
between foreign institutional investors and CSR. Based on the stakeholder theory and empirical 
findings, the following hypotheses are proposed.  
Hypothesis 1a: There is a positive relationship between indigenous institutional investors and 
the amount invested in CSR by the PLCs in Nigeria. 
Hypothesis 1b: There is a positive relationship between foreign institutional investors and the 
amount invested in CSR by the PLCs in Nigeria. 
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Hypothesis 1c: There is a positive relationship between government institutional investors and 
the amount invested in CSR by the PLCs in Nigeria. 
4.4.2 Board of Director Characteristics and Corporate Social Responsibility 
The board of directors (BOD) is involved in formulating CSR policies (Baysinger and 
Hoskisson, 1990; Coffey and Wang, 1998). McGuire et al (1988; 2003) argue that active BOD 
not only invest in CSR, but also encourage managers to engage in CSR. On a similar note, 
Pfeffer (1972) and Goodstein et al (1994) argue that stakeholder theory suggests that BOD 
should implement CSR policies that satisfy a wider group of stakeholders.  
Huse and Rindova (2001) tested the stakeholder theory on the BOD roles and responsibilities 
using ANOVA and correlation analyses and they find that the stakeholder theory favours long 
term relationship of the companies. Huse and Rindova (2001) concluded that different 
stakeholders expect different roles and responsibilities from the BOD. The findings indicate that 
the BOD favour long term relationship of the companies. In support of the above arguments on 
stakeholder theory, Buck and Wright (1998) tested the stakeholder theory, using the interview 
method. They find that the stakeholder theory favours long term relationship of companies.  
Moreover, the BOD is able to check managerial entrenchment through the inclusion of NED in 
the BOD (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002). As a result, Dalton et al (1998); Filatotchev and Bishop 
(2002) argue that the NEDs are efficient in enhancing both BOD independence and board 
effectiveness. Previous empirical studies support the presence of NED in the BOD (Coffey and 
Wang, 1998; Johnson and Greening, 1999). Johnson and Greening (1999) find the inclusions of 
NED in BOD to be positively related to CSR.  
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Furthermore, those that support the inside directors39 dominated BOD (such as, Baysinger and 
Hoskisson, 1990; Schaffer, 2002) argue that the executive directors have more access to 
LQIRUPDWLRQ DERXW WKH GD\ WR GD\ DIIDLUV RI FRUSRUDWLRQ DQG LQIRUPDWLRQ RI VHQLRU PDQDJHUV¶
performance. Donaldson (1990) argues that the stewardship theory assumes executive directors 
to be true stewards and servants of the corporation. They operate as team players and motivator 
to other employees. In line with this theory is the study of Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) that 
find a positive relationship between executive directRUV¶ VNLOOV DQG WRSPDQDJHUV¶ HYDOXDWLRQV
Also, Kruger (2010) reports the executive directors to be positively related to CSR. According to 
Kruger (2010) the result suggests that a higher number of experienced executive directors in the 
BOD influence the decision making process of the BOD, prevent the BOD from pursuing short 
WHUPLQWHUHVWEXWHQJDJHLQ&65DQGVWDNHKROGHUVDWLVIDFWLRQ7KHUHIRUHWKHH[HFXWLYHGLUHFWRU¶V
presence in the BOD reduces the amount of lawsuits that could harm the company. In other 
words, Kruger (2010) argues that the inclusion of executive directors in the BOD reduces 
occurrence of negative events such as litigations against the company. 
Besides, resource dependence and stakeholder theories advocate larger board size by 
emphasising that increase in board size assists the BOD to connect the corporation to its external 
stakeholders and gather resources, reputation and good corporate brand (Pfeffer, 1972; 
Goodstein et al, 1994). Resource dependence theory views BOD as providing a pool of 
potentially valuable resources for the firm (Pfeffer, 1972; Goodstein et al, 1994; Hillman et al, 
2000). Pfeffer (1972) and Goodstein et al (1994) argue that increased resources could enhance 
WKHFKDQFHVRIFRUSRUDWLRQ¶VERDUGVDGRSWLQJ&65$OVRH[pert skills and advice are vital to the 
BOD to help reduce law suits against the corporation due to environmental and human rights 
violations (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002; McKendall and Wagner, 1997). Accordingly, Pfeffer 
                                                 
39The inside dominated BOD refers to the executive directors dominated boards with a higher proportion of inside 
directors compared to NEDs (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Schaffer, 2002). 
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(1973) finds a positive relationship between BOD size and CSR. Also, Kruger (2010) finds that 
BOD size is positively related to CSR suggesting that BOD size, especially with higher fraction 
of experienced directors, has less negative events.  
In addition, the stakeholder theory advocates for BOD diversity because, the minority group as 
members of BOD, brings their personal experiences, interests and commitments to the BOD 
(Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Johnson and Greening, 1999). The stakeholder theory suggests that 
the BOD is able to reach quick decisions concerning environmental issues when the BOD is 
diverse. So, ethnic minorities have more knowledge of their communities and are more likely to 
encourage the company to invest in CSR as a way of improving their relationship with the 
communities (Huse et al, 2009). In support of the arguments, Coffey and Wang (1998) find CSR 
to be positively associated with increase in the number of women in the BOD. This is because 
charities and donations are in line with long-term goal of the company. Furthermore, Johnson 
and Greening (1999) find the inclusion of women, ethnic minorities and people of different 
racial background in the BOD to be positively related to CSR. 
 Based on the stakeholder, resource dependence, stewardship theories and empirical findings, the 
following hypotheses are proposed.  
Hypothesis 2a: There is a positive relationship between board composition and the amount 
invested in CSR by the PLCs in Nigeria. 
Hypothesis 2b: There is a positive relationship between board size and the amount invested in 
CSR by the PLCs in Nigeria. 
Hypothesis 2c: There is a positive relationship between board diversity and the amount invested 
in CSR by the PLCs in Nigeria. 
Thus, the present study presumes there is a relationship between different institutional investors, 
BOD characteristics and CSR. Theoretically and empirically, the stakeholder theory advocates 
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that institutional investors and BOD engage in CSR because of the long term interest of the 
company (such as, Pfeffer, 1973; Goodstein et al, 1994; Thomson and Cowton, 2004; Prado-
Lorenzo et al, 2009). 
In view of the hypothesis formation for this study, the next section discusses the research design 
employed in examining the effect of different institutional investors and BOD characteristics on 
CSR of PLCs in Nigeria, starting with the research design. 
4.4.3 Research Design 
This is the triangulation approach employed in the collection and analyses of data. This involves 
a combination of both the quantitative and qualitative methods. The motivation for this approach 
arises from the need to have a primary and secondary data set that plays both a supportive and 
complementary role to each other. This ensures the testing of the hypotheses and providing 
answers to the research questions. Through the formulation of hypotheses quantitatively, 
indicating the cause and effect relationships and also taking into consideration that this study is 
qualitative, the research questions provided are also addressed. 
There are two variants in this approach, sequential triangulation and simultaneous triangulation 
(Morse, 1991). However for the purpose of this research, the sequential triangulation approach was 
used, with the quantitative data playing a principal role, and the qualitative data playing a 
subordinate role. This allows for the answering of some of the research questions and hypotheses, 
which requires further investigation through qualitative approach. The secondary data were collected 
and tested first (See chapter 5), then followed by the qualitative data analyses using case study 
method (See chapter 6). 
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4.4.4 The Sample 
In other to achieve the research objectives, the population samples and units of analyses were 
selected in order to test the hypotheses and answer the research questions respectively.  While it 
is occasionally possible to collect data from all members of a population, it is in most cases 
practically impossible, due to constraints of time, money, and accessibility to the units of 
analyses. For these reasons, sampling provides an alternative way of accessing the intended 
subjects. The results of data collected are used to generalise to the overall population, depending 
on the method of sampling adopted, and the kind of inferences intended. As in a single method 
design, the question of data collection method and the sampling strategies used in selecting 
participants for the qualitative and quantitative aspects of a study (Teddlie and Yu, 2007) must 
be addressed with utmost importance and rigour. Irrespective of the method employed, it is 
important that clear inferences are capable of being drawn from both the qualitative and 
quantitative data (Teddlie and Yu, 2007); otherwise the time and resources committed into the 
research would amount to efforts in futility. For a qualitative study, sampling techniques that 
yield information-rich cases is usually utilised, which when added to those utilised by the 
quantitative sampling techniques results in depth and breadth in relation to the phenomena being 
investigated (Teddlie and Yu, 2007). Given that sampling in a multi-method research requires 
some compromise between the requirements of quantitative and qualitative sampling; termed - 
representativeness/saturation trade-off (Teddlie and Yu, 2007), the current work uses sequential 
convenience/probability sampling, for the two strands of the study. The sampling strategy, it 
must be pointed out, addresses the three questions that must be answered in a 
representativeness/saturation trade-off of the multi-methods (Teddlie and Yu, 2007) discussed 
above:  
 
Is the overall sampling strategy sufficiently focused to allow researchers to actually gather the 
necessary data to answer the research questions?  
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Will the purposive/convenience sampling techniques utilised in the study generate saturated 
information on the qualitative research questions?   
Will the probability sampling techniques utilised in the study generate a representative sample 
related to the quantitative research questions?  
The overall research strategy is well focused on answering the research questions and 
hypotheses. This study develops a balanced panel data of 174 PLCs for the quantitative strand. 
The balanced panel data was intended to capture the dynamics and changes over a period of 
time. This explores the cause and effect relationship of the roles of institutional investors and 
BOD characteristics on CSR over a period of time from 2003 to 2009. The first Code of 
Corporate Governance was established in 2003 and later revised in 2009. Expectedly, this 
increased the transparency and accountability of PLCs to their stakeholders. The Code of 
&RUSRUDWH*RYHUQDQFHH[SHFWV3/&VWREHVWDNHKROGHUV¶RULHQWHGLQDSSURDFKUDWKHUWKDQ
IRFXVLQJRQVKDUHKROGHUV¶LQWHUHVWDORQH (Okike, 2007). This offers insight into the phenomena 
being investigated. Also, it attempts to provide answers to the research questions and 
hypotheses. For instance, the 174 PLCs utilised in this study generated a representative sample 
of the population. There are 264 PLCs listed on the NSE (See appendix E for the classification 
of industries).  
In selecting the 174 PLCs, the researcher ensure that the data were representatives of the different 
institutional investors being investigated. For examples, the main features of all 174 PLCs are that 
they have the presence of indigenous, foreign or government institutional investors in terms of their 
major shareholding (having 5% of shareholding and above). See appendix H for details. Also, that all 
the 174 PLCs engage in CSR. Companies not involved in CSR activities were removed or dropped 
from the panel data. 
Furthermore, the survey questionnaire was designed by the researcher to understand the 
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behavioural aspects of institutional investors and BOD characteristics as they affect CSR. The 
survey questionnaire was developed along the social issues to capture the four concepts of CSR 
principles namely economic, legal, ethical and discretionary components as illustrated by Carroll 
(1991; 1999).  The sampling of the questionnaire was based on several guidelines, particularly in 
answering the research questions. First, the PLCs are listed on the NSE market. Second, the 
PLCs information must be available and accessible. In total, 333 postal questionnaires were 
distributed by the mailing method to all the PLCs. The respondents were reminded twice by 
telephone and personal contacts. A total of 102 completed questionnaires were returned resulting 
in a response rate of 38.6%. This is used to complement and validate the secondary data. The 
survey provides insights into why the institutional investors and BOD characteristics engage in 
CSR (See Table 4.1 for profiles of respondents in survey and their relationship with the 
interviewees). $OVRVHHDSSHQGL[+IRUGHWDLOVRIWKHUHVSRQGHQWV¶SURILOHV 
In line with Stiles (2001), convenient sampling method was adopted because of the need to have 
interviews with the CEOs and senior managers from the PLCs. This is because of the difficulty 
in having access to the CEOs. Earlier, the CEOs were asked in the questionnaires if they would 
be prepared to provide an opportunity for interviews. Those top managers that provided an 
affirmative response were treated as respondents for the interview method. 
In respect of the qualitative strand, this study uses the convenience sampling technique (Teddlie 
and Yu, 2007). This study interviewed 18 participants who willingly made themselves available 
for the interview out of those that were contacted. As with Aaron (2005), the selection of the 18 
interviewees is considered sufficient to generate reliable and trustworthy results for the 
qualitative strand of the study. The employees interviewed are from different levels of the 
companies so as to generate a wide variety of information for this study. Top management and 
CEOs were involved among those interviewed because as a top executive officer who is a 
member of the BODs, their views are very critical and significant to this study since we are 
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LQWHUHVWHGLQJDWKHULQJLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKH%2'FKDUDFWHULVWLFVLQYHVWRUV¶EHKDYLRXUVRQ&65
policies and implementations. The Public Relations Officers, CSR managers and 
Communication managers were also interviewed because they act as mediator between the 
companies and communities. Also, the investment managers were interviewed so as to get 
information concerning LQVWLWXWLRQDO LQYHVWRUV¶ YLHZSRLQW RQ &65 VWUDtegic investments and 
directions. 
Moreover, the case study choses four (4) PLCs namely ExxonMobil PLC (dominated by foreign 
investors), Industrial Gas Insurance (IGI) company (has the presence of female directors), Zenith 
bank (dominated by indigenous investors) and Wema bank (dominated by government 
investors). Part of the criteria for chosen the PLCs are representativeness. For instance, the PLCs 
not only engage in CSR but also have the presence of institutional investors. Table 4.1 shows the 
profiles of the survey respondents and their relationship with the interviewees, with respect to 
age classification. Other profiles of the respondents such as gender, ownership and Nigerian and 
Non-Nigerian classification are found in Appendix H.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 Research Methodology 
139 
 
 
Table 4.1 Profiles of respondents in survey and their relationship with interviewees 
 Survey Interviewees 
Age 
Classifications 
26-30 
(30%) 
31-65 
(55%) 
65 above 
(15%) 
Total 
(102) 
Per cent 
(%) 
Total 
(18) 
Per cent 
(%) 
CEOs 3 9 4 16  15.69 3 16.67 
Deputy CEOs 0 7 0 7  6.86 2 11.11 
CSR Managers 2 11  13  5.88 2 11.11 
P.R.O 
 
7 12 2 21 20.59 1 5.56 
Director of 
Operations 
0 3 0 3 2.94 1 5.56 
Safety and 
Environmental 
Managers 
3 4 5 12 11.76 1 5.56 
Communication 
Managers 
2 4 2 8 7.84 1 5.56 
Administrative 
Managers 
2 2 0 4 3.92 1 5.56 
Finance Managers 4 1 0 5 4.90 1 5.56 
Secretaries 2 5 0 7 6.86 1 5.56 
Investment 
Managers 
3 3 0 6 5.88 3 16.67 
Total 
 
   102 100 18 100 
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4.5 Model Specification 
This study uses balanced panel data of 174 PLCs in Nigeria between 2003 and 2009. The panel 
data regression is expressed as follows: 
Yit = D +Xit ȕ +Eit ....................(i)     
i =1........ N; t = 1............. T 
Where i  denotes PLC and t denotes time. D is the scalar (constant), ȕ is coefficient of 
determination and it&  is the observation on the independent variables. Eit is the error term. 
Expanding model on equation (i) to include the control variables (Z), the following model is 
specified as: 
Yit = Di +E1Xit +E2Zit + Eit.................... (ii)     
Where: 
Y = CSR Investment (as amount spent on CSR practices per year) 
X = Different types of institutional investors and BOD characteristics 
Z = Control variables  
ȕ1= the coefficient that gives the impact of ɏit on Yit 
i = Public Listed Companies (PLCs) observations 
t = Time period observation  
E = Error or disturbance term 
 
4.5.1 The Error Components Term (E) 
Eit = Ȟi + uit.................... (iii)     
The error term Eit comprises two parts, namely, the time invariant unobserved variable that does 
QRWFKDQJHZLWKWLPH*UHHQH7KLVWLPHLQYDULDQWILUPVSHFLILFHUURUWHUPLVGHQRWHGDVȞi 
(See equation iii). The second part of the error term, u it, is the time variant unobserved variable 
that varies with time and across firms. For example, factors such as general confidence in the 
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FRPSDQ\ GLUHFWRUV¶ DELOLW\ %2' DELOLW\ %2' FXOWXUH SHUFHSWLRQ RI PDQDJHUV DQG VRFLDO
capital may have an effect on market valuation, and influence managers to engage in CSR.  
Failure to control this correlation within the model would yield biased results that will be 
unreliable (Del Brio et al, 2006; Ramasamy et al, 2007).  
 More importantly, the panel data studies the dynamics of change and help to investigate the 
behavioural model over a time period. The panel data takes a closer look at the evolution of CSR 
in Nigeria as it varies from 2003 to 2009. Besides, the panel data enables the researcher to gain 
insights into the BOD structure, role of BOD and various forms of institutional investors as it 
affects CSR investments among 174 PLCs in Nigeria from 2003 to 2009 (Baltagi, 2009, Goss 
and Roberts, 2009). 
7KHUHIRUHDGGLQJWKHWLPHLQYDULDQWILUPVSHFLILFHUURUWHUPȞi) in the next equation. The panel 
data regression is expressed as follows: 
Yit = Di +E1Xit +E2Zit Ȟi + uit.................... (3)    
4.5.2 The Effects of Types of Institutional Investors on Corporate Social Responsibility 
(Model 1) 
This study uses Model 1 to test hypothesis 1, to capture the effect of the indigenous, foreign and 
government institutional investors on CSR when all the control variables are held constant. In 
this study, Model 1 is illustrated below as: 
)1(10987
654
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Where: 
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Table 4.2 Lists of Variables  
Variable Explanation 
itlnCSR  Log of corporate social responsibility investment for ith firm and 
time t 
itIndigenous  Indigenous institutional investors for ith firm and time t 
itForeign  Foreign institutional investors for ith firm and time t 
itGovt  Government institutional investors for ith firm and time t 
itlnCOMPage  Log of company age for ith firm and time t 
iteelnNoemploy  Log of number of employees for firm size for ith firm and time t 
itIndustry  Industry effect or type for ith firm and time t  
itBeta  Firm beta or risk for ith firm and time t 
itROA  Return on assets for ith firm and time t 
itlnDebt  Log of debt for ith firm and time t 
lnEPS  Log of earnings per share for ith firm and time t 
D  Alpha for ith firm and time t 
Eit  Error term or disturbance term 
ln Natural logarithm of variables 
 
The control variables (Z) = 
ititititit
itit
EPSDebtROABetaIndustry
Noemployeecompage
lnln
lnln



 
The regression instruments (Pooled OLS, fixed effect and random effect estimators) are used to 
capture the effect of the institutional investors on CSR investment, if the P-value of the 
coefficient of indigenous institutional investors ( 1E ), foreign institutional investors ( 2E ), 
government institutional investors ( 3E ) are positively statistically significant, then we cannot 
reject the null hypotheses. Therefore, this research expects the coefficients of the following; 
indigenous institutional investors ( 1E )>0, foreign institutional investors ( 2E )>0, government 
institutional investors ( 3E )> 0, and all to be statistically significant. 
Using the aforementioned variables in model 1, the ( 1E ) estimates the impact of the indigenous 
institutional investors on CSR. 2E measures the impact of foreign institutional investors on 
CSR. 3E measures the impact of government institutional investors on CSR. 4E to 10E  
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measures the impact of the control variables, company age 4E , number of employees 5E , 
industry effects 6E , risk (Beta= 7E ), return on assets 8E , debt 9E  and earnings per 
share 10E , on CSR.  
4.5.3 The Effects of Board of Director Characteristics on Corporate Social Responsibility 
(Model 2) 
Model 2 test hypothesis 2. Model 2 estimates the effect of the non-executive directors, executive 
directors, BOD size and BOD diversity on CSR investments when all the control variables are 
held constant. In this study, Model 2 is illustrated below as: 
)2(11
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54321
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Where: 
Table 4.3: List of Variables  
Variables Meaning 
itBsizeln  Log of board size for ith firm and time t 
itED  Executive Director for ith firm and time t 
itNED  Non-Executive Director for ith firm and time t 
itDiv  Board Diversity for ith firm and time t 
All other variables definitions  are given as in Model 1 
 
 
Additionally, this study uses regression instruments (Pooled OLS, fixed effect and random effect 
estimators) to capture the effect of the BOD composition, BOD size and BOD diversity on CSR 
investments, if the P-value of the coefficient of BOD size is positively, statistically significant, 
then we cannot reject the null hypotheses. Therefore, this research expects the coefficients of the 
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following; non-executive directors ( 1E )>0, executive directors ( 2E )>0, BOD size ( 3E )> 0, 
BOD diversity ( 4E )> 0, and all to be statistically significant. 
Using the aforementioned variables in model 2, the non-executive directors ( 1E ) estimate the 
impact of non-executive directors on CSR. 2E estimates the effect of executive directors on 
CSR. 3E measures the impact of board size on CSR. 4E measures the impact of board 
diversity on CSR. 5E to 11E  measures the impact of the control variables, company age 5E , 
number of employees 6E , industry effects 7E , risk (Beta= 8E ), return on assets 9E , debt 
10E
 and earnings per share 11E , on CSR.  
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Table 4.4 Hypotheses, dependent variables, explanatory variables, and model assumptions (A Priori 
Assumption) 
Hypotheses Dependent 
Variables 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Model Model 
Assumption 
Expected 
Sign 
H1a CSR 
investments 
Indigenous 
investors 
Model   1 B1 > 1 +Ve 
H1b CSR 
investments 
Foreign 
investors 
Model   1 B2 > 1 +Ve 
H1c CSR 
investments 
Government 
investors 
Model   1 B3 > 1 +Ve 
H2a CSR 
investments 
Non-
Executive 
Directors 
Model   2 B1> 1 +Ve 
H2b CSR 
investments 
Executive 
Directors 
Model   2 B2 >1 +Ve 
H2c CSR 
investments 
BOD Size  Model   2 B3 > 1 +Ve 
H2d CSR 
investments 
BOD 
Diversity 
Model   2 B4 > 1 +Ve 
 
Table 4.5 shows the relationship between other variables identified from the literature as having 
an effect on CSR investments (See section 4.6.1). These variables include other financial 
performance variables such as total sales, return on equity, CEO incentives, managerial 
ownership just to name a few. 
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Table 4.5 Other Variables and Model Assumptions 
CSR investment Return on Equity +Ve 
CSR investment Return on Total 
Sales 
+Ve 
CSR investment Market capitalisation +Ve 
CSR investment Total sales +Ve 
CSR investment Return of capital 
employed 
-Ve 
CSR investment Managerial 
ownership 
+Ve 
CSR investment Reputation (R& D) +Ve 
CSR investment CEO Duality -Ve 
CSR investment CEO Type + Ve 
CSR investment CEO Type + Ve 
CSR investment Firm value (Tobin q) + Ve 
CSR investment CEO incentive + Ve 
 
In view of the discussion concerning the model specification and a-priori assumptions, that there 
is a positive and statistically significant relationship between different institutional investors, 
BOD characteristics and CSR, the next section discusses model estimation techniques used in 
this study in examining the effects of different institutional investors and BOD characteristics on 
CSR of PLCs in Nigeria. 
4.5.4 Model Estimation Techniques 
In this study, model 1, the control variables were tested. Following the test of the control 
variables, each of the independent variables (indigenous, foreign and government institutional 
investors) are added to the model and tested40 alongside the control variables and results reported 
(See, chapter 5). The same process was repeated for model 2; non-executive directors, executive 
directors, BOD size and BOD diversity added to the control variables as in Model 1 to 
investigate the effect of each independent variable on CSR. 
                                                 
40The Stata 11 software is used for the test and econometric analyses of the panel data (Gujarati, 2003). 
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Moreover, the Pooled OLS, Fixed effect and Random effect estimators are used to test the fixed 
effect of different institutional investors and BOD characteristics on CSR. The Pooled OLS 
regression absorbed the individual effect of each variable in the error term thereby causing 
biased, inconsistent and unreliable coefficient estimates. As a result, it does not capture the 
unobserved (within) differences or heterogeneity across groups. In contrast, the fixed effect and 
random effect estimators measure the effects of the unobserved variables (Stock and Watson, 
2007). In order words, the fixed effect reduces the omitted variable bias, that is, time invariant 
characteristics in the model. For example, culture, religion, gender and race. Also, the fixed 
effect estimator is designed to study the causes of changes within the PLCs.  As a result, the role 
of institutional investors and BOD on CSR between 2003 and 2009 is explored. While the fixed 
effect estimator assumed the unobserved variables to be correlated with the error term in each 
time period, the random effect estimator assumes the unobserved effect to be random and 
uncorrelated with the error term in each time period. Therefore, the main differences between 
fixed effect and random effect estimators are if, the unobserved individual effect is correlated 
with the independent variables in the model, and not if these unobserved individual effect are 
stochastic (non-deterministic) or not. 
However, in this study the random effect estimator captures model 1 and 2. This is because it 
reports the effects of all the independent variables on CSR, whereas the fixed effect estimator 
absorbs the independent variables measured with binary numbers such as the industry effect. 
Also, the random effect estimator captures the individual level differences among corporate 
bodies over time leading to a better finding for the regression coefficients (Gujarati, 2003).  
In this study, all results of the Pooled OLS, Fixed effect and Random effect estimators are 
reported to enhance comparison among the results. However, several diagnostic tests are carried 
out to enhance the robustness of the findings.  
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4.5.5 Diagnostics Tests 
This section examines the assumptions in the models. These assumptions include Hausman, 
normality, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. These tests are carried out 
in this study to enhance the reliability and validity of the findings (Greene, 1993). Also, 
diagnostic tests are carried out to verify whether the panel data of 174 PLCs from 2003-2009 
could meet the assumption of OLS. This test is to ensure that the assumption for the regression 
analysis in determining the coefficient of determination and predicting the dependent variable 
(CSR investment). For instance, if the assumption of multicollinearity is violated, it could have 
impact on the regression coefficient and the value of other explanatory variables. The robust 
standard error was used to correct the biasness, thereby making the fixed and random estimators 
to be consistent.  
4.5.6 Hausman Test 
The Hausman (1978) test is formulated to assist in making a choice between the fixed effect and 
random effect estimators. In other words, the Hausman test is used to differentiate between fixed 
and random effect estimators. This test is useful in determining which of the estimators (Baltagi, 
2009) is biased and effective in capturing the effects of the different institutional investors and 
BOD characteristics on CSR. The test checks if the ;¶V and the random effects (Eit) are 
uncorrelated. More importantly, the Hausman (1978) assumes that there are two estimators of 
E 0

(FEM) and E 1

(REM) of the parameter vector E  and the author added two hypotheses 
testing. In the H0 both estimators are consistent but E 0

(FEM) is inefficient, and under 
H1E 0

(FEM) is consistent and efficient while E 1

(REM) is inconsistent.   
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The Hausman test statistics is: 
W ( E REM-E FEM) 1S-1 ( E REM-E FEM) 
Where  
S=var ( E REM-E FEM) 
W represents a chi-square distribution with (k-1) degrees of freedom, where k is the number of 
explanatory variables. The FEM represents the fixed effect model while REM is the random 
effect model. If the value of the statistic is large, then the difference between the estimates is 
significant and the null hypothesis is rejected meaning that the fixed effect model is more 
appropriate. Conversely, a small value of Hausman statistic implies that the difference between 
the estimates is small, which indicates that the random effect model is consistent and more 
suitable (Stock and Watson, 2007).  
4.5.7 Hausman Test Choses Fixed Effect Estimator 
Moreover, fixed effect estimators are used to test the fixed effect of the different institutional 
investors and BOD characteristics on CSR. The fixed effect method not only absorbed the 
individual effect of each variable in the model, but also has the ability to control for all stable 
characteristics of the variables in the model, thereby eliminating potentially sources of bias.  
The comparisons within PLCs have also been popular in designed experiments known as 
changeover or crossover designs. The fixed effect reduces the omitted variable bias, that is, the 
time invariant characteristics in the model. For example, culture, religion, gender and race. Also, 
the fixed effect estimator is designed to study the causes of changes within the PLCs, as a result 
of the role of institutional investors and BOD when they adopt CSR between the periods 2003 to 
2009. While the crossover designs reduce sampling variability and hence produce better 
hypothesis. The fixed effect estimator differentiates the individual variability across subjects; by 
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this the error variance is eliminated. Below are the Hausman test results. All Hausman test result 
chooses fixed effect estimator instead of the random effect estimator.         
Table 4. 6   Hausman Test 
 Variables Fixed Effect Results 
1 Indigenous Investors 34.93 
2 Foreign Investors 35.67 
3 Government Investors 33.51 
4 Non-Executive Directors 30.55 
5 Executive Director 30.88 
6 BOD Size 36.06 
7 BOD Diversity 36.97 
Source: Compiled from this study  
 
4.5.8 Test for Normality 
The skewed data or presence of outliers is tested using the Kdensity in Stata 11. The presence of 
these outliers causes poor results and lack of robustness of findings. This test is carried out to 
determine the normality of each other. Consequently, the fourteen variables (indigenous, foreign 
and government institutional investors, NEDs, executive directors, BOD size and BOD diversity, 
ROA, company age, number of employees, debt, industry effect, EPS and risk) are tested for the 
presence of normal distribution.  
The natural logarithm of CSR, number of employees and company age were used. Logged 
values are used to reduce the effect of outliers and extreme values (See Appendix E1 for some of 
the normality test). The reasons for transforming data (logging variables) should be determined 
by the statistical analyses (Gujarati, 2003). The Kdensity was used to determine if the samples 
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have normal distribution (Bell-shaped) or not. The whole idea of data transformation is to ensure 
that the sample mean varies normally. However, if the population is skewed, the resulting 
approximation from the sample size can be poor. Therefore, any evidence of skewed data makes 
it important to transform the data to symmetric distribution before constructing a confidence 
interval. In this study, there was evidence of skewed data, hence the reasons some of the 
variables were logged. Examples of the logged variables are CSR investments, number of 
employees, company age and BOD size. The normality test helps to reveal the presence of 
outliers and lacked of bell shaped data, while the logged variables reduce the presence of outliers 
as mentioned earlier. 
Nonetheless, when the statistical analyses were carried out using Kdensity to test for normality, 
it was observed that some of the variables passed the normality test. The normality results show 
a normal distribution indicating absence of skewed data. Therefore, it was unnecessary to log 
these variables since they have a bell-shaped distribution. Examples of the variables not logged 
include the different institutional variables (indigenous, foreign and government), executive 
directors and NEDs. Hence, the reasons some of the variables were logged, while others are not. 
4.5.9 Test for Multicollinearity 
The presence of multicollinearity (two or more independent variables are correlated) is tested 
using Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). The VIF measures the extent to which the variance of the 
output regression is affected by the collinearity. In addition, the VIF checks how severe the 
multicollinearity problem is. The General Assumption of VIF used in this study is, if mean VIF 
value > 10, then it means that the multicollinearity is high and if mean VIF value < 10, means 
low multicollinearity and results are accepted (Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge, 2003).  
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4.5.10 Test for Heteroscedasticity 
In this study the Breusch-Pagan estimator is used to test for the presence of heteroscedasticity 
(residual error term variance not constant) in the model. The General Assumption is that the null 
hypothesis (Ho) assumes that the model has a constant variance. If the findings have value lower 
than 5% where the t statistics calculated is less than the t-tabulated, Ho is rejected. The Stata 
V\QWD[FRPPDQG µKHWWHVW¶ LV XVHG IRU WKH WHVW RIKHWHURVFHGDVWLFLW\7R UHVROYH WKHSUREOHPRI
KHWHURVFHGDVWLFLW\ WKH UREXVW VWDQGDUG HUURU WHVWV DUH FDUULHG RXW 6WDWD  FRPPDQG µYFH
UREXVW¶QRUPDOLVHVWKHVWDQGDUGHUURURIWKHPRGel, thereby reducing the variance of the error 
term.  
4.5.11 Serial Correlation 
The time series components of the panel data is mostly affected by serial correlation or auto-
correlation. The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation is used to test for the presence of auto-
FRUUHODWLRQLQWKHPRGHOVXVLQJWKH6WDWDFRPPDQGµ[WVHULDO¶7KHQXOOK\SRWKHVLV+RDVVXPHV
that there is no autocorrelation. When the value of the Wooldridge test is less than 5% reject null 
hypothesis.  
In this study, to resolve problem of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, the robust standard 
HUURU WHVW ZDV FDUULHG RXW IRU WKH PRGHO XVLQJ WKH 6WDWD  FRPPDQG µYFH UREXVW¶ ZKLFK
normalises the standard error of the model, thereby making the variance of the error term to be 
constant (homoscedasticity). Also, the logarithmic transformations of data are carried out to 
minimise the problem of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Greene, 2003). The logarithmic 
transformation of data helps to compress the scales used in measuring variables by reducing a 
tenfold difference between two values to a twofold difference thereby avoiding the presence of 
outliers in the sample (Wooldridge, 2003). Hence, the use of logarithmic transformation of the 
data into ideal data is employed in this study. 
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4.5.12 The Issue of Omitted Variables bias 
Several factors such as general confidence, social capital, image and reputation may affect both 
the likelihood of an organisation being socially responsible and their performance. Due to 
unavailability of data these variables mentioned above were not included. These time-invariant 
variables may correlate with the explanatory variables or the amount invested in CSR causing 
omitted variable bias. Ignoring omitted variable bias or unobservable heterogeneity can produce 
biased results. In this study, the extent to which unobservable heterogeneity problem occurs 
were investigated and corrective action were taken to resolve it. This is done by using fixed 
effect and random effect estimators.  
Studies in corporate finance and corporate governance uses fixed effect estimator to resolve the 
problem of unobservable heterogeneity across firms, by removing the time-invariant variable 
through a transformation process of using either de-meaned or dummy variables (Wintoki et al, 
2011). Thus, this study employs fixed effect estimator to resolve the problem of unobservable 
heterogeneity across firms (See Chapter 5).   
In this study, the issue of collinearity of NEDs, executive directors and female directors with the 
error term E was not only resolved by the robust standard error test, but also through testing each 
explanatory variable. These variables are indigenous investors, foreign investors, government 
investors, NEDs, executive directors, board size and female directors. These explanatory 
variables are tested with the dependent variable (that is, CSR investment) to determine their 
individual impact on the dependent variable.  
The selection of independent rariabhes in this study is based on not only the literature, but on the 
availability of consistent data for all the PLCs under study. However, the PLCs with incomplete 
dataset concerning the seven year period under review could not be included because some of 
the data for some years are missing. Also, the corporate governance variables such as board 
Chapter 4 Research Methodology 
154 
DELOLW\ERDUGFXOWXUHDQGSHUFHSWLRQRIPDQDJHUV¶LQIOXHQFHRQ&65FRXOGQRWEHPHDVXUHG,Q
certain cases, for instance the BOD age was removed because of unavailability of data.  
In order to generate large sample data and avoid problem of selection bias due to attrition, a 
balanced panel data of company-year matrix was created from 2003 to 2009. The number of 
firms was 174 PLCs from 2003 to 2009 amounting to 1,218 observations. Therefore, the total 
aggregated observation is 174 PLCs over 7 years and 14 variables, resulting in 17,052 
observations. This dataset gives 1,218 CSR investments relationships (observations).  
The next section focuses on how the variables are measured. The dependent and independent 
variables used in this study in examining the effects of different institutional investors and BOD 
characteristics on CSR of PLCs in Nigeria are discussed. 
4.6 Variable Measurements 
The dependent variables are the observed variables. In other words, the dependent variable is the 
event or phenomenon that is being investigated and expected to vary when the independent 
variable changes. In this study, CSR investments are the dependent variables. Mathematically, 
WKHGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHVDUHGHQRWHGE\µ\¶IXQFWLRQEHFDXVHLWVYDOXHLVGHSHQGHnt on the value 
RIWKHLQGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHGHQRWHGE\µ[¶ 
The measurement of variables (that is independent and dependent variables) and their 
subsequent selection were guided by the literature review. Most of the control variables were 
captured during the survey and use of secondary data. These variables include firm size, age, 
profitability, risk, debt, etc. All these variables have been included in previous studies by several 
authors relating to the roles of institutional investors, BOD characteristics and CSR (Coffey and 
Fryxell, 1991; Graves and Waddock, 1994; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Goergen and 
Ronneboog, 2002; Bartkus et al, 2002; Neubaum and Zahra, 2006; Wahba, 2010; Rasic, 2010). 
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4.6.1 CSR Investments 
The CSR investments are the amount spent by the company on CSR activities per year. These 
amounts invested in CSR are measured in the Nigerian currency, the Naira. In this study, CSR 
investment data is obtained from the audited annual financial statements and annual reports of 
companies and complemented by survey data. This is the pre-tax earnings donated to charities, 
philanthropic activities and community development projects (Coffey and Fryxell, 1991), partly 
referred to as, CSR practices. Therefore, the CSR investment and practices are used 
interchangeably in this study. This method of data collection is in line with Chai (2010) who 
study the relationship between types of institutional investors and CSR. Chai (2010) uses the 
corporate philanthropy data as a proxy for CSR. The author argues that the data has more 
reliability because it measures the actual amount spent on CSR. Also, this is in line with Bartkus 
et al (2002) who uses CSR investments as a proxy for CSR. The CSR investments for 174 PLCs 
from 2003 to 2009 period are generated.  One of the statistical criteria of normal distribution is 
fulfilled by natural logarithmic of CSR investments (lnCSR). See Appendix E.1 
4.6.2 Independent Variables 
The independent variables represent the variables that influence the dependent variables. In this 
study, the independent variables are the corporate governance variables influencing the CSR 
investments (dependent variables). The data on corporate governance variables such as 
indigenous institutional investors, foreign institutional investors, government institutional 
investors, NEDs, executive directors, BOD size and female directors (used as proxy for BOD 
diversity) are obtained from the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) fact book from 2003-2009, and 
FRPSOHPHQWHGIURPFRPSDQ\¶VDQQXDOUHSRUWDQGVXUYH\GDWa. However, other information such 
as BOD age was dropped because of unavailability of data.  
The NSE transactions are regulated by the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) which 
Chapter 4 Research Methodology 
156 
administers the Investment and Securities Act of 1999. All PLCs submit their audited annual 
financial statements to the NSE, which is a mandatory requirement by NSE and SEC. In other 
words, NSE collates historical information and extracts from balance sheets, profit and loss 
accounts and financial ratios of PLCs. Similarly, the N6(¶V IDFW ERRN SXEOLVKHV ERWK WKH
management and financial information of PLCs such as directorship shareholdings, BOD 
characteristics and financial statements. The company reports are prepared according to SAS 30 
and IAS 34 guidelines. The SAS 30 and IAS 34 are financial reporting standards and part of the 
SEC rule. This involves the publication of the quarterly annual report in one national daily 
newspaper as a sign of transparency to investors. 
The listed companies comply with the accounting standards and information as recommended by 
&RGH RI &RUSRUDWH *RYHUQDQFH  $OVR DOO 3/&V¶ DFFRXQWV DUH DXGLWHG E\ WKH H[WHUQDO
auditors. This statement includes institutional holdings, total assets, debt, market capitalisation, 
BOD size, BOD composition, number of directors and NEDs, number of women on the board 
etc. The NSE transactions are published and documented in NSE Fact book annually.  
4.6.2.1 The Types of Institutional Investors 
In this study, indigenous, foreign and government institutional investors provide the exploration 
of diversity and disparities in behaviour between the various institutional investors (Cox et al, 
2004; Li and Zhang, 2010). In other words, the role of different institutional investors is used 
because their interests are different IURP WKH LQYHVWRUV¶ W\SHV EXW VLPLODU ZLWKLQ D SDUWLFXODU
investor group. 
The indigenous, foreign and government institutional investors are measured using percentage 
shareholdings for indigenous investors, foreign investors and government investors. Institutional 
investors are measured as investors with equity holdings of 5% and above (Johnson and 
Greening, 1999). This approach is similar to Bartkus et al ZKRXVHGRIILUP¶VVWRFNDV
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a measure for institutional investors. Foreign investors are measured as a percentage of equity 
held by foreigners (Non-Nigerians). The government investments are measured as a percentage 
of equity holdings held by state and federal governments or their agencies. The indigenous 
institutional investors are measured as a percentage of equity holdings (5% and above) held by 
Nigerians. This is in line with Chai (2010). The study expects a positive relationship between 
different institutional investors and CSR of PLCs in Nigeria, when all the control variables are 
held constant. 
4.6.2.2 Board Composition 
The BOD composition is the total number of executive directors in relation to the NED (Coffey 
and Wang, 1998). The NEDs are measured as the percentage of NEDs to total number of 
directors on the board, while the executive directors are measured as the percentage of executive 
directors to total number of directors (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2009). The executive directors 
DQG 1('V¶ LQIRUPDWLRQ DUH REWDLQHG IURP 16( IDFW ERRN -2009. This study expects a 
positive relationship between BOD composition and CSR of PLCs in Nigeria, when all the 
control variables are held constant. 
4.6.2.3 Board Size 
The BOD size is the total sum of all directors at the end of the last fiscal years, in this case 2003-
2009 (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002). The data on BOD size is derived from NSE fact book from 
2003-2009. The normal distribution of BOD size is determined. The natural logarithm for the 
BOD size (lnBsize) had a similar distribution close to normal. The study expects a positive 
relationship between BOD size and CSR of PLCs in Nigeria, when all the control variables are 
held constant. 
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4.6.2.4 Board Diversity 
The BOD diversity refers to the presence of women and ethnic minorities in the board (Johnson 
and Greening, 1999). In this study, due to unavailability of data, the BOD diversity is measured 
as the percentage of women (female directors) on the board compared to total board members 
(Coffey and Wang, 1998). Therefore, the number of women on the BOD is used as a proxy for 
BOD diversity (Wang and Coffey, 1992). The BOD diversity (number of women) information is 
REWDLQHG IURP WKH 16(¶V IDFW ERRN EHWZHHQ  DQG  7KLV VWXG\ H[SHFWV D SRVLWLYH
relationship between BOD diversity and CSR of PLCs in Nigeria, when all the control variables 
are held constant. 
4.6.3 Control Variables 
The control variables are those explanatory variables that influence CSR, but they are not part of 
the research objectives or variables of interest in this study. It is necessary to include control 
variables so as to avoid and reduce any bias in the results. These are variables derived from the 
review of literature. Therefore, based on the following empirical evidence from the literature, 
availability of data and the need to prevent multicollinearity, seven control variables were 
chosen carefully (Prado-Lorenzo, 2010). The following are the control variables; financial 
performance, risk, firm size, company age, industry effect, and debt. 
4.6.3.1 Financial Performance 
The financial performance is the overall picture of the financial health of the PLC. Also, it is 
how the PLC uses its assets and resources (Balabanis et al, 1998). Balabanis et al (1998) 
categorise the measures of financial performance into two groups, namely, the accounting and 
capital market measures. The accounting measures are quantified using accounting values in 
monetary units or other units such as volumes. Also, accounting measures are expressed based 
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on historical cost while the capital market measures could be previous, current or forward 
looking, which can be used for estimates.  
In this study, the accounting measure used is Return on Asset (ROA). A high ROA value 
signifies efficient management, while low ROA means inefficient management. The ROA 
LQIRUPDWLRQLVREWDLQHGIURPWKH16(¶VIDFWERRNIURP to 2009. The ROA measures how 
companies utilize the assets at their disposal. The shortcomings of the accounting measures 
include inflation on their nominal value; these figures are subjected to manipulation using 
different accounting procedures (Balabanis et al, 1998).  
The capital market measures used is the earnings per share (EPS). The EPS are the earnings 
generated from the investment funds (Balabanis et al, 1998). Balabanis et al (1998) measure 
EPS by earnings divided by the number of outstanding shares. The capital market could give an 
indication of how investors perceive the company that contributes to the society (Griffin and 
Mahon, 1997). The EPS information is obtained from the NSE fact book 2003 to 2009. 
4.6.3.2 Risk (beta) 
The market risk is represented by beta which is the covariance of the expected return on the 
ILUP¶VVKDUHRIWKHPDUNHW.LPet al, 1993). This follows the findings of Orlitzky and Benjamin 
(2001) who argue that CSR is more strongly correlated with measures of market risk, than 
PHDVXUHVRIDFFRXQWLQJULVN+RZHYHUWKHILUP¶VULVNLVPHDVXUHGE\WKHVWDQGDUGGHYLDWLRQRI
accounting measures employed on returns (Kim et al, 1993). The disadvantage of stock market 
returns adjusted for risk (Anand and Singh, 1993) is that the announcement of great events leads 
to high fluctuations and abnormality on stock returns.  
Nevertheless, due to unavailability of data for the measure of beta, accounting risks are used as a 
proxy for beta and this is in line with Kim et al (1993). In this study, gearing is used as a 
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measure of risk. This is measured as the ratio of Debt/Equity ratio (Kim et al, 1993). The data 
for total assets and debt are obtained from the NSE fact book (2003) to (2009). 
4.6.3.4 Firm Size 
The firm size is measured using the number of full time employees (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 
 7KH QXPEHU RI HPSOR\HHV¶ LQIRUPDWLRQ LV REWDLQHG IURP WKH 16( IDFW ERRN  WR
(2009). It is assumed that firms with large assets have slack resources that will be used for CSR 
practices. The natural logarithm of number of employees is used (lnNoemployees) because its 
distribution (log form - lnNoemployees) is close to normal (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2009). 
Most studies (Waddock and Graves, 1997; McGuire et al, 1988; Mckendal et al, 1999; 
McWilliams and Siegel, 2001) find firm size to be related to financial performance and CSR, 
this study adopts firm size as one of the control variables. 
4.6.3.5 Company Age 
Company age is measured as the current year used for this study, that is (2009) less year of 
FRPSDQ\LQFRUSRUDWLRQWKDWLV\HDURIFRPSDQ\¶VUHJLVWUDWLRQLQ1LJHULD6RPHDXWKRUV6HH
Agle et al, 1999; Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008) argue that older companies are more likely 
to perform better than new companies and have better financial performance, by engaging in 
CSR (Buchholtz et al, 1999). Buchholtz et al (1999) argue that older firms could be motivated to 
get involved in CSR activities. To control company age, the value for age of company is derived 
from the NSE fact book (Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008).  
4.6.3.6 Industry Effects 
Industry effects refer to the terms of sector, product, competition, barriers to entry and business 
cycles that have impact on the performance of the firm (Aupperle et al, 1985) and amount 
invested in CSR (Johnson and Greening, 1999). The industry effects information is obtained 
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from NSE fact book (2003-2009). The companies are classified based on the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) contribution to the Nigerian economy as oil companies, that is extractive oil 
companies coded as (1), while the remaining 174 PLCs are grouped as other sectors and coded 
as (0) (Perrini et al, 2007). (See appendix E for the NSE classification of Nigerian PLCs into 33 
sectors). 
4.6.3.7 Debt 
The data for debt is derived from the NSE fact book 2003 to 2009. The natural logarithm for the 
debt is used and it has a normal distribution. Debt is the amount owed by a company (Mallin, 
2004). Neubaum and Zahra (2006) argue that debt affects the level of investments in CSR. They 
argue that as the level of debt rises, companies are under more pressure to repay its loan and this 
approach affects the resources needed for CSR practices. Goss and Roberts (2009) find the 
impact of cost of debt financing to be high and low levels on CSR. This means that at a low level 
of debt, a company invests in CSR but as the debt increases the company is forced to repay its 
loans and this makes it difficult for the firm to invest in CSR practices. 
Following the discussion concerning the variable measurements, the next section discusses data 
collection (survey questionnaire) uses the effects of different institutional investors and BOD 
characteristics on CSR of PLCs in Nigeria. 
4.7 Survey Questionnaire 
Survey questionnaire is used by designing a questionnaire and delivered to respondents by post 
(postal questionnaire), email, by hand just to mention few. The questionnaires are designed to 
capture board characteristics, institutional investors and CSR practices of PLCs in Nigeria. 
Previously, the pilot study carried out, highlighted some issues such as the need for a ticking box 
system which improves the clarity and chances of getting higher numbers of answered questions. 
These issues from the pilot survey were noted when designing the postal questionnaires for the 
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main study. The intention is to make the questionnaires clear, simple and easy to answer by 
respondents who were required to tick the appropriate box indicating the answer to the questions 
as illustrated in appendix A. If they wished, respondents were encouraged to add detailed 
information by commenting on the questionnaires in the spaces provided.  
Furthermore, the research was conducted in Nigeria, while the researcher is based in the UK 
thereby making the sending of the questionnaires internationally more expensive. This is 
because international postage is very costly. Also, it was very difficult for people in Nigeria to 
return questionnaires by post to another country during the survey exercise. More worrying, 
when it is a western nation, especially in a situaWLRQZKHUHUHVHDUFKHUV¶FRPPHQWVRQ01&VDUH
viewed with suspicion and scepticism because of crises in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. In 
essence, it was better and necessary for the researcher to travel to Nigeria to conduct the survey 
after getting clearance from the research ethics committee (See Appendix F). By travelling to 
Nigeria the cost of sending and returning the questionnaires by post was largely reduced because 
local postage in Nigeria is relatively cheaper than the UK by approximately 50%. In addition, 
the questionnaires were reviewed in Nigeria before conducting the in-depth interviews. By 
visiting Nigeria, the researcher was also able to collect other published materials, annual reports 
of PLCs necessary for the case study. 
Meanwhile, prioU WR WKHUHVHDUFKHU¶VGHSDUWXUHIURPWKH8.WR1LJHULDIRXUEDVHVIRUGDWD
collections were set up in Nigeria. These acted as centres for distribution points of 
questionnaires. This is done because of the huge size and population of the country as it will be 
extremely difficult for the researcher to travel across the thirty-six (36) states of Nigeria. Also, it 
was important to seek contact, social ties and networking if you really want things to be done 
quickly in Nigeria.  
First base was Port Harcourt, the capital of River state, one of the 36 states that make up Nigeria. 
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River state was made up of 80% of the oil MNCs and oil servicing companies because of its 
abundant oil deposits. The state is home to many westerners and foreigners who are either 
suppliers or employees of the oil MNCs. More importantly, the consent and assistance of a 
senior manager in Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) who is a family friend of the 
researcher is sought to assist the researchers in dealing with the respondents. Also, the senior 
managers assist in soliciting other senior managers and CEO contacts that may be willing to 
grant interviews.  
The second base was in Bayelsa state, another oil producing state in the Niger Delta region. 
Historically, Bayelsa state is where the first oil deposits in Nigeria was discovered in 1958 in a 
town called Oloibiri (Oyefusi, 2007a). There are few MNCs operating in Bayelsa state as most 
of them are operating offshore, escravos and rivers using badges. It is in this state that most of 
the environmental degradation is common (Bisina, 2005). This is because of the oil exploration 
activities of the MNCs leading to recurring problems such as, gas flaring causing air pollution 
and climate change, oil spillages and dumping of waste in waters (Watts, 2004). Both, Bayelsa 
and River state form part of the Niger Delta community where the agitation for improved CSR 
practice is most visible. The consequences of these agitations have led to kidnapping of 
foreigners, employees of the oil MNCs by youths in the communities. An indigene adviser was 
VHW XS KHUH %D\HOVD VWDWH WR FROODWH UHVSRQGHQWV¶ LQIRUPDWLRQ DQG TXHVWLRQQDLUHV HVSHFLDOO\
through the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and community representatives.  
The third base was in Lagos, the commercial nerve centre of Nigeria. Most of the PLCs in the 
NSE market are either located in Lagos or have their head office in Lagos. This is because Lagos 
state has huge market and labour force in Nigeria. Also, the state was originally the capital of 
Nigeria before the government re-located the capital to Abuja in 1991. Lagos state has huge 
economic potentials and this made most companies open offices and branches in Lagos state. A 
former friend of the researcher was set up in the state to assist in data collection. 
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 )LQDOO\ WKHIRXUWKEDVHZDV$EXMDQRZWKHFDSLWDOFLW\RI1LJHULDZKHUHVRPH3/&V¶RIILFHV
are located. Most offices in Abuja include government ministries such as the Central Bank of 
Nigeria, Ministry of National Statistics and Planning. These offices have valuable data that 
assisted the researcher in this study were gathered from Abuja. A friend who is also a banker 
was in Abuja to collect the completed questionnaires from colleagues. This approach motivated 
most reluctant respondents to participate and respond. 
The postal questionnaires focus on two major aspects; first, the various components of CSR 
(philanthropy, product quality, environmental issues, ethical issues, employee welfare and the 
communities). Second, is the role of institutional investors (indigenous, foreign and 
government), and BOD characteristics (board size, board diversity, and board composition). The 
survey questionnaires are designed to understand the behavioural aspects of institutional 
investors and BOD characteristics as they affect CSR investments.  
Also, the roles of institutional investors are captured by the questionnaires through questions on 
ownership concentration in Section D. The postal questionnaires were developed along the 
social issues to capture the four concepts of CSR principles namely economic, legal, ethical and 
discretionary components as illustrated by Carroll (1991; 1999). However, the shortcomings of 
survey methods include being prone to over reporting or under reporting (Goss and Roberts, 
2009). 
Furthermore, the sampling of the questionnaires was based on several guidelines. First, the PLCs 
comprising foreign owned MNCs, indigenous companies and government owned companies. 
Second, the PLCs are listed on the NSE market. In line with Stiles (2001) convenient sampling 
method is adopted because of the need to have an interview with the CEOs and senior managers 
from the PLCs. The CEOs were asked in the questionnaires if they would be prepared to provide 
an opportunity for interviews.  
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4.7.1 Sample Size 
The NSE has a good coverage of the listed companies operating in Nigeria. There are 264 
companies listed in the NSE as at March 2009. These companies constituted the sampling frame 
which, according to Creswell (2003), explains the objective list of the population size. Despite 
operating in Nigeria for over 100 years, some of the MNCs are not listed in the NSE, for 
example, SPDC. However, Okike (2007) points out the lack of the desire on the part of SPDC to 
disclose its financial accounts to constituted authorities, further mask and illustrates its 
oppressive and corrupt practices in Nigeria. 
In selecting the convenient sampling method for the survey, three factors were considered. First, 
the budget concerning the cost of labour, postage stamps, envelopes, cost of transportation and 
accommodation because the researcher used four (4) bases as central collating points for the 
survey. Second, the percentage of returned questionnaires was considered as valid in this study. 
Third, the availability of postal addresses, websites and email addresses and telephone numbers, 
while previous research has voiced concern of poor response rate in postal questionnaires in 
Nigeria (Amaeshi et al, 2006).  
Meanwhile, one month before the researcher travelled to Nigeria, a total of 250 email addresses 
were collated. 333 questionnaires (see Appendix A) were sent to the PLCs through the internet 
as attached copies. The response rate was very poor. Two companies completed their 
questionnaires and returned them by email. Five companies sent auto replies and did not respond 
again despite two reminders sent to them through email by the researcher. Three companies 
replied and mentioned that they do not attend to unsolicited emails. The remaining respondents 
did not reply until the day the researcher travelled to Nigeria. It was this poor response of the 
emails that made the researcher to adopt postal survey. 
Chapter 4 Research Methodology 
166 
In total, 333 postal questionnaires were distributed by the mailing method. The respondents were 
reminded twice by telephone and personal contacts. For some companies, social ties network, 
that is, friends were used. The use of social ties was done to enhance commitment of respondents 
and achieve a high response rate in completing the questionnaires whilst ensuring validity and 
reliability of data. Ojo (2009) noted that the use of friends in developing countries like Nigeria in 
questionnaire distribution increases the response rate.   
A total of 102 completed questionnaires were returned resulting in a response rate of 38.6%. 
This is used to complement and validate the secondary data. The response rate is slightly lower 
than that of Ibrahim et al (2003) that had a response rate of 32.5% in their postal survey. 
4.7.2 Nature of the Respondents 
The postal questionnaires sent to companies included the foreign-MNCs, government and 
indigenous companies. These companies practice CSR. The NSE classifications of PLCs in 
Nigeria are presented in appendix E. Most MNCs are western conglomerates listed in NSE. The 
western countries mainly include US, UK, Italy, Netherlands, and Germany. British investors are 
targeted as their head office could be contacted for information when the researcher returned to 
London. 
4.7.3 Response Rate of Returned Questionnaires 
The 38.6% response rate achieved was attributed to both the use of social ties in Nigeria that 
assisted in distributing and collecting the questionnaires. More frustrating, is complaints from 
the respondents of their inability to complete the questionnaires because of lack of time. 
Incidentally, it is a general belief that Nigerians hardly respond to questionnaires especially if 
you are not known to them on personal basis. However, they feel honoured and committed if 
someone approaches them for assistance believing that one day you might help them too. To 
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counter this negative attitude, friends and social ties were heavily engaged throughout the 
duration of the fieldwork which lasted for eight (8) weeks. 
The survey questionnaires are more efficient than observation, more economic than in-depth 
interviews (Ritchie and Lewis, 2006). Oftentimes, postal questionnaires generate much 
information through some questions which would have taken much time, efforts and resources 
through observation. Further, postal questionnaires as a medium of communication and data 
gathering can help by expanding the geographic coverage at a lower cost than an in-depth 
interview (Creswell, 2006). Besides, there is no bias in a postal survey, unlike interviews. 
However, the shortcomings of postal questionnaires are: firstly, the possibility of generating 
quality information is difficult and secondly, is the poor percentage of completed and returned 
postal questionnaires that is always common (Emory, 1985). Similarly, since survey 
questionnaires are activities that occur after events have taken place, respondents may forget 
important issues or the events that actually occurred. By doing this, survey questionnaires may 
not give a vivid account of what happened. Moreover, respondents are tempted to give 
superficial answers in situations where the questionnaires take a long time to complete. Also, 
some respondents, especially students, may not be willing to give sensitive information for 
reasons ranging from lack of benefits to fear of victimisation. 
Given that the present study uses the multi-method approach, for instance, the statistical analysis 
including the use of Pooled OLS, Fixed and Random effect estimators to measure the impact of 
types of institutional investors and BOD characteristics on CSR in Nigeria, it is good to note that 
the case study method will be employed as complement. However, it has to be recalled that in 
such cases, Petersen and Vredenburg (2009a) argue that the quantitative method lack depth. The 
authors emphasised the importance of understanding Why CSR and institutional investors are 
related. This is because of the need to explore and examine the factors that influence investors 
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and BOD to invest in CSR. Therefore, the use of the case study method becomes more 
appropriate for this study. 
In view of the discussion above concerning the positivist approach, the next section discusses the 
validity and reliability of research instruments used to examine why and how different 
institutional investors and BOD characteristics affect CSR of PLCs in Nigeria? 
4.7.4 Validity and Reliability of Instruments (Reducing Sampling Error and Bias) 
According to de Vaus (2002), validity is concerned with determining whether a measuring 
instrument actually measured what a researcher contended it was measuring, while reliability 
measures the consistency of such an instrument in terms of responses collected at different 
times. With regards to the survey questionnaire, validity could be assessed by different methods, 
such as content validity, criterion-related validity, and construct validity. Face validity measures 
the extent to which an instrument is viewed by experts as representing the concept purporting to 
be measured. Content validity is similar to face validity, but goes beyond representation to 
include adequacy by measuring the extent to which the instrument covers all the generally 
accepted meanings of the concept (Sirkin, 2006). Whilst face and content validity are regarded 
as subjective measures, criterion and construct validity are considered less subjective and more 
empirical (Sirkin, 2006). In measuring criterion validity, attempt is made to relate the results of 
the survey instrument to another one external to it by measuring the extent to which it is able to 
predict the external criterion. Despite these various ways of establishing validity, validity is 
usually argued for, and not proven, as no single way provides clear evidence of validity in social 
science (de Vaus, 2002).  
Furthermore, the sampling error is an inherent weakness of any research sample. It is caused by 
observing a sample survey instead of a whole population. While sampling bias is a possible 
source of sampling errors in previous studies, this study tends to minimize that error so as to 
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enhance the validity. The researcher try to get a sample mean that represent the population 
parameter of (µ). Therefore, in order to ensure that the result from sample survey is consistent 
with the population so as to guarantee generalization, a large sample size (264) and high 
response rate of completed questionnaire was aimed at. All listed PLCs in the NSE amounted to 
264. The researcher sent questionnaire to all of them. 102 completed questionnaires were 
collected. 
While the response modes and questions in a questionnaire can come in different types, the 
questions for the questionnaire described above were in Semi-structured format. This type of 
response format offers the advantages of generating frequencies of response, and enhances 
statistical analysis (Cohen et al., 2007). This leads to higher comparisons among groups within 
the sample (Oppenheim, 1992); easier and quicker to code and analyse (Bailey, 1994); direct to 
the point and more focused (Cohen et al., 2007); and not biased towards respondents in terms of 
how articulate they are in completing the questionnaires (Wilson and McLean, 1994). In order to 
minimize social response bias, and ensure that the respondents read each question carefully 
(Cohen et al., 2007; Saunders et al., 2007), some of the questionnaire items were simple and 
directly worded. The tick box system was employed to increase response rate.  
According to Chai (2010) previous research concerning types of institutional investors and CSR 
suffer from sampling and methodological error as a result of accounting disclosures in CSR 
practices. Consequently, results from rigorous and robust empirical analysis based on reliable 
longitudinal and cross sectional data are limited. Therefore, this study uses panel data 
(combining both longitudinal and cross sectional data) to generate large sample data and avoid 
problem of selection bias due to attrition. The balanced panel of 174 PLCs from 2003 to 2009 
generated 1,218 observations or relationships thereby reducing the sampling error and bias. 
In addition, the study employed mixed method approach which provided more insights into the 
different institutional investors and offers a deeper understanding of engagement practices and 
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investment goals of different institutional investors. In the quantitative approach, the thesis 
adopted a more robust approach for cross validation of findings, by using econometric method 
and in the qualitative approach, use the case study method. This combined approach was aimed 
at reducing the sample error, since the multi-method approaches yield better results, with the 
advantages and strengths of one method, replacing the disadvantages of the other method. For 
instance, the quantitative method provides generalisation and breadth, while the qualitative 
method provides depth and deeper understanding of the phenomenon, which the quantitative 
method lacks. 
In view of the discussion above concerning the positivist approach, the next section discusses the 
realist approach using the multi-sector case study method to examine why and how different 
institutional investors and BOD characteristics affect CSR of PLCs in Nigeria? 
4.8 The Case Study Method 
)ROORZLQJ WKH HPSLULFDO DQG VWDWLVWLFDO ILQGLQJ¶V ODFN RI GHSWK DQG UREXVWQHVV WKH FDVH VWXG\
method is adopted to understand the perception and behavioural perspectives concerning what 
influences institutional investors and BOD to engage in CSR. In other words, the reasons behind 
their investments and strategic decisions will provide the understanding between the institutional 
investors, BOD characteristics and CSR. This provides the reasons why and how BOD 
characteristics, institutional investors engage in CSR (Petersen and Vredenburg, 2009a). 
Therefore, the case study method is employed to provide an in-depth understanding concerning 
the relationship between different institutional investors, BOD characteristics and CSR. The case 
study method combines information from the in-depth interviews, survey and documentary 
evidences to achieve the stated objectives and answer the research questions in this study (see 
Research question section 4.9.1). 
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The case materials (Yin, 2005; 2009) is developed using four sources to derive relevant 
information. These sources are: the primary data which includes the in-depth interviews and 
survey questionnaire, while the secondary data includes the company websites, mission 
statements, NSE fact book and annual reports by companies. These multiple data (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Ritchie and Lewis, 2003; Yin, 2005) are to ensure triangulation, reliability, construct and 
hypotheses validation and diversity of opinions (Yin, 2005). In order to answer the research 
questions concerning the factors that affect the board characteristics and the institutional 
investors on CSR practices, diversity of the PLCs, nature of business and type of industry were 
considered.  
The case study spans a period of 2003 to 2009 because the period witnessed the introduction and 
development of the Code of Corporate Governance (2003), Code of Bank Consolidation (2006) 
and the revised Code of Corporate Governance (2009) in Nigeria. This provides information 
concerning the policy differences about CSR and corporate governance of PLCs in Nigeria over 
time. The case study method follows the Yin (2009) road map to theory building as supported by 
Eisenhardt (1989) and Creswell (2003). 
The case study was based on the Werther and Chandler (2006) model. According to the Werther 
and Chandler (2006) model of the strategic CSR, CSR indicators can be used as a guide. This 
study uses the CSR indicators as the framework/model for discussion. These strategic CSR 
indicators are: the CSR planning (including vision, mission), strategy and implementation.  
Werther and Chandler (2006: 45) state that DVXVWDLQDEOHHIIRUW WRDWWDLQD ILUP¶VPLVVLRQDQG
vision depends on a strategy and tactics that are evaluated through the CSR filter within the 
organisation policy and external environmental constraints under which the firm must operate. 
Comprehensively, Werther and Chandler (2006: 44) explain the meaning of the CSR planning to 
include vision, mission, strategy and implementation: 1) the vision answers why the organisation 
exists. It identifies the needs the firm aspires to solve for others. 2) The mission states what the 
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organisation is going to do to achieve its vision. It addresses the types of activities performed for 
others. 3) The strategy determines how the organisation is going to undertake its mission. It set 
forth the ways it will negotiate in its competitive environment. 4) The tactics determine when and 
where the strategy will be implemented and by whom. They are the actions necessary for 
success. 
Furthermore, Hess et al (2002) illustrates the importance of aligning CSR practices to the core 
business philosophy of the corporation. According to Hess et al (2002) the top managers 
incorporate the CSR programmes into strategic planning. Linking CSR programmes to core 
values helps to bridge the rhetoric reality gap. By so doing helps to achieve the long term interest 
of the company. The involvement of top management is an indicator of strategic CSR. Werther 
and Chandler (2006) argue that the core competencies enable the company to compete from its 
VWUHQJWKVZLWKLQWKHFRQWH[WRILWVH[WHUQDOHQYLURQPHQW7KHLQVWLWXWLRQDOLQYHVWRUVDQGGLUHFWRUV¶
ideological perspectives of CSR are very important in determining the support and form of CSR 
policy (Polonsky and Jevons, 2009; Galbreath, 2009). 
Given the use of the primary data (such as in-depth interviews and survey questionnaires) and 
alongside secondary data (documents from annual reports, websites and CSR reports), the data 
and information are coded to develop patterns (Yin, 2005; 2009). These patterns show the 
linkages between CSR and the BOD characteristics and institutional investors. Sometimes these 
linkages are assembled to form the conceptual model that captures how the role of BOD 
characteristics and institutional investors influence CSR in Nigeria (Petersen and Vredenburg, 
2009).  
Data analysis or discussion in this research includes comparing the field notes and interview to 
match the theories and concepts relevant to this study. The questions in the interview provide a 
broad parameter for assessment and comparison (Yin, 2005). The coded and transcribed 
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interviews are categorised under themes (as derived from the literature on CSR) to see if the 
questions are addressed in line with the research aims and objectives. 
The transcribed and coded interviews are analysed and categorised in three (3) phases. The first 
phase is the CSR planning phase that indicates the alignment of CSR policies with the corporate 
philosophy of the organisation. Also, the CSR planning phase signifies, how and why, CSR 
policy is aligned to the vision, mission and values statements of the companies which will 
indicate whether CSR is strategic or not. The second phase is the CSR strategy. The CSR 
strategy refers to the tactics, approaches and policies of CSR activities. In other words, it 
measures how important and significant CSR is to the company. Consequently, the CSR strategy 
indicates the level of involvements of different institutional investors and BODs on CSR. Also, 
it signifies the level of compliance to national and international Codes of Conduct of Best 
Practices highlighting the reasons for compliance. This includes formation of corporate 
governance structure such as Code of Ethics and Business Conduct.  
Galbreath (2009: 110) stated that strategy is conceptualised as what the firm intends to achieve 
LQ WKH ORQJ WHUP PLVVLRQ ZKDW LQWHUQDO DQG H[WHUQDO LVVXHV LPSDFW RQ WKH ILUP¶V DELOLW\ WR
achieve its mission (strategic issues). Hence, Galbreath (2009) suggests the development of 
Codes of Ethics, preparing CSR reports and communication of CSR as the signal for strategic 
CSR. CSR strategy enables the company to become a more responsible, competitive and better 
performing company. While according to Polonsky and Jevons (2009), the organisational and 
communication tactics are the prerequisite for strategic CSR and global branding. The authors 
argue that companies should try to maximise the CSR values by recognising CSR as the central 
core of the business activities and treating CSR practices as strategic.  
The third phase is the CSR implementation and performance evaluation phase. This phase 
involves the launching of formal CSR practices and strategy documents, the process of getting 
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feedback and evaluating performances. The CSR implementation phase comprises 
CEO/management briefings and meetings on CSR, community development projects, donations 
and charitable activities (Werther and Chandler, 2006).   
4.8.1 Advantages of Case Study 
The case study provides in-depth insight into the roles of different institutional investors and 
BOD characteristics on CSR. This helps to provide rich and robust findings that supplement the 
statistical findings in this study. Also, it helps to understand the phenomenon from the natural 
context. In this case, the board, institutional investors and CSR practices constitute the 
phenomenon, while the PLCs and communities is the natural context. Therefore, it enables the 
UHVHDUFKHUWRXQGHUVWDQG&65SUDFWLFHVIURPWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VSHUVSHFWLYHV 
4.8.2 Limitations of Case Study 
On the contrary, the shortcomings of case study include lack of representations and as such 
cannot be generalised (Creswell, 2003). However, Yin (2005) argues that lack of representation 
and generalisation of case study results can be resolved and rectified by employing multiple case 
study approach. Yin (2009) argues that multiple case studies can be used for analytical 
generalisation. Hence, in this study, the use of multi-sector case studies of four (4) PLCs are 
adopted with the aim of resolving the above shortcomings which is in line with the 
recommendation of Yin (2005; 2009).  
Another criticism of the case study method is its inability to differentiate between the case and 
the unit of analysis (Grunbaum, 2007). Grunbaum (2007) offers a solution by separating the case 
into the inner case micro and outer case macro. By extension, the unit of analysis becomes the 
link between the effect of different institutional investors and BOD characteristics on CSR. On 
the other hand, the inner case micro, refers to the link between the company and the 
environment, and the outer case macro, refers to both the existing theoretical and the empirical 
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knowledge in accounting and finance (Mahmood and Riaz, 2008; Yin, 2009). Yin (2009) noted 
that the clear assessment of unit of analysis can help in the generalisation of case study results.  
4.8.3 Selection of the Unit of Analysis (4 PLCs) 
The selection of a unit of analysis is a very crucial step in case studies. According to Yin (2005; 
2009) once a unit of analysis (case) is defined, it provides stability to the case study designed. 
Yin (2009) stated that the criteria for selecting multiple case studies depended on whether they 
are topical, critical and feasible. That is, the four (4) PLCs namely ExxonMobil PLC are 
dominated by foreign investors. The Industrial Gas Insurance (IGI) Company are not only 
dominated by indigenous investors but has the presence of female directors which is considered 
in this study as a proxy for board diversity. The Zenith bank is dominated by indigenous 
investors and Wema bank dominated by government investors. These PLCs are selected for the 
case studies because of their critical and unique position in the socio-economic development in 
Nigeria.  
In addition, the most important criteria for the selection of the four (4) companies are because of 
the availability of data and the involvement of the PLCs in CSR activities. Also, it signifies the 
CSR practices are spreading across sectors because of the increased awareness regarding 
compliance to the recommendation of the Code of Corporate Governance in Nigeria (2003; 
2009). Also, the increased pressures from NGOs, government, the media and parent companies 
have increased the CSR practices across sectors in Nigeria. Other criterLD¶VDUHDOVRVDWLVILHGE\
all four PLCs in that the phenomenon is contemporary and topically relevant because of the role 
of companies in society. This role has come under close investigation today as investors, 
stakeholders and NGOs are demanding that companies become more socially responsible. 
Therefore, all four companies practice CSR and have the presence of institutional investors. 
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a) ExxonMobil PLC is a foreign owned company operating in Nigeria. The company 
engages in CSR activities (www.exxonmobil.com).  
b) ,QGXVWULDO*DV ,QVXUDQFH,*,&RPSDQ\7KHFRPSDQ\¶VJHRJUDSKLFDO ORFDWLRQVSUHDGV
across all the 36 states in Nigeria. This is unique as its interaction to local communities 
all over Nigeria is complex. It has two (2) female directors on the board 
(www.iginigeria.com). 
c) Zenith Bank is an indigenous bank with branches all over the 36 states of Nigeria. Zenith 
Bank has a corporate philanthropy department responsible for CSR activities. (Zenith 
Bank Annual Report, 2009). 
d) Wema bank is a government owned bank with branches in Nigeria and other Africa 
FRXQWULHV:HPDEDQN¶V&65SUDFWLFHVDUHSKLODQWKURSLFLQQDWXUHZLWKORWVRIFKDULWLHV
donations and community development activities (www.wemabank.com). The company 
profile of the four (4) PLCs and their corporate governance structure are illustrated in 
Appendix D. 
In line with the main aims and objectives of this study, the case study method is used as a 
supplement to the econometric method that uses the pooled OLS, fixed and random effect 
models to estimate the impact of types of institutional investors and BOD characteristics on CSR 
in Nigeria. Next, the following subsection presents the objectives of this study that guides the 
formulation of the research question for the case study. By doing this, the personal, behavioural, 
VLWXDWLRQDO DQG PRWLYDWLRQDO IDFWRUV WKDW DIIHFW LQVWLWXWLRQDO LQYHVWRUV DQG GLUHFWRUV¶ SHUFHLYHG
role in CSR activities are explored. 
4.9 Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this study is to use the case study method involving eighteen (18) interviews, 
documentary and survey data to determine the impact of the types of institutional investors and 
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the BOD characteristics on CSR of PLCs in Nigeria. Based on the research aims and objectives, 
the following research questions are formulated. 
4.9.1 Research Questions 
x What are the roles of indigenous, foreign and government institutional investors on CSR?  
x What are the roles of NEDs, executive directors, board size and board diversity on CSR? 
x Why do indigenous, foreign and government institutional investors influence CSR in 
Nigeria? 
x Why do NEDs, executive directors, board size and board diversity influence CSR 
practices in Nigeria? 
4.9.2 Reliability and Validity of Case Studies 
In case study, the reliability and validity of findings are measured using the following: construct 
validity, external validity, internal validity and reliability (Yin, 2005) and they were all taken 
into consideration in this case study. The research questions demonstrate the construct validity 
while adopting multi-sector case studies to ensure generalisations and external validity (Yin, 
2009). Also, the various theories are to ensure internal validity. The case study protocol is 
developed to ensure accuracy, reliability and validity. The processes involve linking the CSR 
practiceVWRWKHFRPSDQ\¶VYLVLRQPLVVLRQYDOXHVLPSOHPHQWDWLRQDQGSHUIRUPDQFHHYDOXDWLRQ
Consequently, these linkages are to determine the strategic importance of CSR and to confirm 
that the process of the case study protocol has been followed. 
According to Yin (2009) multiple sources of evidence are among the processes of ensuring 
construct validity. This study employed interviews, company documents, annual reports and 
company websites to enable the researcher to gain insights from different perspectives that could 
converge on the same themes of the case study to ensure construct validity. The theories (that is, 
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the stakeholders, legitimacy and institutional ± See section 2.5) are to ensure internal validity 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  
4.9.3 Data Sources 
Both primary and secondary data were used in this study. First, the primary research data  
consists of in-depth interviews. Secondly, the secondary data are the documentary data, some 
IURP DQQXDO UHSRUWV FRPSDQLHV¶ ZHEVLWHV DQG 16( IDFW ERRNV 7KLV LV WKH PL[HG PHWKRd 
approach (Geringer et al, 2000)41. Next, the in-depth interviews are discussed below. 
4.9.3.1 In-depth Interview 
In the in-depth interview method there is a conversation between two persons namely the 
interviewer and interviewee. In this case, the interviewer asks questions with the goal of 
obtaining information that is of importance to the researcher (Creswell, 2003). Following the 
review of the survey questionnaires, eighteen (18) in-depth interviews were conducted. The 
interviews were conducted among the PLCs. The people interviewed include the CEOs, 
departmental heads, senior managers and employees. See Appendix C for the interviewee 
participants.  
Furthermore, the interview method is one of the most important primary data collection methods 
involving communication (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2002; Engle, 2007). Unlike the postal 
questionnaires, the in-depth interviews are not restricted to managers, but extended to other 
employees. The interview lasted for an average of one hour. The pre-interview stage involved a 
brief introduction about the topic, issue of confidentiality, advantages of the research to 
respondent, company, community and country in line with the studies (Such as, Ghauri and 
                                                 
41According to Geringer et al (2000) multiple measures are beneficial when using economic performances such as 
Return on Asset (ROA), return on equity (ROE), Gross profit margin, Turnover, P/E and Tobin q. 
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Gronhaug, 2002; Jankowicz, 2005; Ritchie and Lewis, 2006 and Engle, 2007).  
Generally, the interviews are based on the perceptions and behavioural role of managers, factors 
that encouraged them to practice CSR and the effect of CSR on the efficiency and performance 
of their firm. Semi structured interviews were adopted in this research study (See Appendix B 
for details of interview questions). The use of both note-taking and tape recording was employed 
as suggested by Ghauri and Gronhaug (2002) as very useful techniques in in-depth interviews 
while being aware of the disadvantages, such as, the respondents not wanting to answer sensitive 
questions (Ritchie and Lewis, 2006).  In addition, the explanatory and exploratory probes are 
used for the in-depth interviews (Bryman and Bell, 2003). This is done to probe and understand 
the facts relating to the behaviours, views and feelings of the BODs and investors. Finally, the 
interviews were more successful than the postal questionnaires because respondents told the 
truth and were very passionate about the CSR problem during the discussion with the researcher 
(Creswell, 2003). 
The employees interviewed are from different levels of the companies so as to generate a wide 
variety of information for this study. Top management and CEOs were involved among those 
interviewed because as a top executive officer who is a member of the BODs, their views are 
very critical and significant to this study since we are interested in gathering information about 
WKH%2'FKDUDFWHULVWLFVLQYHVWRUV¶EHKDYLRXUVRQ&65SROLFLHVDQGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQV)LUVWWKH 
CEOs of some of the companies were interviewed at their head offices. The Public Relations 
Officers, CSR managers and Communication managers were also interviewed because they act 
as mediator between the companies and communities. Second, the investment managers and 
LQYHVWPHQWDQDO\VWVZHUHLQWHUYLHZHGVRDVWRJHWLQIRUPDWLRQFRQFHUQLQJLQVWLWXWLRQDOLQYHVWRUV¶
viewpoint on CSR strategic investments and directions. 
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4.9.3.2 Coding of Interviewees Response 
The coding of interviewees from the four (4) PLCs was done to protect the identity of those 
interviewed as agreed prior to commencement of the exercise as shown in the covering letter 
sent to them. The codes assigned to the interviewees are related to the names of the companies, 
the Industrial and General ,QVXUDQFH ,*, &RPSDQ\ DUH DVVLJQHG WKH SUHIL[ µ,*¶ µ(¶ IRU
([[RQ0RELOµ:¶IRU:HPD%DQNDQGµ=¶IRU=HQLWK%DQN 
Table 4.1: Summaries of Field Interviews 
Interviews Industrial 
General 
Insurance 
PLC 
ExxonMobil Wema 
Bank PLC 
Zenith Bank 
PLC 
Number of 
interviews 
5 4 4 5 
Code of 
interviewees 
IG1, IG2, IG3, 
IG4 and IG5  
E1, E2, E3 and 
E4 
W1, W2, W3 
and W4 
Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4 
and Z5 
 
4.9.3.3 Analysis of Data 
The data analysis is a process by which interview and documentary data are broken down, 
reorganized and categorised. During interpretation of data, there is a constant iterative moving 
back and forth data to the theoretical concepts, involving the process of building theory (Ritchie 
and Lewis, 2006).  
The first stage of the analyses involves starting the analyses with a small portion of the data, 
formulating an initial set of categories. For instance, looking at the data to see if it falls into 
categories, such as partnership, long-term value, ethics or stakeholder oriented, while at the same 
time taking into considerations, the vision, mission and values of the company. This forms the 
basis for comparative approach, where data analyses start with a small portion of data, moving 
back forth between data and theoretical model of Werther and Chandler (2006). According to 
Ritchie and Lewis (2006) this method of data analysis is appropriate for both the interview and 
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case study methods, because data collection and data analysis are interrelated; until all data have 
been explained in the emerging theory or to fit into the theoretical model as mentioned above. 
For example, that the emerging data analyses construct (See Chapter 6) fits into the narrative that 
institutional investors support strategic CSR in the case study. 
Furthermore, the pattern of processes of formulating CSR policies and the attitudes of investors 
and directors were considered and listed. All data were identified that relate to the already 
classified pattern of partnership, ethical, implementation, stakeholders oriented. Next, all related 
patterns were joined and classified into sub-themes. Finally, the themes are categorised and 
matched with the theoretical model. 
In this study, an excel spread sheet was set up with five worksheets, one for each topics 
(partnership, ethical, implementation, long-term value, stakeholders oriented) and the transcripts 
were broken into three different cohorts. These themes were labelled according to the language 
used by the respondents (Bryman and Bell, 2003), and the statement made by the respondents 
and related to the theme were pasted into the spread sheet, along with the respondent code, 
position, nationality and company of respondent. The theme names and where they were located 
in the spread sheet were written on the side of the transcript to provide a record of the 
progression of the themes and analysis. Subsequently, additional transcript with a similar theme 
was recorded in the same way as above, where the previous text was pasted and the label name 
adjusted accordingly.  This form of categorisation continued for all three cohorts of data.  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 Research Methodology 
182 
Figure 1: Role of Institutional Investor in CSR Planning Phase 
Partnership 
Explain key areas of roles of investor in 
CSR  
E3, ExxonMobil, Safety and 
Environmental Manager, Nigerian 
The CSR is linked with our values of 
integrity, partnership and need to satisfy 
our stakeholder especially protecting the 
environment. Our investors are putting 
pressure on management to build good 
community relations with the 
community. 
Uh hum I think that if you look at the 
CSR format, they have been developed. 
 
Stakeholder oriented Z1, Zenith Bank, Investment manager In fact, personally I think that the 
institutional investors are interested in 
short term investments. The institutional 
investors do not show interest in the 
CSR agenda at all stages. So it is the 
directors that make sure the CSR 
policies are in line with our culture 
which is to satisfy our customers and 
other stakeholders. The level of 
awareness of CSR by institutional 
investors is poor because of lack of 
effective communication between the 
board and investors. 
 
Another technique employed was the charting technique (Ritchie and Lewis, 2006) with each 
central theme and sub-themes (determined from the data). The charting technique involves the 
classification of CSR into (planning, strategy and implementation phase), while institutional 
investors (indigenous, foreign and government) and BOD characteristics (NEDs, executive, 
ERDUG VL]H DQG ERDUG GLYHUVLW\ +HUH UHVSRQGHQWV¶ TXRWHV ZHUe categorised as positive 
comments or negative comments, if they talked positively or negatively respectively, about the 
theme. The central themes were the CSR planning-policy phase, strategy and implementation 
phase (See Appendix G for details). This technique ensures that all outliers and conflicting 
evidences were captured. On the whole, thematic analysis (identifying themes and patterns) and 
charting technique were used in this study. 
The interview demands direct interactions between the respondents and the researcher. Also, it is 
flexible and it gives a more detailed, accurate and vivid view of respondents (Ghauri and 
Gronhaug, 2002; Jankowicz, 2005). The interviews offer the desire to see respondents¶ reactions 
and perceptions which survey questionnaires do not reveal. In addition, they provide depth and 
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challenges. The interviews reveal the best thinking of each participant which may not be 
possible with group participants in focus group (Bryman and Bell, 2003).  
However, the shortcomings of the in-depth interview method include requiring great skill on the 
part of the researcher and interviewer (Ritchie and Lewis, 2006). In other words, it requires a 
skilled interviewer (Ritchie and Lewis, 2006). 
To address such a shortcoming, in this study once a theme is identified that matches the research 
objectives, the correct response is categorised to ensure that the appropriate and detailed 
analyses of the interview is carried out using an analysis sheet (Creswell, 2003). This enables the 
researcher to scan each theme and issue and identify patterns with the theoretical framework. 
Therefore, once the theme and pattern identified matches the institutional investors and BOD 
characteristics with CSR policies, strategy and implementations, then, they are accepted. This 
acceptance is based on the theoretical framework of strategic CSR approaches by Werther and 
Chandler (2006). Thus, the conclusion is made that strategic CSR practices as conducted by the 
company are either being influenced by the institutional investors or BOD characteristics or 
both. However, if there is no pattern matching, then there is no strategic CSR in that company. 
4.9.3.4 Secondary data 
The secondary data for statistical analyses include 174 PLCs selected from the NSE fact book, 
2003 to 2009. Other sources of secondary data include SEC, NSE, annual reports, and financial 
statements of PLCs. The following data were derived such as CSR investments, number of 
executive directors, NEDs, women on board, number of employees, total assets, debt, company 
age, earnings, and institutional shareholdings.  Companies without data or incomplete data were 
removed from the study. Thirty-five (35) companies in NSE are MNCs (15.5%) of the total 
records. The MNCs are mainly in oil, extractive and pharmaceutical industries. An average of 
40% equity holding is held by foreign investors in MNCs (NSE Fact book, 2009). 
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The PLCs comprise public and medium sized companies listed on the NSE (Ojo, 2009). 
According to Ehikioya (2009) listed companies in NSE are mandated to prepare, submit and 
publish financial information in line with the accounting principles, standards and practices. The 
author further stated that listed companies adhere to the standards and norms of regulatory 
authorities compared to non-listed companies. 
In the case study method, the secondary data include documents from the four (4) PLCs. These 
are chosen because they reflect the purpose of the study such as the context, cultural, social and 
institutional. These documents include the company annual reports, newspaper reports and 
company websites of four (4) PLCs. This document will enable the researcher to have an 
understanding about the context and nature of the phenomenon under study. These documents 
are obtained by the researcher during a preliminary visit to the companies before the interviews. 
The documents are not only helpful for verification purposes such as for correction of spellings 
and names of firms, but can be used to corroborate information from other sources (Yin, 2009). 
Some newspapers reported on the CSR policies and implementations of the four (4) PLCs and 
therefore the researcher analysed them too. 
The study uses secondary data because it enables the researcher to pull together large data 
because someone else has collected the data and so the researcher does not have to devote time 
and money collecting the data. Also, the data are cleaned and stored in electronic format. This 
gives the researcher enough time to interpret and analyse the data. Secondary data are easily 
quantifiable (Creswell, 2003). The secondary data collection process is informed by expertise 
and professionalism that may not be available to smaller research study. Consequently, this is 
why quantitative analysts and positivists prefer secondary data because it is ideal for the analyst 
who wants to spend their time thinking and testing hypotheses using existing data (Ritchie and 
Lewis, 2006). 
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Conversely, secondary data are collected for certain reasons other than that of the researcher. 
Hence, information that may answer research questions may not be available. Sometimes, it does 
not meet the purpose of the study.  Moreover, the data may be collected from a geographic 
region different from that of the researcher or from a different population category or diffe rent 
time period (Bryman and Bell, 2003). Also, variables maybe categorised differently from those 
of the researcher. In certain instances, it is difficult to know how it was done because the 
researcher does not participate in the planning and execution of data collection. Finally, the 
researcher may lack the information concerning low response rate or how respondents 
misunderstand some survey questions. 
4.10 Limitations of the Study 
The limitations in this study like most other studies are the difficulties in gaining access to 
information and data. Most managers are sceptical of releasing company information because of 
competition from other industry and data regulations such as UK Data Protection Acts. Most 
MNCs in Nigeria are foreign owned, particularly those from the UK (such as Shell Petroleum 
Development Company, former Cadbury PLC, Lever Brothers PLC) are being influenced by 
their host country regulations despite the fact that they are operating in Nigeria which is govern 
by the CAMA 1991 law (See section 3.1.1). Most employees mentioned such laws as hampering 
them from completing the questionnaire. 
Other limitations include bureaucratic bottlenecks in companies limit information flow and 
access (Ameashi et al, 2006; Hegg, 2007 and Amao and Amaeshi, 2008). For instance, most 
companies requires you to fill forms, make phone calls and report in person if you are to be 
taken seriously, even after sending the questionnaire and follow up reminder. This study is also 
limited by the availability of resources, cost and time.  
Besides, the postal questionnaires that are characterised by many non-response questionnaires, 
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for example, most respondents either ignored or filled the questionnaires incorrectly. The non-
response rate was reduced through the use of social ties and friends who assisted the researcher 
in convincing their colleagues to provide interviews and assist in completing the questionnaires. 
Also, some friends helped in collecting some of the completed questionnaires. 
The problem of self-evaluation, self-selection and low response rate arising from the use of 
questionnaires can be attributed to the highly sensitive nature of the corporate governance 
variable which most managers are reluctant to disclose. To circumvent this problem secondary 
data is used to reconfirm the survey data. 
Also, the postal survey did not account for country to country perspectives of the role of 
different investors in CSR practices in the PLCs. This is because the study is centred on Nigeria. 
As identified from the literature in chapter 2, the link between the role of investors, BOD 
characteristics and CSR is country, firm and industry specific. This study covers only various 
firms and industrial sectors but do not cover country to country differences or factors. So there is 
a need for country to country study in Africa or comparative studies in other developing and 
emerging economies to be explored. 
Moreover, the cost of purchasing data is a limiting factor in Nigeria because it was expensive. 
The Nigeria Stock Exchange (NSE) fact book for 2003 to 2009 was purchased by the researcher 
from NSE research office. Each NSE fact book and its Compact Disc cost 100,000 Naira (i.e. 
approximately 400 pounds per copy). A total of seven (7) copies of the book and disc each were 
used. 
The problem of subjectivity in the case study can lead to bias during the interview since the 
researcher is part of the data collection. Also, bias can occur through establishing friendship and 
rapport with respondents. However, the presence of the researcher can ensure rich and quali ty 
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data through probing of respondents. In this study, the use of note-taking and tape recording was 
used to minimise these biases. 
In addition, the use of other methods such as observation was not carried out as this is one of the 
three methods for data collection in case study approach. The other two are focus group and 
interview methods. Instead, the researcher opted for the interview method. The observation of 
the employees and companies was not carried out due to lack of resources and time. 
The problem of causality between institutional investors and CSR is another limitation. The 
essence was to find out whether it is the good CSR management that attracted investors and 
directors to the company or if it was WKH LQVWLWXWLRQDO LQYHVWRUV¶ SUHVHQFH WKDW attracted CSR 
investments.  
4.11 Conclusion 
This chapter provides a detailed discussion and explanation of the research methods and 
analytical techniques employed in this research study. The chapter is outlined in six key points: 
first, the assertion of a relationship between the different institutional investors, BOD 
characteristics and CSR formed the main argument of this study. Also, the pragmatic research 
philosophy is used to investigate the research objectives (see sections 4.9) in examining the 
relationship between institutional investors, BOD characteristics and CSR. By doing this, the 
study contributes to methodology, knowledge and management research in the areas of corporate 
governance and CSR, by arguing that the pragmatics philosophy is a better way of understanding 
the complexities surrounding relationships between the different institutional investors, BOD 
characteristics and CSR. 
Second, the models for testing the hypotheses are specified. The models test hypotheses 1 and 2 
in order to capture the effects of the independent variables (types of institutional investors and 
BOD characteristics) on the dependent variables (CSR investments). The statistical method 
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involves the use of 174 PLCs from 2003 to 2009. All findings of the Pooled OLS, Fixed and 
Random effect estimators are reported (See chapter 5). The regression instruments (Pooled OLS, 
Fixed effect and Random effect estimators) estimate the effects of the independent variables on 
the dependent variables; if the P-value of the coefficients of independent variables is positively 
statistically significant, then we cannot reject the null hypotheses. Therefore, this research 
expects the coefficients of the types of institutional investors, BOD characteristics to be greater 
than zero (>0), and statistically significant. 
Third, several diagnostic tests are carried out in this study to enhance the reliability and validity 
of the findings. Such diagnostic tests include Hausman, normality, multicollinearity, 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. The Hausman test is used to discriminate between the 
fixed effect and random effect estimators. The correction of the problem of multicollinearity 
(when two or more independent variables are correlated) and problem of heteroscedasticity 
(when residual error term variance not constant) are achieved by using robust standard error test.  
Fourth, the use of a case study provides the in-depth explanation concerning the CSR responses 
to social issues from the corporate governance perspectives using types of institutional investors 
and BOD characteristics. The case study method is exploratory, inductive and appropriate for 
explaining the perceptions and link between the roles of institutional investors and BOD 
characteristics on CSR activities. 
Fifth, the eighteen (18) interviews were coded and used to build the case study by forming a 
pattern that explains the relationship between institutional investors, BOD characteristics and 
strategic CSR practices. Furthermore, the postal survey conducted, generated a response rate of 
38.6%. The 38.6% response rate is consistent with the 30.6% generated by Ibrahim and 
Angelides (1995) and 32.5% response rate generated by Ibrahim et al (2003). 
Sixth, the researcher ensures that ethical standards are met in this research by getting 
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clarification and approval. The clarification and approval for data collection was sought from the 
research ethics committee of the University of Greenwich before the commencement of the 
exercise. Other issues include health and safety, intervieweeV¶ comfort, safety of researcher and 
data protection laws. Also, the issue of confidentiality might cause some interviewees to be 
cautious on account of being employees. In fact, the researcher provided assurances to 
concerned interviewees of my willingness to adhere to strict confidentiality. See appendix F for 
details on ethical issues¶ considerations. Also, a covering letter explaining the research purpose 
and objectives was sent along with the questionnaires (see appendix A).  
The next chapter discusses the overall analysis of the econometric findings involving the use of 
Pooled OLS, Fixed effect and Random effect estimators of a balanced panel of 174 PLCs from 
2003 to 2009 to estimate the effect of different institutional investors and BOD characteristics on 
CSR.  
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CHAPTER 5 
5.0 DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF ECONOMETRICS/STATISTICAL RESULTS 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the research methodology aimed at investigating the effects of 
the roles of different institutional investors and BOD characteristics on Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR). This chapter discusses the statistical analysis using pooled cross sectional 
estimator, fixed effect estimator and random effect estimator to determine the impact of different 
institutional investors and BOD characteristics on CSR of balanced panel of 174 PLCs from 
2003 to 2009 in Nigeria. In essence, this chapter allows the results of the quantitative data to be 
generalised to the entire population, considering the fact that the case study was based on a 
relatively smaller sample of the population. 
This chapter discusses the following: results of the statistical analysis concerning the effects of 
indigenous institutional investors, foreign institutional investors, government institutional 
investors, board composition, board size and board diversity on CSR. The next section discusses 
the descriptive statistical analysis of the variables. 
5.1.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the 174 PLCs describing the pattern and trend in 
the dataset. The descriptive statistics analysis reveals that the lowest CSR investment value is 
12,423 naira (£50) in 2003 from a start-up company (BCN Plc.), while the highest CSR 
investment value from Zenith Bank totalled 1.6 billion naira (£8m) in 2009. The first column 
shows the variable names while the second column is the number of observations indicating the 
number of companies, 174 PLCs from 2003 to 2009 amounting to 1,218 observations. 
Therefore, the total aggregated observation is 174 PLCs over 7 years and 14 variables, resulting 
in 17,052 observations, when the control variables (seven in numbers) are taken into 
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consideration. This dataset gives 1218 CSR investments relationships (observations). The second 
column is the mean of the variables, a total of 15 variables were considered in this study. The 
mean for indigenous investors (32%) is higher than the foreign investors (24%) and government 
investors (17%). The mean of the non-executive directors (NEDs) is (57%), higher than the 
mean of the executive directors (43%), while the mean of board size stands at 8 directors per 
PLC. The mean value for female directors is 33%, compared with male directors that are 67%. 
2Q WKH FRPSDQ\¶V SURILWDELOLW\ PHDQ YDOXH RI UHWXUQ RQ DVVHWV  LQGLFDWLQJ that the 
majority of companies are profitable, while the mean age for company is 30.5 and mean for 
number of employees is 850. This suggests that the 174 PLCs are mostly made up of older, 
medium and larger companies. 
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
csrinvestm~t  1218  3.88e+07  1.34e+08  12423  1.66e+09 
nedpercent  1218  .5735155  .1515204  .125  .875 
edpercent  1218  .4267408  .151051  .125  .875 
boardsize  1218  8.119048  2.9905  2  20 
womenpercent  1218  .3304429  .3403962  0  2 
indigenous  1218  32.03041  20.81309  5.5  91 
foreign  1218  24.9221  17.00294  5  88.4 
govt  1218  16.64934  14.07868  .29  56 
risk  1218  .4574467  .9008018  .0001905  26.55637 
industry  1218  2.090312  .7745254  1  3 
noofemploy~s  1218  850.2775  1728.388  10  16967 
companyage  1218  30.48522  16.45896  1  87 
debt  1218  5.79e+10  2.04e+11  774000  1.52e+12 
roa  1218  11.13376  14.35395  -8.834765  86.88392 
eps  1218  3.932277  9.770986  .0004271  98.88797 
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5.1.2 The Regression Analysis and as it relates to Causality 
This section uses Pooled OLS, fixed effect and random effect estimators which are forms of 
general linear modelling used to examine the relationship between the dependent variables and 
independent variables, with the intent of examining the predictive ability of sets of the 
independent variables (cause and effect) on the dependent variable, and further confirm the 
proposed relationships. Applying the regression analysis is borne out of the fact that 
relationships and predictions in real-life scenario, as in this case, are best established and made 
by a combination of factors. By applying this analysis, the relative contribution of each 
independent variable in explaining variance in the criterion variable can be determined. 
Specifically, the interest here is the institutional investors and BOD characteristics, the predictor 
variables that cause and determine the variance in the outcome, the CSR investments.  
Another contribution to these cause and effect relationship is the control variables. The control 
variables are financial performance, risk, firm size, company age, industry effect, and debt. That 
is, the extent to which institutional investors, BOD characteristics and the control variables 
might contribute to the prediction of the perceived role of institutional investors and BOD 
characteristics for achieving and predicting CSR activities. Therefore, this can be interpreted as 
if it is the institutional investors and BOD characteristics that are leading to the outcome in CSR 
investments, holding all the control variables constant. The results of these relationships are 
presented below. This analysis also aims to specify a variable(s) that is (are) most accurate in 
predicting the outcome of CSR using both fixed effect and random effect estimators. Since 
human behaviour is complex and could be influenced by many factors, it is expected that certain 
sets of independent variables might not completely give totally accurate predictions especially 
that the construct under investigation has been established to be a multidimensional construct. 
The fixed effect estimator did reduce the multicollinearity problem (See section 4.5.9). The 
Hausman test did select fixed effect estimator as against random effect estimator as the best fit 
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for the model to determine the cause and effect relationship. These estimators did resolve the 
problem of omitted variable bias. However, this study did not go further to determine the extent 
of causality and endogeneity problem, but it has been recommended, particularly in the area of  
future studies that generalised method of moments or 2-stage least square can used to determine 
the extent of  causality and endogeniety problem (See section 7.8). 
5.2 Presentation of Empirical Results for Model 1 
The pooled cross sectional estimator, fixed effect estimator and random effect estimator are used 
to estimate the effects of the balanced panel of 174 PLCs from 2003 to 2009. Model 1 tested 
hypotheses 1a, 1b and 1c. The Hausman test indicates that the fixed effect estimator is the 
preferred estimator compared to the random effect estimator. This is because the fixed effect 
estimator is consistent and its differencing process eliminates the time-invariant firm specific 
component variables leaving the residual error term uncorrelated to the dependent variables.  
The selection equation uses the same control variables (z), along with one identification variable 
such as indigenous, foreign and government institutional investors. In other words, each 
independent variable of interests (indigenous, foreign and government institutional investors) are 
added to the seven control variables (z) separately and tested using the pooled cross sectional 
estimator, fixed effect estimator and random effect estimator. This is done in order to capture the 
specific effect of each variable on CSR investments. 
The results of the fixed effects estimator show that the different institutional investors have a 
negative effect on CSR investments but the effects are statistically insignificant at 1%, 5% and 
10% level when all control variables are held constant. The standard error value is in 
parenthesis. In the next subsection, the findings on the effects of the role of indigenous 
institutional investors on CSR investments using the pooled cross sectional estimator, fixed 
effect estimator and random effect estimator are presented. 
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5.2.1 The Role of Indigenous Investors 
The effects of indigenous investors on CSR are presented in Table 5.2. Model 1 tests hypothesis 
1a. The fixed effect estimator and random effect estimator produce the same negative and 
insignificant results between the indigenous institutional investors and CSR investments (b = -
0.136; P=0.54) and (b = -0.039; P=0.81) respectively. However, the pooled cross sectional 
estimator shows a positive and insignificant relationship (b=0.59; P=0.089) between the 
indigenous institutional investors and CSR. See Table 5.2 for details of results.   
In fact, because the pooled cross sectional estimator does not capture the heterogeneity across 
JURXSV3/&VWKHIL[HGDQGUDQGRPHIIHFWHVWLPDWRUV¶UHVXOWVDUHPRUHUHOLDEOH*UHHQH
As started earlier, the Hausman test preferred fixed effect model (chi2=34.93; Prob >chi2=0.00) 
compared to the random effect model.  
Furthermore, the fixed effect estimator showed indigenous investors have a negative and non-
significant effect on CSR (b = -0.136; P=0.54). The finding means that 1% increase in 
LQGLJHQRXVLQVWLWXWLRQDOLQYHVWRUV¶UHVXOWVLQGHFUHDVHLQ&65LQYHVWPHnts, holding all the 
control variables (z) constant. The negative and non-significant results indicate that indigenous 
investors do not influence CSR among PLCs in Nigeria. In other words, this negative 
relationship is not relevant from an econometric point of view. However, this finding rejects 
hypothesis 1a that predicted a positive relationship between indigenous institutional investors 
and CSR. 
Certainly, the findings are similar to that of Rasic (2010) that finds no relationship between 
indigenous institutional investors and CSR having a value of Chi2 = 4.96; and P=1.27. Rasic 
(2010) identified weak institution, high cost of new technologies as the militating factors against 
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CSR. Therefore, fixed effect model results (b = -0.136; P=0.54) which is negative and non-
significant results indicate that indigenous institutional investors do not have influence on CSR. 
Furthermore, the R square within for the fixed effect estimator is 0.22, implying that the 
independent variables in the model accounted for 22% variations in CSR investments, signifying 
a good fit for the model (Benson et al, 2009).This means that the explanatory variables in the 
model explain the CSR investments by 22%. The R-square value is between the R-square for 
Benson et al (2009) which is 0.08 and the R-square of Andayani et al (2008) of 0.376.  
Nevertheless, in this study the presence of heteroscedasticity was tested (chi2=0.78; Prob 
>chi2=0.38) indicating the absence of heteroscedasticity. This means that the variance of the 
error term is approximately constant. Further, the presence of multicollinearity was tested and 
the result (Mean VIF=1.48), means absence of multicollinearity. The Woodridge tests for 
autocorrelation results (F=10.20; Prob > F=0.0017) means there is autocorrelation. 
Consequently, the presence of heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity and autocorrelation were 
corrected using the robust standard error test and the findings reported in Table 5.2. 
Moreover, the finding of absence of multicollinearity implies that the explanatory variables such 
as the indigenous institutional investors do not correlate with the unobserved error term, for 
example, board age, general confidence and social capital. This may affect market valuation and 
financial performance of the firm; ultimately, affecting CSR. Further, the absence of 
heteroscedasticity shows that the variance of the unobserved variables such as managerial skills 
is constant or homoscedastic. The robustness check did reveal no substantial change in results 
indicating that the findings are not driven by unobservable firm heterogeneity. 
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Table 5.2: The Effects of Indigenous Institutional Investors on CSR 
Variables Pooled Cross-
Sectional Model 
Random Effect Model Fixed Effect 
Model 
Indigenous 
Investors 
0.59(0.089) -0.039(0.115) -0.136(0.086) 
Number of 
employees 
0.519(0.044)*** 0.558(0.786)*** 0.528(0.101)*** 
Age of Company -0.351(0.100)*** 0.707(0.253)*** 0.895(0.323*** 
EPS -0.079(0.035) * 0.005(0.012) * 0.006(0.012) 
Risk -0.111(0.051) ** -0.021(0.011) * -0.019(0.011) * 
Debt 0.047(0.038) 0.006(0.010) 0.006(0.010) 
ROA -0.004(0.058) -0.008(0.001) -0.001(0.001) 
Industry effect 0.684(0.092) *** 0.545(0.222)** -0.418(0.280) 
Number of 
groups(n) 
174 174 174 
Number of 
Observation(N) 
1218 1218 1218 
Within R2  0.22 0.22 
Between R2  0.08 0.003 
Overall R2  0.09 0.006 
 R Square adjusted 0.17 
Intercept 10.02(1.08)*** 8.04(1.001)*** 9.95(0.736)*** 
Heteroscedasticity 
chi2( p-value) 
 
0.78(0.377)   
Multicollinearity 
(Mean VIF=1.25) 
 
1.48   
Woodridge test for 
autocorrelation 
results  
 
10.20(0.002)   
Hausman Test   34.93 
 
VIF is the Variance Inflation Factor used to test for Multicollinearity. Robust standard error is 
used for pooled cross sectional, random effect and fixed effect models. 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. All variables marked ***, **and * are significant at 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The Hausman test refers to the test of the null hypothesis 
of the random effect against the fixed effect estimators, b represents the coefficient and p is 
the p-value. 
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5.2.2 The Role of Foreign Institutional Investors 
Table 5.3 shows the result analyses for the effects of foreign institutional investors on CSR 
investments. Also, Model 1 test hypothesis H1b. The fixed effect estimator and random effect 
estimator produce negative and insignificant results (b = -0.238; P=0.38) and (b = -0.057; 
P=0.76) respectively, the pooled cross sectional estimator is positive and insignificant (b = 
0.131; P=0.095). See Table 5.3 for details of results.   
Expectedly, the Hausman test preferred fixed effect estimator (chi2=35.67; Prob >chi2=0.00) as 
against random effect estimator. This is because the fixed effect estimator is consistent and its 
differencing process eliminates the time-invariant firm specific components variables leaving the 
residual error term uncorrelated to the dependent variables. 
Again, the fixed effect estimator showed indigenous investors have a negative and non-
significant effect on CSR. These findings means that 1% increase in foreign institutional 
investors results in 0.24% decrease in CSR investments, holding all the control variables (z) 
constant. However, this finding rejects hypothesis 1b that predicted a positive relationship 
between foreign institutional investors and CSR. 
The negative but non-significant relationship indicates that foreign institutional investors do not 
influence CSR among PLCs in Nigeria. This is similar to the findings of Dasgupta et al (2000). 
Dasgupta et al (2000) find no effect between foreign ownership and CSR indicating that foreign 
institutional investors lack experience and knowledge about the local environments; hence 
foreign investors find it difficult to engage in CSR. Similarly, Rasic (2010) finds no relationship 
between foreign institutional investors and CSR, having a value of Chi2 = 6.27; P=0.652.  
Moreover, the R square within for the fixed effect estimator is 0.22, implying that the 
independent variables in the model accounted for 22% variations in CSR investments signifying 
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a good fit for the model (Benson et al, 2009).This means that the explanatory variables in the 
model explain the CSR investments by 22%. This is consistent with the findings of Andayani et 
al (2008) that got a slightly higher R-square value of 0.376, while Benson et al (2009) find R2 to 
be 0.08. 
In this study the presence of heteroscedasticity was tested (chi2=0.81; Prob >chi2=0.37), 
indicating the absence of heteroscedasticity. This means that the variance of the error term was 
constant. Further, the presence of multicollinearity was tested and the result (Mean VIF=1.49) 
means absence of multicollinearity. The Woodridge tests for autocorrelation results (F=10.20; 
Prob > F=0.0017) means there is autocorrelation. The presence of heteroscedasticity, 
multicollinearity and autocorrelation are corrected using the robust standard error and the 
findings reported in Table 5.3. 
Moreover, the finding of absence of multicollinearity implies that the explanatory variables such 
as the foreign institutional investors do not correlate with the unobserved error term, for 
example, board age, general confidence and social capital may affect market valuation and 
financial performance of the firm. Ultimately, this may affect the CSR practices of the firm. 
Further, the absence of heteroscedasticity shows that the variance of the unobserved variables 
such as managerial skills is constant or homoscedastic.  
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Table 5.3: The Effect of Foreign Institutional Investors on CSR 
Variables Pooled Cross-
Sectional Model 
Random Effect Model Fixed Effect 
Model 
Foreign Investors 0.131(0.095) -0.057(0.170) -0.238(0.180) 
Number of 
employees 
0.520(0.043)*** 0.557(0.050)*** 0.527(0.101)*** 
Age of Company -0.354(0.099)*** 0.707(0.254)*** 0.896(0.323)*** 
EPS 0.069(0.035)  0.005(0.010) 0.007(0.012) 
Risk -0.120(0.052) **  -0.021(0.011) * -0.019(0.011) * 
Debt 0.055(0.037) 0.006(0.010) 0.006(0.010) 
ROA -0.004(0.006) -0.001(0.001) -0.001(0.001) 
Industry effect 0.690(0.092) *** 0.543(0.222)* * * -0.419(0.280)* ** 
Number of 
groups(n) 
174 174 174 
Number of 
Observation(N) 
1218 1218 1218 
Within R2  0.22 0.22 
Between R2  0.08 0.003 
Overall R2  0.09 0.006 
 R Square adjusted 0.17 
Intercept 9.64(1.114)*** 8.09(1.05)*** 10.22(0.881)*** 
Heteroscedasticity 
chi2=6.11( p-value) 
 
0.81(0.38)   
Multicollinearity 
(Mean VIF=1.25) 
 
1.49   
Woodridge test for 
autocorrelation 
results  
 
10.20(0.002)   
Hausman Test   35.67 
VIF is the Variance Inflation Factor used to test for Multicollinearity. Robust standard error is 
used for pooled cross sectional, random effect and fixed effect models. 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. All variables marked ***, **and * are significant at 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The Hausman test refers to the test of the null hypothesis 
of the random effect against the fixed effect estimators, b represents the coefficient and p is 
the p-value. 
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5.2.3: The Role of Government Institutional Investors 
Table 5.4 shows the result analyses for the effects of government institutional investors on CSR. 
Also, Model 1 tests hypothesis H1c. The pooled cross sectional estimator, random effect 
estimator and fixed effect estimator produce the same negative results. While, the pooled cross 
sectional estimator reveals negative and significant results (b = -0.307; p=0.01), the random 
effect estimator and fixed effect estimator produce negative and insignificant results (b = -0.295; 
p=0.105) and (b = -0.145; p = 0.62) respectively. See Table 5.4 for details of results.   
The findings mean that 1% increase in government institutional investors results in 0.15% 
decrease in CSR investments, holding all the control variables (z) constant. These findings 
indicate that as the government increases its shareholding, the CSR investments decline. 
However, this finding rejects hypothesis 1c that predicted a positive relationship between 
government institutional investors and CSR. In addition, the Hausman test preferred fixed effect 
estimator (chi2=33.51; Prob >chi2=0.00) compared to the random effect estimator.  
Furthermore, the R square within for the random and fixed effect estimator is 0.22, implying that 
the independent variables in the model, accounted for 22% variations in CSR signifying a good 
fit for the model (Benson et al, 2009). This means that the explanatory variables in the model 
explain the variations of CSR investments by 22%. This is consistent with the findings of 
Andayani et al (2008) that got a slightly higher R-square value of 0.376.  
In this model, the presence of heteroscedasticity was tested (chi2=0.73; Prob > Chi2=0.39) and 
this indicates the absence of heteroscedasticity, meaning that the variance of the error term was 
approximately constant. Further, the presence of multicollinearity was tested and the result 
(Mean VIF=1.50) means the absence of multicollinearity. The Woodridge tests for 
autocorrelation results (F=10.21, Prob > F=0.0017), means there is autocorrelation. The effect of 
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control variables on the CSR is tested using the random effect model and fixed effect model. 
Despite the diagnostics test results above, the robust standard error test was applied to correct for 
any heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity and autocorrelation, thereby helping to reduce the 
standard error value.  
Table 5.4: The Effect of Government Investors on CSR 
Variables Pooled Cross-
Sectional 
Model 
Random Effect 
Model 
Fixed Effect 
Model 
Government Investor -0.307(0.111)** -0.296(0.185) -0.145(0.228) 
Number of employees 0.535(0.043)*** 0.562(0.079)*** 0.529(0.101)*** 
Age of Company -
0.351(0.997)*** 
0.709(0.253)*** 0.895(0.324)*** 
EPS 0.071 (0.035)  0.005(0.012) 0.007(0.012) 
Risk -0.098(0.050) * -0.021(0.011) * -0.019(0.011) * 
Debt 0.041(0.036) 0.006(0.010) 0.006(0.010) 
ROA -0.005(0.006) -0.001(0.001) -0.001(0.001) 
Industry effect 0.581(0.101) 
*** 
0.471(0.220)** -0.419(0.220) 
** 
Number of groups(n) 174 174 174 
Number of Observation(N) 1218 1218 1218 
Within R2  0.22 0.22 
Between R2  0.09 0.07 
Overall R2  0.09 0.010 
R Square adjusted 0.18   
Intercept 11.26 (1.08)*** 8.78(1.035)*** 9.86(0.853)*** 
Heteroscedasticity chi2=6.11( p-value) 
 
0.73(0.393)   
Multicollinearity (Mean VIF=1.25) 
 
1.50   
Woodridge test for autocorrelation 
results  
 
10.03(0.002)   
Hausman Test   33.51 
VIF is the Variance Inflation Factor used to test for Multicollinearity. Robust standard error is used 
for pooled cross sectional, random effect and fixed effect models. 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. All variables marked ***, **and * are significant at 1%, 
5% and 10% level, respectively. The Hausman test refers to the test of the null hypothesis of the 
random effect against the fixed effect models, b represents the coefficient and p is the p-value. 
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Given the above discussion on the effect of the indigenous, foreign and government institutional 
investors on CSR, it was discovered that the different institutional investors had similar 
preferences for CSR in Nigeria with the same negative coefficient and statistically insignificant 
value. The indigenous, foreign and government institutional investors reveal insignificant 
relationship with CSR. In conclusion, the findings indicate that institutional investors do not 
influence CSR among PLCs. Similarly, the next section discusses the empirical results in Model 
2 using the pooled cross sectional estimator, fixed effect estimator and random effect estimator 
to estimate the effects of BOD characteristics on CSR investments. 
5.2.4 The Role of Board Composition 
The board composition is made up of the Non-Executive Directors (NEDs) and executive 
directors. Table 5.5 presents the findings on the effects of NEDs on CSR and Table 5.6 present 
the findings on the effect of executive directors on CSR. Model 2 tests hypotheses 2a, 2b, 2c and 
2d. Also, the Hausman test indicates that the fixed effect estimator was preferred to random 
effect estimator in the model. 
5.2.5 The Role of Non-Executive Directors (NEDs) 
Table 5.5 presents the findings concerning the effects of NEDs on CSR. Model 2 tests 
hypotheses 2a. The pooled cross sectional estimator, random effect estimator and fixed effect 
estimator results showed positive and highly significant relationships between NEDs and CSR. 
The pooled cross sectional estimator (b = 0.586; P=0.01) is positive and highly significant at 5% 
and the random effect estimator (b = 0.386; P=0.00) produces the same positive and significant 
results at 1% (that is 99% confidence level). Similarly, the fixed effect estimator (b = 0.370; 
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P=0.00) produces the same positive and highly significant results at 1% (that is 99% confidence 
level). 
The findings mean that a 1% increase in NED results in a 0.37% increase in CSR investments, 
holding all the control variables (z) constant. The finding implies that the higher the number of 
NEDs in the board, the more the CSR investments. This finding is robust as all three different 
estimators, namely, the pooled cross sectional, random effect and fixed effect produce the same 
positive and significant results. 
Besides, the R square within is 0.24, implying that the independent variables in the model 
accounted for 24% variations in CSR investments. The R square obtained in this study is higher 
than the R2 from Benson et al (2009) which is 0.08. This means that the explanatory variables in 
the model explain the CSR investments by 24%. 
Expectedly, the Hausman test preferred the fixed effect estimator (chi2=30.55; Prob >chi2=0.00) 
compared to the random effect estimator. Therefore, the fixed effect estimator results (b = 0.370; 
p=0.00) that is positive and highly significant at 1%, means that as the proportion of NED in the 
corporate board increases, the PLC increases their CSR. Therefore, this finding supports 
hypothesis 2a that predicted a positive relationship between NED and CSR. 
In this study, the presence of heteroscedasticity was tested (chi2=0.58; Prob > chi2=0.45) 
indicating the absence of heteroscedasticity. This means that the variance of the error term was 
constant. Further, the presence of multicollinearity was tested and the results (Mean VIF=1.48) 
indicate the absence of multicollinearity. The Woodridge tests for autocorrelation results 
(F=9.929; Prob > F=0.0019) means there is autocorrelation. Still, the robust standard error was 
applied to correct for any heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity and autocorrelation. Hence, this is 
to correct for the error term variance, collinearity and serial correlation. The robust standar d 
error test reduces the standard error value.  
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Table 5.5: The Effect of NEDs on CSR Investment 
Variables Pooled Cross-
Sectional 
Model 
Random Effect Model Fixed Effect 
Model 
NEDs 0.586(0.208) ** 0.385(0.115) *** 0.370(0.116)* ** 
Number of employees 0.519(0.043)*** 0.487(0.081)*** 0.449(0.101)*** 
Age of Company -
0.386(0.100)*** 
0.620(0.234)*** 0.810(0.304)*** 
EPS 0.074(0.035) ** 0.007(0.012) 0.007(0.010) 
Risk -0.120(0.051) 
** 
-0.021(0.012) * -0.0179(0.013) * 
Debt 0.053(0.037) 0.006(0.010) 0.005(0.010) 
ROA -0.004(0.006) -0.008(0.001) -0.001(0.012) 
Industry effect 0.714(0.094) 
*** 
0.561(0.226)* * -0.430(0.257) )* * 
Number of groups(n) 174 174 174 
Number of 
Observation(N) 
1218 1218 1218 
Within R2  0.22 0.24 
Between R2  0.08 0.001 
Overall R2  0.09 0.004 
R Square adjusted 0.17 
Intercept 10.47(1.026)*** 8.79(0.869)*** 10.48(0.683)*** 
Heteroscedasticity 
chi2=6.11( p-value) 
 
0.58(0.448)   
Multicollinearity(Mean 
VIF=1.25) 
 
1.48   
Woodridge test for 
autocorrelation results  
 
9.929 (0.002)   
Hausman Test   30.55 
VIF is the Variance Inflation Factor used to test for Multicollinearity. Robust standard error is 
used for pooled cross sectional, random effect and fixed effect model. 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. All variables marked ***, **and * are significant at 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The Hausman test refers to the test of the null hypothesis 
of the random effect against the fixed effect models, b represents the coefficient and p is the p-
value. 
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5.2.6 The Role of Executive Directors 
Table 5.6 presents the findings on the effect of executive directors on CSR. Model 2 tested 
hypothesis 2b. The effects of the executive directors on CSR is negatively related and highly 
statistically significant using all estimators, that is, the pooled cross sectional, random effect and 
fixed effect estimators. The pooled cross sectional estimator produces the negative and 
significant results (b = -0.530; P=0.00) at 1% (that is 99% confidence level); the random effect 
estimator produces the same negative and highly significant results (b = -0.331; P=0.00) at 1% 
(that is 99% confidence level). On a similar note, the fixed effect estimator reveal a negative and 
significant result (b = -0.315; P=0.00) at 1%. Subsequently, the findings mean that a 1% increase 
in executive directors leads to a 0.32% decrease in CSR investments, holding all the control 
variables (z) constant. 
Generally, this finding is robust as all three different estimators namely, the pooled cross 
sectional, random effect and fixed effect produce the same negative and highly significant 
results. Also, the Hausman test preferred fixed effect estimator (chi2=30.88; Prob >chi2=0.00) 
compared to random effect estimator. Therefore, the fixed effect estimator results (b = -0.315; 
P=0.00) which is negative and significant at 1%, means that, as the proportion of executive 
directors in corporate board increases, the CSR investments decrease. However, this finding 
rejects hypothesis 2b that predicted a positive relationship between executive directors and CSR. 
In addition, the R square within for fixed effect is 0.24, implying that the independent variables 
in the model accounted for 24% variations in CSR investments within the firm. The R square 
obtained in this study is higher than the findings of Benson et al (2009), which is 0.0086, and 
less than the findings of Andayani et al (2008) with an R square of 0.37. This means that the 
explanatory variables in the model explain the CSR investments by 24%. 
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Moreover, the presence of heteroscedasticity was tested (chi2=0.78; Prob >chi2=0.378) 
indicating the absence of heteroscedasticity. This means that the variance of the error term was 
constant. Further, the presence of multicollinearity was tested and the result (Mean VIF=1.48), 
means the absence of multicollinearity, while, the Woodridge tests for autocorrelation results 
(F=9.963; Prob > F=0.0019) means there is autocorrelation. As a result, the presence of 
heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity and autocorrelation was corrected using the robust standard 
error test and the findings reported in Table 5.6. 
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Table 5.6: the Effect of Executive Directors on CSR Investment 
Variables Pooled Cross-
Sectional 
Model 
Random Effect Model Fixed Effect 
Model 
Executive Directors -0.530(0.175)** -0.331(0.104)*** -0.315(0.104)** * 
Number of employees 0.522(0.043)*** 0.485(0.079)*** 0.446(0.058)*** 
Age of Company -
0.391(0.099)*** 
0.628(0.244)*** 0.820(0.314)*** 
EPS -0.069(0.035) * 0.005(0.012) 0.007(0.012) 
Risk -0.121(0.051) 
** 
-0.022(0.011) * -0.020(0.011) * 
Debt 0.054(0.037) 0.007(0.010) 0.006(0.010) 
ROA -0.004(0.006) -0.001(0.001) -0.001(0.001) 
Industry effect 0.710(0.093) 
*** 
-0.562(0.227) ** -0.428(0.258) 
Number of groups(n) 174 174 174 
Number of 
Observation(N) 
1218 1218 1218 
Within R2  0.23 0.23 
Between R2  0.09 0.001 
Overall R2  0.09 0.004 
R Square adjusted 0.17 
Intercept 9.637(1.06)*** 8.23(0.893)*** 9.93(0.667)*** 
Heteroscedasticity 
chi2=6.11( p-value) 
 
0.35(0.55)   
Multicollinearity(Mean 
VIF=1.25) 
 
1.48   
Woodridge test for 
autocorrelation results  
 
9.963(0.002)   
Hausman Test   30.88 
VIF is the Variance Inflation Factor used to test for Multicollinearity. Robust standard error is 
used for pooled cross sectional, random effect and fixed effect models. 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. All variables marked ***, **and * are significant at 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The Hausman test refers to the test of the null hypothesis 
of the random effect against the fixed effect, b represents the coefficient and p represents the 
p-value. 
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5.2.7 The Role of Board Size 
Table 5.7 presents the findings on the effect of board size on CSR. Model 2 tested hypothesis 2c. 
The pooled cross sectional estimator produces negative and insignificant results (b = -0.018; 
P=0.93). However, the random effect and fixed effect estimators produce positive and highly 
significant results. While, the random effect estimator reveals (b = 0.805; P=0.00) at 1% (that is 
99% confidence level), the fixed effect estimator results show (b = 0.819; P=0.00) at 1%. 
Subsequently, the finding means that a 1% increase in board size leads to a 0.82 % increase in 
CSR investments, holding all the control variables (z) constant. The finding implies that the 
higher the size of the board, the more the CSR investments. This finding is robust as both the 
random effect and fixed effect estimators produce the same positive and significant results. 
Therefore, these findings support hypothesis 2c that predicted a positive relationship between 
board size and CSR. In addition, the Hausman test preferred fixed effect estimator (chi2=36.06; 
Prob >chi2=0.00) compared to the random effect estimator.  
The R square within for fixed effect estimator is 0.24, implying that the independent variables in 
the model account for 24% variations in CSR investments. The R square obtained in this study is 
higher than the findings of Benson et al (2009), which is 0.0086 and less than the findings of 
Andayani et al (2008) with an R square of 0.37. This means that the explanatory variables in the 
model explain the CSR investments by 24%. 
In this study, the presence of heteroscedasticity was tested, indicating the absence of 
heteroscedasticity (chi2=0.91; Prob >chi2=0.341). This means that the variance of the error term 
was constant. Further, the presence of multicollinearity was tested and the result (Mean 
VIF=1.52), means the absence of multicollinearity, while the Woodridge tests for 
autocorrelation results (F=9.67; Prob > F=0.0022), means there is autocorrelation. The presence 
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of heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity are corrected using the robust standard error test and 
the findings reported in Table 5.7. 
Table 5.7: The Effect of Board Size on CSR 
Variables Pooled Cross-
Sectional Model 
Random Effect Model Fixed Effect 
Model 
Board Size -0.018(0.195) 0.804(0.238)*** 0.819(0.251)*** 
Number of 
employees 
0.524(0.044)*** 0.439(0.083)*** 0.402(0.101)*** 
Age of Company -0.350(0.100)*** 0.587(0.231)*** 0.756(0.296)*** 
EPS -0.068(0.0355) ** 0.004(0.012) 0.005(0.012) 
Risk -0.111(0.051)  -0.021(0.011) * -0.019(0.011) * 
Debt 0.046(0.037) 0.008(0.010) 0.008(0.010) 
ROA -0.004(0.006) -0.001(0.001) -0.019(0.001) 
Industry effect 0.686(0.095) *** 0.472(0.219)** -0.422(0.271) 
Number of 
groups(n) 
174 174 174 
Number of 
Observation(N) 
1218 1218 1218 
Within R2  0.24 0.24 
Between R2  0.08 0.004 
Overall R2  0.09 0.008 
R Square adjusted  0.17   
Intercept 10.24(1.057)*** 7.46(0.916)*** 8.98(0.716)*** 
Heteroscedasticity 
chi2=6.11( p-value) 
 
0.91(0.341)   
Multicollinearity 
(Mean VIF=1.25) 
 
1.52   
Woodridge test for 
autocorrelation 
results  
 
9.62(0.003)   
Ramsey Reset test (chi2=38.34; p=0.00 i.e. p< 0.05) 
Hausman Test   36.06 
VIF is the Variance Inflation Factor used to test for Multicollinearity. Robust standard error 
tests are used for pooled cross sectional, random effect and fixed effect model. 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. All variables marked ***, **and * are significant at 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The Hausman test refers to the test of the null hypothesis 
of the random effect against the fixed effect models, b represents the coefficient and p is the p-
value. 
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5.2.8 The Role of Board Diversity 
Table 5.8 presents the findings on the effects of board diversity on CSR which are negative and 
significant. The presence of female directors was used as a proxy for board diversity. Model 2 
tested hypothesis 2d. While, the pooled cross sectional estimator produces negative and 
insignificant results (b = -0.010; P=0.92), the random effect estimator produces negative and 
highly significant result at 1%, that is, 99% confidence level (b = -0.414; P=0.00). Likewise, the 
fixed effect estimator produces negative and significant results (b = -0.477; P=0.00) at 1%.  
Expectedly, the Hausman test chose the fixed effect estimator (chi2=36.97; Prob >chi2=0.00) 
instead of the random effect estimator. Therefore, the fixed effect estimator results (b = -0.477; 
P=0.00) is negative and significant at 1%. Subsequently, the findings mean that a 1% increase in 
the female directors leads to a 0.48% decrease in CSR investment, holding all the control 
variables (z) constant. The finding implies that the higher the number of female directors, the 
less the CSR. This finding is robust as both the random effect and fixed effect estimators 
produce the same negative and significant result. However, this finding rejects hypothesis 2d 
that predicted a positive relationship between female directors and CSR. The reason for this 
relationship could be the characteristics of female directors in the board of PLCs who may be 
interested in short term returns on investment (profit maximisation) rather engaging in CSR. 
The R square within for fixed effect estimator is 0.23, implying that the independent variables in 
the model account for 23% variation in CSR within the firm. The R square obtained in this study 
is higher than the findings of Benson et al (2009), which is 0.0086 and less than the findings of 
Andayani et al (2008) with an R square of 0.37. This means that the explanatory variables in the 
model explain the CSR investments by 23%. 
Furthermore, the presence of heteroscedasticity was tested (chi2=0.88; Prob >chi2=0.349) 
indicating the absence of heteroscedasticity. This means the variance of the error term is 
Chapter 5 Discussion and Analyses of Statistical Results 
211 
constant and homoscedastic. Further, the presence of multicollinearity was tested and the result 
(Mean VIF=1.48), means the absence of multicollinearity. The Woodridge test for 
autocorrelation results (F=10.08; Prob > F=0.0018) means there is autocorrelation. The presence 
of heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity and autocorrelation are corrected using the robust 
standard error test and the findings reported in Table 5.8. 
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Table 5.8: The Effects of Board Diversity on CSR Investments 
Variables Pooled Cross-
Sectional 
Model 
Random Effect Model Fixed Effect 
Model 
Board Diversity 0.010(0.104) -0.414(0.185) *** -0.477(0.218) *** 
Number of employees 0.524(0.044)*** 0.492(0.082)*** 0.449(0.102)*** 
Age of Company -
0.350(0.100)*** 
0.647(0.241)*** 0.818(0.308)*** 
EPS 0.068(0.006) * 0.005(0.012) 0.007(0.012) 
Risk -0.111(0.051) 
**  
-0.022(0.011) * -0.020(0.011) * 
Debt 0.046(0.035) 0.008(0.010) 0.008(0.010) 
ROA -0.004(0.006) -0.001(0.014) -0.001(0.001) 
Industry effect 0.686(0.093) 
*** 
0.504(0.220)** -0.402(0.286) 
Number of groups(n) 174 174 174 
Number of 
Observation(N) 
1218 1218 1218 
Within R2  0.23 0.23 
Between R2  0.08 0.004 
Overall R2  0.08 0.001 
Adjusted R Square  0.17   
Intercept (11.09)*** 7.94(0.888)*** 9.46(0.708)*** 
Heteroscedasticity 
chi2=( p-value) 
 
0.88(0.349)   
Multicollinearity(Mean 
VIF) 
 
1.49   
Woodridge test for 
autocorrelation results  
 
10.08(0.002)   
Hausman Test   36.97 
VIF is the Variance Inflation Factor used to test for Multicollinearity. Robust standard error is 
used for pooled cross sectional, random effect and fixed effect models. 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. All variables marked ***, **and * are significant at 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The Hausman test refers to the test of the null hypothesis 
of the random effect against the fixed effect models, b represents the coefficient and p is the p-
value. 
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Table 5.9 shows the independent variables relationship with CSR (dependent variable) and the R 
square adjusted. The R square adjusted measures the goodness of fit of the models. Incidentally, 
this result indicates that the model is fitted accordingly as it is able to demonstrate that the 
independent variables are able to predict the outcome values (that is the CSR). 
Table 5.9: The Relationship Between Independent Variables and CSR, and Adjusted R Squared 
Nos. Variables R Square adjusted CSR relationship with independent 
variables 
1 Indigenous Investors 0.17 Insignificant result 
2 Foreign Investors 0.17 Insignificant result 
3 Government Investors 0.18 Insignificant result 
4 Non-Executive 
Directors 
0.17 Positive relationship 
5 Executive Director 0.17 Negative relationship 
6 Board Size 0.17 Positive relationship 
7 Board Diversity 0.17 Negative relationship 
Sources: Compilation of the findings from this study 
 
5.3 The Role of the Control Variables 
The effect of the control variables on CSR is illustrated in Table 5.10. The number of employees 
is positive and significant (b=0.45; p<0.00), the company age is significant at (b=0.82; p<0.00). 
Also, the industry effect is positive and significant (b = 0.40; p<0.00). However, the ROA is 
insignificant at (b=0.41; p<0.10).  
The control variables from previous research findings point to a reduction in firm risk as 
favouring CSR activities (McGuire et al, 1988). However, in model 2, the firm risk is found to 
be negative and not significant with CSR. The coefficient for firm risk is -0.02 and non-
significant. This is in line with the findings of Orlitzky and Benjamin (2001) that find financial 
risk to be negatively related to CSR (that is, most especially with the result of the Pooled OLS 
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and Random effect estimator, that produced a negative and significant results at 5% and 10% 
respectively). This finding implies that the higher the risk faced by companies the lower the CSR 
investments, though the result is not significant. 
Furthermore, the control variables show the firm size to be positive and significant with CSR 
implying that the larger the firm, the more they invest in CSR (Waddock and Graves, 1997). 
Similarly, the industry effect is positive and significantly correlated with CSR. On the other 
hand, the company age is negative and significant with CSR. This means that the older 
companies invest less in CSR.  
Table 5.10: The Effect of Control Variables on CSR investments 
Variables Pooled Cross-
Sectional Model 
Random Effect Model Fixed Effect 
Model 
Number of 
employees 
0.524(0.044)*** 0.492(0.054)*** 0.449(0.057)*** 
Age of Company -0.350(0.100)*** 0.647(0.090)*** 0.818(0.097)*** 
EPS 0.068(0.006) * 0.005(0.010) 0.007(0.010) 
Risk -0.111(0.051) **  -0.022(0.013) * -0.020(0.013) 
Debt 0.046(0.035) 0.008(0.010) 0.008(0.010) 
ROA -0.004(0.006) -0.001(0.014) -0.001(0.001) 
Industry effect 0.686(0.093) *** 0.504(0.201)** -0.402(0.401) 
 
The next section discusses the empirical results comparing them with previous findings (See 
Table 5-12 for comparison of results to previous findings). Also, several theories such as the 
stakeholder, stewardship, resource dependence and agency (See section 2.5) will be employed in 
explaining the effect of the different institutional investors and BOD characteristics on CSR. 
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5.4 Discussion of Empirical Results 
This chapter provides detailed discussion and analyses of the statistical method of balanced 
panel of 174 PLCs from 2003 to 2009. This is aimed at examining the role of different 
institutional investors (indigenous, foreign and government); BOD characteristics (NEDs, 
executive directorsERDUGVL]HDQGERDUGGLYHUVLW\RQ&65LQ1LJHULD¶Vlisted companies.  
The study finds that the indigenous, foreign and government institutional investors are negative 
and insignificantly correlated with CSR investments. These findings imply that the role of 
indigenous, foreign and government institutional investors in a company do not affect CSR. 
However, the role of NEDs and board size on CSR investments is positive and significant, 
whereas, the effects of the role of executive directors and board diversity on CSR are negative 
and significant.  
5.5 The Role of different Institutional Investors 
The study extends previous studies on the development of corporate governance and CSR in the 
literature. The pooled cross sectional estimator, fixed effect estimator and random effect 
estimator are used to investigate the balanced panel of 174 PLCs from 2003 to 2009. Generally, 
the study reveals an insignificant effect of indigenous, foreign and government institutional 
investors on CSR. In other words, the findings show little or no difference between institutional 
inYHVWRUV¶SUHIHUHQFHVIRU&65&RQVHTXHQWO\WKHUHVXOWVLPSO\WKDWWKHLQGLJHQRXVIRUHLJQDQG
government shareholding in a company do not affect CSR. Put in another way, there are no 
differences in support for CSR among the different institutional investors of PLCs. 
In terms of how CSR investment is measured (the amount or pre-tax earnings donated to 
charities, philanthropic activities and community development projects per year), signifies that 
the interpretation of findings should be done cautiously considering the fact that CSR 
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measurement is varied and inconsistent, as reveal from the literature. This is because CSR is a 
multi-dimensional construct (See section 2.5). Measuring CSR investments as the amount spent 
on philanthropic and community development could be restrictive of the meaning of CSR, 
excluding other CSR practices such as CSR reporting. In other words, this study did not account 
for CSR reporting. It accounted for the amount spent on CSR only which captures the 
philanthropy responsibility of CSR. This is the actual amount spent on donations or community 
development projects. Therefore, these findings do recommend that future findings should take 
into consideration how to correctly account for both CSR investments and CSR reporting 
activities at the same time.  
5.5.1 The Role of Indigenous Investors 
Specifically, the indigenous institutional investors are negative and insignificantly correlated 
with CSR. As mentioned earlier, this finding indicates that indigenous investors do not influence 
CSR among PLCs in Nigeria. The finding does not support hypothesis 1a. The finding is similar 
to that of Rasic (2010) which finds no relationship between indigenous institutional investors 
and CSR, having a value of Chi2 = 4.96; and P=1.27. Rasic (2010) identified weak institution 
and high cost of new technologies as the militating factors for indigenous investors investing in 
CSR. 
Theoretically, the finding contradicts the stakeholder theory that argues that the investors as part 
of the company should satisfy all stakeholders for the long term survival of the company. 
,QVWHDG WKH LQGLJHQRXV LQYHVWRUV DUH PRUH FRQFHUQHG ZLWK WKH VDWLVIDFWLRQ RI VKDUHKROGHUV¶
interests rather than the other stakeholders. The other reason could be that the indigenous 
institutional investors are more interested in compliance to the fiduciary role of the company, by 
HQJDJLQJLQGHIHQVLEOHLQYHVWPHQWV¶GHFLVLRQVWKDWVDWLVILHVWKHLQWHUHVWRIWKHVKDUHKROGHUV 
 
Chapter 5 Discussion and Analyses of Statistical Results 
217 
 
5.5.2 The Role of Foreign Institutional Investors 
Similarly, the effect of foreign investors on CSR produces negative and non-significant findings. 
This finding indicates that foreign institutional investors do not influence CSR among PLCs in 
Nigeria. The finding do not support hypothesis 1b. This is similar to the findings of Dasgupta et 
al (2000). Dasgupta et al (2000) find no effect between foreign ownership and CSR indicating 
that foreign institutional investors lack experience and knowledge about the local environment; 
hence foreign investors find it difficult to engage in CSR. Likewise, Rasic (2010) finds no 
relationship between foreign institutional investors and CSR having a value of Chi2 = 6.27; 
P=0.652. 
6LPLODU WR WKH LQGLJHQRXV LQVWLWXWLRQDO LQYHVWRUV¶ ILQGLQJV WKH UHVXOW FRQFHUQLQJ WKH IRUHLJQ
institutional investoUV FRQWUDGLFWV WKH VWDNHKROGHU WKHRU\ WRR EHFDXVH RI WKH IRUHLJQ LQYHVWRUV¶
lack of information and understanding about the host communities. They do not invest in CSR. 
Instead the foreign institutional investors, just like the indigenous institutional investors, are 
more concerned with the satisfaction of shareholders interest alone (Dasgupta et al, 2000).  
5.5.3  The Role of Government Investors 
Besides, the effect of government institutional investors on CSR is negative and non-significant. 
This finding implies that the government investors do not influence CSR among PLCs in 
Nigeria. The finding does not support hypothesis 1c. These findings are similar to the findings 
from Dam and Scholtens (2010). The authors find negative and no significant relationship 
between government institutional investors and CSR (b= -0.0118; t-statistics = -1.73). Also, 
Zhang et al (2009) find government institutional investors to be negatively related to CSR. This 
suggests that government institutional investors do not favour CSR. 
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,Q WKH VDPH ZD\ DV LQGLJHQRXV DQG IRUHLJQ LQVWLWXWLRQDO LQYHVWRUV WKH JRYHUQPHQW LQYHVWRU¶
findings contradict the stakeholder theory too because, according to Zhang et al (2009), the 
government investors are poor in monitoring managers. It is the managers who manage company 
assets, thereby making loss because of political interference. Zhang et al (2009) argue that, given 
poor corporate performance, government institutional investors will not engage in CSR. This 
finding contradicts Li and Zhang (2010). The authors find government institutional investors to 
be positively related to CSR. In addition, in developing countries like Nigeria with weak 
institutions and legal framework, the government investors will not be held accountable to 
anyone if company resources are diverted to personal use instead of CSR. This could be due to 
corruption rather than carrying out community development projects.  
On the same line, Earnhart and Lizal (2002) study the effect of privatisation policy from 1996-
1998 and find that government institutional investors are negatively related to CSR; as a result, 
the government investors invest less in pro-environmental companies (environmentally friendly 
companies). 
The implication of the findings is that institutional investors are capitalist in nature and hence, 
concentrate on short term return on investment, by ignoring the long-term interest of the 
company. By doing this, they pursue profit and do not influence the company to invest in CSR. 
This is supported by the agency theory that assumes the sole interest of owners (Investors) as 
profit maximisation. 
5.5.4 The Role of Non-Executive Directors (NEDs) 
The effect of NED on CSR is positive and significantly correlated with CSR. This finding 
supports hypothesis 2a. This finding is similar to Johnson and Greening (1999) that find the 
1('¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLRQWREHSRVLWLYHDQGVLJQLILFDQWO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWK&657KLVILQGLQJPHDQV
that the BOD with higher NED will pursue CSR policies.  
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Theoretically, the stakeholder, the resource dependence and stewardship theories support this 
finding. Also, Mackenzie (2007) proposed a positive relationship between financial performance 
and the proportion of NED sitting on the board. Mackenzie (2007) stated that NEDs are getting 
involved in social and environmental practices, which is backed by the Combined Code of 
Corporate Governance which mandates boards to formulate policies and values for corporations 
to meet their social and environmental obligations. In line with the above findings, Baysinger 
and Butler (1985) find that the NEDs are positively correlated with higher equity returns. 
Therefore, Baysinger and Butler (1985) argue that the direct influence of NED on financial 
performance will motivate them to pursue CSR. As a result, the BODs with higher NED may be 
more likely to pursue CSR (Webb, 2004). The resource dependence theory suggests that NED on 
the board can help develop strategies for the corporations to combat the environment because of 
their experience and skills which they bring to the board room (Pfeffer, 1972; Bergh, 1995).  
5.5.5 The Role of Executive Directors 
This study shows that the effect of executive directors on CSR is negative and significant. The 
findings do not support hypothesis 2b. This finding supports the studies of Vance (1964) and 
Rose (2007). Vance (1964) finds executive directors help to improve financial performance 
when they are in majority on the board. Therefore, given the need to satisfy shareholders interest 
on the short run and protect their job, the executive directors may not invest in CSR. On a 
similar note, Rose (2007) finds that executive directors do not invest in CSR when faced with 
legal compliance to federal or state laws. Therefore, executive directors may prefer not to invest 
in CSR such as harming the society (dumping of toxic materials on rivers) and making legally 
defensible decisions because of the need to satisfy the shareholders. In addition, Rose (2007) 
argues that the pressure from the stock exchange regulations and corporate laws forces the 
executive directors to place shareholders higher and above other stakeholders. The negative and 
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significant relationship between the executive directors influence on CSR is explained by the 
agency and stewardship theories.  
This negative relationship between executive directors and CSR contradicts the stewardship 
theory which suggests that executive directors are not self-interested but do have a broader 
motivation that is pro-organisations (such as supporting the organisation). However, the agency 
theory does not VXSSRUW WKH H[HFXWLYH GLUHFWRUV GRPLQDWHG ERDUG DV LW ZLOO OHDG WR PDQDJHUV¶
entrenchments and misappropriation of company resources. In fact, the reason for the negative 
relationship according to Atkinson and Galaskiewicz (1988) is that if managers are not 
institutional investors, firms engage in CSR. Atkinson and Galaskiewicz argue that executive 
directors will only support CSR if they are not investors because they have no investment 
interest or motives, unlike the institutional investors that have a fiduciary responsibility to 
SURWHFWWKHVKDUHKROGHUV¶LQWHUHVW 
Nonetheless, this study finding that executive directors are negatively correlated with CSR 
contradicts the stakeholder theory. The stakeholder theory expects executive directors to satisfy 
multiple stakeholders. In contrast, Kruger (2010) finds executive directors to be positively 
related to CSR. According to Kruger (2010) the higher the number of experienced executive 
directors on the board, the more the executive directors influence the decision-making process of 
the BODs. Therefore, the BODs are influenced to pursue short term interests rather than 
focusing on CSR and stakeholders¶ satisfaction. According to Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) 
there is a positive relationship between executive direcWRUV¶VNLOOVDQGWRSPDQDJHUV¶HYDOXDWLRQV
Therefore, according to Kruger (2010) the H[HFXWLYHGLUHFWRU¶VSUHVHQFHRn the board reduces the 
amount of law suits that could harm the company. In other words, the author argues that the 
inclusion of executive directors in the BOD reduces the occurrence of negative events such as 
litigations against the company. 
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In contrast, the negative assertion suggests that the interest of shareholders and executive 
directors converge evidencing support for the agency theory (See session 2.5.1). The agency 
theory expects managers to allocate firm resources in such a way as to maximise shareholders 
value. In addition, the agency theory expects the interests of managers to be aligned to the 
shareholders¶ interests so the BOD can carry out their monitoring role on managers. Therefore, 
WKHERDUGHIIHFWLYHQHVVZLOOLQFUHDVHWKHUHE\KLQGHULQJWKHPDQDJHUVIURPGLYHUWLQJFRPSDQ\¶V
resources to CSR.  
5.5.6 The Role of Board Size 
Furthermore, the role of board size on CSR reveals positive and significant correlation with 
CSR. This means that the higher the size of the board, the more the directors invest in CSR. The 
finding supports hypothesis 2c. Empirically, Pfeffer (1972) and Kassinis and Vafeas (2002) find 
board size to be positively and significantly related to CSR. The positive and significant 
relationship between the board size and CSR are supported by the stakeholder and the resource 
dependence theories. 
According to Pfeffer (1972; 1973) the stakeholder and the resource dependence theories support 
a positive and significant correlation between the board size and CSR. Some authors (See, Daily 
and Dalton, 1994a, 1994b) argue that larger boards bring contact and connection to the board by 
gathering resources. Likewise, the resource dependence theory views large board size as 
providing a pool of potentially valuable resources for the firm through the addition of NEDs 
(Pfeffer, 1972; Goodstein et al, 1994; Hillman et al, 2000). Therefore, the resource dependence 
theory supports larger board size by emphasising that increase in board size assists the board to 
connect the corporation to its external stakeholders and gather resources, reputation and good 
corporate brand (Pfeffer, 1972; Goodstein et al, 1994). Pfeffer (1972) argues that increased 
resources could enhance the chances of corporations¶ boards adopting CSR policies and 
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practices. Also, expert skills and advice are vital to the BOD to help reduce lawsuits against the 
corporation due to environmental and human rights violations (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002; 
McKendall and Wagner, 1997). 
5.5.7 The Role of Board Diversity 
The role of board diversity on CSR shows negative and significant results. This finding means 
that the higher the inclusion of women in the board, the lower the amount invested in CSR. This 
finding does not support hypothesis 2d. This finding is similar to Prado-Lorenzo et al (2009b) 
that finds a negative relationship between board diversity (inclusion of women) and CSR. So 
many authors (Rose 2007; Prado-Lorenzo et al, 2009b) have suggested reasons for the negative 
relationship between board diversity and CSR. One of the reasons could be that the 
characteristics of female directors that become board members are such that they do not favour 
CSR engagement. It could be that female directors are influenced by the company objectives 
especially if they pursue short term profit at all cost. Also, it could be that the perception of the 
female directors of CSR is negative and therefore are not encouraged to support CSR. They 
perceive CSR as not adding economic value to the company, particularly, if that is the feelings 
among the dominant male directors in the board. However, one should interpret this result with 
caution considering the way board diversity was measured (See section 4.6.2.4). Board diversity 
was measured using the presence of women in BOD. Other determinants of board diversity from 
the literature include ethnic minorities, education, age; culture and religion. These determinants 
were not measured due to unavailability of data and resources. 
7KHUHDUHRWKHUH[SODQDWLRQVDERXWWKHQHJDWLYHDVVHUWLRQRIIHPDOHGLUHFWRUV¶ODFNRIVXSSRUWIRU
CSR. This can be explained by the low number of women on the board. This is the glass ceiling 
effect (Rose, 2007). That is the invisible barrier that limits the level to which a woman or 
another member of a demographic minority can advance within the hierarchy in an organization . 
This discrimination of women find support in the descriptive statistics where the mean 
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percentage for women is very low (0.33), less than half, while then men is about 0.67 (See 
section 5.1). The boards of PLCs in Nigeria are dominated by male directors. It could be that the 
characteristics of male directors favour profit maximisation which might influence the few 
female directors to support their approach which is short term in nature.  
In listing the factors that limit female managers from attaining directorship position, Burke 
(1997) mentions a number of barriers that could hamper women from becoming members of the 
BOD. These factors include lack of experience, lack of commitment; lack of ambition, CEO 
GXDOLW\ OHVV TXDOLILHG ZRPHQ SUHVHQFH RI VRFLDO WLHV DV PDOH &(2V YDOXH HDFK RWKHU¶V
friendship. This is in line with the findings of Post et al (2011). Post et al (2011) argue that 
having one or two women on the board is not enough for the female directors to make impact on 
the male dominated BOD. The authors stated that female directors can only make impact if the 
number of female directors exceeds three (3) women on the BODs. Consequently, this finding 
indicates lack of impact of women on the board on CSR. The characteristics of the few female 
directors on the board could also be career oriented, which influence the negative effect on CSR. 
This might cause the female directors not to support CSR. 
Conversely, the negative and significant findings between board diversity and CSR investments 
contradict the stakeholder, stewardship and agency theories. All theories favour diverse boards 
with the inclusion of women on the board. Though, the agency theory does favour board 
diversity through inclusion of female directors, it does not support the influence of their 
engagement in CSR. Generally, diverse boards help the BOD to reach decisions quickly 
concerning environmental and other CSR issues because the minority groups as members of 
boards bring their personal experience, interests and commitments to the BOD (Baysinger and 
Butler, 1985). However, in contrast to the belief that women are generally considered to be 
cautious, conservative, altruistic and support CSR (Werbel and Carter, 2002; Williams, 2003), 
this study finds that women do not support CSR. 
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5.6 The Role of the Control Variables 
The relationship between the financial performance of the firm and CSR is negative and 
insignificant. This is measured by ROA which produced a negative and insignificant relationship 
with CSR. This finding is supported by McWilliams and Siegel (2000) that find no significant 
relation between CSR and financial performance. Similarly, Dam and Scholtens (2010) find a 
negative relationship between ROA and CSR, but it is not significant (b = -0.00555; t statistics = 
-0.51). The findings imply that CSR investment does not lead to improve ROA. Also, another 
financial performance measure is the earnings per share (EPS) which is negative and 
insignificant with CSR. The findings imply that CSR does not lead to improve financial 
performance or not related to financial performance. 
The company size is very important in determining the level of CSR investments and it is 
measured by the number of employees. The number of employees is positive and significant 
with CSR investments. This means that the higher the company size, the more it invests in CSR 
because of the huge asset and slack resources at its disposal. This is similar to Waddock and 
Graves (1997) that finds firm size to be related to CSR. According to Waddock and Graves 
(1997) large firms have slack resources that are channelled to CSR practices. Moreover, 
according to Dasgupta et al (1997) firm size does matter because of the huge resources at their 
disposal as larger firms are more likely to adopt CSR policies that improve environmental 
performances. 
Moreover, this study reveals that CSR investment is industry specific. This finding implies that 
CSR investments increase with companies in the oil and extractive sectors. This is because CSR 
helps companies to reduce social issues and irresponsible behaviours in the host community. 
Also, banks follow the oil MNCs in terms of CSR investments because of their exposure and the 
need to improve their reputation (Brammer and Millington, 2005). This is in line with Brammer 
and Millington (2005) who argue that CSR is mostly used to avoid social externalities and 
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reduce negative reputation and its consequences such as environmental damage and avoidance of 
lawsuits.  
5.7 Validating the Results of the Regression Models 1 and 2 
 
Since the concern of this study goes beyond showing that the results obtained are true for both 
the samples used for estimation and also for managers as respondents in the entire 174 PLCs (i.e. 
generalising to the population).  This section attempts to cross-validate the regression models to 
achieve this aim. While the direct approach of doing this is to take another sample from the 
population and compare the two results (Hair et al., 1998, Field, 2005), the obvious constraints 
of doing this is in terms of time and money. This led to alternative approaches of examining the 
adjusted R square and splitting the sample of the study. The first method involves comparing the 
R squared with the adjusted R squared to find out if the model is over fitted to the sample (Hair 
et al., 1998). As observed by Field (2005), the adjusted R square tells how much variance in Y 
would be explained if the model had been derived from the population from which the samples 
have been selected, as opposed to R square which only relates to the sample of the study.  
 
The comparison of the R square and the adjusted R square for Models 1a, 1b, 1c, 2a, 2b,2c, and 
2d as shown in Table 5.11 did not show much difference in the two values for each model, 
indicating that the models have not been over fitted to the samples. Also, the R square adjusted 
for all the variables are between 0.17 to 0.18, while the R square within for all variables lies 
between 0.22 and 0.24. These numbers are close implying that the models are not over fitted too 
(Gujarati, 2003). 
 
In this study, the Hausman test prefers the fixed effect model which produces three (3) R squares 
and an adjusted R square. The 3 R squares are namely, the within  R square, between R square 
and overall R square. The preferred R square is the R Square within which measures the mean-
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deviated regression, i.e. the ordinary R square from running OLS on the transformed data. On 
the other hand, the R square between computes the fitted values using the fixed effect 
parameter vector and the within-individual means of the independent variables.  It then 
calculates the R square as the squared correlation between those predicted values and the within-
individual means of the original y variable. Finally the R square overall measures the fitted 
values using the fixed effect parameter vector and the original, untransformed independent 
variables.  It then calculates the R square as the squared correlation between those predicted 
values and the original, untransformed y variable (CSR investment). 
 
Table 5.11: Shows the Variables, Adjusted R Squared and R square for All the Models 
Models Variables R square adjusted R square 
Within 
R square 
Between 
R Square 
Overall 
1a Indigenous Investors 0.17 0.22 0.003 0.006 
1b Foreign Investors 0.17 0.22 0.003 0.006 
1c Government Investors 0.18 0.22 0.07 0.09  
 
2a Non-Executive 
Directors 
0.17 0.24 0.001 0.004 
2b Executive Director 0.17 0.23 0.001 0.004 
2c Board Size 0.17 0.24 0.004 0.008 
2d Board Diversity 0.17 0.23 0.004 0.001 
Sources: Compilation of the findings from this study 
 
5.8 Comparison of Statistical Findings with Existing Literature 
In comparing the results of this study with previous findings, it is important to mention that 
comparison will be difficult since CSR is a multidimensional construct (Carroll, 1991, 1999) and 
has been measured differently by several authors; some use pollution, philanthropy, environment 
Chapter 5 Discussion and Analyses of Statistical Results 
227 
management, content analysis of annual reports. This makes comparison across boards difficult. 
However, previous findings that support this study results are presented in Table 5.12 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 Discussion and Analyses of Statistical Results 
228 
Table 5.12: Comparison of Results with Previous Studies 
Previous Study 
 
Findings 
 
Differences and Similarities 
Dam and Scholtens 
(2010) find significant 
relationship between 
indigenous investors and 
CSR. However, they find 
that employees, 
individuals and firms are 
linked to poor CSR. 
In this study there is no 
significant relationship 
between indigenous investors 
and  CSR  
Dam and Scholtens use firm-level 
data for more than 600 European 
firms from 16 countries and 35 
industries for 2005. While, in this 
study, a balanced panel of 174 
companies were used from 2003 to 
2009. Only one country (Nigeria) 
is used. 
Rasic (2010) finds no 
relationship between 
foreign institutional 
investors and CSR 
In this study there is no effect 
between foreign ownership 
and CSR 
While Rasic used environmental 
performance as proxy for CSR and 
chi-square test and ANOVA 
analyses. This study in addition to 
using the case study method, use 
the fixed and random effect 
estimator for testing the 
hypotheses and panel data. 
Rasic (2010) finds an 
insignificant relationship 
between government 
institutional investors and 
CSR. 
No significant relationship 
between government investors 
and CSR  
Just as above 
Johnson and Greening 
(1999) 
NEDs is positive and 
significantly correlated with 
CSR 
The finding in this study supports 
that of Johnson and Greening 
(1999). The authors use product 
quality and environment as product 
dimension and women and 
minorities, employee relations and 
community as people dimension. 
The product and people 
dimensions were used by the 
authors as a measure for CSR. In 
this, study CSR was measured by 
the actual amount of money spent 
on philanthropic activities. But the 
measurement of NEDs as the 
number of NEDs compared to total 
numbers of BODs are same for 
both studies. 
Rose (2007) Executive directors do not 
invest in CSR 
The finding in this study supports 
that of Rose (2007). 
Pfeffer (1972; 1973) Board size is positively related 
to CSR 
The finding in this study supports 
that of Johnson and Greening 
(1999). 
Prado Lorenzo et al 
(2009b) 
Negative relationship between 
inclusion of foreigners and 
women in the board and CSR 
This differs from that of Tsalikis 
and Ortiz-Buonafina (1990) but 
agrees with Prado Lorenzo et al 
(2009b) 
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Following the discussion above, it is clear that all the different institutional investors 
(indigenous, foreign and government) have the same preferences for CSR in Nigeria. This 
suggests that investors have insignificant relationship with CSR investments. This is because the 
investors have similar negative and insignificant values, but, unlike the different institutional 
investors, the BOD characteristics produced mixed findings. The NEDs and board size produced 
positive and significant relationship with CSR, while executive directors and female directors 
produced a negative and significant correlation with CSR. The next section is the conclusion of 
this chapter. 
5.9 Conclusion 
This chapter provides a detailed discussion and analysis of the empirical findings in this study. 
This chapter is spread over five key points. First, the effects of indigenous institutional investors, 
foreign institutional investors and government institutional investors on CSR investments are 
negative and insignificant. This result means that the different institutional investors do not 
influence CSR. These findings imply that the different institutional investors (indigenous, 
foreign and government) have the same preferences for CSR which contradicts Earnhart and 
Lizal (1999; 2002), which produced mixed results. Earnhart and Lizal (1999; 2002) find that the 
government institutional investors do not influence CSR, while the indigenous institutional 
investors show positive and significant relationships with CSR. Similarly, Rasic (2010) finds no 
relationship between foreign institutional investors and CSR.  
Second, the negative and insignificant findings for the different institutional investors contradict 
the stakeholder theory that argues for the satisfaction of all stakeholders. Therefore, this did not 
support hypothesis 1a, 1b and 1c. The different institutional investors are interested in the 
VDWLVIDFWLRQRIVKDUHKROGHUV¶LQWHUHVWVDORQHUDWKHUWKDQVWDNHKROGHUV 
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Third, the effects of NED and board size on CSR investments are positive and significant. This 
means that the higher the number of NEDs and board size, the more the CSR investments. The 
findings support hypotheses 2a and 2c. These findings support the stakeholders, stewardship and 
resource dependence theories (Pfeffer, 1972; Goodstein et al, 1994).  
Fourth, contrary to the positive and significant findings of NEDs and board size, the role of 
executive directors in CSR investments was negative and significant. This implies that the higher 
the numbers of executive directors in the BODs, the less the company engages in CSR. This 
does not support hypothesis 2b. This finGLQJ FRQWUDGLFWV VWDNHKROGHUV¶ WKHRU\ -RKQVRQ DQG
Greening, 1999).   
Fifth, the effect of board diversity on CSR is negative and significantly correlated with CSR. 
The findings indicate lack of impact of women on CSR. Also, the reason for the negative 
relationship could be that the presence of women in the BODs is too small to influence the male 
dominated BODs to engage in CSR (Tsalikis and Ortiz-Buonafina, 1990; Rodriguez-Dominguez 
et al, 2009). This does not support hypothesis 2d. This finding contradicts the stewardship 
WKHRU\UHVRXUFHGHSHQGHQFHWKHRU\DQGVWDNHKROGHUV¶WKHRU\WKDWVXSSRUW WKHGLYHUVLILFDWLRQRI
the board through inclusion of female directors which helps to increase CSR investments. 
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CHAPTER 6 
6.0 THE CASE STUDY 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the case study findings with the aim of providing a comprehensive and in-
depth explanation of the role of institutional investors and Board of Director (BOD) 
characteristics on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), aimed at complementing the statistical 
findings in chapter five (5). The need for this emerges from the quantitative analysis in chapter 
five. The statistical analyses lack the model of enquiry to provide deeper and actual practices in 
real social settings. In essence, this chapter allows for the results of the quantitative method to be 
extended through the case study approach. To this effect, the chapter further shows the 
significance of the case study method in management research and how it can be used to 
strengthen the quantitative study. 
Consequently, this study uses multi-sector42 case study approach to provide explanations 
concerning the role of institutional investors and BOD characteristics on CSR. This comprises 
the use of in-depth interviews, documentary analysis and survey questionnaires. Eighteen (18) 
semi-structured interviews were conducted43. The interview data was derived from the top 
management team, BODs such as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), CSR managers, Public 
Relation Officer (PRO) and investor analysts. The documentary data includes the company 
annual reports, company websites and newspaper reports on CSR. In addition, the survey 
                                                 
42The multi-sector companies are 4 Public Liability Companies (PLCs) the oil, banks and insurance sectors. These 
companies are used as case studies, and they include ExxonMobil Nigeria, Industrial Gas Insurance (IGI), Zenith 
bank, and Wema bank. These four (4) PLCs are selected for the case studies because of their critical and unique 
position in the socio-economic development in Nigeria. For instance, ExxonMobil is dominated by foreign 
investors, Zenith bank dominated by indigenous investors, Wema bank dominated by government investors and 
Industrial Gas Insurance (IGI) Company has the presence of female directors in the board (board diversity). Yin 
(1994) stated that this meets the criteria for a robust case study research because the four (4) PLCs in this case study 
are critical, topical and feasible. 6HH$SSHQGL['IRUDEULHIKLVWRU\RIWKHIRXU3/&V¶SURILOH 
43See Appendix C for the details of the list of interviewees (respondents). 
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TXHVWLRQQDLUHV¶ UHVXOWV DUH XVHG LQ WKLV FDVH VWXG\ ZKHQ QHFHVVDU\ WR VXSSRUW DQG H[SODLQ WKH
factors affecting the different institutional investors and BOD characteristics to engage in CSR.  
Werther and Chandler (2006) develop a theoretical framework of strategic CSR comprising three 
(3) phases, namely, the CSR planning phase, CSR strategy phase and CSR implementation 
phase44 (See section 4.8 for details). Accordingly, the discussion and analyses in this study will 
be based on the theoretical framework of Werther and Chandler (2006). The emerging themes 
from the interviews and documentary data are analysed and discussed using responGHQWV¶TXRWHV
from interviews and supplemented with documentary information. As a result, the emerging 
pattern that matches the Werther and Chandler (2006) theoretical framework of CSR planning, 
strategy and implementation, shows whether the company practices strategic CSR or not. On the 
whole, Creswell (2006) suggests that the interviews, documentary information and survey 
questionnaires discussion provide vivid description and in-depth knowledge of the true 
phenomenon studied in a true life environment. 
This chapter discusses the following: the role of indigenous institutional investors, foreign 
institutional investors, government institutional investors, non-executive directors (NEDs), 
executive directors, and board size and board diversity on CSR planning, strategy, 
implementation and evaluation. The next section discusses the role of indigenous institutional 
investors on CSR planning, strategy, implementation and evaluation using Zenith Bank PLC as a 
case study (See Appendix D for the company profile). Also, a brief discussion of the findings on 
                                                 
44Werther and Chandler (2006) model of strategic CSR comprises: first phase, which is the CSR planning phase that 
indicates the alignment of the CSR policies with the corporate philosophy (vision, mission and values statements) of 
the organisation. The second phase is the CSR strategy indicates the tactics; signify the level of compliance to 
national and international Code of Conduct of Best Practices. This includes formation of corporate governance 
structure such as Code of Ethics and Business Conduct. The third phase is the CSR implementation and 
performance evaluation phase. This phase involve the lunching of formal CSR practices and strategy documents,  
CEO/management briefings and meetings on CSR, community development projects, donations and charitable 
activities, the process of getting feedback and evaluating performances. 
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the role of indigenous institutional investors and CSR, followed by a sample of comments from 
respondents is presented. 
6.2 Role of Indigenous Institutional Investors 
From the literature the following institutional investors, namely, indigenous, foreign and 
government are used in this empirical study as follows, CSR planning, strategy, implementation 
and evaluation stages. 
6.2.1 Role of Indigenous Institutional Investors (CSR Planning Phase) 
The majority of the respondents do appear to show preferences that the indigenous institutional 
investors45 revealed lack of interest in the CSR planning phase. This answers the research 
question one, concerning the effects of indigenous institutional investors on CSR. For instance, 
when (Z1) was asked if indigenous institutional investors influence CSR policies at the planning 
phase. Z1 said.  
I think that our investors are not very serious about our CSR policy even 
at the planning stage. They seem to be more concerned with company 
performance. The investors hardly influence the board on CSR policies 
(Investor analyst, Interview date: 19th June, 2009). 
Z2 also responded: In fact, personally I think that the institutional investors are interested in 
short term investments. The institutional investors do not show interest in 
the CSR agenda at all stages. So it is the directors that make sure the CSR 
policies are in line with our culture which is to satisfy our customers and 
other stakeholders. The level of awareness of CSR by institutional 
investors is poor because of lack of effective communication between the 
board and investors (Investment manager; Interview date: 15th June, 
2009). 
Clearly, the evidence available from the interview comments suggests that the indigenous 
institutional investors show little or no interest on CSR policies at the planning stage. One of the 
                                                 
45The indigenous institutional investors are institutional investors with equity holdings of 5% and above (Johnson 
and Greening, 1999; Bartkus et al, 2002; Chai, 2010). In other words, the indigenous institutional investors 
represent Nigerians¶LQYHVWRUV.  
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reasons given was poor communication between BOD and investors. However, WKHUHVSRQGHQWV¶
comments indicate that the board is in charge of the strategic CSR policies of the bank at the 
planning stage. However, the indigenous institutional investors do not get involved in these 
decisions because of lack of awareness and engagement between the BOD, top management and 
investors.  
,Q WKH GRFXPHQW DQDO\VLV WKH FRPSDQ\¶V DQQual report (2009:09) and websites 
(www.zenithbank.com/about us) do not reveal any role played by the indigenous investors in 
CSR planning stage (this answer research question one). However, there is evidence to indicate 
that CSR is strategic from the annual reports, as shown in the values and mission statement of 
the bank as mentioned below. 
Zenith Bank Corporate Values states: To surpass superior performance so as to 
sustain brand equity and long-term interest through maintaining high integrity, 
honesty, trust and transparency $QQXDO UHSRUW  WLWOHG µ&RUSRUDWH
6WUDWHJ\¶ 
Vision: To build the Zenith brand into a reputable international financial 
institution recognised for innovation, superior customer service and performance 
while creating premium value for all stakeholders (www.zenithbank.com/about 
us, titled µ9LVLRQ¶. 
The annual report (2009: 09) provides evidence that illustrates the corporate values and mission 
statements of the bank are aimed at satisfying the long term interest of the stakeholders. 
7KHUHIRUHWKLVILQGLQJLQGLFDWHVWKDW=HQLWKEDQN¶V&65LVVWUDWHJLFDQGVWDNHKROGHURULHQWHG.  
2QWKHRWKHUKDQG=HQLWKEDQN¶V&65FRQWUDVWVZLWK:HPDEDQN¶V&65EHFDXVH=HQLWKEDQN¶V
CSR is strategic while that of Wema bank is not (See Table 6.3 for Wema bank, which is the 2nd 
bank considered in this case study). Incidentally, the corporate values, vision and mission 
statements of Wema bank does not reveal commitment to stakeholders and CSR. 
Furthermore, the websites (www.zenithbank.com) and Annual report (2009) of Zenith Bank did 
not reveal any role of the institutional investors on CSR at planning stage (this answers research 
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question one). However, it reveals that the CSR department is known as Zenith philanthropy 
department charged with CSR at the planning phase. This is because under the CSR section on 
the websites, it reads:  
Zenith Bank has instituted a full-blown corporate social responsibility organ. 
"Zenith Philanthropy", through which it reaches out to touch its host communities 
and the larger society....This has informed our focus on key need areas, including 
healthcare, education, information technology and youth empowerment, sports 
and public infrastructure development (www.zenithbank.com/about us, titled 
µ&RUSRUDWH6RFLDO5HVSRQVLELOLW\¶. 
 
Table 6.1: Strategic Lens of CSR Practices of Zenith Bank Plc. 
Corporate Philosophies Statements 
Corporate Values To surpass superior performance so as to sustain brand equity and 
long-term interest through maintaining high integrity, honesty, trust 
and transparency. 
Vision  To build the Zenith brand into a reputable international financial 
institution recognised for innovation, superior customer service and 
performance while creating premium value for all stakeholders. 
Mission To establish a presence in all major economic and financial centres 
in Nigeria, Africa and indeed all over the world; creating premium 
value for all stakeholders. 
Strategy Use of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) to 
improve services to customers. Creation of CSR department known 
as Zenith philanthropy (founded in 2001) and Zenith Foundation. 
Creation of Ethics and Code of Conduct. 
Implementation Cash donations, charities, road beautification and construction, 
waste management practices. 
Performance Evaluation Social audits, review and monitoring. 
Source: Derived from annual report (2009: pg. 9, titled µ&RUSRUDWH 6WUDWHJ\¶) and website of 
Zenith Bank (www.zenithbank.com/about XVWLWOHGµ&RUSRUDWH6RFLDO5HVSRQVLELOLW\¶. 
Given the evidence above, indigenous institutional investors do show little or no interest in CSR 
at the planning stage. The interview comments show that indigenous institutional investors are 
interested in the return on their investments and do not show any interest in the CSR policy. 
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Empirically, this provides answers to research question one (1) (What are the effects of 
indigenous institutional investors on CSR? See chapter 4.9 for details). The poor communication 
and engagement has been responsible for the lack of participation of investors in CSR planning 
of the bank. Hence, the next subsection discusses the role of indigenous institutional investors on 
CSR strategy regarding the formation of corporate governance structure such as the Code of 
Ethics and Business Conduct. 
6.2.2 Role of Indigenous Institutional Investors (CSR Strategy Phase) 
One of the major themes revealed by the interview comments and documentary data is the 
support by the indigenous institutional investors for CSR strategy encouraging the board to 
strengthened corporate governance structure of the firm. In responding to the question 
concerning the role of indigenous institutional investors on CSR strategy, Z1 responds: 
 Yes, the investors are supportive of our ethical record. The investors 
believed that good corporate governance practices are essential to 
guaranteeing their return on investment and long term survival of the 
FRPSDQ\«7KH LQYHVWRUV EHOLHYH WKDW JRRG FRUSRUDWH JRYHUQDQFH
practices improve the image of company and reduce the risk to the 
EDQN««WKH LQYHVWRUV¶ LQIOXHQFH WKH GLUHFWRUV WR IRUP LQWHUQDO
governance structures that can act as a check to management and all other 
employees (Investor analyst; interview date: 19th June, 2009).  
Z2 also responded:  I think investors personal belief, traditions, morals, values, experiences 
and characteristics do play a role in defining how investors view CSR. 
These values could be the propelling thing that motivates investors to 
VXSSRUW WKH FRPSDQ\¶V LQWHUQDO &65 VWUDWHJ\ (Investment manager; 
interview date: 15th June, 2009). 
Z4 further response: I do think the institutional investors have much influence on CSR strategy 
by encouraging the board to look at CSR. There seems to be a new trend 
towards CSR since 2003 following the introduction of the SEC Code and 
CBN Code for more ethical compliances by banks (CSR manager; 
interview date: 16th  June, 2009). 
7KH LQWHUYLHZHHV¶ FRPPHQWV DERYH GHPRQVWUDWH WKDW WKH LQVWLWXWLRQDO LQYHVWRUV GR VXSSRUW
internal CSR strategy because of recognition of the long term interest of the company. The other 
reason could be that the investors believe internal corporate governance system, such as Code of 
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Ethics could help monitor managers and encourage them to pursue their shareholders interest. 
For instance, investors support the formation of Code of Ethics Policy and Risk Management 
Committee. The institutional investors understand the importance of internal governance 
VWUXFWXUHV WKDW DFW DV D FKHFN WR PDQDJHUV¶ H[FHVVHV RQ FRPSDQLHV hence their support. 
Empirically, this provides answers to research question one (1) (what are the effects of 
indigenous institutional investors on CSR?).  
$OVR WKH SHUVRQDO YDOXHV DQG FKDUDFWHULVWLFV GR SOD\ D UROH LQ IRUPLQJ WKH FRPSDQ\¶V &65
strategy. In Zenith bank, DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH LQWHUYLHZHH = LW LV WKH LQVWLWXWLRQDO LQYHVWRU¶V
strength of character, personal and industry experiences that caused the investors to support 
increased engagement of companies in CSR.  
Additionally, documentary data does show that the investors support the CSR strategy as shown 
in the annual report (2009: 08, 15) and websites (www.zenithbank.com/corporate governance, 
LQYHVWRUV¶UHODWLRQVHFWLRQ) of Zenith bank stating that:  
At Zenith Bank, investors and management... are conscious of our enviable place 
in the industry and judging from the global interest in the banking industry at 
large and our bank in particular, the management have put in place a robust 
system of corporate governance, bearing in mind the key elements of honesty, 
trust, integrity, openness and accountability as well as commitment to the 
RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VJRDO as illustraWHGRQWKHLQYHVWRUVUHODWLRQVHFWLRQRI WKHEDQN¶s 
websites (www.zenithbank.com/ investors relation). 
The bank did suggest in their Annual Report (2009: 08) that the practice of good corporate 
governance in the bank has enhanced returns to stakeholder and it is the management that put the 
governance structure in place, investors were mentioned, however that their role remains 
unclear. This further reinforces the banks claim in their annual report that they invest in CSR by 
satisfying their stakeholders. ThH%DQN¶VFRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFHVWUDWHJ\ VKRZV WKHSUHVHQFHRI
CSR strategy, most especially towards the compliance with global best practices. Also, the long 
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history of corporate culture demonstrate institutionalised norms and rules for best practices 
which has help ensure consistent returns to stakeholders. 
«For Zenith Bank excellent service delivery and development of superior asset 
quality, strong capital base, professionalism and corporate governance have 
provided the grounds for consistently high returns to stakeholders. The bank 
maintains sound corporate governance culture in line with global best practices 
(Zenith Bank Annual Report, 2009:08WLWOHGµ&RUSRUDWH3URILOH¶). 
Together with other forward thinking financial institutions, Zenith Bank 
contributHGWRWKHUHVKDSLQJRI1LJHULD¶VEDQNLQJODQGVFDSHUHGHILQLQJFXVWRPHU
service and branding whilst playing a role in contributing towards the 
improvement of the environment through strategic corporate social responsibility 
(Zenith Bank Annual Report, 2009:15; WLWOH µOHWWHUV WR WKHVKDUHKROGHUV¶E\
the Chief Executive Officer- CEO). 
There is regular communication between the management and institutional investors. In these 
forums the investors are briefed about WKH %DQN¶V RSHUDWLRQV WKHUHE\ UHGXFLQJ LQIRUPDtion 
asymmetry. 
The Bank also, from time to time, holds briefing sessions with market operators 
(stockbrokers, dealers, institutional investors, issuing houses, stock analysts, etc.) 
to update them with the state of our business. These professionals, as advisers 
and purveyors of information, relate with and relay to the shareholders useful 
information about us. We also regularly brief the regulatory authorities, and file 
statutory returns which are usually accessible to the shareholders 
(www.zenithbank.com/ FRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFHWLWOHGµUHODWLRQVKLSZLWK
VWDNHKROGHUV¶). 
 
The documentary analyses of Zenith bank annual report do reveal that the investors and board do 
support CSR. It is evident that the Bank placed more emphasis on customers above other 
stakeholders. The reason may be due to their focus on long term interest which they think 
satisfying the customers will result in achieving the long term interest of the firm. Though caring 
for the environment by the firm was mentioned as a way of achieving good corporate 
governance practice that improved the Bank brand. 
The strategy of the Bank says....Delivering superior service experience to all our 
customers at all times.....As a bank; we are monitoring developments both in the 
Chapter 6 Case Study Approach 
239 
local and global economy, and applying pragmatism and dynamism. Obviously, 
we are not unmindful of the demands and obligations inherent in our 
environment; but this is why we have entrenched global best practices in every 
facet of our operations. We also ensure that all these are anchored on good 
corporate governance (Zenith Bank Annual Report, 2009:18; the FKDLUPDQ¶V
statement to investorsWLWOHGµWKH1LJHULDQHFRQRP\¶). 
The annual reports (2009) show that the BODs are responsible for most of the CSR strategies, 
corporate governance challenges such as managing risk, through their various committees. This 
following statement in the annual report supports this by stating: 
They use the various committees to achieve this, establishing the various 
committees of the bank including the Terms of Reference, review of reports of 
VXFK &RPPLWWHHV WR DGGUHVV NH\ DUHDV RI WKH %DQN¶s business (Zenith Bank 
$QQXDO5HSRUWWLWOHGµ5HVSRQVLELOLWLHVRIWKHERDUG¶) 
«Bank discharges its oversight functions through various committees such as 
risk management, audit, remuneration and nomination (Zenith Bank Annual 
5HSRUWWLWOHGµ&RPPLWWHHV¶).  
The committees are set up in line with statutory and regulatory requirements and consistent with 
global best practices. Memberships of the committees of the BODs are intended to make the best 
use of the skills and experiences of NEDs. 
The next subsection discusses the role of indigenous institutional investors on CSR 
implementations and performance evaluations such as the presence of CSR activities, for 
example, donations, charities, community developments and product qualities. Also, the 
presence of social audits and feedback mechanisms to ensure project performance and evaluation 
from the community is also discussed.  
6.2.3 Role of Indigenous Institutional Investors (CSR Implementation and Performance 
Evaluation) 
7KH LQWHUYLHZHHV¶ FRPPHQWV VKRZ WKDW WKH LQGLJenous institutional investors play little or no 
significant role in CSR implementation, performance and evaluation. Empirically, this provides 
answers to research question one (1). In responding to the role of the indigenous institutional 
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investors in CSR implementation and performance evaluation, the CSR manager (Z4) responds 
that: 
The investors do not get involved with CSR implementation and social audit as 
they only tell the board of their intention and consider the firm values when they 
plan and invest. It is the CSR department that is in charge of CSR evaluation and 
auditing. We report our findings to the board (Interview Date: 16th June, 2009). 
The reason for the lack of interest by investors could be they assume that the board should be 
capable of implementing CSR, resulting in lack of effective monitoring, and this may have 
contributed to increase in CSR breaches at the implementation stage. Similarly, the documentary 
data analyses reveal that the CSR implementation of Zenith bank is carried out by a separate 
department, the Zenith philanthropy department. This is confirmed in the CSR section of the 
annual report (2007; 2008; 2009) that says:  
As a responsible and responsive corporate citizen, Zenith Bank will continue to 
accord very high priority to our CSR engagement. This commitment accounts for 
why we are one of the few banks in Nigeria that maintains a full-fledged 
department Zenith Philanthropy that serves as the vehicle for all our 
customers««As we continue to expand and grow, we will also continue to 
expand and deepen the scope of our commitment to giving back to society a 
reasonable chunk of the fruit of our labour as a corporate citizen. In doing this, 
we will ensure that we do not just spread our assistance thinly across all manner 
of needs, but endeavour to make contributions that make meaningful impact on 
the well-being of the beneficiaries and the society at large (Zenith Bank Annual 
Report, 2009:20FRUSRUDWHVRFLDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\WLWOHGµFRQFOXVLRQ¶).  
,Q IDFW WKHUH LV QR LQIRUPDWLRQ RQ WKH EDQNV ZHEVLWHV RU DQQXDO UHSRUW WR VXJJHVW LQYHVWRUV¶
involvement in CSR implementation. Moreover, in response to the question of what factors 
influence the indigenous institutional investors to invest in CSR? The Investment Manager (Z2) 
responds that: 
«,VWURQJO\EHOLHYH WKDW the short term philosophy of stock market, companies 
and investors drives investment behavior, for example imagine a situation when 
words like trading, quarterly data and report are frequently mentioned by 
investors in the capital and stock market instead of using words like stakeholder 
satisfaction, sustainability and long-term interesW«« $OVR WKH SHUIRUPDQFH
measures incentives (bonus) is short term in nature. The bonus system is structure 
and lop-sided to reward employees that make profit for the company less than one 
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year sometimes annually. That is the higher the profit made by employees for the 
company on short term, the higher the bonus paid out to them (Investment 
Manager, Interview Date: 15th June, 2009). 
According to the interviewee Z4 who is the CSR manager: 
CSR improves the corporate reputation of our company through the community 
development and good environmental practices. Our bank is involved in street 
beautification and road constructions in many states in Nigeria. This project has 
made the community to see the bank as a responsible and caring company and our 
investors are proud of our achievement and they commend our effort at the 
Annual General Meetings. We receive lots of emails and letters from the 
communities thanking us for our CSR activities and performances (CSR 
manager, Interview Date: 16th June, 2009).  
The interview evidence shows that image and reputation, government regulation, market based 
conditions, short-termism of market and performance incentives are the main factors that 
influence indigenous institution LQYHVWRUV¶EHKDYLRr to engage in CSR or not. Empirically, these 
factors provide answers to research question 3 (What are the factors that influence indigenous 
institutional investors to engage in CSR in Nigeria?). In practice, the stock market measures are 
based on short-term interest but on the corporate values of µDERXWus section¶RIWKHZHEVLWHVWKH
long term interest of the company is being emphasized: 
To surpass superior performance so as to sustain brand equity and long-term 
interest through maintaining high integrity, honesty, trust and transparency 
(www.zenithbank.com/about XVWLWOHGµFRUSRUDWHYDOXHV¶)  
The survey questionnaires illustrate the factors that influence indigenous institutional investors 
to engage in CSR. The survey results also substantiate the interview responses by revealing that 
58% of most respondents believe that improving the image and reputation of the companies is 
the highest motivating factor that influences the indigenous investors to engage in CSR (See 
Table 6.2). Incidentally, this answers research question 3. 
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Table 6.2: Survey Results on the Factors Affecting Indigenous Investors to Engage in CSR 
Benefit of CSR Count % 
Improved financial performance 8 7.8 
Improved company image & reputation 59 57.8 
Confers legitimacy on company 30 29.4 
Reduce cost  2 2.0 
To benefit society 1 1.0 
Total 102 100.0 
Source: Own compilation from survey data carried out in 2009 in Nigeria 
 
Given the discussion on the role of indigenous institutional investors on CSR, there is evidence 
from both the interviews and documentary data analyses indicating that the role of indigenous 
institutional investors shows little or no support for CSR policies at the planning and 
implementation stage. This provides answers to research question 1 on the role of indigenous 
investors in CSR. However, there is evidence that institutional investors only support internal 
CSR strategy for example, the formation of Code of Ethics and Best Practices. In fact, the 
evidence from the annual report and websites (Zenith Bank Annual Report, 2008, 2009; 
www.zenithbank.com) indicate that indigenous institutional investors support CSR strategy 
phase. In addition, the survey findings reveal that the need to improve the image and reputation 
of the company is the main factor that influences indigenous institutional investors to engage in 
CSR, thereby providing answers to research question 3. 
Likewise WKH UHVSRQGHQW¶V FRPPHQWV, just as the documentary data, indicate that indigenous 
investors support CSR at the strategy phase. But, from the evidence available, Zenith Bank 
philanthropy department is headed by a CSR manager. On the whole, the role of investors in 
CSR can be considered minimal based on the above evidence from both the respondents and 
documentary analyses. The case study findings are similar to the statistical results that show no 
significant difference between investors and CSR investment. The next section discusses the role 
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of foreign institutional investors on CSR planning, strategy, implementation and performance 
evaluation and how it assists in aligning the CSR activities to the ([[RQ0RELO¶V values, vision 
and mission statements.  
6.2.4 Role of Foreign Institutional Investors (CSR Planning Phase) 
Unlike the indigenous institutional investors, the majority of the respondents reveal that the 
foreign institutional investors46 influence CSR policies positively at the planning stage. This 
means that the foreign investors are more interested and play more active role in CSR than 
indigenous investors, for instance they are more interested in strategic CSR than indigenous 
investors. When WKHLQYHVWRU¶VDQDO\VWZDs asked about the role of foreign institutional investors 
in CSR policy at the planning phase? E1said:  
Investors are very concerned about our CSR policy and they are interested in 
making sure that CSR is in line with our corporate vision and values right from 
the first meeting (Investor analyst; interview Date: 1st July, 2009). 
The E1 comments pointed out that not only did foreign institutional investors support CSR 
policies at the planning stage; they also want CSR to be strategic. Similarly, the Safety and 
Environmental Manager (E3) agreed with (E1) above that the foreign institutional investors 
influence CSR policy to be strategic: E3 said: 
The CSR is linked with our values of integrity, partnership and need to satisfy our 
stakeholder especially protecting the environment. Our investors are putting 
pressure on management to build good community relations with the community 
(Safety and Environmental Manager, Interview Date: 2nd July, 2009). 
Clearly, there is evidence from respondents that the CSR policies are aligned to the values, 
vision and mission statements of ExxonMobil Nigeria and these are supported by the foreign 
institutional investors. The investors are very serious about company involvement in CSR 
                                                 
46The foreign institutional investors are institutional investors with equity holdings of 5% and above (Johnson and 
Greening, 1999; Bartkus et al, 2002; Chai, 2010). In other words, foreign investor is measured as percentage of 
equity held by foreigners (Non-Nigerians).  
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especially at the planning stage. In the same way, the document data analyses from the 
FRPSDQ\¶VDQQXDOUHSRUW(2008) and websites (www.exxonmobil.com) do show the involvement 
of foreign institutional investors in CSR at the planning stage. For instance, the corporate 
citizenship report revealed that investors through meetings provide valuable suggestions for 
enhancing company¶V performance including CSR. The investors vote at the Annual General 
Meeting (AGM), thereby, playing an active role on CSR initiatives. 
Every year, ExxonMobil receives suggestions from shareholders on ways to 
improve company, Management and the Board carefully considers investors 
suggestions and typically seek a dialogue with the proposal sponsor (Corporate 
Citizenship Report, 2008; pg. 17 WLWOHG µ6KDUHKROGHU SURSRVDOV DQG SUR[\
VWDWHPHQWV¶).  
We are committed to safety, health and environment which is an integral and 
critical part of ExxonMobil's global operational policies and 
practices....ExxonMobil has established a carefully structured management 
system for the purpose of assuring consistent implementation of industry-wide 
best practices for protecting employees, those who live in the communities in 
which we operate, and the natural environment (www.exxonmobil.com/about 
us, WLWOHGµsafety, health and environment¶).  
Furthermore, both the corporate citizenship reports and information from websites shows 
alignment of CSR to the values, vision and mission statements of ExxonMobil. This ensures that 
CSR is structured according to the corporate philosophies of the company, and therefore, 
strategic (See Table 6.2). The corporate values of ExxonMobil further demonstrate that CSR is 
strategic, For example, the ExxonMobil values statement states the following:  
We pledge to be corporate citizen, maintain high ethical standards, obey laws 
and respect local and national cultures (Corporate Citizen Report, 2008: pg. 
10WLWOHGµFRPPXQLFDWLRQDQGHQJDJHPHQW¶) 
«being customer focus, teamwork philosophy, community development and the 
environment (www.exxonmobil.com/ DERXWXVWLWOHGµEXVLQHVVHWKLFV¶) 
......Corporate citizenship is embedded in our business model (Corporate 
Citizenship Report, 2008; pg. 3WLWOHGµPDQDJLQJFRUSRUDWHFLWL]HQVKLSLVVXHV
DW([[RQ0RELO¶). 
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Moreover, just like the two respondents¶ E1 and E2 comments that reveal investors support for 
CSR above, so are the documentary evidences from the values, vision and mission statements 
that ExxonMobil is sincere in their positive view of CSR. ExxonMobil support the company to 
operate as a good citizen by having a good CSR policy for the local community. Another 
H[DPSOHLVLQWKHFKDLUPDQ¶VVWDWHPHQW: 
«that the company is committed to long term vision by focusing on ethics, 
safety, team works, local community, environment and customers (Corporate 
Citizenship Report, 2008; pg. 1WLWOHGµ$/RQJ-7HUP9LVLRQ¶). 
Table 6.3 illustrates that the corporate philosophies of the company such as, the values, vision 
and mission statements that support the CSR of ExxonMobil are strategic. The Table also 
reveals that the company CSR implementation is based on partnership and engagement with 
local community. 
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Table 6.3: Strategic Lens of CSR Practices of ExxonMobil 
Corporate Philosophies Statements 
Corporate Values We pledge to be corporate citizen, maintain high ethical standards, 
obey laws and respect local and national cultures 
Vision  We are committed to meeting the world's growing demand for 
energy in an economically, environmentally and socially 
responsible manner. 
 
Mission ExxonMobil uses innovation and technology to deliver energy to a 
growing world, explore for, produce and sell crude oil, natural gas 
and petroleum products. 
 
Strategy Standards of Business Conduct: Policies on ethical, environmental, 
open door communication, equal employment policy, health and 
safety policy 
Implementation Partnerships and Engagement 
Performance Evaluation Undertake appropriate reviews and evaluations of its operations to 
measure progress and to foster compliance with this policy. 
Performance reviews are done by 1) External stakeholders reviews 
e.g. Donor agencies, NGOs etc. and Independent assurance auditing 
e.g. KPMG matches the CSR investment cost with number of 
completed projects.  
Source: Derived from Corporate Citizenship Reports (2009) and website 
(www.exxonmobil.com). 
Following the information above, there is empirical evidence that foreign institutional investors 
support CSR policy at the planning stage. They also support CSR to be strategic in nature. 
However, the foreign institutional investors support for CSR policy in the planning stage differs 
from indigenous institutional investors that do not support CSR policy at the planning stage. The 
reason for the investors support for CSR policy could be the experience of foreign investors 
from their host country about the benefit of CSR reporting, compliance to global standards and 
formation of internal corporate governance structure. The next subsection discusses, the role of 
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foreign institution investors on CSR strategy regarding the formation of corporate governance 
structure such as Code of Ethics and Business Conduct. 
6.2.5 Role of Foreign Institutional Investors (CSR Strategy Phase) 
The respondents reveal foreign institution investors support the formation of corporate 
governance structure in ExxonMobil. This is done because ExxonMobil want to be seen as 
complying with national and international regulations on best practices.In responding to the 
question about the role of foreign institutional investors on CSR strategy? E2 said: 
<HV«RXU LQVWLWXWLRQDO LQYHVWRUV DUH LQWHUHVWHG LQ &65 VWUDWHJ\ 2XU LQYHVWRUV
initiated that we have a good code of standard practice in our company which is 
in line with international standards for best practices. This code of standard 
practice is being used by all ExxonMobil in other parts of the world. Our foreign 
investors know the importance of adhering to international standards for best 
practices as that is what is obtainable in their country of origin (Public Relation 
Manager; Interview Date: 18th June, 2009). 
What the evidence reveals is that foreign investors know the benefit of CSR and hence are 
willing to play active role by supporting CSR investment. They are being encouraged by the 
successful benefits emanating from the compliance to international standards for best practices. 
As for the document data analyses, it reveals that the foreign institutional investors encourage 
CSR strategy in ExxonMobil. Though the board is responsible for the CSR strategy formulation 
in ExxonMobil, they seek the opinions of institutional investors. The board and management 
engage institutional investors in discussions on how to best deliver governance. For instance,  
...the board made changes to the Corporate Governance Guidelines (Corporate 
Citizenship Report, 2008; pg.  17WLWOHGµERDUGUHVSRQVH¶).  
7KHZHEVLWHVRI([[RQ0RELOLQWKHµDERXWXV¶VHFWLRQVWDWHV 
We are committed to high business ethics.....The policy of ExxonMobil 
Corporation and its subsidiary companies is one of strict observance of all laws 
and adherence to a strict set of Standards of Business Conduct 
(www.exxonmobil.com/Nigeria/µDERXWXV¶). 
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Generally, ExxonMobil is aware of the importance of communication between their foreign 
investors and board, unlike the indigenous investors in Zenith Bank that seems to be unaware. 
Therefore, the communication has led to increase awareness on the foreign investors about the 
CSR activities of the company. In addition, the annual report of ExxonMobil further confirms 
that the board and management seek the opinions of institutional investors in CSR strategy 
formulation and corporate governance as indicated below: 
We engage with institutional and individual shareholders, socially responsible 
investors, and pension funds to discuss our performance and approach to 
corporate governance (Corporate Citizenship Report, 2008; pg. 9, titled 
µXVLQJVWDNHKROGHUVGLDORJXHRXWFRPHVWRLPSURYHFRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFH¶). 
Also, the BOD not only consults institutional investors on CSR but also formulates BOD 
committees responsible for corporate governance issues in ExxonMobil as stated in their 
Corporate Citizenship Report (2008);  
...corporate citizenship topics are generally overseen by the Board Affairs, 
Compensation, and Public Issues and Contributions Committees (Corporate 
Citizenship Report, 2008; 14 WLWOHG µ&RUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFH PDQDJLQJZLWK
VWDQGDUGVDQGV\VWHPV¶). 
This committee oversees the remuneration, audit, public and contribution committee issues. The 
Board Affairs Committee reviews issues arising under the applicable standards of business 
conduct with respect to an executive officer or director and will report its findings to the BOD. 
7KHUHVSRQGHQWV¶FRPPHQWs reveal the overall positive attitude of foreign institutional investors 
towards CSR strategy. In the same way, the foreign institutional investors¶ behaviour towards 
internal CSR strategy is similar to indigenous institutional investors, which support CSR at the 
strategy phase. The next subsection discusses the role of foreign institutional investors on CSR 
implementation and performance evaluation such as the presence of CSR activities and social 
audits. 
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6.2.6 Role of Foreign Institutional Investors (CSR Implementation and Performance 
Evaluation) 
$FFRUGLQJ WR UHVSRQGHQWV¶ FRPPHQWV DQG WKHGRFXPHQWGDWD DQDO\VHV WKH IRUHLJQ LQVWLWXWLRQDO
investors show little or no interest on CSR implementation. In responding to the question on the 
role of foreign investors on CSR implementation and evaluation? The Public Relation Manager 
(E2) responded: 
In my view I do not think the investors have interest in CSR implementation 
EHFDXVH WKH\ DUH YHU\ EXV\«LW LV P\ GHSDUWPHQW WKDW FDUULHV RXW WKH
implementation of CSR and report back to the board (Public Relation Manager, 
Interview Date: 2nd July, 2009).  
Evidently, the documentary data analysis provides evidence that institutional investors are being 
consulted by the board on CSR. However, that did show or suggest that foreign institutional 
investors do support CSR in the implementation and evaluation stage. In this case the use of the 
ZRUG µZH¶ GLG QRW VSHFLI\ LI LQVWLWXWLRQDO LQYHVWRUV DUH SDUWV RI WKDW µZH¶ )RU LQVWDQFH WKH
ZHEVLWHVRI([[RQ0RELODWWKHµDERXWXV¶VHFtion, titled safety, health and environment states:  
We are committed to safety, health and environment is an integral and critical 
SDUWRI([[RQ0RELO¶VJOREDORSHUDWLRQDOSROLFLHVDQGSUDFWLVH([[RQ0RELOKDV
established a carefully structured management system for the purpose of assuring 
consistent implementation of industry-wide best practices for protecting 
employees, those who live in the communities in which we operate, and the 
natural environment (www.exxonmobil.com/nigeriaµDERXWXV¶). 
From the survey results, the Social License to Operate (SLTO) is chosen as the most influential 
factor on companies to engage in CSR. 70% of respondents believe that the ability to secure 
SLTO by the company is the highest motivating factor for foreign investors to engage in CSR 
(See Table 6.4). Empirically, this provides answers to research question 3 (What are the factors 
that influence foreign institutional investors to engage in CSR in Nigeria?). 
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Table 6.4: Survey Results on the Factors Affecting Foreign Investors to Engage in CSR 
Benefit of CSR Count % 
Improved financial performance 3 2.9 
Improved company image & reputation 9 8.8 
Confers legitimacy on company 70 69.0 
Reduce cost  12 11.8 
To benefit society 6 5.9 
Total 102 100.0 
Source: Own compilation from survey data carried out in 2009 in Nigeria 
The above discussion on the role of foreign institutional investors on CSR demonstrates support 
for CSR policies and strategy. This provides answers to research question 1, about the role of 
foreign institutional investors on CSR. The value statement mentions that ExxonMobil are 
socially and environmentally responsible and this a good signal to the community, NGOs and 
other stakeholders that ExxonMobil is a caring company. Also, the respondent comments show 
that the foreign institutional investors influence the CSR at the planning and strategy phase but 
do not get involved in CSR implementation, performance and evaluation because they are very 
busy. Empirically, this provides answers to research question 1 about the role of foreign 
institutional investors on CSR (See Chapter 4.9). In addition, the survey findings reveal the 
SLTO as the factor that influences foreign institutional investors to engage in CSR, thereby 
providing answers to research question 3. 
Consequently, these findings contrast with the findings that indigenous institutional investors do 
not influence the CSR at the planning and implementation and evaluation except the formation 
of internal CSR strategy such as, the Code of Ethics and Best Practices. The next section 
discusses the role of government institutional investors on CSR planning, strategy, 
implementation and performance evaluation and how it assists in aligning the CSR to the vision 
and mission statement of the company.  
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6.2.7 Role of Government Institutional Investors (CSR Planning Phase) 
In examining the role of government institutional investors on CSR investments, Wema bank 
(W) is used as case study (See appendix D for company profile). The majority of respondents 
reveal that the government institutional investors47 do not appear to have support for CSR at the 
planning stage. In responding to the question on the role of government institutional investors on 
CSR policies at the planning stage? The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) W3 said: 
Personally, I think the government investors hardly show interest even at the start 
of policy formulation. The institutional investors I think trust our management to 
handle the policy formulation of CSR (CEO; Interview Date: 6th July, 2009). 
The secretary to the bank (W4) further responded that: 
«2XU&65LVVXEMHFW WR WKHGLFWDWHVRI WKHERDUG WKDWGUDZXS WKH&65SROLF\
The board only satisfies the investors¶ interest at the expense of other 
shareholders because they are appointed by government and do not want to lose 
their jobs«LQYHVWRUVGRQRWERWKHUDERXWDOLJQLQJ&65activities to company¶V 
values (Bank Secretary: Interview Date: 8th July, 2009). 
It is revealed that the board is solely responsible for formulating CSR policy. The policy is not 
strategic because it focuses only on shareholder interest neglecting other stakeholder. Also, the 
comments from respondents show that the government institutional investors have little or no 
interest in CSR policy at the planning stage, because their actions are motivated by political 
reasons because they are government appointee. As a result, investors do not bother about CSR 
being strategLFDVUHYHDOHGE\WKHUHVSRQGHQWV¶ interviewed. 
On the other hand, the documentary data analyses show that Wema banks are involved in 
strategic CSR. Also, it was mentioned that their CSR is sustainable and is integrated into its core 
business functions. However, the role of government investors on CSR at the planning stage was 
not mentioned in both the annual reports (2009) and websites (www.wemabank.com/about us) 
                                                 
47The government institutional investors are institutional investors with equity holdings of 5% and above (Johnson 
and Greening, 1999; Bartkus et al, 2002; Chai, 2010). In other word, this represents the government investment as 
measured by percentage of equity holdings held by state and federal governments or their agencies.  
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with regards to the CSR practices of the bank. In fact, the government institutional investors do 
not influence CSR to be strategic as illustrated in the Wema bank websites that reads:  
7KH %DQN¶V CSR focus is premised on its core values of Teamwork, Mutual 
Respect, Innovation, Professionalism and Result Orientation. Its strategic 
approach to CSR places high premium on sustainability, especially on the issue 
of cross-generational equity. The sustainability practices are consciously being 
integrated into its core business functions (www.wemabank.com/about us, 
WLWOHGµ&65)RFXVDQGLQLWLDWLYHV¶. 
7KHUHVHHPVWREHGLVDJUHHPHQWEHWZHHQWKHUHVSRQGHQWV¶FRPPHQWVDQGGRFXPHQWDU\DQDO\VLV
While the respondent comments suggest Wema Bank CSR is not strategic, their documentary 
data show that they are strategic without active support from investors. Also, the role of 
government institutional LQYHVWRUV LQ&65ZDVQRWPHQWLRQHG LQ WKHFRPSDQ\¶VYDOXHVYLVLRQ
and mission statement as stated below. Nonetheless, the corporate values, vision and mission 
statements of Wema bank illustrates high commitment by the bank to satisfying the customers.  
For example, the value statement reads: The result of teamwork in a service 
organisation like Wema Bank is a satisfied customer (Annual Report of Wema 
Bank, 2009; pg. 3WLWOHGµYLVLRQDQGPLVVLRQVWDWHPHQW¶). 
The vision reads: To be the best financial institution of choice in service delivery 
and superior returns for our customers (Annual Report of Wema Bank, 2009; 
pg. 3WLWOHGµYLVLRQDQGPLVVLRQVWDWHPHQW¶). 
The Mission reads: To give every customer a delightful and memorable service 
experience (Annual Report of Wema Bank, 2009; pg. 3 WLWOHG µYLVLRQ DQG
mission statement¶). 
Clearly, the corporate philosophies (values, vision and mission statements) of the bank do not 
reveal commitments to stakeholders instead, only the customers were mentioned (See Table 6.5 
for details). However, on the websites (www.wemabank.com), the following statement was 
written by the bank that mentioned that the bank is interested in the stakeholders and local 
community. 
Wema Bank Plc, as a socially responsible corporate citizen, has demonstrated 
consistent commitment to sustainable development of its resident communities. In 
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the process of creating an enduring institution, emphasis is laid on high 
professional and ethical standards (ZZZZHPDEDQNFRPDERXWXVWLWOHGµ&65
)RFXVDQGLQLWLDWLYHV¶. 
In fact, :HPD EDQN¶V Yalues, vision and mission statements did not GLVFORVH WKH EDQN¶V
commitment to stakeholders, rather customers were only mentioned. On the Contrary, Wema 
bank mission statements differ from that of Zenith bank because while, that of Zenith bank 
reveal commitment to stakeholder groups on the vision and mission statements, Wema bank 
does not. 
Table 6.5: Strategic Lens of CSR Practices of Wema Bank Plc. 
Corporate Philosophies Statements 
Corporate Values Team work, Innovation, Mutual respect and Performance driven. 
The result of teamwork in a service organisation like Wema Bank 
is a satisfied customer. 
Vision  To be the best financial institution of choice in service delivery 
and superior returns. 
Mission To give every customer a delightful and memorable service 
experience. 
Strategy Code and Regulations, Compliance to CBN Code, approved 
conflict of interest policy 
Implementation Cash donations and charities 
Performance Evaluation No Mention 
Source: Derived from annual reports (2009) and website of Wema Bank (www.wemabank.com). 
6.2.8 Role of Government Institutional Investors (CSR Strategy Phase) 
By and large, the majority of the respondents and documentary data show that the government 
institutional investors have influence on the CSR strategy of the Bank. The question on what is 
the role of government institutional investors on CSR strategy? W3 responds that: 
Investors ensure that the company complies with the CBN directives for uniform 
reforms across the financial industry in ensuring uniformity of CSR projects , 
UHSRUWLQJDQGGLVFORVXUHV«<HVZHKDYHSROLFLHVRQ&65VXFKDVLQHWKLFVDQG
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best practices. In the case of CSR reporting investors are equally committed to 
making sure that we report our CSR activities in our annual report and websites 
(CEO; Interview date: 7th July, 2009). 
7KH DERYH YLHZ LV IXUWKHU VXEVWDQWLDWHG E\ WKH GRFXPHQW GDWD DQDO\VHV IURP WKH µFRUSRUDWH
goverQDQFHLQIRUPDWLRQ¶VHFWLRQRIthe :HPD%DQN¶VZHEVLWHDVVKRZEHORZ:  
Wema bank PLC is committed to good corporate governance as a system for 
PDQDJLQJ DQG VXSHUYLVLQJ FRUSRUDWLRQ««HIIHFWLYH DQG WUDQVSDUHQW FRUSRUDWH
governance, guarantees that, the bank is managed in a responsible and value 
driven manner, towards sustaining the confidence of shareholders, employees, 
stakeholders and the public in our bank (www. wemabank.com/about us, titled 
µcorporate goverQDQFH¶). 
This means that the Bank is interested in strong corporate governance practices including CSR 
disclosures. However, on the same annual report page, the report mentions that the board is 
interested in shareholder satisfactions. Also, mentioned is the board intention for formulating a 
strategic policy that will guarantee long term survival of the firm. This is confusing as the word 
strategic was not mentioned in the values, mission and vision statement of the bank.  On the 
other hand, the documentary analyses do not reveal that government institutional investors 
influence CSR strategy. However, it is the board and management of Wema bank that governs 
the company on the principles oIJRRG&RUSRUDWH*RYHUQDQFHDVVWDWHGLQWKHFRPSDQ\¶VDQQXDO
report (2010). 
The responsibility for the governance of the bank lies with the Board of Directors 
which is responsible to the shareholders«The primary purpose of the board is 
to provide strategic direction for the bank in order to deliver long term value to 
shareholders (:HPD %DQN $QQXDO 5HSRUW  SJ  WLWOHG µ&RUSRUDWH
*RYHUQDQFH5HSRUW¶). 
The board represents and protects the interests of the shareholders and as such allocates the task 
of monitoring board and management's actions through board committees as stated below. 
The Committee is also responsible for ensuring that the Bank's internal control 
procedures in the area of risk assets remain high to safeguard the quality of the 
Bank's risk assets (Wema Bank Annual Report, 2010 pg. 17WLWOHGµ&RUSRUDWH
*RYHUQDQFH5HSRUW¶ 
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The next subsection discusses the role of government institutional investors on CSR 
implementation and performance evaluation such as, the presence of CSR activities. 
6.2.9 Role of Government Institutional Investors (Implementation and Performance 
Evaluation) 
The UHVSRQGHQWV¶ FRPPHQWV DQG WKH document data analyses reveal that the government 
investors show lack of interest for CSR implementation and performance evaluation. In 
responding to the role of government institutional investors on CSR implementation and 
performance evaluation? The Investment Manager (W1) rresponds: 
All I know is that we do not have CSR performance evaluation and monitoring 
committee, which means that the investors do not care about feedback from CSR, 
hence they would have pressured the BODs to ensure that CSR is monitored and 
IHHGEDFN JRWWHQ IURP WKH FRPPXQLW\ « , EHOLHYH SHUVRQDOO\ LQYHVWRUV KDUGO\
show interest, they only care about return on their investment because they have 
got to account to shareholders at the end of the day (Investment Manager, 
Interview Date: 6th July, 2009).  
In response to the question of what factors influence the government investors to invest in CSR? 
The investors view CSR as a tool for enhancing corporate reputation and improving financial 
performance.The Administrative Manager (W2) said:  
«regarding government regulation, I think this is the main factor influencing 
investors to have a rethink on CSR or else they would not have shown interest on 
CSR investments. The investors are just too concern with profit, the market and 
short term interest (Interview Date: 7th July, 2009).  
In addition, the survey results reveal 38% of most respondents believe that government 
institutional investors should contribute to society for their own good. The need for companies to 
contribute and benefit the society is the highest motivating factor for government investors to 
engage in CSR, while improving corporate image and reputation had 20% of the respondents 
(See Table 6.6). Empirically, this provides answers to research question 3 (that is, what factors 
influence government institutional investors to engage in CSR). 
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Table 6.6: Survey Results on the Factors Affecting Government Investors to Engage in CSR 
Benefit of CSR Count % 
Improved financial performance 16 15.7 
Improved company image & reputation 20 19.6 
Confers legitimacy on company 18 17.7 
Reduce cost  12 11.8 
To benefit society 34 38 
Total 102 100.0 
Source: Own compilation from survey data carried out in 2009 in Nigeria 
In total, the empirical evidence shows government institutional investors have little or no interest 
in CSR at the planning, implementation and evaluation phase. Empirically, this provides answers 
to research question 1, concerning the role of government institutional investorsin CSR (See 
Chapter 4.9). In other words, the investors do not monitor the board during policy formulation 
and CSR feedback. The government institutional investors do support the CSR strategic phase 
such as the formation of internal corporate governance structures and in general, they have little 
or no interest in CSR investment. The reason could be their short term interest on investment and 
the compliance to the Code of Banks Consolidation (2006) that recommends strengthening of 
internal corporate governance mechanisms. This is supported by some of the respondents that 
gave reasons such as pressures from government regulation as one of the factors motivating the 
investors to comply with national and international codes of conduct. 
In addition, the survey findings reveal that the need to contribute to society and improve the 
image of the company are the factors that influence government institutional investors to engage 
in CSR, thereby providing answers to research question 3. 
6.3 The Relationship between the Institutional Investors and CSR 
Figure 6.1 shows the relationship between the factors that influence the indigenous, foreign and 
government institutional investors in CSR strategy. However, it is only the foreign institutional 
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investors that show interest in CSR Planning, while the indigenous and government institutional 
investors influence CSR strategy positively through the formation of internal corporate 
governance structures. The foreign institutional investors influence both the CSR at the planning 
and strategic phase. Furthermore, this indicates that all the different institutional investors have 
almost similar preferences for CSR strategy, the internal corporate governance structure, for 
instance, the formation of Code of Ethics and Business Conduct. 
Also, the various factors, such as image and reputation of company, social licence to operate, 
performance incentives, government regulation and short term interest of stock market, has been 
found to influence the different institutional investors to engage in CSR. 
Figure 6.1 The Relationship between the Institutional Investors and CSR 
 
The next section discusses the role of BOD characteristics on CSR planning, strategy, 
implementation and performance evaluation and how it assists in aligning CSR to vision and 
mission statements of the company. The influence of Non-executive directors on CSR planning, 
strategy, implementation and performance evaluation are discussed below. 
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6.4 Role of Non-Executive Directors 
The non-executive directors (NEDs) are part of the BODs (Coffey and Wang, 1992, 1998). The 
NEDs, executive directors, Board size and board diversity are used in this empirical study to 
illustrate their roles as follows: CSR planning, strategy, implementation and evaluation stages. 
6.4.1 Role of Non-Executive Directors (CSR Planning Phase) 
The evidences from both the interview comments and documentary data analyses reveal that the 
NEDs support CSR planning, strategy, implementation and performance evaluation. This is 
unlike the different institutional investors that show little or no effect on CSR investment. In 
responding to the question concerning the role of NEDs in CSR policies? The Public Relation 
Manager (E2) said:  
The NEDs, to be honest, I think support the main objective of ExxonMobil to 
provide sustainable development to relevant stakeholders and supports 
implementation of projects that are cost effective and at the same time satisfy the 
needs of our host community. The NEDs insist that our core values and vision 
should guide us in our CSR policies (Public Relation Manager, Interview 
Date: 2nd July, 2009). 
In addition, the respondent Z4, the CSR manager said:  
7KH1('V¶DUHYHU\SRZHUIXOGLUHFWRUVLQWKHERDUGDQGWKH\VXSSRUWFRPPXQLW\
development projects in our company. The NEDs ensures that the aim of our CSR 
matches our corporate slogan. The NEDs are particular about the way we execute 
CSR project so that CSR benefit the company through ensuring overall cost 
reduction and value addition (CSR Manager, Interview Date: 16th  June, 2009). 
The documentary analyses of Zenith bank annual report (2009:09) reveal that the NEDs do 
support CSR. This is illustrated by the fact that the NEDs¶GLVFKDUJH WKHLU oversight functions 
through various committees put in place such as risk management, audit, remuneration and 
nomination. TKH 1('V DUH PHPEHUV RI WKHVH FRPPLWWHHV 7KH &65 PDQDJHUV¶ UHSRUW WR WKH
BOD, with the NEDs being part of the BOD as stated below: 
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The board discharges its oversight functions through various committees. 
Membership of the committees of the board is intended to make the best use of the 
skills and experience of Non-executive directors (Zenith Bank Annual Report, 
SJWLWOHGµ*RYHUQDQFH5HSRUW¶ 
Following the above comments, it is evident empirically that the NEDs support CSR in the 
planning stage. This provides answers to research question 2, referring to what are the roles of 
NEDs in CSR activities? The next subsection discusses the role of NEDs on CSR strategy 
regarding the formation of corporate governance structure such as Code of Ethics and Business 
Conduct. 
6.4.2 Role of Non-Executive Directors (CSR Strategy Phase) 
The comments below indicate that the NEDs support the formation of governance structure to 
enhance CSR practices. In responding to the question concerning the role of NEDs in CSR 
strategy formation; the Director in Zenith Bank (Z3) responds: 
Our outside directors ensure the company sets the corporate governance 
standards. The NEDs are always developing good policies that make the company 
to be profitable including formation of committees and it is part of the NEDs 
responsibility because of their experience to guarantee that the board complies in 
setting the corporate governance standards of the company (Director of 
Operations; Interview Date: 16th July, 2009). 
The documentary analyses of Zenith Bank Annual Reports (2009) reveal that the NEDs support 
CSR at the strategy phase. For instance, the corporate governance section states:  
«the board is responsible for reviewing and providing overall guidance for the 
%DQN¶VFRUSRUDWHVWUDWHJ\PDMRUSODQVRIDFWLRQDQGULVNSROLF\....monitoring the 
effectiveness of the corporate governance practices under which the Bank 
operates and making appropriate changes as necessary (Zenith Bank Annual 
Reports, 2009: pg. FRUSRUDWH JRYHUQDQFH WLWOHG µ5HVSRQVLELOLWLHV RI WKH
ERDUG¶ 
In fact, there are eight (8) committees of the board, including the risk management, credit, audit, 
and the executive; which meet quarterly but, hold extra-ordinary sessions as the business of the 
bank demands. Part of the audit committee function is to enhance the ethical code of conduct of 
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the bank by having good and strong corporate governance structure. This shows that the NEDs, 
as members of these committees, ensure that there is the formation of the code of ethics and risk 
management committee in compliance with the Code of Bank Consolidation (2006) and the 
Code of Corporate Governance in Nigeria (2009).  
6.4.3 Role of Non-Executive Directors (Implementation and Performance Evaluation) 
The NEDs support the implementation and evaluation of CSR. This is in direct response to the 
question of whether NEDs support the implementation and evaluation of CSR practices, the CSR 
manager of Zenith Bank (Z4) responds:  
Our NEDs are members of the risk management committees that are charged with 
monitoring risky and failed projects and inside trading. Also, the NEDs, who are 
part of the board request for reports concerning CSR activities and projects from 
our department and we forward it to the board. This is a way of monitoring the 
CSR projects (CSR manager; Interview date: 13th July, 2009). 
Furthermore, in response to the question of what factors influence the NEDs to engage in CSR; 
the answer is that the NEDs view CSR as a tool for achieving stock market stability. Many 
respondents believe that CSR brings stability to the capital market by attracting both huge long 
term capitals and more investors to the market, thereby reducing price fluctuation. IGI4, the 
deputy managing director said: 
Perception, profit and risk reduction are the driving and motivating factors that 
influence the NEDs in investing in CSR. For example, if NEDs perceive that CSR 
will reduce risk as they do in our company, then they will support the board to 
LQYHVWLQ&65«&65LVDWWUDFWLQJIXQGVWRFDSLWDOPDUNHWWKRXJKLWLVVPDOOWKH
awareness is growing and these funds can be used to stabilise the market (Deputy 
Manager Director; Interview Date: 10th July, 2009). 
IGI2 further responded: 
....the NEDs look at the sectors, some sectors like the financial sector are raising 
the stake in CSR because of the awareness it has generated among investors, 
customers and management. But remember that company resources will be the 
determining factor on the extent our company invests in CSR (Public Relations 
Manager, Interview date: 10th July, 2009). 
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The documentary analyses of Zenith bank do not reveal NEDs¶ involvement in CSR 
implementation and evaluation. However, it is stated that the Zenith philanthropy department is 
responsible for the CSR implementation of projects and its evaluation. 
,QOLQHZLWKUHVSRQGHQW,*,¶V comment above, the survey results also substantiate this opinion 
by revealing that 39% of respondents believe that improving the image and reputation of the 
company is the highest motivating factor that influences the NEDs to engage in CSR, while 30% 
of the respondents support CSR as cost reduction strategy. The financial performance comes 
third with 18% (See Table 6.7). Empirically, this provides answers to research question 4 (why 
NEDs engage in CSR). 
Table 6.7 6XUYH\5HVXOWVRQ1('¶V3HUFHSWLRQRI&653UDFWLFHV 
Benefit of CSR Count % 
Improved financial performance 18 17.8 
Improved company image & reputation 39 38.2 
Confers legitimacy on company 8 7.9 
Reduce cost  30 29.4 
To benefit society 5 4.9 
Total 102 100.0 
Source: Own compilation from survey data carried out in 2009 in Nigeria 
 
Given the role of NEDs in IGI, Zenith bank and ExxonMobil companies, the empirical 
evidences from respondents show that NEDs are involved in CSR at the planning, strategy and 
the implementation stages. This indicates that the NEDs are supportive of strategic CSR because 
they ensure that this practice is in line with the corporate philosophy of the company. Also, it 
VKRZV1('V¶VXSSRUWIRU&65SODQQLQJVWUDWHJ\LPSOHPHQWDWLRQSHUIRUPDQFHDQGHYDOXDWLRQ
Undoubtedly, this provides answers to research question 4 (See chapter 4.9) as the majority of 
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respondents affirm that NEDs support CSR. Also, the case study findings of NEDs support for 
strategic CSR is similar to the statistical finding of a positive and significant relationship 
between NEDs and CSR investment. Both methods are robust and affirm that NEDs support 
CSR practices. 
Nonetheless, the findings about the role of NEDs in CSR contrast with the mixed findings on the 
roles of indigenous, foreign and government institutional investors in CSR activities. For 
instance, both indigenous and government investors support only the CSR strategy phase, while 
the foreign investors support CSR at the planning and strategy phase. However, none of the 
institutional investors played a role in the CSR implementation and evaluation stage. The next 
section discusses the role of the executive directors on CSR planning, strategy; implementation 
and performance evaluation and how it assists in aligning CSR to the vision and mission 
statement of the company. 
6.4.4 Role of Executive Directors (CSR Planning Phase) 
The evidences from both the interview comments and documentary data analyses reveal that the 
influences of the executive directors on CSR are mixed. In responding to the question on the role 
of the executive directors on CSR policies; the CEO of Zenith Bank (Z5) said: 
«$VKHDGRI WKHH[HFXWLYHPDQDJHPHQW WHDP ,PDNHVXUH WKDW ,PRQLWRU&65
from the early stage to the final stage of project execution. The executive 
directors definitely show concerns if the CSR policies do not align with corporate 
objectives of the firm because they are responsible for success or failure of the 
implementation of policies made by the board, including the design of CSR 
policy (CEO; Interview Date: 16th July, 2009). 
In contrast to the above comments from the CEO, some respondents argue that executive 
directors will not engage in CSR because they want to protect their jobs as they think the 
shareholders might fire them and hire someone else who will not divert company resources to 
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satisfying other stakeholders but, instead satisfy the shareholders alone. IGI3, the Finance 
Manager said:  
The executive directors are employees who will want to protect their jobs by 
concentrating on profit making rather than diverting company resources to 
&65«« PRVW &(2V SUHIHU FDVK GRQDWLRQ ZKLFK WKH\ XVH WR JDLQ SHUVRQDO
attraction from friends. This cash donation has nothing to do with our company 
performance (Finance manager; Interview Date: 13th July, 2009). 
IG1 further responded: 
«Personally, these executive directors are friends with each other, even some 
are friends to the NEDs and executive directors because sometimes the CEOs 
LQIOXHQFHGWKHLUHPSOR\PHQWWRWKHFRPSDQ\«VRWKH\EULQJLQWKHLUIULHQGVZKR
will eventually support him, even in CEOs¶ decisions not to invest in CSR 
(Operation manager; Interview Date: 9th July, 2009). 
The comments from the interviews reveal that the executive directorV¶ influences on CSR at the 
planning phase are mixed. While the CEO agrees that the executive directors do support CSR at 
the early stage of planning, others disagree citing the social ties network among executive 
directors as a hindrance to engaging in CSR activities.  
In essence, the documentary analyses of IGI insurance websites do not mention the role of 
executive directors in CSR policies at the planning stage as shown below concerning their CSR. 
7KH&65VHFWLRQPHQWLRQVWKDWWKH&65LVDOLJQHGWRWKHFRPSDQ\¶VJRDODQGREOLJDWLRQWRWKH
society as stated: 
IGI PLC aligns its development and growth with what it perceives as its 
obligations to the society. It has therefore adopted a corporate social 
responsibility culture that supports organisations, activities and causes which 
promote the values of good citizenship, youth development and healthy living, 
particularly through sport sponsorship and endorsements (www.iginigeria.com, 
5HVRXUFHWLWOHGµ,*,&RUSRUDWH6RFLDO5HVSRQVLELOLW\¶. 
By this comments, IGI is demonstrating that not only is the compan\¶V&65DFWLYLWLHVVWUDWHJLF
but also that the whole company are interested in being seen as a good corporate citizen. 
However, there is no specificity in the website statement as to who is responsible for the 
FRPSDQLHV¶LQYROYHPHQWLQ&65QRPHQWLRQRILnvestors and this can be misleading. The next 
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subsection discusses the role of executive directors on CSR strategy regarding the formation of 
corporate governance structures such as Code of Ethics and Business Conduct. 
6.4.5 Role of Executive Directors (CSR Strategy Phase) 
The evidence from the interview reveals that executive directors support CSR at the strategy 
phase. In responding to the question on the role of executive directorsin CSR strategy, the 
Finance Manager (IGI3) responds: 
Some executive directors are good and they do want the company to succeed. 
Executive directors will implement policy that will promote the overall survival 
of the company by enhancing the performance of the company through putting 
checks and balances in place (Finance Manager; Interview Date: 13th July, 
2009).  
The comments demonstrate that the executive directors are interested in improving the 
FRPSDQLHV¶SHUIRUPDQFH7KH\GR WKLVE\ FRPSO\LQJZLWK WKH&RGHRI&RUSRUDWH*RYHUQDQFH
(2003; 2009), that recommends the formation of internal governance structure aimed at reducing 
management excesses and enhancing performances. 
The documeQWDU\DQDO\VHVRIWKH,*,¶Vwebsites (www.iginigeria.com) do not mention the role 
of executive directors in CSR at the strategy stage.However, the website did mention that the 
shareholders were happy with IGI insurance overall performance as illustrated by this statement 
from their website: 
Shareholders have commended Industrial and General Insurance Plc. (IGI), 
Nigeria's leading insurance company, for the company's results-oriented local 
and continental business expansion programme, which yielded great dividends in 
terms of the size of the balance sheet, Group profit and stakeholder value in spite 
of the harsh operating environment in 2008 (www.iginigeria.com, community 
relations WLWOHG µShareholders commend IGI's business expansion 
programme¶). 
In the above statement, emphasis was placed on dividends, profit and balance sheet signifying 
that investors and shareholders are more interested in profit maximisation. Though the word 
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µVWDNHKROGHUV¶ZHUHPHQWLRQHG WKHUHZDVQRHPSKDVLVRQLW2WKHUVWDNHKROGHUVDQGLQWHUHVWHG
parties might think the company is paying a lip-service to CSR. The next subsection discusses 
the role of executive directors on CSR implementation and performance evaluation such as, the 
presence of community development projects, social audits and donations. 
6.4.6 Role of Executive Directors (Implementation and Performance Evaluation) 
The findings reveal that executive directorV¶ support for CSR implementation and performance 
evaluation is mixed. In response to the question of whether executive directors support the 
implementation and evaluation of CSR practices; IGI3 said: 
The executive directors only engage in CSR implementation because they are 
under obligation from government agencies to do so, otherwise they would not, 
because of their interest to make profit for shareholders (Finance Manager; 
Interview Date: 13th July, 2009).  
Similarly, IGI1 responded: 
The executive directors do not get involved in CSR program implementation. It is 
the department in charge of CSR that does it (Operation Manager; Interview 
Date: 9th July, 2009). 
The comments demonstrate that the executive directors only show interest in CSR because they 
are under obligation from the government agencies such as the Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to comply with CSR activities. Also they leave the role of CSR 
implementation for the CSR departments to implement. 
The documentary data analyses reveal that the executive directors engage in CSR practices for 
self-interest purposes. For example, on the IGI websites (www.iginigeria.com) the vice chairman 
of IGI was awarded an honorary degree of Doctor of science from a university in Nigeria by 
donating an X-ray machine to the University. The company was proud about it. Consequently, 
this is using CSR as a cover for self-interested purposes because the philanthropic gesture to the 
University was perhaps carried out in exchange for an honorary degree to the executive director. 
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These philanthropic activities indicate that CSR is not strategic, and hence will not impact on the 
performance of the company (www.iginigeria.com/resource/corporate social responsibility). 
The survey results reveal that CSR improves the image of the company, 41% of most 
respondents believe that improving the image and reputation of the company is the highest 
motivating factor for executive directors to engage in CSR, while 30% of respondents thought 
SLTO, or the legitimacy factor, was a motive. The need to contribute to the society is third with 
15% (See Table 6.8). Consequently, this answers research question 3 (See section 4.9). 
Table 6.8: Survey Results on Executive Directors Perception of CSR 
Benefit of CSR Count % 
Improved financial performance 8 7.8 
Improved company image & reputation 41 41 
Confers legitimacy on company 30 29.4 
Reduce cost  6 5.9 
To benefit society 15 14.7 
Total 102 100.0 
Source: Own compilation from survey data carried out in 2009 in Nigeria 
 
Generally, the role of executive directors on CSR planning, strategy, implementation and 
performance evaluation clearly demonstrates mixed findings. This implies that the CEO and 
CSR managers because of their knowledge on the benefits of CSR support it, whilst other 
managers such as the operation managers do not support CSR.  
While some executive directors support CSR planning, strategy, implementation and 
performance evaluation, others do not. This provides answers to research question 1 (See section 
4.9). In contrast to the mixed findings of the role of executive directors in CSR, previous section 
reveals that the NEDs support CSR. In addition, the survey findings reveal that the image and 
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reputation of the company is the factor that influences executive directors to engage in CSR, 
thereby providing answers to research question 4.  
Also, the next subsection, discusses the role of board size on CSR planning, strategy, 
implementation and performance evaluation and how it assists in aligning the CSR to vision and 
mission statement of the company, followed by the presentation of a sample of comments from 
respondents. 
6.4.7 Role of Board Size (CSR Planning Phase) 
The evidence available from the interviews and documentary data reveals that large board size 
supports strategic CSR. This finding is similar to that of NEDs that support strategic CSR, and at 
the same time, the statistical finding (See section 5.5.4) was also positive and significant with 
CSR practices.  
In responding to the role of board size in CSR; IGI2 said: 
Definitely, the board size increases CSR culture and philosophies. I do remember 
in 2003, we used to have a small board size of 4 and the company was hardly 
thinking about community development not to talk of engaging in it, but as time 
moved on and the board size increased to 8 in 2005; and now our board size are 
12 in 2009. As a result, our company is becoming more socially responsible. 
What actually changed is the introduction of more local indigenes, female, and 
NEDs directors into the board (Public Relation Officer; Interview Date: 10th 
July, 2009). 
The comment implies that the board size of the Bank increased over time especially between 
2003 and 2009, which has a positive effect on CSR investment.  Therefore, one can suggest that 
there was an upward increase in BOD support for CSR at the planning phase. On the other hand, 
the documentary data analyses from the IGI websites do not mention that board size supports 
CSR at the planning phase. The next subsection focuses on the role of board size on CSR 
strategy regarding the formation of corporate governance structure such as Code of Ethics and 
Business Conduct. 
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6.4.8 Role of Board Size (CSR Strategy Phase) 
The majority of respondents agree that an increase in board size supports formation of 
governance structure to enhance CSR strategy. This is because of the introduction of NEDs onto 
the board. In responding to the role of board size in CSR strategy; IGI2 said: 
I think the increase in board size means more directors are available to be 
members of the committees that will implement CSR such as the compliance to 
the code of corporate governance (Public Relation Officers; Interview Date: 
10th July, 2009). 
IGI3 responded: 
««/DUJHERDUGVL]HKDVPRUH1('VDQGPRUe ability to monitor management 
and this means less power for the CEOs in running the company like his own 
property. Hence, larger board will help control the excessive power of the 
executives and this will be beneficial in promoting CSR ideas for the benefit of 
the society (Finance Manager; Interview Date: 13th July, 2009). 
The comments clearly show that the board size do influence CSR positively. By implication, the 
larger the board size, the more the CSR activities.  The benefits and the awareness created by the 
Code of Corporate Governance (2003; 2009) might have influenced companies to have more 
NEDs in their BOD. The NEDs brings their connection, contacts and skills which help to 
improve the board independence, diversity and its effectiveness. 
The documentary data analyses from the IGI websites do not show that BOD size supports CSR 
at the strategy phase (www.iginigeria.com; Annual Report, 2007). The next subsection discusses 
the role of BOD board size on CSR implementation and performance evaluation such as the 
presence of CSR activities. 
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6.4.9 Role of Board size (Implementation and Performance Evaluation) 
The increase in BOD size influences the company to set up committee or CSR department to 
monitor compliance to international standards and the Nigeria Code of Corporate Governance 
(2009). In responding to the question on the role of the BOD size in CSR implementation and 
performance evaluation; IGI4 said: 
The large BOD size will ensure that directors with experience and diverse ideas 
oversee the CSR projects. Yes, I think the directors with experience are appointed 
to evaluate projects. In my company, because of our large board size, we have a 
special department that reports to the board on CSR activities (Deputy Managing 
Director; Interview Date: 10th July, 2009). 
The documentary data analyses from the IGI websites, however, do not show that BOD size 
supports CSR at the implementation phase (www.iginigeria.com). 
Given the discussion on the role of BOD size, the study clearly demonstrates that large board 
size is supportive of CSR planning, strategy, implementation and performance evaluation. 
Empirically, this provides answers to research question 1 (See chapter 4.9). This is similar to the 
findings that NEDs are supportive of strategic CSR at the planning, implementation and 
performance evaluation phase. In addition, the finding of the case study affirms the statistical 
finding of a positive and significant relationship between NEDs and CSR. The next section 
focuses on the role of board diversity on CSR planning, strategy, implementation and 
performance evaluation and how it assists in aligning CSR to the vision and mission statements 
of the company. Also, comments from respondents (directors and top managers) are presented.  
6.4.10 Role of Board Diversity-CSR Planning Phase 
The findings on the impact of the role of board diversity (female director) on CSR produce 
mixed results. As a consequence, this finding remains inconclusive. In responding to the 
question concerning the role of board diversity in CSR; IGI2, who is a female manager said:  
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:RPHQDQGHWKQLFPLQRULWLHV¶GLUHFWRUVDFWXDOO\PDNHVXUHWKDWFRPSDQLHVJLYH
back to society for allowing the company to operate. Women and ethnic 
minorities in our companies make other directors to understand the consequences 
of not aligning CSR to company vision. Neglects of alignment of CSR to vision 
and values will lead to disaster of CSR policy because the company will be like a 
ship without a map. The female directors always come to office to find out how 
we are coping with CSR and they often offer to assist with the planning by 
making inputs in form of ideas or through contributing their time (PRO; 
Interview Date: 10th July, 2009). 
IGI3, who is the finance manager, further responded that: 
«:RPHQDUHNLQGHUYHVVHOFDXWLRXVDQGFRQVHUYDWive in nature. These attitudes 
I think they bring to the board and influence their colleagues to be generous giver. 
They are passionate about CSR.  Also, women are more religious than men. They 
have the fear of God in them so I think women will favor CSR more than men 
because if you go to churches in Nigeria, women outnumbered men by 5:1 ratio 
(Finance manager; Interview Date: 9th July, 2009). 
)URPWKHDERYHUHVSRQGHQWVWKHLQIOXHQFHRIUHOLJLRQRQZRPHQGLUHFWRUV¶GHFLVLRQVLQIDYRULQJ
CSR at policy stage was well captured. They were described as morally more sound than men 
because of their religious beliefs. Also, women interest in CSR can be seen in their punctuality 
and passion exhibited in meetings concerning formulation of CSR policies. However, some 
respondents disagree E\ DUJXLQJ WKDW LW LV WKH FRPSDQLHV¶ SROLF\ WKDW LQIOXHQFH ZRPHQ DQG
shaped the direction of CSR, rather than gender composition. The Deputy Managing Director 
(IGI4) said:  
Nigerian women are few in the board and they hardly move up the corporate 
ladder. Currently, in our company, there are two women on our board and they 
may not be able to influence the male directors because most managers follow 
company policies statement, drafted mainly by male directors so the same with 
CSR (Deputy Managing Director; Interview Date: 13th July, 2009). 
«VRFLHW\LVVRPHWLPHVUHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKHfew or lack of female directors in the 
board. The society favors the male in every aspects of life ranging from education 
to work place, for instance in a family of four, two boys and two girls, even if the 
girls are seniors. The parents will prefer to sponsor the male, who are junior to 
school, while the girls are pressured to marry early (Deputy Managing Director; 
Interview Date: 13th July, 2009). 
IGI1, who is a female director, further responded that: 
The female directors are so marginalised by culture practices in Nigeria so much 
that only a few female managers finally make it to the top as directors. This 
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culture creates a glass ceiling for women becoming member of board. For 
example, previously some culture practice emphasises that only the male child 
should be trained and allow to go school. Other culture such as the Ibos relegates 
women to kitchen and as house-keepers while the male are seen as bread winners. 
These practices alone can demoralise women from aspiring to be top managers. 
(Director of Operations; Interview Date: 13th July, 2009). 
The comments imply that the few female directors in the board cannot influence the male-
dominated BOD to invest in CSR, if the company policy stipulates otherwise. In essence, this 
PHDQVWKDWLWLVWKHFRPSDQ\¶VSROLF\WKDWGULYHVFRPSDQ\¶VDFWLRQVDQGWKHVHZRPHQDUHERXQG
by the company policies. Also, the culture is seen as an impediment to the rise of women in 
corporate organisation. The documentary data analyses from the IGI websites do not reveal that 
the female directors or ethnic minorities support CSR at the planning phase 
(www.iginigeria.com). Consequently, the evidence indicates that the influence of board diversity 
on CSR is mixed. The presence of female directors and ethnic minorities does not have an effect 
on CSR planning; other respondents do agree that female directors and ethnic minorities 
influence CSR at the planning phase. 
Table 6.9: Strategic Lens of CSR Practices of Industrial and General Insurance (IGI) PLC 
Corporate Philosophies Statements 
Corporate Values To achieve maximum customer satisfaction and create wealth for 
national development. 
Vision  To reach global standards, by expanding to African nations, anchored 
on a team of well-trained highly motivated professionals. 
Mission IGI will be the professional insurance company that leads in the 
provision of the highest standards of financial protection and risk 
management services. 
Strategy Collaborates with NGOs and foundations to provide CSR projects 
such as, youth development and sports. 
Implementation Cash donations, charities, sport sponsorship and health. 
Performance Evaluation No mention of audits 
Source: Derived from website of IGI (www.iginigeria.com/resource WLWOHG µcorporate social 
UHVSRQVLELOLW\¶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6.4.11 Role of Board Diversity (CSR Strategy Phase) 
The influence of board diversity on CSR strategy is in the affirmative. In responding to the 
question on the role of board diversity on CSR strategy; IGI3, finance Manager responds: 
The inclusion of women in board will ensure balance of ideas. Female directors 
are more ethical and so will influence the board to form the corporate governance 
structure and comply in setting standards of governance of the company (Finance 
Manager; Interview Date: 13th July, 2009).  
The female directors acknowledge the importance of ethical responsibility in the company. This 
ensures that appropriate corporate governance structure is put in place to enhance the 
compliance to the Code recommendations and enhance board independence. The documentary 
data analyses from the IGI websites and annual report do not reveal that the female directors 
support CSR at the strategy phase (www.iginigeria.com). 
6.4.12 Role of Board Diversity (Implementation and Performance Evaluation) 
Board diversity does help the board to get involved in CSR implementation, performance and 
evaluation. In responding to the role of women on CSR implementation and performance 
evaluation; IGI2, the PRO responds: 
Women ensure that there is good monitoring structure that ensures fairness, 
WUDQVSDUHQF\ DQG DFFRXQWDELOLW\ ZKLFK LV WKH ZDWFK ZRUG RI WKH FRPSDQ\¶V
objectives which is achieved and maintained through formation of institutional 
governance structure WKDWHQVXUHVWKHERDUGFRPSO\LQVHWWLQJVWDQGDUGV«,QP\
company there are no social audits that monitor CSR (Public Relation Officer; 
Interview Date: 10th July, 2009). 
This finding reveals that though female directors (board diversity) support transparency and 
accountability in CSR reporting, it was observed that the CSR evaluation and feedback 
mechanism and structure were non-existent. As for the response to the question of what factors 
influence the female directors to engage in CSR. IGI5, the CEO said: 
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Yes, board diversity encourages our boards to widen their CSR practices so as to 
enhance the competitive advantage of the company and reduce environmental 
risk. The reasons could be that women are mothers, motivated to serve and to care 
for others. These selfless attitudes of women are displayed also when they 
become directors (CEO; Interview Date: 14th July, 2009). 
The documentary data analysis from the IGI¶VZHEVLWHVGRHVQRWUHYHal that female directors and 
ethnic minorities support CSR at the implementation phase. In fact, IGI¶V CSR practices include 
healthcare, education and donations. 
The story of IGI's involvement in sports sponsorship is as old as the company. 
Right from inception, IGI made sports sponsorship a pivot of its social 
responsibility programme (www.iginigeria.com, pg WLOWHG µSports 
Sponsorship and Promotion¶). 
Furthermore, the survey results showed that CSR improves the image of the company. The 
survey results reveal that (63%) of most respondents believe that improving the image and 
reputation of the company is the highest motivating factor for investors to engage in CSR, while 
social license to operate (SLTO) or the legitimacy factor had 13% of the respondents. The 
financial performance is third with 11% (See Table 6.10). This provides answers to research 
question 4 on what factors affect female directors to engage in CSR (See Chapter 4.9). 
Table 6.10 Survey Results on the Factors Affecting Female Directors to Engage in CSR 
Benefit of CSR Count % 
Improved financial performance 11 11 
Improved company image & reputation  64 62.8 
Confers legitimacy on company 13 12.7 
Reduce cost  6 5.8 
To benefit society 7 6.9 
Total 102 100.0 
Source: Own compilation from survey data carried out in 2009 in Nigeria 
 
The influence of female directors and ethnic minorities on CSR planning is mixed; while some 
respondents do agree that board diversity influences CSR, others disagree insisting that women 
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are few in number on a male dominated board and as such cannot influence the board. However, 
the majority of respondents did agree that board diversity does influence CSR strategy and 
implementation. Also, it is noted that most respondents agree that board diversity benefits both 
the company and the stakeholders, while other respondents noted that CSR benefits the company 
alone, in areas, such as reputation, image building and publicity.  
6.5 Comparison of Case Study Findings with Existing Literature 
In comparing the results of the case study with previous findings, the literature reveals that 
previous studies support these findings. The findings show that CSR was strategic for the four 
(4) PLCs. However, the institutional investors show little or no effect on CSR, while, the NEDs 
and board size show support for CSR. In the case of executive directors and board diversity, the 
findings were mixed. In other words, some executive directors support CSR planning, strategy, 
implementation and performance evaluation phase, while others do not. Hence, this finding is 
inconclusive. This makes comparison across boards difficult. However, previous findings that 
VXSSRUWWKLVVWXG\¶VUHVXOWVDUHSUHVHQWHGLQ7DEOHEHORZ 
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Table 6:11 Comparison of Case Studies Findings with Past Studies 
Nos Past Studies 
 
Findings 
1) Role of Indigenous 
investors in CSR 
Hendry et al 
(2006); Cumming 
and Johan (2004) 
and Dam and 
Scholtens (2010) 
find no relationship 
between 
indigenous 
institutional 
investors and CSR. 
Show little or no interest in the CSR planning 
phase, implementation and evaluation  phase 
 Show interest in CSR at the strategy phase 
2) Role of foreign 
investors in CSR 
Dasgupta, et al 
(2000); Cole et al 
(2008) and Rasic 
(2010) find small 
effects between 
foreign institutional 
investors and CSR. 
Show interest in the CSR at the planning and 
strategy phase 
Show little or no interest in the CSR 
implementation and evaluation  phase 
3) Role of 
Government 
investors in CSR 
 
 
Rasic (2010), Dam 
and Scholtens 
(2010) find no 
relationship 
between 
government 
institutional 
investors and CSR. 
Show little or no interest in the CSR planning 
and implementation and evaluation phase. 
But interested in CSR at the strategic phase. 
 
4) Role of NEDs in 
CSR 
 
Johnson and 
Greening (1999) 
NEDs support the CSR at the planning, 
strategy, implementation and performance 
evaluation stage 
5) Role of executive 
directorsin CSR 
 
 
Rose (2007) find 
that executive 
directors do not 
invest in CSR  
Mixed findings (some executive directors 
support CSR planning, strategy, 
implementation and performance evaluation, 
others do not). 
 
    6) Role of Board size in 
CSR 
Pfeffer (1972; 
1973) and Kruger 
(2010) find board 
size influence CSR. 
 
Board size support the CSR at the planning, 
strategy, implementation and performance 
evaluation stage 
     7) Role of female 
directors in CSR 
Khan (2010) finds 
no relationship 
between female 
directors and CSR 
Mixed findings (some executive directors 
support CSR planning, strategy, 
implementation and performance evaluation, 
others do not). 
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6.6 The relationship between the BOD Characteristics and CSR 
Figure 6.2 shows the relationship between the various BOD characteristics and CSR at the 
planning, strategy, implementation and evaluation stages. In other words, it identifies the factors 
that affect NEDs, executive directors, board size, female directors and how they affect CSR 
planning, strategy, implementation and evaluation. 
The factors include image and reputation, risk reduction, performance incentives and 
government regulation. These factors positively influence the NEDs and the board size during 
the stages of CSR planning, strategy, implementation and evaluation, while executive directors 
only influence the CSR strategy, but its effect on CSR planning and implementation are mixed. 
On the other hand, these factors influence the female directors and ethnic minorities towards 
engaging in CSR strategy and implementation.  
Figure 6.2 The Relationship between the BOD Characteristics and CSR 
 
6.7 Discussion of Findings 
In this part of the chapter, the findings are discussed in a number of themes in relation to the 
literatures. The themes for the basis of discussion are classified as the role of indigenous 
institutional investors, role of foreign institutional investors, role of government institutional 
investors, role of NEDs, role of executive directors, role of board size and role of board 
diversity, and how they all affect CSR. 
Female 
Directors 
Executive 
NEDs 
Board size 
Implementation 
and evaluation 
Phase 
CSR Strategy 
Image and 
reputation 
Reduce risk  
Performance 
incentives  
Regulation 
 
CSR planning 
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6.7.1 The Role of Indigenous Institutional Investors 
The study shows that there is little or no influence by indigenous institutional investors on CSR 
practices in Nigeria. The respondents and documentary evidence suggest that the indigenous 
investors have little or no support for CSR planning, implementation and performance 
evaluation stage. As for the CSR strategy stage, the indigenous institutional LQYHVWRUV¶VXSSRUW
for CSR strategy is very evident. For instance, the indigenous institutional investors encourage 
and show interest towards the formation of corporate governance structure, such as the Code of 
Ethics and Best Practices.  
The reason for this investment behaviour could imply that investors still lack the knowledge and 
resources to address CSR related risks and opportunities across their portfolios. Other reason 
investors could not accept full integration of CSR related risks and opportunities in their 
investment decisions could be that they focused solely on their short term return on investments, 
while ignoring the long term interest and its benefits. 
This result finds some support from extant literature (See for example, Cumming and Johan, 
2004; Hendry et al, 2006; Dam and Scholtens; 2010) and emphasise the lack of interest of 
indigenous institutional investors on CSR. On a similar note, Hendry et al (2006); Cumming and 
Johan (2004) and Dam and Scholtens (2010) find no relationship between indigenous 
institutional investors and CSR. In their study, on the role of institutional investors on CSR, 
Hendry et al (2006) find no relationship between institutional investors and CSR. They suggest 
that institutional investors do not favour the long term interest of the company. Their studies also 
indicates that institutional investors are traders and are interested in returns on their huge 
investments, hence they are short term oriented in focus and therefore concluded that the 
principal-agent relationship has compounded the separation of responsibility from accountability 
regarding owners and beneficiaries.  
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However, in their study, Hendry et al (2006) appear to use aggregated institutional investors and 
treat them as a homogenous entity and they draw conclusions based on that premise. On the 
other hand, for instance, the study of Said et al (2010) treated different institutional investors as 
heterogeneous, having different preferences for CSR, while, Said et al (2009) find government 
institutional investors to have a positive relationship with CSR, and their study also shows no 
relationship between indigenous institutional investors and CSR. 
In the same way, Guyatt (2005) finds no relationship between indigenous investors and CSR. 
Guyatt (2005) uses the case study method to explore the behaviours and perceptions of 
indigenous institutional investors on CSR investments in the UK and finds that indigenous 
institutional investors do not support CSR. This finding reveal a number of behavioural 
challenges for indigenous investors such as short term approach, reluctance in adopting CSR 
practices, defensibility of decisions and policies aimed at short term objectives. This finding 
suggests that rules, conventions and the market influence the institutional investors to favour the 
short term approach of maximising profit. Therefore, long term projects are viewed as riskier 
since the market is structured on short term horizons. 
Likewise, Cumming and Johan (2004) find no statistical difference between the indigenous 
investors and CSR. They also find CSR investments increase by 50% more in banks and 
insurance companies with indigenous investors when CEOs or Chief investment officer are in 
charge of decisions to invest in CSR. In other words, organisational structures can be said to 
have an influence on the level of CSR investments.  
In this study, the factors that influenced indigenous institutional investors¶UROH in CSR include, 
improved image and reputation, government regulation and risk mitigation (Joyner and Payne, 
2002; Lohman and Ateinholtz, 2004). Other factors include short term horizons of the market 
and performance incentives (Hendry et al, 2006). Mitchell (2007) argues that the more investors 
make profits based on short term quarterly forecast, the more the market and company reward 
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them. In essence, performance incentives reward investment based on short term horizons and 
hinder investors from engaging in CSR. 
Theoretically, the findings that indigenous institutional investors show little or no interest in 
CSR contradict the stakeholder theory that argues that investors, as part of the company, should 
satisfy all stakeholders for the long term survival of the company. Instead the indigenous 
investors are more concerned with the satisfaction of shareholders interest.  
6.7.2 The Role of Foreign Institutional Investors 
This study reveals evidence that there is little or no influence by foreign institutional investors 
on CSR implementation and performance evaluation. However, it was found that foreign 
institutional investors support CSR at the planning and strategy stage. The evidence show 
foreign institutional investors do have an effect on CSR planning and strategy, unlike indigenous 
and government investors that only support CSR at the strategy phase not at the planning phase. 
This finding is supported by previous studies in the literature such as, Dasgupta, et al (2000); 
Cole et al (2008) and Rasic (2010) that appear to find small effects of foreign institutional 
investors on CSR. 
Most importantly, majority of studies on the impact of foreign institutional investors on CSR are 
investigated using the econometric methods. Few studies that employed the qualitative approach 
explored the aggregated institutional investors rather than splitting institutional investors into 
indigenous, foreign and government.  
Dasgupta et al (2000) appear to find little effect between foreign institutional investors and CSR. 
The authors suggest that foreign institutional investors lack experience and knowledge about the 
local social issues affecting other stakeholders. This lack of understanding of local environment 
makes it difficult for foreign institutional investors to engage in CSR. 
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On a similar note, Cole et al (2008) examine the relationship between foreign institutional 
investors and CSR in Ghana. Their findings show that foreign institutional investors do not 
support CSR because they lack experience and knowledge of host communities.  The finding 
shows WKHLPSRUWDQFHRIIRUHLJQLQVWLWXWLRQDOLQYHVWRUV¶H[SHULHQFHDQGWUDLQLQJDVYHU\HVVHQWLDO
to CSR practices.  
Furthermore, Rasic (2010) studied the effect of the types of institutional investors on CSR in 
Croatia using 63 completed questionnaires. The author finds no relationship between foreign 
institutional investors and CSR and suggested that foreign investors did not pressure companies 
to engage in CSR. Rasic (2010) identified weak institutions, lack of effective government 
relation, and the high cost of new technologies for enhancing CSR practices. On the same lines, 
Ananchotikul (2008) argues that the extent and level of relationship between foreign institutional 
investors and CSR governance depends on the amount of shareholding. For instance, if the level 
of shareholding is small, foreign institutional investors will invest more in CSR and governance 
practices, but if the shareholding is large, foreign institutional investors become entrenched and 
show little interest in CSR and corporate governance practices. 
Regarding the factors that influence foreign investors to engage in CSR, the study reveals 
government regulation, short term philosophy and performance incentives as very important. 
These factors influence the foreign institutional investors on CSR, despite, the fact that the 
annual report and websites indicate stakeholders¶ RULHQWHG3/&VZLWK long term interests. The 
evidence available reveals otherwise, that the stock market is built on rewarding investments 
based on short term horizons (Waddock and Graves, 1997; Neubuam and Zahra, 2006). Hence, 
the investors are forced to invest in short term investments rather than making long-term 
investments as stipulated in their annual report and websites. 
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Furthermore, there is an assumption and belief by investors that the formation of Code of Ethics 
and Business Conduct for companies (that is, CSR strategy) would lead to transparency, 
accountability and favourable opinion from stakeholders, markets and society (Ullah and Jamali, 
2010). Hence, this will mean lower taxes, no fines and fees from government for non-
compliance. All these benefits are transformed to reduced firm risk and improve image and 
FRPSDQ\¶VUHSXWDWLRQ 
Nonetheless, the foreign investors are only interested in CSR if it offers the company the social 
license to operate (SLTO). This factor (SLTO) that influences investors¶ behaviours is supported 
by the legitimacy theory. According to Hannifin and Cooke (2005) organisational legitimacy is 
essential for ensuring social worthiness and corporate survival. Therefore, organisations must 
ensure that their operations and activities are perceived as good to the consumers and public, 
which will ensure the continuing existence of the company through repeated patronage. 
Therefore, according to Idemudia (2009) companies engage in CSR especially in Nigeria, 
because CSR legitimises their operational activities in the community. In other words, 
companies want communities to perceive them as good corporate citizens because of their 
involvement in CSR. Idemudia (2009) argues that many oil companies in Nigeria including 
ExxonMobil Nigeria have been using their CSR as a tool to gain legitimacy and support from the 
local community.  
6.7.3 The Role of Government Institutional Investors 
The study reveals evidence that there is little or no influence by government institutional 
investors for CSR in Nigeria. The respondents suggest that the government institutional 
investors have little or no support for CSR planning, implementation and performance 
evaluation. As for CSR strategy, the indigenous institutional investors support CSR at the 
strategy stage because the indigenous institutional investors encourage and show interest 
towards the formation of corporate governance structures, for example, Code of Ethics and Best 
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Practices. This finding is supported by Rasic (2010), Dam and Scholtens (2010) who find no 
relationship between government institutional investors and CSR. 
In the case of Rasic (2010) finds an insignificant relationship between government institutional 
investors and CSR. In a similar way, Dam and Scholtens (2010) find no significant relationship 
between government institutional investors and CSR; consequently, the reasons for lack of 
support for CSR by different institutional investor is the  preference for short term investments 
horizons rather than pursuing long term interestsDQGWKLVFRQWUDGLFWV WKHVWDNHKROGHUV¶WKHRU\
,QDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHORQJWHUPJRDORIWKHFRPSDQ\WKHVWDNHKROGHUV¶WKHRU\SURYLGHVDXVHIXO
framework for the different institutional investors to invest in CSR (Prado-Lorenzo et al, 2009). 
In contrast, Said et al (2009) employs content analysis and find that the government institutional 
investors support CSR, while the foreign institutional investors had no relationship with CSR. 
The authors investigated CSR reporting.  
Similar to indigenous and foreign investors, the governmenW LQYHVWRUV¶ ILQGLQJV FRQWUDGLFW the 
stakeholder theory, because, according to Zhang et al (2009), government owned companies are 
poor in managing company assets, thereby making losses due to political interference, given 
poor corporate performance, government institutional investors will not engage in CSR. 
6.7.4 The Role of Non-Executive Directors 
In this study, the Non-executive directors (NEDs) support CSR from its planning to 
implementation and performance evaluation stage. For instance, Coffey and Wang (1998), 
Johnson and Greening (1999), Post et al (2011) appear to have strong support of this opinion 
that NEDs influence CSR positively. 
This view is similar to the findings from the extant literature such as Post et al (2011), Coffey 
and Wang (1998) and Johnson and Greening (1999) who suggests that the NEDs positively 
influence CSR. Johnson and Greening (1999) argue that NEDs bring their skills, connection and 
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contact to the board; thereby encouraging the long-term survival of the corporation. According 
to Johnson and Greening (1999) the long term interest is achieved through enhancing product 
quality and good environmental practices with the aim of satisfying a wider group of 
stakeholders. The NEDs develop strategy for the corporations to combat environment challenges 
such as climate change, oil spillage and environmental degradation (Pfeffer, 1972).  
The NEDs are interested in long term commitments and will encourage companies to undertake 
CSR practices so as to reduce risks (Kesner and Johnson, 1990). These long term commitments 
of NEDs are supported by the stakeholder theory which encourages the board to implement CSR 
policies that benefit all stakeholders (Freeman, 1984; Jensen, 2001). 
In addition, Wang and Coffey (1992) analysed the relationship between NEDs and CSR and find 
a positive relationship between NEDs and CSR. Furthermore, the NEDs confer independences to 
the BOD (Kesner et al, 1988) and help to reduce CEO duality role by encouraging the separation 
of the joint structure role of CEOs and chairperson handled by separate individuals. Also, the 
NEDs influence the BODs in monitoring management (Daily and Dalton, 1997). Moreover, 
according to Daily and Dalton (1994a) the inclusion of NEDs into the BODs is one of the 
solutions offered to avoid corporate collapse. In fact, Coffey and Wang (1998) argue for the 
enlargement of BODs, by introducing NEDs into BODs to improve the strategic processes of the 
board and enhance VKDUHKROGHU¶V UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV /LNHZLVH WKH ORQJ WHUP LQWHUHVW RI WKH
company is emphasised by respondents¶ FRPPHQWV annual reports and websites. The 
respondents agree that the NEDs and large board size pursue the satisfaction of stakeholders and 
long term interests of the company are achieved (Johnson and Greening, 1999). 
Theoretically, the stakeholder theory, resource dependence theory and stewardship theory 
support this finding. Mackenzie (2007) states that NEDs get involved in social and 
environmental practices, because it is backed by the UK Combined Code of Corporate 
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Governance which mandates boards to formulate policies and values for corporations to meet 
their social and environmental obligations. The resource dependence theory suggests that NEDs 
can help develop strategy for the corporations to combat the environmental issues because of 
their experience and skills which they bring to the board room (Bergh, 1995; Pfeffer, 1972).  
6.7.5 The Role of Executive Director 
Specifically, the role of executive directors on CSR planning, strategy, implementation and 
performance evaluation demonstrates mixed findings. While some executive directors support 
CSR planning, strategy, implementation and performance evaluation, others do not.  
These results are supported in the extant literatures (See, Vance, 1964; Rose, 2007; Kruger, 
2010). Rose (2007) finds that executive directors do not invest in CSR when faced with legal 
compliance to federal or state laws. Therefore, executive directors prefer to harm the society and 
make legally defensible decisions because they want to satisfy the shareholders. 
Vance (1964) finds executive directors improve financial performance when they dominate the 
BODs. Therefore, given the need to satisfy shareholders¶ interest on the short run and protect 
their jobs, the executive directors may not invest in CSR. In addition, Rose (2007) argues that 
the pressure from the stock exchange regulations and corporate laws forces the executive 
directors to place shareholders higher and above other stakeholders. The negative and significant 
relationship between the executive directors¶ influence on CSR investments is explained by the 
agency and stewardship theories.  
This negative effect contradicts the stewardship theory that suggests executive directors are not 
self-interested but do have a broader motivation that is pro-organisations, servant-like and 
collectivist in nature (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Davis et al, 1997). Hence, the stewardship 
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theory supports executive directoUV¶ LQFOXVLRQ LQ %2's because stewardship theory expects 
managers to be good and true servants to the corporation.  
Still, the agency theory does not support the executive director dominated board as it will lead to 
PDQDJHUV¶ HQWUHQFKPHQWV DQG PLVDSSURSULDtion of company resources (See, Johnson and 
Meckling, 1976; Rediker and Seth, 1995; Hawley and Williams, 1996; Kirkbride and Letza, 
2004). Therefore, the agency theory expects managers to allocate firm resources in such a way 
as to maximise shareholders¶ value. Further, the agency theory expects the interests of managers 
to be aligned to the shareholders¶ interests so that the BODs can carry out their monitoring role 
on managers. Therefore, the board effectiveness will increase thereby hindering the managers 
from diverting companies¶ resources to CSR practices (Kirkbride and Letza, 2004; Kulik, 2005).  
1RQHWKHOHVV WKH H[HFXWLYH GLUHFWRUV¶ ILQGLQJ FRQWUDGLFWV WKH VWDNHKROGHU WKHRU\ $FFRUGLQJ WR
Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) there is a positive relationship EHWZHHQ H[HFXWLYH GLUHFWRUV¶
VNLOOVDQGWRSPDQDJHUV¶HYDOXDWLRQV$OVRWKHVWDNHKROGHUWKHRU\H[SHFWVH[HFXWLYHGLUHFWRUVWR
satisfy multiple stakeholders. Kruger (2010) finds executive directors to be positively related to 
CSR. According to Kruger (2010) the higher the number of experienced executive directors on 
the board, the more they influence the decision-making process of the BODs, prevents the BODs 
from pursuing short term interests and focuses on stakeholders¶ satisfaction. Therefore, the 
executLYHGLUHFWRU¶VSUHVHQFHRn the board reduces the amount of law suits that could harm the 
company. In other words, Kruger (2010) argues that the inclusion of executive directors on the 
BODs reduces the occurrence of negative events such as litigations against the company. 
The reasons why the executive directors support CSR strategy and do not support CSR 
implementation is that, part of the exercise of the BODs discretion is the provision of duty of 
care for stakeholders. Therefore, the BODs will support CEO decisions to engage in satisfying 
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wide stakeholders, regardless of the outcome of the implementation of the CSR programme and 
Performance evaluation (Cumming and Johan, 2007).  
6.7.6 The Role of Board Size 
In this study, larger board size supports the CSR from its planning to implementation and 
performance evaluation stage. These findings are supported from past studies (for instance, 
Pfeffer, 1972; Hillman et al, 2000; Kruger, 2010) that find larger board size has strong support 
and influence on CSR. 
Pfeffer (1972) emphasises that larger board size assists the board to connect the corporation to 
its external stakeholders and gather resources, reputation and good corporate brand. This 
assertion is supported by the resource dependence view. The author argues that increased 
resources could enhance the chances of corporations¶ boards adopting CSR practices and also 
large boards provide enhanced expertise and skills that can be used to monitor an entrenched 
executive management. This indicates that larger boards are well positioned to make strategic 
decisions. Empirically, Pfeffer (1972; 1973) find board size to be positively related to CSR, 
while concluding that larger BODs can act as a linkage to the community and environment 
because the BODs are interested in the long term interest of the firm.  
Also, expert skills and advice are vital to the BODs to help reduce lawsuits against the 
corporation due to violations of environmental and human rights (McKendall and Wagner, 
1997). Kruger (2010) in examining the relationship between BODs and CSR using a panel of 
2417 PLCs in the US between 1999 and 2007 finds that board size is positively related to CSR 
while suggesting board size, especially with higher fraction of experienced directors, have less 
negative events. 
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Coleman (2007) finds that the board size is positively related to the maximisation of 
shareholders¶YDOXH and corporate performance. Given higher financial performance, managers 
will engage in CSR practices implying that the board is not independent.  
6.7.7 The Role of Board Diversity 
7KHIHPDOHGLUHFWRUV¶VXSSRUWIRU&65LVPL[HGSpecifically, the role of board diversity on CSR 
planning, strategy, implementation and performance evaluation indicates mixed results. While, 
some respondents suggest that the female directors support CSR strategy and implementation 
and performance evaluation, others do not. However, it is important to note also that these 
results should be interpreted with care, especially considering the fact that board diversity was 
measured based on the number of female directors in the board. 
In support of the findings is the study of Post et al (2011) that female directors do not influence 
CSR and the reason was traced to the low numbers of female directors on the board. Post et al 
(2011) argue that female directors favour CSR only if they are more in number on the board. For 
example, three (3) female directors and above are expected to have an impact on the board, for 
them to engage in CSR. However, if the number falls below a minimum of three (3) female 
directors on the board, the tendency is that there is little or no impact of female directors on 
CSR. 
Moreover, Khan (2010) finds no relationship between female directors and CSR. In examining 
WKHUROHRIIHPDOHGLUHFWRUVRQ&65.KDQ¶VILndings imply that female directors are new 
LQ H[HFXWLYH UROHV DQG WKLV LV D QHZ SKHQRPHQRQ 7KHUHIRUH IHPDOH GLUHFWRUV¶ UROH PLJKW EH
restricted as a result of their small numbers on the board. Subsequently, the role of female 
directors in CSR will be small or indifferent. This supported the argument of Post et al (2011) 
mentioned earlier. 
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Moreover, Prado-Lorenzo et al (2009b) find a negative relationship between inclusion of 
foreigners and women on the board and CSR, while, Tsalikis and Ortiz-Buonafina (1990) find 
no significant relationship between board diversity and CSR. In the same way, Rose (2007) finds 
no significant relationship between female directors and firm performance, and given low 
profitability, companies will not invest in CSR. These findings imply that the majority of the 
male dominated board influences the female directors, through unconscious socialisation, to 
adopt the view of the majority of board members, toward investing less in CSR. 
Similarly, Rodriguez-Dominguez et al (2009) find negative and no significant relationship 
between women on boards and CSR. The finding indicates the lack of impact of women on CSR 
especially on ethical issues. Also, the non-significant results imply that women on the board are 
in the minority position in a male dominated board, as a result, the decision and view of the 
minority group will not be considered in the decision-making process of the BODs. Likewise, 
Rodriguez-Dominguez et al (2010) find mixed and inconclusive results between female directors 
and corporate performance.  
In contrast, Coffey and Wang (1998) find a positive relationship between the inclusion of 
women on the BOD and philanthropy. Likewise, William (2003) finds including women on 
boards to be positively correlated to CSR and reputation. Also, William (2003) finds women 
GLUHFWRUVWREHPRUHLQFOLQHGWRXVHSDUWRIWKHFRUSRUDWLRQ¶VIXQGIRUFKDULWDEOHFDXVHVFRPSDUHG
to less inclined male directors. Surprisingly, William finds no relationship between female 
directors and investments in education suggesting that female directors note that many sources 
of educational funding are available and no sector requires urgent attention. However, it was 
observed that both studies did not control for risk which has been discussed above as having a 
correlation with CSR and financial performance.  
The lack of support for the effect of female directors for CSR has been attributed to the 
presences of few women on the board (Rose, 2007). However, this relationship between board 
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diversity and CSR contradicts the stakeholders, resource dependence, stewardship and agency 
theories. All theories favour diverse boards, supporting the inclusion of women in the board. 
Generally, diverse boards help the BODs to reach decisions quickly concerning environmental 
and other CSR issues, because, the minority groups as members of the board, bring their 
personal experience, interests and commitments to the BODs (Baysinger and Butler, 1985).  
6.7.8 The Reason for the Relationship between Institutional Investors, BOD 
characteristics and CSR 
Previous studies have examined the relationship between institutional investors, BOD 
characteristics and CSR, but none has probed the factors that motivate this relationship in 
developing countries. Using the case study approach, by combining interview and survey 
methods, this study explores what factors influences the investors and directors to engage in 
CSR. The finding was mixed. With some respondents having the view that not only do CSR add 
economic value to the company, it is also rewarded by the capital market which perceives CSR 
as a positive tool used to minimize risk (Cummings and Burritt, 2007). 
Therefore, the positive part of the mixed findings is that, investing in CSR, for instance in 
education, hospital equipment or drugs or other socially oriented project, if aligned to the 
economic objectives of the company such as increasing market opportunities and reducing risk, 
will improve the economic value of the company (Petersen and Vredenburg, 2009a; 2009b). 
Furthermore, investors and directors who found value in the community or in social responsible 
activities are able to mitigate risk or improve financial benefit of the company (Guyatt, 2005; 
Hendry et al, 2006). This is most noticeable when investors perceive CSR as strategic, that is, 
aligned to the corporate objectives of the company, instead of just discretionary activities (such 
as donations that are mostly not linked to the business philosophy of the company). Also, the 
management raises awareness of their community investments. However, in the case study, poor 
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communication of these benefits to the investors was attributed as the main reasons for the lack 
of interest by investors to engage in CSR (Hockets and Moir, 2004). Consequently, this lack of 
interest maybe one of the reasons for the non-significant relationship derived between the 
different institutional investors and CSR. 
On the other hand, some respondents believe that investors, female directors and executive 
directors do not support CSR. The reason for this, according to some respondents (IGI3) is 
because of the characteristics of the directors who might be interested solely on profit making. 
Also, the lack of knowledge of the local environment by investors, female directors and 
executive directors could be attributed as the reason for the lack of the interest expressed by 
them for CSR activities. 
The involvement of NEDs in CSR leads to increased competencies which add economic value to 
the firm through enhanced competitiveness and greater market opportunities for the company 
(Marshall et al, 2009). Moreover, CSR also appears to communicate to capital markets as a 
secure investment vessel or tool capable of reducing risk and adding economic benefits to the 
company. CSR, as a risk mitigating strategy, signals competence, ethics and trustworthiness. It 
communicates protected earnings and growth and seeks a diversity of investors that reduces 
share price volatility. 
 
By way of using mixed methods (qualitative and quantitative) of corporate executives and 
institutional investors, this study inquiries into why there appears to be a link between CSR and 
corporate governance. The finding that corporate executives believed that their CSR actions led 
to economic value for their firm demonstrates that there is not only a link between investors, 
directors and CSR, but also the perception of CSR as risk-mitigator by investors and directors 
that influence them to support CSR. However, other executive directors, investors and top 
managers appear to disagree. This can be seen in the respondeQWTXRWHV LQ H[HFXWLYHV¶ UROH LQ
CSR implementation, for example, IGI3. 
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During interviews, the executive directors passionately believed in CSR activities engaged by 
their companies. Those executives worked very hard to establish and maintain an organizational 
culture of business ethics and CSR, which can be said to be strategic. But they also 
acknowledged that if the capital markets did not recognize their CSR efforts as impacting on 
corporate performance they would not be motivated to engage in CSR. Their organisations were 
bound by the discipline and logic of the market, which mainly compensate short term 
investments. However, the market allowed them to exercise their personal, moral and ethical 
beliefs. 
 
In summing up, these VWXG\¶V ILQGLQJV concerning the impact of the role of board diversity on 
CSR produce mixed results, indicating that the inclusion of women in the BOD does reveal 
mixed comments and findings on their role on CSR. The next subsection discusses the summary 
of this chapter. 
6.8 Conclusion 
This chapter provides the case study method by focusing on why and how investors and BOD 
characteristics engage in CSR. Werther and Chandler (2006) theoretical framework of analysing 
CSR policies and practices into three (3) stages as CSR planning, strategy and implementation, 
was employed in this study. The emerging themes from the 18 interviews and documentary data 
analysed and discussed, using respondents¶ quotes from interviews and supplemented with 
documentary information from websites and annual reports of the 4 PLCs, produced useful and 
in-depth finding about the role of investors and BOD characteristics on CSR. As a result, the 
emerging pattern that matches the Werther and Chandler (2006) theoretical framework of CSR 
planning, strategy and implementation, shows whether the company practice strategic CSR or 
not. The conclusion of this chapter provides six key concepts for this research. 
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First, the role of indigenous institutional investors on CSR reveals that the indigenous 
institutional investors support CSR strategy. For instance, the formation of internal corporate 
governance structures such as Code of Ethics and Standard Practices. The evidence from 
respondents shows that indigenous institutional investors support the formation of Code of 
Ethics and Standard Practices because they perceive that it will enhance corporate performance 
and reduce managerial entrenchment (Kulik, 2005). On the other hand, the evidence available 
indicates that the indigenous institutional investors appear to have no interest in CSR planning, 
implementation and performance evaluation. In other words, the investors do not monitor the 
board on how CSR is implemented and performance evaluated. Hence, in general, indigenous 
institutional investors have no interest in CSR feedback mechanism.  
Second, the majority of respondents reveal that the roles of foreign institutional investors support 
CSR at the planning and strategy stage. However, foreign institutional investors do not influence 
CSR implementation, performance and evaluation of the company. This result, that foreign 
institutional investors support CSR planning, contrasts with both the findings that indigenous 
and government institutional investors do not influence CSR at the planning phase. 
Third, the role of government institutional investors on CSR reveals that the government 
institutional investors do not support CSR policies in the planning and implementation stage. 
However, the majority of respondents and evidences available indicate that the government 
institutional investors do not support CSR at the implementation and performance evaluation 
phases. In other words, this suggests that investors do not monitor the board on CSR feedback. 
On the other hand, the role of government institutional investors on CSR reveals that the 
government institutional investors do support CSR strategy, for instance, the formation of 
internal corporate governance structures such as Code of Ethics and Standard Practices. 
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Fourth, the role of NED indicates support for strategic CSR. Also, it shows the NED support 
CSR planning, strategy, implementation and performance evaluation. In contrast, while the 
NEDs support CSR positively (Johnson and Greening, 1999), this differs from the findings of 
both the executive directors and board diversity that produce mixed findings on their influence 
on CSR planning, strategy, implementation and performance evaluation.  
Fifth, with regard to the role of board size that shows that CSR is strategic, a result that is similar 
to the findings that NEDs are supportive of strategic CSR, imply support for CSR investment. 
However, this contrasts with the findings on the impact of the role of board diversity on CSR 
that produces mixed results. Some respondents agree that board diversity supports CSR 
planning, strategy, implementation and performance evaluation whereas others do not agree.  
Sixth, several factors such as economic, social, cultural, environmental and historical, shape 
investors¶ EHKDYLRXU and BOD characteristics and how they influence CSR at the planning, 
strategy, implementation and performance evaluation stage. These factors include an increase in 
image and reputation, financial performance, reduced costs, SLTO, recruitment and retention of 
talented employees. Other factors include regulation, performance incentives and short term 
philosophy of the investors and market. 
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CHAPTER 7 
7.0 GENERAL CONCLUSION 
7.1 Introduction 
In chapters 5 and 6 we analysed the empirical findings concerning the impact of the role of 
different institutional investors and board of director (BOD) characteristics on Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR). This chapter highlights the contributions of this study and how the aims 
and objectives of the research were achieved. Finally, the chapter discussed the winding up of 
this study giving attention to areas of future research studies.  
This chapter discusses the following: the contributions of this research study in line with the 
research objectives, the findings, implications for practitioners, strengths and limitations and 
areas of future studies.  
7.2 The Aim of the Study 
During the course of this study, the complementarities of the findings from both the case study 
and the statistical method have been discussed in line with the following research objectives.  
x To investigate and identify the effects of the indigenous, foreign and government 
institutional investors on CSR.  
x To investigate and identify the effects of the non-executive directors (NEDs), executive 
directors, board size and board diversity (female director) on CSR.  
x To determine why indigenous, foreign and government institutional investors influence 
CSR in Nigeria. 
x To determine why NEDs, executive directors, board size and board diversity influence 
CSR in Nigeria. 
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This aim was considered appropriate and significant as there has been a considerable gap in the 
literature around these topics with regard to developing countries, especially Nigeria (Monks and 
Minow, 2004; Amaeshi et al, 2006; Aguilera et al, 2006; Consolandi et al, 2008; Prado-Lorenzo 
et al, 2010; Ghahroudi et al, 2010; Li and Zhang, 2010).  
Consequently, the goal in this study was to use the case study method and Pooled-Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS), Fixed Effect Estimator and Random Effect Estimator and balanced panel 
data of 174 PLCs from Nigeria between 2003 and 2009. Also, using these instruments the study 
determines the impact of the different institutional investors and BOD characteristics on CSR. 
Previous chapters in this study contribute significantly to achieving these aims and objectives 
(See section 7.2). Chapter 2 provides a critical understanding of the literature concerning the 
empirical evidence on the effect of indigenous institutional investors, foreign institutional 
investors, government institutional investors,  NEDs, executive directors, board size and board 
diversity on CSR. Subsequently, the effect of different institutional investors and BOD 
characteristics on CSR has been generally unclear, mixed and blurred (Wahba, 2010; Rasic, 
2010). This critical review reveals lack of empirical studies concerning the effect of different 
institutional investors and BOD characteristics on CSR in Nigeria.  
Furthermore, review of the literature reveals that the level of diversity of how institutional 
investors relates to stakeholders. As a result, some institutional investors may have short term 
orientation in their investment approach, since their interest is to ensure return on investments 
for shareholders, while others, such as the long term institutional investors satisfy the 
stakeholders (Coffey and Fryxell, 1991; Johnson and Greening, 1999), and engages in CSR 
(Waddock and Graves, 1997; Neubaum and Zahra, 2006). 
Moreover, in chapter 2, the various theories, namely, agency, stakeholder, resource dependence, 
stewardship, legitimacy and institutional were critically reviewed. The chapter indicates that 
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agency and stakehROGHUV¶ WKHRULHV VRPHWLPHV WDNH opposing viewpoints. For instance, agency 
WKHRU\ VXSSRUWV WKH VLQJOH ERWWRP OLQH RI VKDUHKROGHUV¶ ZHDOWK PD[LPLVDWLRQ JRDO, while the 
VWDNHKROGHUV¶WKHRU\VXSSRUts the triple bottom line of economic, social and environmental goals.  
Chapter 3 outlines and evaluates CSR policies and practices in Nigeria. The implementation of 
the corporate governance framework in Nigeria was also discussed. It outlines compliance with 
the Code of Corporate Governance (2009). Also, CSR in Nigeria is influenced by the social 
nature and culture of the people such as, their religion and traditions. Moreover, the literature 
also reveals the attitude of PLCs in incorporating the stakeholder oriented approach as shown in 
their websites and annual reports. 
Chapter 4 explains the research methodology. The pragmatist research philosophy was adopted 
for this study. This involves the case study method and Pooled OLS, Fixed and Random Effect 
Models to estimate the impact of the institutional investors and BOD characteristics on CSR in 
Nigeria. Also, the multi-sector case study method and the sampling technique are discussed. 
Consequently, the multi-methods are selected to ensure validity and reliability of the 
methodology in the same research context or another research context using mixed methods 
(Creswell, 2003). Apparently, this is the first time such a consistent and methodological 
approach has been used in studying corporate governance and CSR in Nigeria. 
Chapter 5 presents the empirical findings for the models. These involve results from the Pooled 
OLS, Random and Fixed Effect Estimators. The hypotheses tested Models 1 and 2. The finding 
of insignificant relationship between institutional investors and CSR provides answers to 
research question 1. This finding implies that different institutional investors have little or no 
interest in CSR. However, other findings show that both the NEDs and board size have a 
positive correlation with CSR. These findings provide answers to research question 2. This 
finding implies that NEDs and board size support CSR. 
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On the other hand, some findings show that the presence of executive directors and female 
directors in the BOD have a negative correlation with CSR. This finding implies that the 
executive directors and female directors do not influence the BODs to engage in CSR. 
Consequently, this provides answers to research hypotheses 2a and 2c. 
Chapter 6 focuses on the use of the multi-sector case study method to investigate the role of 
institutional investors and board characteristics on CSR. In this chapter, it is evident that CSR 
activities are in place in the 4 PLCs and the practices are also strategic. Also, several factors 
were found to influence institutional investors and board characteristics to either engage in CSR 
or not. These factors include improved image and reputation, government regulation, risk 
mitigation, short term horizons of the market and performance incentives. This provides answers 
to research questions 3 and 4. 
7.3 Beyond the Samples of Study 
One of the dominant concerns of most empirical studies is the extent to which findings can be 
extrapolated to the entire population, different context and countries (if it is country-specific) 
(Gujarati, 2003). In other words, the questions that remains is, can the above findings be 
generalised to all managers of PLCs in the Nigerian context, other industries within the country 
and possibly other developing countries? These concerns and other preoccupations (e.g. 
reliability, validity etc.) underpinned the consideration for the sampling strategy (non-random 
and convenient sampling), and the analysis (parametric) employed in the quantitative strand of 
the study. The problem which was purely a qualitative study, presented was ameliorated by the 
quantitative strand of this work. To a great extent therefore, the findings of this study have good 
internal and external validity, to enhance its generalisability beyond the sample of the study to 
the entire industry. However, it must be pointed out that the findings may vary from industry to 
industry, considering that industry effect which could be a potential moderating factor. Beyond 
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the country context of this study, it is doubtful whether these findings could be extrapolated to 
RWKHU $IULFDQ FRXQWULHV WKRXJK WKLV VWXG\ RIIHUV LQVLJKWV LQWR RWKHU $IULFDQ FRXQWULHV¶ &65
activities with similar cultures and governance system.  
The critical and unique position of the companies and why they are considered in this case study 
are because, first, ExxonMobil PLC is a foreign owned company operating in Nigeria. It has the 
presence of foreign institutional investors. The company engages in oil and CSR activities (See 
appendix D2 for details concerning the profile of the company). Second, Industrial Gas 
Insurance (IGI) Company is spread across all the 36 states in Nigeria, with unique interaction to 
WKHORFDOFRPPXQLWLHVDQGWKHVHXQGRXEWHGO\LQIRUPLWV¶&65DFWLYLWLHV$OVR,*,LVFULWLFDOWR
this study because it is the only company among the 4 PLCs that has two (2) female directors on 
the board (See appendix D4 for details concerning the profile of the company). This makes it 
critical and relevant to the investigation of the role of board diversity on CSR. Third, Zenith 
Bank is an indigenous bank with indigenous institutional investors and branches all over the 36 
states of Nigeria. It has a corporate philanthropy department responsible for CSR activities (See 
appendix D1 for details concerning the profile of the company). Lastly, Wema bank is a 
JRYHUQPHQWRZQHGEDQNZLWKEUDQFKHVLQ1LJHULDDQGRWKHU$IULFDFRXQWULHV:HPDEDQN¶V&65
practices are philanthropic in nature with lots of charities, donations and community 
development activities. The company profile of the four (4) PLCs and their corporate 
governance structures can be found in Appendix D. 
7.3.1 The Research Findings 
The behaviour of how investors and directors perceive CSR and what factors influence them in 
CSR activities is important in providing understanding on corporate behaviour and strategic 
decision making process of the BOD. 
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The findings in this study show the effect of different institutional investors (indigenous, foreign 
and government) on CSR to be negative and insignificant. These findings provide answers to 
research question 1, and imply that the different institutional investors have no influence on 
CSR. What this means is that there are no differences among different institutional investors in 
CSR, except in internal corporate governance structure of the company as revealed in the case 
study. However, other findings show both the NED and BOD size produce positive and 
significant correlations with CSR. These findings provide answers to research question 2. These 
findings imply that NED and BOD size support CSR. In contrast, the executive directors and 
female directors produce negative and significant correlations with CSR. These findings imply 
that the executive directors and female directors prevent the BODs from investing in CSR. 
This study highlights the role of different institutional investors and BOD characteristics on CSR 
SROLFLHVDQGSUDFWLFHVLQ1LJHULDUHYHDOLQJDGHILQLWHWUHQGWRZDUGVVWDNHKROGHUV¶DZDUHQHVVDQG
its incorporation into the business philosophies of both financial and oil MNCs sectors in 
Nigeria. For example, institutional investors and the NEDs support the formation of internal 
CSR governance structure such as the Code of Ethics and Business Conduct in PLCs. This is 
because not only is the company complying with the recommendation to the Code of Corporate 
Governance but also perceives CSR governance to improve companies. 
The evidence that CSR policies, strategy and implementation of companies are strategic in 
Nigerian PLCs is evident, indicating that CSR is an accepted institution in Nigeria and this is a 
significant and relevant finding. The evidence also demonstrates that PLCs in Nigeria have been 
able to align their CSR practices to their corporate philosophies. That is, their mission, vision 
and values of the company. As a result, one could say that the CSR activities in PLCs are 
strategic. 
In addition, this research provides the opportunity for theories such as the stakeholder, resource 
dependence and stewardship to be tested in Nigeria. The testing of these theories in the context 
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of Nigeria, contributes to the body of knowledge for developing countries. Currently, to the best 
of the literature review, the researcher is yet to come across any study from the literature that 
investigates the effects of role of board characteristics and institutional investors on CSR on 
PLCs in Nigeria.   
Furthermore, there is clear evidence that the PLCs do embrace stakeholders as their dominant 
philosophy. However, it is the customers, shareholders and employees that were mostly 
mentioned in their corporate websites and annual reports. Also, the customers, shareholders and 
HPSOR\HHVZHUHSRZHUIXOVWDNHKROGHUV¶JURXSFRPSDUHGWRORFDOHQYLURQPHQWDQGFRPPXQLW\
The research reveals some insights into the presence of institutional CSR strategy in the PLCs. 
This was supported by the institutional theory because of its enabling capabilities towards 
FRQWUROOLQJ HPSOR\HHV DQG WRS PDQDJHUV¶ EHKDYLRXU WKURXJK WKH XVH RI &RGH RI &RQGXFW DQG
Best Practices.  
Table 7.2 compares the findings from this study with past studies. The study reveals evidence 
that there is little or no influence by indigenous, foreign and government institutional investors 
on CSR in Nigeria, while the effects of NEDs and board size were positive and significantly 
correlated with CSR, the impact of executive directors and female directors on CSR were 
negative and significantly correlated with CSR. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 7 Conclusion 
301 
Table 7.1: Comparison of Results with Previous Studies 
No. This study findings Signs Past Studies 
1 No significant 
relationship between 
indigenous investors 
and  CSR 
-Ve but not 
significant 
Dam and Scholtens (2010) find no 
significant relationship between 
indigenous investors and CSR.  
2 No significant 
relationship between 
foreign investors and  
CSR 
-Ve but not 
significant 
Dasgupta et al (2000) findno effect 
between foreign ownership and CSR. 
3 No significant 
relationship between 
government investors 
and  CSR 
-Ve but not 
significant 
Earnhart and Lizal (2002) find 
government institutional investors are 
negatively related to CSR. Also, Dam and 
Scholtens (2010) find no significant 
relationship between government 
investors and CSR. 
4 Positive and 
significant 
relationship between 
NEDs and CSR 
+Ve sign Johnson and Greening (1999) find 
NEDs are positive and significantly 
correlated with CSR. 
5 Executive directors 
are negative and 
significantly related 
to CSR 
-Ve sign Rose (2007) finds negative and significant 
relationship between executive directors 
and CSR that the executive directors do 
not invest in CSR. 
6 Positive and 
significant 
relationship between 
board size and CSR 
+Ve sign Pfeffer (1972; 1973) and Kruger (2010) 
find that the board size is positively 
related to CSR. 
7 Female directors are 
negative and 
significantly related 
to CSR 
-Ve sign Prado Lorenzo et al (2009b) find negative 
and significant relationship between 
women in the board and CSR. While, 
Rodriguez-Dominguez et al (2009) find 
negative and insignificant relationship 
between women in the board and CSR. 
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More importantly, the case study reveals a low level of engagement and interaction between 
different institutional investors and CSR. In terms of the CSR policy, it is only the foreign 
institutional investors that show support and play a significant role in pressuring the BOD to 
have a formal CSR policy. In the case of CSR implementation and practices, the foreign 
institutional investor played little or no role. On the other hand, the indigenous and government 
institutional investors do not show support for CSR policy and implementation too. What this 
means is that, investors in developing countries like Nigeria are yet to come to terms of the 
missed opportunity in not using CSR as a risk and reputational management tool, not only to 
gain licence to operate, but also to increase corporate performance. From the case study findings, 
this can be achieved through increased engagement in the level of CSR policy design, its 
framing and implementations. Therefore, it is very critical for institutional investors to 
understand these long term risks and opportunities presented by CSR and to take policy 
responses and implementation into considerations. 
Additionally, CSR governance is supported by investors only when investors and companies 
perceive CSR as beneficial to a company in terms of risk mitigation, improving image and 
reputation, offering social licence to operate (SLTO) and compliance to legal obligation. These 
factors provide answers to research questions 3 and 4.  
During the course of the research, it emerged from the quantitative data that the NEDs are 
positively and significantly favourable to CSR. This finding was also confirmed by the 
qualitative interview data that the NEDs are interested in the long term interest and survival of 
the company. NEDs support both profit goal (agency theory) and other goals such as creating 
values for stakeholders (stakeholder theory). Also, this study has provided insight on the need to 
use larger board size and NEDs to strengthen the corporate governance system. This reinforces 
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the BOD independence and its effectiveness. Thus, this motivates them to support the company 
to invest in CSR practices. 
On the other hand, in terms of CSR practises and BOD oversight functions, there is no evidence 
of presence of CSR board committees in all the PLCs as compared to developed countries 
(Prado-Lorenzo et al, 2010), but there is presence of a CSR department in Zenith bank called, 
Zenith philanthropy and also the presence of a Public Relation Officer for ExxonMobil charged 
with CSR activities. Other companies such as the Wema bank and Insurance General Industry 
(IGI) insurance company do not have separate CSR departments. In essence, this study is 
advocating for the formation of a CSR committee comprising of NEDs charged with the 
formulation and monitoring of CSR policies. This will ensure that the directors monitor the CSR 
activities from the planning to the implementation stage.  
In addition, the study reveals that the BODs are involved in a greater role in CSR than 
institutional investors in PLCs in Nigeria. This might be due to the fact that the board are hired 
by investors to protect their interest by not only monitoring managers but formulating policies 
and rules that govern the company, especially CSR policy. However, the case study did reveal 
that lack of interest by institutional investors in CSR is traceable to a lack of effective 
communication between the board and investors. So monitoring regular communication will 
motivate the investors to show more interest and support for CSR. 
Moreover, the pragmatic approach selected for this study has been driven by the strengths and 
weaknesses of the research methods in the literature concerning the relationship between the role 
of institutional investors, BOD characteristics and CSR. Therefore, the reason for combining 
both the econometric method and case study method is because, according to Petersen and 
Vredenburg (2009a), the positivist approach lacks depth and robustness in understanding the link 
between different institutional investors and BOD characteristics on CSR. Also, to increase the 
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reliability and validity of the study, as one method reinforces the other. Thus, it became 
significant to use the mixed method approach. 
Furthermore, the reliability and validity of the findings are assured by carrying out the 
diagnostics test using econometric methods, while for the case study, the validity and reliability 
was achieved through ensuring construct validity (such as the use of research questions and 
multiple sources of evidence, see chapter 4). The external validity is assured by using multi-
method approaches for generalisation of data. Finally, the use of theories such as stakeholders 
guarantees internal validity. This is the first instance of such an application in research study in 
Nigeria.  
7.4 The contribution of Study 
The study contributes to the body of knowledge in Nigeria and developing countries concerning 
the role of institutional investors and BOD characteristics on CSR policies and practices. 
However, it must be pointed out that whilst the unique Nigeria situation does not permit the 
findings to be generalised, it does provide some insight into the activities of other developing 
countries with similar cultures and governance systems, commonly found in Africa. For example 
the characteristics of  Nigeria, which includes weak institutions, poor compliance to the Code of 
Corporate Governance (40%), corruption, different religion, culture and ethnic groups, may 
remain unique to this country,  but does allow an element of comparison and extrapolation with   
other African developing country, displaying similar characteristics.   
This thesis argues for the positive role of institutional investors and BOD characteristics on CSR 
in Nigeria. This study provides an understanding of how directors and institutional investors 
influence CSR in Africa. Most especially, these influences may arise due to their different 
cultural background that differs from those in advanced economies. In contrast to the view that 
CSR is µstrange and alien¶ to Africa, and has no connection with these economies, the findings 
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and analyses show that directors and investors in developing economies are not different, for 
instance they show similar support for CSR. The study also shows a shift in emphasis from short 
WHUP LQGLFDWRUV RQ FRPSDQLHV¶ SHUIRUPDQFH WR ORQJ WHUP Serformance and measurable 
evaluation. 
The testing of the theories in the Nigerian context contributes to the body of knowledge for 
developing countries. Therefore, the theory and findings of this study expand our understanding 
of the stakeholder, agency, stewardship, resource dependence and institutional theories and 
provide insights into the nature of CSR activity in PLCs in Nigeria. Currently, the researcher is 
yet to find a study from the literature that investigates the effect of the role of different 
institutional investors and BOD characteristics on CSR in PLCs in Nigeria.   
The stakeholder, agency, resources dependence, stewardship, legitimacy, and institutional 
theories explain the relationship between the firm and its stakeholders. The stakeholder theory 
was able to illuminate the relationship between NEDs and BOD size and CSR. While agency 
theory explains the relationships between investors and CSR because of their interest in short 
term profit maximisation, it does emphasise the aligning of the manDJHUV¶LQWHUHVWWRLQYHVWRUV. 
The legitimacy and resource dependence theories provide the theoretical basis for understanding 
how and why investors and directors use external resources such as NEDs, to increase employee 
morale, retain talented employees, improve corporate image and reputation of the company, with 
the aim of gaining competitive advantage and improving the performance of the company. In 
terms of the institutional theory, it provides insight into the formation of CSR structure through 
the use of the institutions such as governance rules, norms and standards. For example, the 
formation of Code of Ethics and Best Practices by companies.  
Past studies explored the role of indigenous, government and foreign institutional investors, 
NEDs, executive, female directors and board size on CSR, using single methodological 
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approach, such as, the quantitative or qualitative method. Coupled with the fact that investors 
and directors are faced constantly with making a choice among multiple and conflicting goals in 
an ever-changing global environment from different stakeholders, implying that a single 
methodological approach might not be able to capture the entire scenarios and issues in 
questions (Aguilera et al, 2006). In the context of this argument, a multi-method approach did 
provide more insights into the different institutional investors and offer a deeper understanding 
of engagement practices and investment goals of different institutional investors. In the 
quantitative approach, the thesis adopted a robust approach for cross validation of findings, by 
using econometric method of Pooled OLS, Fixed effect and Random effect estimators to 
examine the balanced panel of 174 PLCs, while the case study method examined the why and 
how, using 18 interviews, survey and documentary data (this is further explained below): 
Specifically, the empirical contributions are as follows: 1) in the areas of using the pragmatic 
approach involving the case study and statistical method. This study uses the pragmatist method 
by using multiple methods of combining the positivists and realist approach. The interview 
method adds depth to understanding, concerning the role of institutional investors and BOD 
characteristics in CSR policies and practices, while the postal survey is selected as an additional 
method to complement, verify and provide additional data on the role of the institutional 
investors and BOD characteristics in CSR. This has contributed to the body of knowledge in 
Nigeria and to some extent, with caution, developing countries as mentioned earlier. Therefore, 
this study has carried forward the research on the role of institutional investors and BOD 
characteristics in CSR policies and practices into the future. 
The pragmatic approach, in the finance and accounting field highlights how their findings in 
both the case study and the statistical method complement each other and extends the knowledge 
in the CSR governance literatures. 2) In understanding the role of institutional investors and 
BOD characteristics play in CSR policy formulation, strategy and implementation. 3) To 
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illustrate areas of corporate governance and CSR practices of PLCs in Nigeria which are still not 
understood in the literature and hence contributes to the debate on the CSR governance in 
developing countries. 
7.5 Implication for practitioners 
For those interested in the design of corporate governance and CSR policies, it is important to 
take into consideration that different institutional investors have the same preferences for CSR in 
developing countries such as Nigeria. The indigenous, foreign and government institutional 
investors do not engage in CSR activities. This is against what is obtainable in developed 
countries (US and UK) where different institutional investors have different preferences for 
CSR. For instance, long term institutional investors favour CSR, while the short term investors 
do not support CSR. Consequently, this study offers a new perspective for firms, investors and 
other stakeholders about portfolio investments and CSR. The study suggests that firms should 
align their CSR strategy to the objectives of the firm.  
Policy makers should know that ownership structure do not influence CSR. Therefore, they 
should encourage investors to show more interest in CSR policies and implementation. 
Furthermore, given that investors are motivated by their fiduciary responsibilities as revealed by 
case study, means they will not invest in assets except assured of an adjusted return-risk 
investment. Therefore, CSR policies should be designed to mitigate risk and support CSR related 
investments. When policy makers do this, the competitiveness of the company is enhanced, 
thereby improving corporate performance of the company. 
In fact, those managers and policy makers concerned with satisfying shareholders¶ wealth 
maximisation interests must acknowledge that irrespective of what corporate law stipulates 
about the fiduciary role of companies towards shareholders, there is still an important need to 
consider multiple stakeholders rather than concentrating on mechanisms consistent with 
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minimizing agency costs. The way to do this in Nigeria is for CSR to be strategic, which will 
reduce costs and improve corporate performances.  
7.6 The Extent of Generalisability of findings 
The extents to which the research findings can be generalised within the West African sub-
region are anchored on the similar characteristics shared by countries in the Ecowas region. 
Most of these characteristics consist of the presence of the same or similar companies owned by 
same investors.  For example, ExxonMobil, Total and Chevron are present in most West African 
countries with similar CSR activities in the region. They are owned by foreign institutional 
investors.  
It was noted earlier (See Chapter 3.3) that the presence and ownership structure in Nigeria, in 
particular, the foreign institutional investors were influenced by government policies. These 
policies are the Foreign Exchange Act of 1962 and Indigenisation Decree of 1972. According to 
Ahunwan (2002), the aim of the Foreign Exchange Act and Indigenisation Decree was to change 
the ownership structure of companies, dominated by foreigners (Aburime, 2008). This 
ownership structure that promotes indigenous investors and ownership of investments is 
common in other Africa countries, particularly the West Africa region, such as Senegal, Ghana, 
Liberia, Ivory Coast, Benin, Sierra-Leone and Gambia. Politically, some of these countries were 
governed by the military regimes. By implication, it must be pointed out that beyond the country 
context of this study, generalising the findings in the Africa context becomes complicated 
because of the unique characteristics of each country. However, the findings provide insights 
into other developing countries CSR activities since Nigeria processes similar economic, social, 
cultural characteristics with most of them, particularly in West Africa. 
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7.7 Strengths and Limitations 
The findings reveal that the different institutional investors are supportive of the corporate 
governance structure of companies. Particularly, the indigenous, foreign and government 
institutional investors do support ethical responsibility of business organisations, for instance the 
formation of the Code of Ethics and Business Conduct. The reasons being that they perceive 
corporate governance structure improves the financial performance of company. Therefore, this 
is one of the strengths of this study. This strength can be used by companies to increase and 
improve the communication and interactions between investors and BODs. By doing this, they 
make inputs to the corporate governance policies. As a result, the institutional investors play 
more active role in the internal governance mechanisms of companies, thereby improving the 
ethical responsibilities and performance of companies. 
Also, one of the strengths in this study is that it highlights the under-utilisation of institutional 
investors by the BOD. There is a need to incorporate institutional members as part of the CSR 
BOD committees. This will not only enhance the diverse ideas, transparency and accountability, 
but will also promote the understanding and confidence among institutional investors thereby 
encouraging them to support CSR from the planning stage to the implementation, performance 
and evaluation stage. However, this result should be interpreted with caution considering the 
difficulties in gaining access to information and the way CSR investments was measured, as the 
amount spent by the company on CSR activities per year. These amounts are the pre-tax 
earnings donated to charities, philanthropic activities and community development projects 
(Coffey and Fryxell, 1991). Also, most managers are sceptical of releasing company information 
because of competition from other industry. These limitations did affect the sample size as most 
PLCs were dropped due to incomplete data. 
One of the strengths in this study is the importance of the role of NEDs or independent directors 
in CSR. The findings that NEDs support CSR can make one to recommend NEDs to be the chair 
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for CSR board commitWHHV IRU WZRUHDVRQV ILUVW WKLVZLOOHQKDQFHSURMHFW¶VVXVWDLQDELOLW\DQG
guaranteed the independent and effectiveness of CSR committee. Second, the formation of 
internal and external CSR auditors will contribute to the sustainability of CSR at the 
implementation and performance evaluation stages.  
2Q WKH RWKHU KDQG WKH LQFUHDVHG LQYHVWRU¶V UROH LQ HDUO\ HQJDJHPHQW LQ &65 SROLFLHV DQG
implementation may help increased organisational legitimacy (supported by legitimacy theory, 
see section 2.5.6). The increased role of investors reduces CSR breaches and enhances business-
community relations. Also, this reduces the legitimacy gap between firms and community. For 
LQVWDQFH LQYHVWRUV¶SUHVHQFH LQRYHUVLJKW FRPPLWWHHV FRXOG HQKDQFH WKHLUPRQLWRULQJ UROH DQG
provide confidence to the market. However, there is the potential problem of subjectivity during 
the interview stage. This problem affects the strength of the findings as perceived by 
respondents. Therefore, it is important to note that this study try to reduce the bias through the 
probing of respondents.  
The use of the fixed effect and random effect models for the econometric analysis do offer 
insight into the cause and effect relationship between institutional investors and BOD on CSR. 
The fixed effect estimator resolves the problem of unobservable heterogeneity across firms, by 
removing the time-invariant variable through a transformation (Wintoki et al, 2011). Thus, one 
of the reasons for using fixed and random effect estimator is to resolve the problem of omitted 
variable bias (See section 4.9.5), thereby increasing the validity and reliability of this study.   
Furthermore, the strength of the study is that it offers an insight into the factors that affect 
institutional investors and directors to engage in CSR. These factors, economic, social, cultural, 
HQYLURQPHQWDODQGKLVWRULFDOVKDSHLQYHVWRUV¶EHKDYLRXUDQG%2'FKDUDFWHULVWLFVDQGKRZWKH\
influence CSR at the planning, strategy, implementation and performance evaluation stage. 
These factors include image and reputation, financial performance, reduced costs, licence to 
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operate, recruitment and retention of talented employees. Other factors include regulation, 
performance incentives and short term philosophy of the investors and the market.  
Some of the shortcomings from this study arise from the nature of the data collected. The data 
collected for the survey, interviews and secondary were centred on Nigeria. As identified in 
chapter 2, the link between the role of investors, BOD characteristics and CSR is country, firm 
and industry specific. This study covers only various firms and industrial sectors in Nigeria but 
do not cover country to country differences or factors. So there is a need for country to country 
study in Africa or comparative studies in other developing and emerging economies to be carried 
out.  
The problem of subjectivity in the case study can lead to bias during the interview and 
sometimes in the survey since the researcher is part of the data collection. However, the presence 
of the researcher can ensure rich and quality data through probing of respondents. Also, bias can 
occur because the researcher used friends and relatives who are not trained data collectors. The 
researcher ensures that top management were responsible for the interviews and survey (See 
Appendix C for the lists of respondents). 
7.8 Areas of Future Studies 
Research in the future should be extended to cover similar countries in developing countries, in 
order to determine the country to country specific effect in general. Most empirical studies on 
country specific effects of the relationship between institutional investors, BOD characteristics 
and CSR policies and practices as it stands today, appear to be based on developed countries. 
Therefore, there is the need to examine these factors within the parameters of emerging 
economies which will provide a vivid contrast from developed countries. 
The case study aspects of this research concentrated on the financial and oil Macs sectors alone 
because Nigeria economy depends on oil which accounts for 85% of revenue for the Federal 
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Government. Therefore, there is a need to extend the case study to cover other sectors of the 
Nigerian economy, for example, the manufacturing, technology and pharmaceutical industries. 
Another area of future studies is that, while this study concentrated on PLCs, there is a need to 
know the CSR practices for unlisted companies because some of the big companies, for 
example, oil MNCs (Shell Petroleum Development Company), telecommunication sectors 
(MTN and Econet) are unlisted in the Nigeria Stock Exchange (NSE). As a result, the role of 
different institutional investors and BOD characteristics on CSR for companies that are not listed 
in the NSE in Nigeria should be examined.  
Also, future research should focus on the various components of CSR (philanthropy, product 
quality, environmental issues, ethical issues, employee welfare and the communities). It is 
argued in Section 2.5 that CSR is a multi-dimensional construct and disaggregating CSR is 
important in understanding the relationship between corporate governance and CSR. This will 
SURYLGHLQVLJKWVLQWRWKHUROHRILQVWLWXWLRQDOLQYHVWRUVDQG%2'FKDUDFWHULVWLFV¶SUHIHUHQFHVIRU
the CSR components. Some authors (Fernandez-Fernandez, 1999; Brower and Shrader, 2000) 
did argue for the use of CSR components to understand the different preferences of investors and 
directors. Also, this will provide insights into the insignificant relationship between the investors 
and CSR obtained from the econometric analyses in chapter 5. 
Furthermore, the issue of simultaneity, that is, causality has been identified as another potential 
source of endogeneity problem in corporate governance and CSR studies. Causality is a cause 
and effect problem. Therefore, there is the need for further studies to use different methodology 
such as using dynamic panel data method, in this case, the Generalised Methods of Moments 
(GMM), simultaneous equation or 2 Stage Least Square to correct the problem of simultaneity. 
Moreover, there is need to increase the number of control variables in the model. These variables 
are the board ability, general confidence, social capital, reputation and image. This will reduce 
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the occurrence of omitted variable bias and lead to a more consistent estimation. Though, it is 
difficult to measure them but attempts should be made to find ways of measuring them, since it 
is important to know how they affect CSR. 
7.9 Summary 
This study fulfils the research aims and objectives, in that, it confirms the role of different 
institutional investors and BOD characteristics on CSR, identifying their individual preferences, 
motivation, attitudes and factors that influence them to engage in CSR. The methodological 
approach utilised a combination of both the case study and statistical methods involving the use 
of Pooled OLS, Fixed and Random Effect Models to estimate the impact of types of institutional 
investors and BOD characteristics on CSR in Nigeria. These methods enhance our understanding 
of different institutional investors and BOD characteristics preferences for CSR. 
One of the motivations for this study was the continuous CSR breaches by most PLCs, such as 
oil spillage, gas flaring and lack of empirical research in developing countries, such as Nigeria. 
Thesis finding of little or no role by institutional investors in CSR further confirm while CSR 
breaches are on the rise in Nigeria. By extension, these breaches might hurt the long term 
VXUYLYDO RI WKH FRPSDQ\ WKURXJK KLJKHU ULVN FRVW DQG SRRU FRPSDQLHV¶ UHSXWDWLRQ 7KHUHIRUe, 
there should be a reform in both the national law and company code; setting standards that 
encourage both the PLCs and non-PLCs comply. Most MNCs are not listed for instance SPDC, 
Addax Petroleum, MTN, Econet etc. Therefore, there is a need for institutional investors to 
increase their monitoring abilities on BODs and companies, to reduce CSR breaches in Nigeria. 
In addition, further insight into the factors that influence the different institutional investors and 
BOD characteristics to engage in CSR helps to gain a detailed insight into behaviours and 
motivations that influence the attitudes of investors. Finally, such knowledge and insight of these 
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factors and behaviours of investors and directors are vital to business practitioners in the areas of 
CSR planning, strategy, implementation and performance evaluation. 
7KHWKHVLVGHPRQVWUDWHVWKDWLQYHVWRUV¶DQGH[HFXWLYHGLUHFWRUV¶LQWHUHVWRQVKRUWWHUPLQYHVWPHQW
rather than on long term value of company is among the reasons for their lack of interest in CSR 
and also concerns for the high breaches in CSR in Nigeria. 
On the whole, long term survival of company, organisational legitimacy (SLTO),        
reputational and good image are the driving force for CSR investments in a developing country 
such as Nigeria, while lack of interest from institutional investors, executive directors maybe the 
cause for high CSR breaches or obstacles. Also, cultural factors such as values, perception and 
religion, may be the reasons why women are few in the board, hampering them from becoming 
female directors and help create a male dominated board (67%) in Nigeria. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A. Cover Letter and Survey Questionnaire 
 
Corporate Governance and Social responsibility survey for PhD Research 
Greenwich Maritime Campus    Email: ol17@gre.ac.uk  
Park Row, London      Date: 11/06/2009 
SE10 9LS        
Tel: +44(0)2083318205 
Fax: +44(0)2083319924  
 
Chief Executive Officer, 
....................................... 
....................................... 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
Re: Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in Nigeria. 
I am a PhD student under the supervision of Dr Lesley Catchpowle and Dr Aleksandar 
Stojanovic in the Business School of the University of Greenwich. My research study is focused 
on corporate governance and Social Responsibility of Companies in Nigeria. In business 
practise, it is generally agreed that while every sector of a firm such as shareholders, board 
directors, managers and other employees aim at maximising profit, it is also believed that 
corporate bodies should pay attention to the communities within which they operate. In other 
words, they are morally obliged to contribute to the wellbeing of the community, protect the 
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environment and ensure the general wellbeing of the society around them. This is what 
Corporate Social Responsibility means. I would appreciate it if you could make out time to 
respond and fill out the questionnaire. The information will be used for research purposes only. I 
would be most grateful to receive any additional comments. Please do not hesitate to contact me 
on the above contact details if you have any questions. 
Please find enclosed a self-addressed envelope that can be used to return the completed 
questionnaire. 
Thanks for your understanding and cooperation. 
Yours Sincerely, 
Louis Osemeke  
Please complete the questions below by ticking the appropriate box. 
SECTION A 
Institutional Investors influence on CSR 
1) Which institutional investors will influence your company to adopt CSR? 
a) Indigenous institutional investors.........................  
b) Foreign institutional investors.............................. 
c) Government institutional investors......................... 
d) None...................................................................... 
2) Which institutional investors will influence the company to adopt Environmental 
Management practice? 
a) Indigenous institutional investors.........................  
b) Foreign institutional investors.............................. 
c) Government institutional investors......................... 
d) None...................................................................... 
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3) Which institutional investors will influence the company to adopt cash donations and 
charities? 
a) Indigenous institutional investors.........................  
b) Foreign institutional investors.............................. 
c) Government institutional investors......................... 
d) None...................................................................... 
 
4) Rank indigenous institutional investors, foreign institutional investors and government 
institutional investors in order of preference for CSR? 
1st.........................................2nd........................................................3rd.................................. 
5) Please list the actual amount invested in CSR from 2003 to 2009 by your company?  
(Exchange rate is 1 pound: 250 naira) 
a) In 2003............................................................................... 
b) In 2004............................................................................... 
c) In 2005................................................................................ 
d) In 2006.............................................................................. 
e) In 2007.............................................................................. 
f) In 2008.............................................................................. 
g) In 2009.............................................................................. 
SECTION B 
Factors that Motivate a Company to invest in CSR 
6)  Which of the following benefits or factors do you think influence the indigenous 
institutional investors in your company to engage in CSR? 
a) Improved financial performance....................................... 
b) Improved company image & reputation........................... 
c) Confers legitimacy on company....................................... 
d) Reduce cost.................................................................... 
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e) Extremely harmful............................................................. 
f) To benefit society............................................................. 
7) Which of the following benefits or factors do you think influence the foreign institutional 
investors in your company to engage in CSR? 
a) Improved financial performance....................................... 
b) Improved company image & reputation........................... 
c) Confers legitimacy on company....................................... 
d) Reduce cost.................................................................... 
e) Extremely harmful............................................................. 
f) To benefit society............................................................. 
8) Which of the following benefits or factors do you think influence the government 
institutional investors in your company to engage in CSR? 
a) Improved financial performance....................................... 
b) Improved company image & reputation........................... 
c) Confers legitimacy on company....................................... 
d) Reduce cost.................................................................... 
e) Extremely harmful............................................................. 
f) To benefit society............................................................. 
9) Which of the following benefits or factors do you think influence the Non executive director 
in your company to engage in CSR? 
a) Improved financial performance....................................... 
b) Improved company image & reputation........................... 
c) Confers legitimacy on company....................................... 
d) Reduce cost.................................................................... 
e) Extremely harmful............................................................. 
f) To benefit society............................................................. 
10) Which of the following benefits or factors do you think influence the executive directors in 
your company to engage in CSR? 
a) Improved financial performance....................................... 
b) Improved company image & reputation........................... 
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c) Confers legitimacy on company....................................... 
d) Reduce cost.................................................................... 
e) Extremely harmful............................................................. 
f) To benefit society............................................................. 
11) Which of the following benefits or factors do you think influence larger board size in your 
company to engage in CSR? 
a) Improved financial performance....................................... 
b) Improved company image & reputation........................... 
c) Confers legitimacy on company....................................... 
d) Reduce cost.................................................................... 
e) Extremely harmful............................................................. 
f) To benefit society............................................................. 
12) Which of the following benefits or factors do you think influence the board diversity (women 
inclusion in board) in your company to engage in CSR? 
a) Improved financial performance....................................... 
b) Improved company image & reputation........................... 
c) Confers legitimacy on company....................................... 
d) Reduce cost.................................................................... 
e) Extremely harmful............................................................. 
f) To benefit society............................................................. 
13) :KLFKIDFWRUVDIIHFWPDQDJHU¶VDWWLWXGHVWRDGRSW&65" 
a) Traditional values and customs of the people....................................... 
b) Family histories..................................................................................... 
c) Training and Education.......................................................................... 
d) Ethical Standards.................................................................................. 
e) Industrial Standards............................................................................... 
f) Others............................................................................................................ 
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SECTION C 
General Information on your company 
14) How do you describe the ownership structure and control of your company? 
i. The largest shareholders has substantial voting right (for example above 
HIIHFWLYHO\FRQWUROWKHFRPSDQ\««««««««««««« 
ii. 7ZRRUPRUHVKDUHKROGHUVFRQWUROWKHFRPSDQ\««««««««« 
iii. Ownership is diffuse with no controlling 
VKDUHKROGHU««««««««««««««««««««« «
iv. Headquarter of Family owned business group of 
FRPSDQLHV«««««««««««««««««««««« 
v. 2WKHUV««««««««.......................................................... 
 
15) Which of the following best describe the ownership structure of your company? 
a)  Predominately indigenous institutional investors.........................  
b) Predominately foreign institutional investors.............................. 
c) Predominately government institutional investors......................... 
d) None...................................................................... 
16) What is nature of your business company? 
a) Parents company without braQFK««««««««««««««««««« 
b) 3DUHQWVFRPSDQ\ZLWKEUDQFKHVQDWLRQZLGH«««««««««««««« 
c) +HDGTXDUWHURI)DPLO\RZQHGEXVLQHVVJURXSRIFRPSDQLHV«««««««« 
d) %UDQFKRIDIDPLO\RZQHGFRPSDQ\««««««««««««««««««« 
e) 2WKHUV«««««««««............................................... 
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17) The CEOs of your company is of which origin? 
a) Nigerian-ERUQ&(2««««««««««««««««««««« 
b) ([SDWULDWH)RUHLJQ&(2««««««««««««««««««« 
c) African-ERUQ&(2«««««««««««««««««««««« 
d) Asian-ERUQ&(2««««««««««««««««««««««« 
e) 2WKHUV«««««««« 
18) What is your age category? 
a) /HVVWKDQ\HDUV«««« 
b) Between 30-\HDUV««« 
c) 41-\HDUV««««««« 
d) 2YHU\HDUV«««««« 
19) What is your educational qualification? 
a) DLSORPDOHYHO««««««««««««««««««««« 
b) +1'KROGHU«««««««««««««««««««««« 
c) +1'KROGHUSOXVSURIHVVLRQDOFHUWLILFDWH««««««««««« 
d) 'HJUHHKROGHU««««««««««««««««««««« 
e) 'HJUHHSOXVSURIHVVLRQDOFHUWLILFDWHV«««««««««««« 
f) 2WKHUV««««««««..................................... 
20) How long have worked for the company? 
a) /HVVWKDQD\HDU«««««« 
b) 1-\HDUV««««««««« 
c) 4-\HDUV«««««««« 
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d) 0RUHWKDQ\HDUV««««« 
Can you provide an appointment to enable further discussion of the issues raised in this 
questionnaire concerning CSR and your board of directors? If so I would appreciate it if you 
could suggest the time, place and appointment date at a time of your convenience. 
Date of the interview: 
Name of Company: 
Position in the company: 
Time: 
Venue: 
 
Thank you for your cooperation for completing this survey. 
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Appendix B. Interview Questions 
 
Date of the interview: 
Name of Company/Representative: 
Position in the company/ representative: 
PART ONE 
1) What is the role of institutional investors (indigenous, foreign and government) in 
Corporate Social Responsibility in your company at the following stages? 
x Planning stage,  
x strategy stage and  
x implementation stage 
2) What factors do you think affects institutional investors (indigenous, foreign and 
government) to invest in Corporate Social Responsibility in your company? 
3) What is the role of Non-executive directors in Corporate Social Responsibility in your 
company at the following stages? 
x Planning stage,  
x strategy stage and  
x implementation stage 
4) What factors do you think affects Non-executive directors to invest in Corporate Social 
Responsibility in your company? 
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5) What is the role of executive directors in Corporate Social Responsibility in your 
company at the following stages? 
x Planning stage,  
x strategy stage and  
x implementation stage 
6) What factors do you think affects executive directors to invest in Corporate Social 
Responsibility in your company? 
7) How does board size affects Corporate Social Responsibility in your company at the 
following stages? 
x Planning stage,  
x strategy stage and  
x implementation stage 
8) What factors do you think affects female directors (board diversity) to invest in 
Corporate Social Responsibility in your company at the following stages? 
x Planning stage,  
x strategy stage and  
x implementation stage 
9) What factors do you think affects executive directors to invest in Corporate Social 
Responsibility in your company at the following stages? 
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Appendix C. List of Interviewees 
 
Position of 
Interviewees 
Code Interview Date Name of Company represented 
Investor analyst E1 1st July, 2009 ExxonMobil 
Public Relation 
Manager 
E2 2nd  July, 2009 ExxonMobil 
Safety and 
Environmental 
Manager 
E3 3rd July, 2009 ExxonMobil 
Communication 
Manager 
E4 3rd July, 2009 ExxonMobil 
Investment 
Manager 
W1 6th  July, 2009 Wema Bank PLC 
Administrative 
Manager 
W2 7th  July, 2009 Wema Bank PLC 
CEO W3 7th  July, 2009 Wema Bank PLC 
Secretary W4 8th  July, 2009 Wema Bank PLC 
Director of 
Operations 
IG1 9th  July, 2009 Industrial and General Insurance 
Company 
Public Relations 
Manager 
IG2 10th  July, 2009 Industrial and General Insurance 
Company 
Finance Manager IG3 13th  July, 2009 Industrial and General Insurance 
Company 
Deputy Managing 
Director 
IG4 13th  July, 2009 Industrial and General Insurance 
Company 
CEO IG5 14th  July, 2009 Industrial and General Insurance 
Company 
Investor 
manager/analyst 
Z1 19th June, 2009 Zenith Bank 
Investment 
Manager 
 
Z2 15th  June, 2009 Zenith Bank 
Director of 
operations 
Z3 15th  June, 2009 Zenith Bank 
CSR manager Z4 16th  June, 2009 Zenith Bank 
CEO 
 
Z5 16th July, 2009 Zenith Bank 
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Appendix D. Company Profiles 
D.1 Zenith Bank of Nigeria 
In this study, Zenith Bank is used as a case study for the indigenous investor because the 
company has a majority of indigenous institutional investors. The ownership structure of the 
bank is 100% Nigerian with indigenous institutional investors accounting for 6.92 % and the 
former CEO owns 9.53% of the shareholdings as individual investors, while the remaining 
shareholdings belong to individual shareholders with less than 5% shareholding (See Table D.1 
below for ownership concentration of the bank). 
Table D.1: shows shareholders and their shareholdings 
Shareholders Number Of Shares 
Shareholders 
Percentage of 
Shareholdings 
Jim Ovia (former CEO) 2, 392, 340, 140 9.53% 
Institutional Investors 1,738,622, 350 6.52% 
Nigerians 21,006232540 83.95% 
Source: Computed from Zenith Bank Annual Report (2009) 
Zenith Bank Plc is one of the biggest and most profitable banks in Nigeria with total assets plus 
contingents of N1 .66 trillion as at the end of December 2009 (Annual report, 2009: 07). The 
bank was established in May 1990 in Nigeria under Companies and Allied Matters (CAMA) Act 
as a private liability company (Annual report, 2009: 24). Zenith bank started operations in July 
of the same year as a commercial bank. Zenith bank became a public limited company on May 
17, 2004 and is listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange on October 21, 2004 (Annual report, 
2009:24). The bank presently has a shareholder base of about one million, an indication of the 
strength of the Zenith brand (See Table D.1.2). 
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Furthermore, Zenith bank has eleven (11) subsidiaries such as the Zenith General Insurance 
Company and Zenith Pension Custodian Limited that underwrites the risks for clients and 
manages the pension funds respectively (Annual report, 2009:24). The bank has branches in the 
36 states of Nigeria including the Federal Capital Territory-Abuja. 
 
Table D.1.2: Corporate Governance Characteristics of Zenith Bank Plc 
BOD Variables 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Board Size 11 13 14 14 
Executive Directors 5 5 6 6 
Non-Executive 
Directors (NEDs) 
6 8 8 8 
Number of Females 
on the board 
0 0 0 0 
Internal Auditors YES YES YES YES 
External Auditors PriceWaters 
Cooper 
PriceWaters 
Cooper 
PriceWaters 
Cooper 
PriceWaters 
Cooper 
Ownership 
concentration 
Indigenous 
investors (50% 
and individuals 
50%) 
Indigenous 
investors (50% 
and individuals 
50%) 
Indigenous 
investors (50% 
and individuals 
50%) 
Indigenous 
investors (50% 
and individuals 
50%) 
CSR investment N428,423,181m 
approximately 
£1,756,765.24 
N572 million 
approximately 
£2,345,507.35 
N1.66 billion 
approximately 
£6,814,942.039 
N1.96billion 
approximately 
£8,037,053.147 
Source: Own computation from Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) and annual report of Zenith 
Bank (2009 and 2010), N stands for Nigeria currency (Naira)  
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D.2 ExxonMobil Nigeria 
ExxonMobil Nigeria is a subsidiary of ExxonMobil International. Exxon Mobil International is 
the number one Oil and Gas Company throughout the world. ExxonMobil remain the largest 
publicly and traded international company in the oil and gas sector (www.exxonmobil.com). 
ExxonMobil Nigeria began operations in Nigeria in the old Calabar state, now Akwa Ibom state 
in 1967, where it extracts 600,000 barrels of crude oil daily. Their functions include providing 
energy that helps underpin growing economies and improve living standards around the world. 
ExxonMobil uses innovation and technology to deliver energy to a growing world. They explore 
for, produce and sell, crude oil, natural gas and petroleum products. They operate facilities or 
PDUNHW SURGXFWV LQ PRVW RI WKH ZRUOG¶V FRXQWULHV DQG H[SORUH IRU RLO DQG QDWXUDO JDV RQ VL[
continents. ExxonMobil are committed to meeting the world's growing demand for energy in an 
economically, environmentally and socially responsible manner (Idemudia, 2007b). 
The corporate governance of ExxonMobil can be traced to Standard Oil founded by J.D 
Rockefeller in 1882 as both Exxon and Mobil both had their roots in Standard Oil. Both Exxon 
and Mobil merged in 1999 with the existing Mobil shareholders who own about 30 % of the new 
company, while the existing Exxon shareholders own about 70%. The parent company is based 
in the US with branches worldwide. According to Skjaerseth (2004) ([[RQ¶VFRPPDQGVWUXFWXUH
was highly centralised before the merger, which played a major role in the investment ¶s decision 
making process of the company. The merger between Exxon and Mobil led to structural changes 
such as ExxonMobil moving from a multifunctional geographically-based regional company to 
becoming a diversified, global functional business with its attendant consequences on the way 
the company views its relationship with the society. This brought about two changes. Firstly, a 
more relaxed central control of the MNC, allowing branch officers to have a higher degree of 
autonomy than they previously had before the merger. Secondly, the downstream and upstream 
sector was separated and this led to a higher resistance from the public (Skjaerseth, 2004). 
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In this study, ExxonMobil Nigeria is a company that is used as one of the four (4) PLCs for the 
case study because it has a majority of foreign institutional investors. The ownership structure is 
60% foreign institutional investors, while Nigerians own 40% of the remaining shareholdings 
(See Table D.2 for the ownership structure of ExxonMobil). ExxonMobil Nigeria operates its 
capacity production of oil fields as a Joint Venture Partner (JVP) with the Nigeria National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) holding 60% and ExxonMobil having a 40% holding.For more 
information on board size, board composition and amount invested in CSR, see Table D.2. 
Table D.2. Corporate Governance Characteristics of ExxonMobil Plc 
BOD Variables 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Board Size 5 5 6 7 
Executive Directors 3 2 3 3 
Non-Executive 
Directors 
2 3 3 4 
Number of Women in 
the board 
0 0 0 0 
CEO Duality YES YES YES YES 
Internal Auditors YES YES YES YES 
External Auditors PriceWater 
Coopers 
PriceWater 
Coopers 
PriceWater 
Coopers 
PriceWater 
Coopers 
Ownership 
concentration 
Foreign 
Institutional 
Investors 
(60%) 
Nigerian 
Investors 
(40%) 
Foreign 
Institutional 
Investors (60%) 
Nigerian 
Investors (40%) 
Foreign 
Institutional 
Investors (60%) 
Nigerian 
Investors (40%) 
Foreign 
Institutional 
Investors (60%) 
Nigerian 
Investors (40%) 
CSR investment N20, 456, 437 
Approximately 
£83,096 
N62, 435, 823 
Approximately 
£253,591 
N127, 347, 285 
Approximately 
£517,094 
N150, 000,000  
Approximately 
£6,091,757 
Source: Own computation from NSE Fact book and Corporate Citizenship Report (2008; 2009), 
N stands for Nigeria currency (Naira) 
D.3 Wema bank of Nigeria 
In this study, Wema bank is used as an example of a company with a majority of government 
institutional investors because the ownership structure is 100% Nigerian with government 
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institutional investors being represented by 2GX¶D ,QYHVWPHQW &RPSDQ\  7KH RZQHUVKLS
VKDUHKROGLQJRI2GX¶D,QYHVWPHQW&RPSDQ\RQEHKDOIRIJRYHUQPHQWLQYHVWPHQWLQ:HPDEDQN
stood at 40% in 2007 but in 2009 the government investments fell to 9.76%. This is in line with 
the ongoing privatisation and reforms exercise carried out by the Federal Government of Nigeria  
(See, NSE Fact Book, 2009), in the banking industries where the government is divesting its 
shares to indigenous and foreign investors (See Tablee D.3.1 below for ownership concentration 
of the Wema bank). 
Wema bank is established in 1945 and became converted from a private liability company to 
public liability company in 1987. Wema Bank shareholders fund stood at 25 billion naira (4 
million pounds). The bank had 154 branches all over Nigeria. It was granted a universal banking 
licence in 2001 and registered on the Nigeria Stock Exchange in 1990. Also, the subsidiaries of 
Wema Bank include Wema Insurance Brokers and an indirect subsidiary, Great Nigerian 
Insurance PLC etc. (www.wemabank.org/about us). 
Tablee D.3.1: Shows Shareholders and their Shareholdings 
Shareholders Number Of Shares 
Shareholders 
Percentage of Shareholdings 
SW8 Investment Ltd 4, 027, 976,800 39 
Institutional Investors 
Odu'a Investment 
Company Limited 
1,032,063,095 10 
Individual Investors & 
Wema Bank Staff 
5,160,571,057 51 
 
Source: Derived from Wema Bank Annual Report (2009: 21) 
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Table D.3.2: Corporate Governance Characteristics of Wema Bank Plc 
BOD Variables 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Board Size 5 6 7 7 
Executive 
Directors 
3 3 3 3 
Non-Executive 
Directors 
(NEDs) 
2 3 4 4 
Number of 
Women in the 
board 
0 0 0 0 
Internal 
Auditors 
YES YES YES YES 
External 
Auditors 
MGI alibi 
Ekundare and 
KPMG 
MGI alibi 
Ekundare and 
KPMG 
KPMG KPMG 
Ownership 
concentration 
2GX¶D
Investment 
Company (40%) 
Nigerian 
Investors (60%) 
2GX¶D
Investment 
Company (40%) 
Nigerian 
Investors (60%) 
 
2GX¶D,QYHVWPHQW
Company 
(9.76%) 
Nigerian 
Investors 
(90.24%) 
2GX¶D,QYHVWPHQW
Company 
(9.76%) 
Nigerian 
Investors 
(90.24%) 
CSR 
investment 
N10, 467, 897m  
Approximately 
£42,484 
N12,467,897m 
Approximately 
49,352 
N14, 439, 992 
Approximately 
£57,156 
N18,611,500m 
Approximately 
 £73,670 
Source: Own computation from NSE Fact book and annual report of Wema Bank, (2006, 2007, 
2008 and 2009), N stands for Nigeria currency (Naira) 
 
D.4 Industrial and General Insurance (IGI) 
In this study, Industrial and General Insurance (IGI) Company is used as an example of case 
study for board diversity because the company has the presence of female directors in the board.  
Industrial And General Insurance Plc., (IGI) was incorporated on 31st October, 1991 and 
commenced operations in January 1992 as a composite insurer to transact the business of Life 
and General Insurance (including Pensions and Special Risks). Additionally, the IGI introduce 
the Pension Fund Managers (Institutional investor managers) and in 2008 IGI Pension Fund 
Managers was fully formed. 
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The Company has a strong capital base and leverage on its highly qualified professionals and the 
deployment of modern technology has become the preferred insurer for individual and corporate 
clients seeking premium insurance and related financial services in Nigeria.  
IGI has a wide and diversified investment portfolio comprising: investment in money and capital 
markets; real estate; telecommunication services; mortgage banking; aviation; oil and 
engineering services; forestry; health care delivery services, amongst others.   
The company from inception has demonstrated exceptional competence and expertise in the 
underwriting of specialized risks in Oil and Energy, Marine, Aviation, Engineering and 
Industrial Risk Management. IGI handles the insurance programmes of international oil 
companies operating in Nigeria including Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, 
Total Nigeria, Agip Oil Company, Addax Petroleum and Pan Ocean Oil Corporation amongst 
others.  
In 2005, IGI underlined its resolve to be a key player in the African insurance market when it 
acquired 60 per cent majority shareholding in National Insurance Corporation Limited (NICL) of 
Uganda after a competitive international bidding exercise. Also, IGI has acquired ownership of 
Societe Nouvelle d' Assurance du Rwanda (SONARWA), Gamstar Insurance company limited, 
Gambia and IGI Ghana. 
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D.4.1: Corporate Governance Characteristics of Industrial and General Insurance (IGI) 
BOD Variables 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Board Size 8 9 11 12 
Executive Directors 4 4 5 5 
Non- Executive Directors 
(NEDs) 
4 5 6 7 
Number of Women in the board 1 1 2 2 
Internal Auditors YES YES YES YES 
External Auditors Akintola 
William 
deloitte 
Akintola 
William 
deloitte 
Akintola 
William deloitte 
Akintola 
William 
deloitte 
Ownership concentration Indigenous 
investors 
(60% and 
individuals 
40%) 
Indigenous 
investors 
(60% and 
individuals 
40%) 
Indigenous 
investors (50% 
and individuals 
50%) 
Indigenou
s investors 
(50% and 
individual
s 50%) 
CSR investment N4,324,340 
approximate
ly 
£17,729.90 
N21,342,000 
approximatel
y £87, 502.74 
N7,215,300 
approximately 
£29, 582.91 
N15, 435, 
600. 
approxima
tely £62, 
286.35 
Source: Own computation from NSE Fact book and annual report of IGI, (2006, 2007, 2008 and 
2009); N stands for Nigeria currency (Naira). 
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Appendix E. Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) Classification of PLCs 
Agriculture/Agro-Allied (1) Airline Services (2) 
Aviation (3) Automobile and Tyre (4)  
Banking (5) Breweries (6) 
Building Materials (7) Chemical and Paints (8) 
Commercial/Services (9) Computer and office equipment (10) 
Conglomerates (11) Construction (12) 
Emerging Markets (13) Engineering Technology (14)  
Food/Beverages and tobacco (15) Footwear (16) 
Healthcare (17) Industrial/Domestic products (18) 
Information Communication and 
Telecommunications (19) 
Insurance (20) 
Leasing (21) Maritime (22) 
Media (23) Mortgage Companies (24) 
Packaging (25) Petroleum /marketing (26) 
Printing and Publishing (27) Road Transportation (28) 
Textiles (29)  
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E.1 CSR Investment (Dependent Variables) 
The CSR investment is the amount spent by the company on CSR activities per year. The 
amount invested in CSR is measured in Nigerian currency (naira). One of the statistical criteria 
of normal distribution was fulfilled by logarithmic transforming the CSR investments 
(LnCSRinvestment). The presence of normal distribution was tested using Kdensity as illustrated 
in figure 6-1. The CSR investments values do not produce normal distribution. However, in 
figure 6-2, the log of CSR investments produced a distribution close to that of the normal 
distribution (i.e. bell-shaped). Therefore, natural logarithm for the CSR investments had a 
similar distribution close to normal. Based on these findings the log CSR investments were used 
as the dependent variable for the analysis as shown in equation model 1. 
Compares the Kdensity of CSR investment and normal distribution of CSR investment 
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Figure 6-1: Compares the Kdensity of Natural Log of CSR Investment and Normal Distribution 
of CSR Investment. 
E.2. Independent Variables 
The kdensity of the board size, board composition, diversity, return on asset (ROA), earnings per 
share (EPS), beta, company age, number of employees, industry effects and debt was carried out 
to determine if the variables had a normal distribution. The natural logarithm for the board size 
(lnboardsize) and others were logged. In addition, the presence of unit root was tested to 
determine the stationality of the variables using Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF). The value of 
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the ADF (0.00) meaning variables are stationary. The presence of unit root was also tested for 
other variables such as board size, board composition, diversity, return on asset (ROA), earnings 
per share (EPS), beta, company age, number of employees, industry effects and debt to 
determine the stationality of the variables using Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF). All variables 
were found to be stationary. 
Appendix F: Ethical Considerations 
Subsequently, clarification and approval (data collection) was sought from the research ethics 
committee of the University of Greenwich before the commencement of the exercise involving 
data collection. The completed research ethics form was approved by the ethics committee of the 
University of Greenwich. Several ethical issues were considered both during the pilot study and 
the main study and observed concerns of respondents were addressed immediately. These ethical 
issues include confidentiality, privacy, and Code of Best Practices (Monk and Minows, 2004; 
2008). Other issues include health and safety, interviewee comfort, safety of researcher and data 
protection laws. The issue of confidentiality might cause some interviewees to be cautious on 
account of being employees. As expected, the researcher provided assurances to concerned 
interviewees of the willingness to adhere to strict confidentiality.  Also, a covering letter 
explaining the research purpose and objectives was sent along with the questionnaires (see 
appendix A). The respondents and interviewees are informed and assured that they are entitled to 
participate or decline. Furthermore, in some cases the interviewees raised concern about tape 
recording their interviews and their concerns were resolved by note-taking. In addition, the rules 
and regulations of each organisation were observed during the interviews and questionnaires 
distribution.  
Personally, I did not encounter serious ethical issues during my data collection since the top 
managers and employees were all 18+ adults. Occasionally, the interviews were conducted in the 
LQWHUYLHZHH¶V Rffice, quite area or space. In certain cases, the interviews were conducted in 
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designated area within the office complex as suggested by the interviewee for his/her 
convenience. Also, in two particular occasions the home of the interviewees was used to conduct 
the interviews. The total time of about sixty (60) minutes was used for each interview.  All 
respondents and interviewees were contacted prior to commencement of data collection seeking 
their consent. However, some of the managers were reluctant to release information for fear of 
VXFKLQIRUPDWLRQJHWWLQJLQWRFRPSHWLWRUV¶KDQGs.  
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Appendix G: Types of Institutional InvestorV¶UROH in CSR 
 CSR planning CSR strategy CSR Implementation 
 Positive 
comments 
Negative comments Positive 
comments 
Negative 
comments 
Positive 
comments 
Negative comments 
Indigeno
us 
institutio
nal 
investor 
 I think that our investors are 
not very serious about our 
CSR policy even at the 
planning stage. They seem to 
be more concerned with 
company performance. The 
LQYHVWRUV¶ KDUGO\ LQIOXHQFH
the board on CSR policies 
(Investor analyst, Interview 
date: 19th June, 2009). 
    
Foreign 
institutio
nal 
investor 
     In my view I do not 
think the investors 
have interest in CSR 
implementation 
because they are very 
EXV\«LW LV P\
department that carries 
out the implementation 
of CSR and report 
back to the board 
(Public Relation 
Manager, Interview 
Date: 2nd July, 
2009).  
Govern
ment 
institutio
nal 
investor 
  Investors ensure 
that the company 
complies with the 
CBN directives 
for uniform 
reforms across the 
financial industry 
in ensuring 
uniformity of CSR 
projects, reporting 
and disclosures. 
« <HV ZH KDYH
policies on CSR 
such as in ethics 
and best practices. 
In the case of CSR 
reporting 
investors are 
equally committed 
to making sure 
that we report our 
CSR activities in 
our annual report 
and websites 
(CEO; Interview 
date: 7th July, 
2009). 
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                             Appendix H:   Profiles of respondents in survey and their relationship 
with interviewees 
Gender composition  
 
Survey respondents 
 
 
    Interviewees 
 
 
 
Male (%) Female (%) Male Female 
CEOs 80 20 
 
3 
 
0 
Deputy CEOs 90 10 
 
2 0 
CSR Manager 50 50 1 1 
Public Relation Manager 60 40 1 0 
Operations Manager 80 20 1 0 
Finance Managers 70 30 1 0 
Safety and Environmental  80 20 1 0 
Director of Operations 70 30 0 1 
Administrative Manager 55 45 1 0 
Communication Manager 54 46 1 0 
Secretaries 45 55 1 0 
Investment Managers 80 20 3 0 
Total   18 100 
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Appendix H:   Profiles of respondents in survey and their relationship with 
interviewees continues 
 Survey Interviewees 
 Number of 
Respondents 
Nigerians 
(66%) 
Non-
Nigerians 
(34%) 
Nigerians Non-
Nigerians 
CEOs 16 7 9 2 1 
Deputy CEOs 7 5 2 2 0 
CSR Manager 6 6 0 3 0 
Public Relation 
Manager 
21 21 0 1 0 
Operations 
Manager 
7 6 1 0 0 
Finance Managers 5 3 2 1 0 
Safety and 
Environmental  
12 12 0 1 0 
Director of 
Operations 
3 2 1 1 0 
Administrative 
Manager 
4 4 0 1 0 
Communication 
Manager 
8 8 0 1 0 
Secretaries 7 7 0 1 0 
Investment 
Managers/analysts 
6 5 1 2 1 
Total 102 86 16 16 2 
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Appendix H:   Profiles of respondents in survey and their relationship with 
interviewees continues for 
Ownership structure of investors 
 
 
 
 Survey Interviewees 
 Numbers of 
Companies 
Frequency 
 
Companies 
Indigenous Institutional Investors 40 39.2 
 
Zenith Bank Plc 
Foreign Institutional Investors  
 
26 25.4 
 
ExxonMobil Plc 
 
Government Institutional Investors  
 
27 26.5 
 
Industrial And General 
Insurance Plc 
Others  9 8 
 
 
Total 102 100  
 
 
Ownership structure of Companies 
 
 
 
  Survey Frequency Interviewees 
Large Companies (5% 
shareholdings and above) 
 43 43.9  
Small and Medium 
Companies (less 5% 
shareholdings) 
 67 68.3  
